Charting cyberspace : self-identity, community, and nationalism in the virtual realm by Thompson, Kevin
CHARTING CYBERSPACE: 
SELF-IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, AND 
NATIONALISM IN THE VIRTUAL 
REALM 
 
 
Kevin C. Thompson 
B.A. Hons., GCert of Tertiary Educ. (Ballarat) 
 
 
 
This thesis is submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
School of Behavioural & Social Sciences & Humanities, 
 
 
University of Ballarat 
P.O. Box 663 
University Drive, Mt Helen 
Ballarat, Victoria 3353 
Australia 
 
 
Submitted in February, 2003 
 vii 
 
Table of Contents  
 
SECTIONS                              PAGES 
 
Abstract   ii 
 
Statement of Authorship  iii 
 
Acknowledgements    iv 
 
List of Figures  viii 
 
List of Tables    x 
 
Introduction    1 
  
CHAPTER 1 — Methodology: Outlining the    31  
            approach to the research.  
    
CHAPTER 2 — Analysing Identity: Unravelling the   57 
            idiosyncrasies of the individual.  
  
CHAPTER 3 — Internet Identities: Investigating     97 
            the online self. 
 
CHAPTER 4 — Appraising Community: Clarifying      141 
            a contested concept. 
 
CHAPTER 5 — Cyberspace Communities: Virtual   169 
            or virtual? 
   
CHAPTER 6 — Addressing Nationalism:   220 
            Contemplating the notion of nation. 
 
CHAPTER 7 — Net Nationalism: CMC and the pursuit  260 
            of nationalist agendas online.  
               
 
Conclusion  291 
 
Appendices  309
   
Glossary  314 
 
References             321 
 ii 
 
Abstract  
 
 
 This thesis takes a broad look at recent social developments in 
cyberspace with a particular focus on the key concept areas of self-
identity, community and nationalism. The field of cyber research is very 
much a nascent one, but already a seminal core of literature abounds that 
privileges cyberspace as a world that is somehow removed from the 
everyday one in which we reside.  This study argues against this 
assertion, suggesting instead that cyberspace, for most users, is merely 
another commonly accessed part of daily life. 
 Online ethnographic techniques utilising participants from 
Stormfront.org (a prominent white nationalist website), supplement general 
and theoretical literature in order to sustain the main argument that 
cyberspace is real world space.  This primary contention is supported 
across the key concept spheres by three major subsidiary arguments.  
Firstly, with regard to self-identity, it is suggested that online identity 
development relies heavily on the existence of stable and continuous 
personal identifiers, just as is the case for 'real world' identity formation.  
Secondly, in relation to community, the contemporary aversion to virtual 
communities by many social commentators is contested, and counter 
claims are produced in order to support the legitimacy and viability of 
online communities as worthwhile social spaces.  Thirdly, on the subject of 
nationalism, online patriotism is put forward as an understandable human 
actor response to ingrained nation-state approaches to national identity. 
These state approaches can be seen to privilege macro-level economic 
factors over the needs and ambitions of individuals at the micro-level of 
society, ensuring that the relatively free domain of the Internet makes a 
viable empowerment vehicle for those who feel isolated and 
disenfranchised. 
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Introduction  
 
 
The place of cyberspace in the Western world1
 It is easy for those of us residing in affluent Western societies to 
overestimate the true reach of information technologies on a global scale.  
The perils of such misjudgment are even more applicable to cyberspace 
researchers themselves; given that many researchers work in education 
institutions where Internet access is either provided free of charge or 
heavily subsidised.  When one is constantly in touch with the online world 
and regularly involved in interactions with similarly oft-connected persons, 
it is not difficult to fall into the trap of envisioning cyberspace users as 
being the global norm, instead of the privileged exceptions.  Jerry Everard 
(2000) places cyberspatial participation in a more realistic context when he 
argues: 
 
 
If 80 per cent of the world's population have never made a 
telephone call, and more than half of the world's 
population live more than 100 miles from the nearest 
telephone line, then clearly the world is not yet living with 
a global information super-highway (42).    
 
In effect, cyberspace is very much a Westernised terrain and is largely 
dominated by settlers from Northern America, Western Europe and 
Australia (Holderness, 1998:41).   
 The "state of the cybernation" (Barrett, 1996) in Europe is of 
particular interest to this discussion.  It was estimated that Europe would 
accumulate 50 million Internet users by late 2000, a figure that would 
account for 22.7% of the global total of 220 million (Elliott, 1999, 
                                            
1 I will use Western society as the setting for the vast majority of discussion that takes 
place in this thesis.   
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November 6-7).2
 The uneven spread of information technology (IT) development 
across the European continent contrasts conspicuously with the 
advancements occurring in the USA and Australia.  The relatively stable 
and cohesive political environments maintained by these countries within 
their individual nation-states, along with their long-term adherence to the 
ideologies of capitalism and technological development, is reflected in the 
high 'multimedia access' rankings that are held by both countries.
  As a geographical territory Europe is large, but the sheer 
extent of its expanse is mitigated by the proximate nature of its many 
national borders.  The cultural and ideological differences inherent within 
these politically delineated boundaries have served to curtail the 
expansion of computer-mediated communication (CMC) technology 
across the greater European continent. Cyberspace may be a 
predominantly virtual entity, but the situation in Europe reminds us that 
CMC remains heavily indebted to physical constructs for its current 
existence and future development as a medium.   
3
 On the surface, misrepresentation is also clearly apparent in the 
broader European figures that compare very favourably with the global 
averages.  The solidity of the European figures, much like those of the 
Americas and Oceania, are unevenly bolstered by the inordinately strong 
technological showing put forward by the Scandinavian nations (Sweden 
and Denmark in particular).  This scenario may surprise the uninitiated, but 
 North 
America and Australia maintain remarkable per capita multimedia access 
indicators in all four categories of phone lines, cellular phones, Internet 
connections and personal computers per 100/10,000 head of population 
[refer Table 1] and, as a consequence, promote serious statistical 
misrepresentation of the broader geographical regions (Americas & 
Oceania) of which they are the dominant members [refer Table 2]. 
                                            
2 Regional forecasts go on to predict that Internet usage in Europe will quadruple to 200 
million users by the year 2005.  This is in keeping with estimated increases of 400% in 
Latin America and Africa/Middle East during the same period.  Projections for the Asia-
Pacific region are only slightly behind these at 378%, whilst North America (given its 
present state of relative computer-mediated communication saturation) is only expected 
to surge by 209%.  On a worldwide scale, it is suggested that the number of Internet 
users will triple to a total of 660 million come 2005. 
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as Hakken (1999) points out, the technological potency of the 
Scandinavians is not indicative of an "overnight success": 
 
The Nordic experience of [Advanced Information 
Technology] AIT  is special for several reasons.  These 
nations have long pursued policies of openness to and 
participation in world scientific and technological 
discourses, policies that recognize the centrality of 
appropriation of these innovations into national culture.  
This openness includes a trans-Nordic network of 
scientific, technological, and policy workers who interact 
frequently among themselves and with colleagues from 
around the world (142).    
 
In Sweden, the decision to pursue IT policies can be traced back to the 
1950s, when computerised technology became one of many planks in the 
nation's broad spectrum social welfare and development program 
(Hakken, 1999:148).  By way of contrast, IT in neighbouring Norway 
developed largely in concert with NorskData, a once powerful Norwegian 
company that dominated the country's IT landscape by virtue of its ability 
to market itself upon popular elements of national pride (Hakken, 1999: 
144).   
 The success of the Scandinavians overshadows the efforts of their 
higher profile European counterparts.  This is not to suggest that Western 
European nations like Germany, France and Britain are IT paupers, 
although they do have a way to go before they can match the Nordic 
regions on a per capita basis.  At least these nations are in a position from 
which they could make up the leeway, however, unlike the IT-poor 
countries that reside on the eastern flanks of the European continent.  This 
reality is painfully evidenced by the Russian state, which boasts only 1 
computer for every 25, and 1 telephone line for every 5, citizens [refer 
Table 1].  For Russia, the anaemic condition of its national IT infrastructure 
is yet another legacy of its "defeat" in the Cold War.  In stark contrast to 
the inclusive approach to socialism employed by the post-World War 2 
Scandinavians, the Russians—as primary members of the then Soviet 
Union—practised an exclusive form of socialism; ensuring that IT 
                                                                                                                       
3 Multimedia Access Rankings = the density of telephone lines, mobile phones, Internet 
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innovations were directed away from the public at large and accessible 
only to the military and space researchers. 
 The availability of phone lines is not the only factor retarding the 
growth of cyberspatial media in Europe.  European countries, with few 
exceptions, lag well behind the United States with regard to computer 
penetration at the public level and entertain high communications costs 
that inhibit consumers from regular participation in web sessions 
(Drozdiak, 2000, January 15).  Historical factors have also been at play 
here, with European countries showing a preference for participation in the 
mobile phone market over the personal computer industry during the past 
decade (Drozdiak, 2000, January 15).  Finland exemplifies this preference 
having reinvented itself as the most mobile phone intensive nation on the 
globe during the 1990s.4  The Finland scenario serves as a contemporary 
mirror for previous developments in Norway with Norksdata.  After some 
early setbacks, the Nokia company has succeeded in building a corporate 
telephone empire and the Finnish public has embraced its product in the 
name of national pride (Silberman, 1999).5
  
  Similarly, the United States 
has clearly dominated the computer market in recent decades, so it is no 
surprise that the nation's personal computer penetration (45.86 per 100 
inhabitants) should be higher than that of other countries (ITU, 2000).   
www.american_hegemony.com 
 With the recent demise of the Soviet Union, the United States now 
stands alone as a genuine military superpower on the world stage.  A not 
insignificant factor in the maintenance of this superpower status has been  
                                                                                                                       
connections and personal computers per 100 inhabitants within individual countries. 
4 Finland had 57.18 mobile phones per 100 head of population in 1998, a figure that 
incredibly (albeit narrowly) exceeded the 55.39 main telephone lines that it had available 
per 100 head of population.  It is the only country in the world where such a situation 
exists. Refer to the following for a broader outline of these figures — ITU (2000), Basic 
indicators  [Online], Available: http://www.itu.int/ti/industryoverview/at_glance/basic98.pdf 
[2000, February 28] & ITU (2000), Cellular subscribers  [Online], Available: 
http://www.itu.int/ti/industryoverview/at_glance/cellular98.pdf [2000, February 28].  
5 The scope of Nokia is quite extraordinary.  It is easily Finland's largest company and 
accounts for more than half of all activity that takes place on the Helsinki stock exchange.  
It is also recognised as the world's best performed mobile phone company and 75% of all 
mobile phones in Finland are made by the corporation. 
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Table 1. Multimedia Access by country (comparative) 19986
COUNTRY 
 
POPULATION 
{in Millions} 
 
PHONE LINES 
{per 100p} 
CELLULAR 
PHONES 
{per 100p} 
INTERNET 
CONNECTION 
{per 10,000p} 
PERSONAL 
COMPUTERS 
{per 100p} 
 
 
USA 270 66 25.6 2219 46 
CANADA 30 63 17.6 2475 33 
SWEDEN 9 67 46.5 3953 36 
DENMARK 5.5 66 36.5 1887 38 
GERMANY 82 57 17 731.5 31 
RUSSIA 148 20 0.5 68 4 
UK 59 56 25 1357 26 
FRANCE 60 57 19 335 21 
AUST 19 51 28.5 1603.5 41 
NZ 4 48 20 1539 28 
JAPAN 126.5 50 37 1323.5 24 
CHINA 1256 7 2 17 1 
VIETNAM 77.5 2.5 0.24 1.5 0.7 
INDIA 982 2.5 0.12 5 0.3 
STH AFR 44.5 11.5 5.5 286 5 
EGYPT 66 6 0.14 15 1 
 
SOURCE: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database (2000). 
 
Table 2. Multimedia Access indicators by region 1998 
GLOBAL 
REGION 
POPULATION 
{Millions} 
PHONE LINES 
{per 100p} 
CELLULAR 
PHONES 
{per 100p} 
INTERNET 
CONNECTION 
{PER 10,000p} 
PERSONAL 
COMPUTERS 
{per 100p} 
 
AFRICA 760 2 0.5 22 1 
AMERICAS 800 32 12 921.5 20 
ASIA 3538 7.5 3 88 2 
EUROPE 798 37 13 491 14 
OCEANIA 29.5 40 25 1236.5 38.5 
WORLD 5925 14 5.5 256 6.5 
 
SOURCE: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database (2000). 
                                            
6 For this table USA = United States of America, UK = United Kingdom, AUST = Australia, 
NZ = New Zealand and STH AFR = South Africa. Also, the p (eg. per 100p) = persons. 
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flow of job losses that have accompanied the inevitable failure of such 
industries (Drozdiak, 2000).  The Americans have also underscored their 
technological innovation processes with supportive political legislation 
such as the 'US Information Infrastructure Act' (1993), a policy approach 
that envisioned cyberspace as an 'Information Superhighway' (Everard, 
2000: 19) with American citizens occupying the express lanes. This is not 
the case for the Europeans, with the obvious exception of the 
Scandinavians, whose inability to firmly rationalise and articulate their 
place in the burgeoning 'Information Age' has relegated its people and 
businesses to the slow lanes of the virtual thoroughfare. 
 Having firmly established itself as the pacesetter of the Information 
Age, the United States is now looking to improve the technological 
capabilities of the world’s under-developed regions.  The U.S. government 
frames this initiative in heroic social philanthropic terms. But O'Connor 
(1996) hints at unabashed self-interest when he writes that: 
 
The prospect that Africa may not figure into the 
telecommunications equation alarms the Clinton 
administration, which has made the development of the 
so-called Global Information Infrastructure a priority in its 
foreign policy.  The United States sees Africa as a 
potential market for U.S.-made telecommunications gear 
— and as a future market for other U.S. goods and 
services once the continent's economy is bootstrapped by 
the technology (271).   
 
For writers such as O'Connor, cyberspace represents yet another sphere 
in which the United States can impress their considerable will on the rest 
of the world.  Just as IT builds upon earlier forms of media, American 
hegemony of the Internet works from a platform of established American 
rule, echoing prior U.S. dominance of global finance via the International 
Monetary Fund and similar authority over global military matters (through 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation & the United Nations).   
 While the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) may succeed in 
bringing otherwise removed regions into the cyberspace realm, it will only 
allow them to enter as dependent consumers and not independent 
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shapers of technology.  Linda Main fears that the relentless American 
‘trade-not-aid’ approach to information technology is threatening to 
polarise the planet along “north versus south” lines.  In line with this 
thinking, which is Marxist in its overtones, the majority of global citizens 
will become forcibly excluded from the information age, with many of those 
included reduced to importing technology rather than producing it 
(2001:96).7
 The Marxist perspective may appear somewhat alarmist in tone, but 
it nevertheless plays an important role in counter-balancing the over-
enthusiastic treatises on technological innovation that are commonly 
espoused by economically fixated governments and corporations.  
Assorted visual media productions led the conflict approach to global IT 
developments throughout the 1990s; portraying small cross-sections of 
‘winners’ moulded in the high-tech American pioneering image transposed 
against large pockets of ‘losers’ confined to downtrodden suburbs, public 
transport systems, rapidly dissolving industrial centers, and—in some 
cases—dilapidated shanty-towns and garbage dumps (Dowd, 1995; 
Harrison & Klein, 1994a, 1994b). Of the many statements aired in these 
productions, perhaps the most telling is attributable to Microsoft mogul Bill 
Gates, who speaks calmly and dispassionately about the lifestyle 
improvements inherent in the ever surging technological age, and of how 
many people would simply “decline to participate” in it (Harrison & Klein, 
1994b).  Comments like this are indicative of computopian
 
8
                                            
7 It was almost three decades ago that Schiller was writing of global communication 
developments in Marxist terms, envisioning a (Western) culturally-imperialised world 
bifurcated by two distinct social groupings — the winners and the losers (1973:1).  In this 
scenario the winners are the contemporary equivalent of the bourgeoisie, although this 
ownership class not only owns the means of production, but also the primary knowledge 
bases required to shape, develop and control the vehicles used for this production.  In 
essence, this leads to a proletariat that—for the most part—is not only bereft of an 
adequate power base within the dramatically evolving economy, but is removed from it 
entirely.  
 endeavours to 
8 ‘Computropian’ is cyberspeak for those who oppose cyberspatial/computer 
developments on the grounds that they are serving to increase the socio-economic divide 
that separates the haves from the have nots on a global scale.  Such critics should not 
automatically be mistaken for 'technophobes', as many of them are not opposed to the 
technology per se, merely the social inequality that it contributes to. ‘Computopian’, by 
way of contrast, refers to those who are exceedingly optimistic about the virtual realm’s 
potential for improving life chances. 
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depict the ‘technological revolution’ as a bloodless coup; effectively 
absolving the winners from their moral and ethical obligations by 
addressing the losers as if they were elective abstainers from the 
information age, rather than uninvited guests. 
 Any apprehension over the socially divisive qualities of the Internet 
has not, however, prevented mainstream Northern America from 
embracing cyberspace media.  The quixotic appeal of computerised 
technology is all too evident in this regard, with the Internet commonly 
referred to as the new “frontier”.  Jason Abbott alludes to this in writing of 
how “For many, cyberspace resembles the 19th century American West: 
vast, unmapped and legally ambiguous” (2001:99).  This is in keeping with 
romanticised interpretations of the American pioneering spirit, which 
lionise the notion of everyday Americans boldly conquering uncharted 
territories and seizing control of their own destinies in the process.   
 Such idyllic romanticism aside, the frontier also had significant 
practical and legal meaning too.  The legal definition of frontier during the 
mid to late 1800s pertained to "land occupied by two or more but less than 
six persons, on average, per square mile"; although by the 1890s such 
land arrangements no longer existed outside of the idealised confines of 
the newly emerging movie industry (Johnson, 1998:533). On the one 
hand, the notion of frontier (in its romanticised sense) is more in keeping 
with myth than historical reality, although it is interesting to note the way in 
which cyberspatial media has adopted the idealised frontier guise that was 
created by its cinematic predecessor.  On the other hand, for all of the 
frontier’s imaginary appeal it is obvious that in many ways it was a legal 
and logistical headache for American lawmakers.  The same can most 
certainly be said for cyberspace, with contemporary political bodies 
struggling to reconcile archaic, but culturally reified, constitutional acts and 
amendments to a virtual world that stretches their interpreted meanings to 
the limit.9
                                            
9 Amendment 1 of the 'Constitution of the United States of America', with its emphasis on 
the preservation of free speech is proving particularly problematic for contemporary White 
House administrations insofar as the Internet is concerned. 
 
 9 
 
 It is ironic though, that an entity such as cyberspace should come to 
prominence at a time when American nationalist sentiment is on a high.  
History informs us that the United States of America itself effectively came 
into being (post-Declaration of Independence) at a time when the general 
feeling throughout the country was decidedly anti-nation in tone.  The 
North Americans had become accustomed to, if not enamoured of, a 
domestic political structure that encompassed governance by separate 
states “bound together by negotiated agreements and compacts, charters 
and covenants” (Johnson, 1998:431).  The war with Britain had drawn 
widespread support as a reaction to that country’s perceived injustices 
against everyday Americans, but the ideological differences that had 
previously kept Americans aloof from fellow Americans (particularly those 
in the south from those in the north) remained sufficiently resolute as to 
deter broad acceptance of federalisation.  A similar scenario exists today 
as U.S. led computopians try to formalise a single, integrated cyberspace 
in defiance of the long-engrained and radically diverse cultural differences 
that are common to the realm’s many participating real world nation-states. 
 For the United States of America to successfully negotiate a unified 
cyberspace, it will first have to convince other nations that it is not driven 
predominantly by ulterior motives.  The GII sounds admirable in theory, 
but it is clearly indebted to U.S. commerce for its funding and the time will 
inevitably arrive when these investors want some form of return on their 
investments (Main, 2001:83).  Equally as disconcerting for potential 
beneficiaries of American technological philanthropy is the country’s prior 
record of using poorer regions as a recycling depot for outdated 
equipment (Abbott, 2001:109).  It is quite possible that sub-Saharan Africa 
could become a prime dumping ground for obsolete American technology, 
given that much of the $15 million ‘USAID Leland Project’10
                                            
10 The ‘USAID Leland Project’ is a five-year plan aimed at “opening up markets for the 
developed world through the internet” (Main, 2001:86). 
 funding will be 
necessarily needed for shoring-up telecommunication infrastructure in 
Africa.  This will leave little (if anything) over for equipment purchases, but 
given that the Internet is easily accessible from old and slow computers, it 
 10 
 
would appear most opportune for enterprising American businesses to 
“donate” their superseded systems to such countries.   
 All of this would meet the objective of widening the reach of 
cyberspace, whilst simultaneously reaffirming American control over its 
confines.  In spite of this, there are writers such as Jon Stratton who do 
not believe that American dominance of the Internet is certain to be 
maintained in future years.  Unlike previous modes of media, film and 
television in particular, the Internet provides ample scope for audience 
response and interactivity, which may bring challenges to American online 
hegemony as the non-American presence in cyberspace inevitably 
increases (1997:730).  Even more worrying still for the United States 
government is the realisation that cyberspace presents as the 
communication vehicle of choice for American citizens aggrieved at the 
manner in which the country is being administrated.  This is a point that 
will come under closer scrutiny when discussion turns to online patriotism 
in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
 
Britain follows the American lead 
 For several centuries during the past millennia the Western world 
looked to Great Britain for economic inspiration.  From the seventeenth to 
the nineteenth centuries (inclusive) the British were a prominent global 
power, as their expansionist ambitions led to vast expanses of 
geographical territory being colonised under the English flag.  Following on 
from this, the growing need to restructure industry in order to best service 
burgeoning capital markets, both domestically and abroad, put the British 
at the forefront of an industrial revolution that would dramatically reshape 
the world of production and consumption on a global scale (Smith, 
1995:114-115). 
 Throughout the twentieth century, however, Great Britain’s privileged 
place in the overall world order underwent rapid decline.  Revolts against 
British colonialism, coupled with a succession of wars ensured that the 
British Empire was gradually dismantled to the point of insignificance by 
the late 1940s.  The trauma of war also had a pronounced effect on the 
British psyche, prompting the country to adopt a somewhat safe and 
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insular approach to industry during the prosperous years of the fifties and 
sixties.  While the Americans and Scandinavians were focusing upon 
computer technology and gearing themselves for the forthcoming 
information age, Britain preferred to maintain emphasis on the 
manufacturing sectors on which it had long relied for economic security.  
As microchip technology began to monopolise Western attention in the 
1980s, it quickly became apparent that the United Kingdom was in danger 
of falling considerably behind its key Western counterparts as a political 
and economic force on the world stage (Mariou, Raymond & Gerouard, 
2001).  In response to these concerns, successive British governments 
have put IT development and investment at the forefront of the country’s 
social and economic planning for the 1990s and beyond (Slevin, 2000:47). 
 Of course, with the benefit of foresight and a slice of good fortune the 
British may have initially found a place for themselves at the helm of 
information communications development: 
 
In the same year [1965], Donald Davies, in the UK’s 
National Physical Laboratories (NPL), conducted research 
into how best to break down data into packets for a 
storage and forwarding transmission system.  Clearly, 
Britain was considering its options with an approach 
similar to that of the US, and under similar political 
conditions.  Indeed, perhaps for the UK the situation 
seemed more critical, given Britain’s lack of strategic 
depth in the face of the nuclear threat (Everard, 2000:13). 
 
The early efforts of British researchers like Davies would eventually count 
for little, however, with American developers making the all-important 
breakthrough with ARPAnet in 196911
                                            
11 ARPAnet was the first multiple-site computer network in the world, linking research 
centres together electronically across the USA.  ARPAnet would provide the impetus for 
increasing links across the globe and it was from this beginning that the Internet would 
eventually arise. 
 (Moschovitis et al. 1999:61-62). 
Further exacerbating Britain’s problems has been its tendency to adopt 
economic policies that have placed “competition before cooperation”, an 
approach that has helped to stifle domestic IT development, particularly in 
regard to mobile phones (Hirst & Thompson, 1996:148).  The United 
Kingdom, along with several larger European nations, would again miss a 
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prime opportunity to become a leading IT nation in the latter stages of the 
1980s when it declined the chance to devote energy and resources to a 
combined European cellular phone research and development project.  
The potential economic benefits of this technology (in 1990) were 
speculative, at best, but the courage of the Scandinavian nations and—to 
a lesser extent—France (both of whom embraced cellular innovation) are 
being rewarded at the beginning of the twenty-first century, while the UK 
desperately seeks a way to make up lost ground (Mariou et al. 2000).   
 Perhaps inspired by previous Swedish initiatives, the British 
government inaugurated the ‘Realising our Potential’ white paper in 1993, 
which linked the government, corporations and academics in a “think tank” 
aimed at best rationalising the UK’s place in the information age (Tang, 
1998:186).  A subsequent (1995) report titled ‘Competitiveness: Forging 
Ahead’ placed government at the centre of IT development in Britain, 
stressing the importance of government reinvention and streamlining of 
services, via technological means, as a way of encouraging and setting an 
example for British corporate industry (Tang, 1998:18).  Great Britain 
appears to be casting the net wide for fresh ideas on information 
communications although, wherever possible, it still chooses to take its 
lead from the Americans.  This was clearly evidenced by a 1996 report 
that suggested, among other things, that the British parliament endorse a 
similar interactive approach to the broader electorate as exists in the 
United States.  The American government has been at the vanguard of 
experimentation with two-way communication (via cyberspace) with its 
constituents and, as a consequence, “all US members of Congress can 
[now easily] be reached by electronic mail” (Tang, 1998:187). 
 A desire to emulate the interactivity and user-friendliness of the 
American system has been paramount in recent British government 
(conservative and labour) initiatives that have sought to bring the citizenry 
into its broader Internet development plans (Slevin, 2000:47).  This would 
seem to have positive implications for the British people, but the current 
state of British society ensures that it will take more than oblique offerings 
of “people empowerment” to aid the United Kingdom in its attempts to 
achieve a top three presence in the world of information communications.  
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The Blair Labour government won the 2001 election by a landslide, but the 
comfortable winning margin failed to accurately reflect the enormous task 
it is faced with in trying to put the 'united' back into United Kingdom.  For 
many English persons the new millennium is plagued with frustration over 
high unemployment rates and an exorbitant cost of living.  Such 
uncertainty is even more acutely felt by the large number of people 
disenfranchised from job and society with the dramatic erosion of mining 
and manufacturing industries across the 1970s and 1980s.  In other 
corners of Britain the situation seems equally tense, as Irish and Scottish 
nationalists continue to display a deeply ingrained disaffection with their 
English neighbours. The impending growth of the European Union (EU) is 
only likely to intensify the tenuous nature of Great Britain, as the non-
English members of the British realm face the prospect of their sensitive 
national identities being further marginalised by the English-led push for 
EU inclusion. 
 Even with regard to the Internet itself, there are signs appearing that 
the smaller British nations are failing to keep pace with England in the 
global race to colonise cyberspace.  For example, the geographical 
structure of Wales neatly links the country’s transport routes to major 
English locales, and conventional media forms (newspaper & magazine) 
are necessarily concentrated along these pre-established routes.  
Conversely, the transport routes within Wales itself are less effectively 
integrated, which is helping to fragment the culture of the nation as English 
media deeply penetrates the Welsh society.  On top of this, conventional 
Welsh media vehicles have attracted recent criticism for promoting 
“English views, mass culture, or a version of Welsh culture that is of little 
relevance to most people in [present day] Wales” (Mackay & Powell, 1998: 
203-204).  Such conditions would appear to be ideal for the rise of a 
uniquely Welsh Internet presence aimed at restoring the traditional 
aspects and values of community that have long been a central tenet of 
Welsh culture.  This possibility is complicated, however, by the dominant 
state of non-traditional Welsh culture as expressed in the conventional 
British mass media. This means that such endeavours would need to 
necessarily compete with the conventional media, along with rival Internet 
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groups enamoured of the views expressed by such media, in attempting to 
promote the cause of Welsh nationalism. 
 
Asia online 
 The Welsh situation shows the problems facing some Western 
nations as cyberspace begins to take shape around the interests of a few 
IT-rich countries.  For all of its past neglect and hesitancy over IT 
innovation, the United Kingdom still enjoys a more advanced position in 
the information age hierarchy than any of its Asian rivals (Japan 
excluded). In spite of this it is the Asian countries that pose the biggest 
threat to the many ambitious nations trying to bridge the broad 
technological divide that separates the Americans (and Scandinavians) 
from the rest of the developed world.    
 The Asian countries, with the possible exception of Japan, have been 
late arrivals to the high-tech world of cyberspace.  In the present day, most 
of them are caught in the catch-22 situation of wanting to control 
information flow to protect against possible cultural imperialism, whilst 
simultaneously needing to foster the free information flow that is integral to 
the region’s burgeoning business interests (Haywood, 1998:25; Slevin, 
2000:210).  Up until the mid-1990s the former need was clearly being 
given preference over the latter, but in the aftermath of the East Asian 
financial crisis many Asian states are finding themselves compelled to 
ease harsh Internet restrictions as a means of encouraging domestic 
economic growth. 
 As was the case with Great Britain some years earlier, the East 
Asian nations have been found wanting as global emphasis has sharply 
shifted from an industrial to an information focus.  From the 19th century 
onwards, these nations (at varying stages) have pursued four phases of 
economic growth that have mirrored  developments previously occurring in 
American and European regions.  In linear order, these phases have 
encompassed a shift from textiles, to steel through automobiles, and on to 
microchips, with Japan currently the only major Asian nation to have 
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adequately completed all four phases (Ozawa et al. 2001:2).12
 The East Asian nations, prior to the late-1990s financial crisis, were 
largely insulated from global economic concerns via domestic regulation 
and protection of industry.  The first clear signs of a shift from protectionist 
policies occurred in 1994, when Japan bowed to US pressure and 
deregulated its cellular phone industry.  In the years to follow, Japan 
surged to the top of global mobile phone subscription figures, and the 
country now sees widespread deregulation of domestic industry as a 
necessary step in its bid to become a primary player in the IT market 
(Ozawa et al. 2001:5).  The political necessity of deregulation is 
nonetheless counterbalanced by the substantial social angst that such 
processes entail.  The American approach to capitalism has always 
privileged individualism above all else, but the modern Japanese 
experience—at the large corporation level—has been more inclined 
towards notions of paternalism and long-term job security (Ikegami, 
1999:7).  The recent Japanese switch to more aggressive economic 
policies and initiatives has necessitated a corresponding move away from 
employer paternalism, characterised by a rapid eradication of middle 
management positions across the country’s corporate sphere.  For a 
country that has placed such significant stock in the projection of national 
pride as underscored by employee loyalty to high profile domestic 
  Proponents 
of the information age contend that the developed Western nations have 
entered into a new fifth phase of economic growth — “the McLuhan 
stage”.  This stage differs from the previous phases principally on account 
of its capacity to impact upon all other types of industry “in the areas of 
management, production, procurement, distribution, and customer 
services” (Main, 2001:1; Ozawa et al. 2001:3).  The East Asian nations—
by and large—have been slower to negotiate these shifts in phase, partly 
on account of their allegiance to communist ideology, but mainly as a 
result of their tendency for shielding domestic industries from global 
market developments.   
                                            
12 Each of these industries still exist in today’s world, of course, but it argued that none of 
them encompass the social and economic significance that is currently accorded to 
information communications technology. 
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corporations, it remains to be seen how warmly the everyday people 
embrace this new approach to economics and industry. 
 For the larger Asian nations, cyberspace looms as both a 
reinvigorating vehicle for national economy, as well as a debilitating agent 
for national pride.  We have already seen the difficulties that the Internet 
poses to Asian language users, but this is only half of the dilemma being 
faced by eastern governments seeking to colonise cyberspace en masse.  
National pride in both China and Japan has long been openly espoused 
through explicit linguistic and cultural symbols; as evidenced by the 
Chinese word for China (Zhongguo) meaning “middle nation” and the 
Japanese flag depicting the country as the place on which the sun 
chooses to rise and set.  Both of these symbols unambiguously position 
the Asian nations at the centre of the known universe, which is a primary 
tenet of sinocentric perspectives on Asian primacy in the broader global 
scheme of things.  Such national pride has been under threat in recent 
times with the “defeat” of communism in the Cold War and the Japanese 
struggle to negotiate fresh industrial avenues following several decades of 
economic prominence on the world stage.  Cyberspace is a Western 
construct dominated by Western countries with Western concerns, but it is 
still a sphere in which the Asian nations must participate if they are to 
become powers in the burgeoning global marketplace.  Such participation 
is predicated on the promise of future glory, but also with the humbling 
knowledge that their present place is on the periphery of cyberspace, and 
not at its hub. 
 The Cold War may have ended, but for communist China (as for 
other communist Asian nations) the political paranoia associated with the 
period has left a lasting legacy.  From the 1950s to the late 1970s, the 
Chinese Ruling Party (CCP) maintained a fixation with political ideology 
that stimulated similar levels of political awareness and interest in the 
general population at large.  As the nation’s focus switched to economic 
matters during the 1980s, the concerns of the people appear to have 
undergone a like transition (Hachigian, 2001:3).  Signs of growing public 
indifference for political issues has not served to dim CCP unease over its 
capacity to maintain control over the country, however, and cyberspace is 
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causing the party particular anxiety in this regard.  Throughout the 
twentieth century China entertained the view that information was “a part 
of state policy”, which limited the flow of information within the country to 
the state’s ruling party (Berring, 1998:1).  Even today the state still controls 
most media outlets in China, but much of the CCP’s nervousness 
surrounding the Internet pertains to fears that conventional media sources 
may lose their appeal and relevance to new, seemingly boundless online 
media, robbing the state of considerable potency in the process (Yang, 
2001:4). 
 The CCP’s misgivings over Internet technology can be traced back to 
1989, when dissidents exploited the medium in order to quickly and widely 
disseminate news of the country’s violent attempts to quell localised 
democratic uprisings In Tiananmenn Square (Abbott, 2001:100; Castells, 
1996:354; Everard, 2000:19; Moschovitis et al. 1999:141).  With this in 
mind, China has made attempts to tighten Internet security by erecting an 
(ultimately useless) firewall, and by legislating to make ISP’s responsible 
for policing and censoring the Chinese virtual realm.  These initiatives are 
viewed in some quarters as a cynical government ploy to convince 
technologically illiterate “old guard” officials that the CCP is in control of 
China’s Internet media (Abbott, 2001:102).  Of greater concern to civil 
libertarians and freedom of speech advocates is China’s propensity for 
taking a hard line stance on Internet ‘indiscretions’ whenever the 
opportunity arises.  In the past three years the government has jailed one 
man for providing e-mail addresses to a dissident group; jailed another for 
four years for committing online ‘subversion’; and sentenced two hackers 
to death for infiltrating the computer system of a major domestic bank 
(Abbott, 2001:103; Hachigian, 2001:5). 
 Such cases are still isolated ones, however, given that the Internet is 
not classified as a major immediate threat to the CCP because the party is 
managing the new technology effectively, only a small section of the 
population is online and the country’s current economic and political 
stability dissuade firm opposition to the CCP (Hachigian, 2001:8).  At any 
rate, the government is well aware that for all the organisational strength 
and capability cyberspace offers, most political demonstrations still need 
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to occur in real world locales, which means that physical force can still 
discourage dissension in many cases (Hachigian, 2001:5).  Violent 
displays are very much the least preferred option though, particularly as 
China strives to convince the world that its promises to improve on its 
dismal human rights record are genuine.  In line with this ‘ambassadorial’ 
attitude to cyberspace administration, the CCP recently called for the 
creation of an ‘International Internet pact’ aimed at global regulation of the 
WWW as a means of minimising dissidence and enhancing economic 
productivity (Yang, 2001:2).  The proposal was not met with great 
approval, but at the very least it would appear to indicate that China will 
not be prepared to leave the formidable task of Internet legislation and 
regulation entirely to their Western counterparts. 
 China can ill afford to lie silently as cyberspatial development 
continues at a phenomenal rate.  The country’s economy is enjoying 
unprecedented growth and the pace of this accretion will only increase by 
virtue of China’s newly obtained membership within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  Chinese businesses will need to embrace the WWW 
in order to ensure competitiveness and survival in the global marketplace, 
but 99% of these businesses do not even have a basic computer 
(Hachigian, 2001:2).  The lack of widespread equipment and access to 
technology has been the biggest challenge facing the CCP in its bid to 
usher China into the information age.  Undeterred by the monumental 
scope of the task, the CCP has worked hard over the past five years and 
succeeded in making several noteworthy steps toward a viable Chinese 
presence on the WWW.  Firstly, it has restructured the domestic 
telecommunications industry, which has in turn resulted in competitive 
services, expanded networks, and cheaper across the board Internet 
participation costs.  Secondly, it has eagerly encouraged and facilitated 
consumer demand for telecommunications capability, leading to 120+ 
million fixed-line and 60+ million cellular phone subscribers at the end of 
the year 2000.  Thirdly, it has rigorously worked to put most government 
agencies online (the Government Online Project) so as to inspire domestic 
corporations to do likewise.  Finally, it has closely followed the American 
example by offering these agencies interactively to the public, markedly 
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improving political transparency measures in the process (Yang, 2001:2-
3).  The reward for these efforts are all too apparent, with the number of 
Chinese Internet users ballooning to 22+ million in early 2001; a massive 
rise from the paltry 1997 figure of fewer than one million (Hachigian, 
2001:1). 
 Internet participation is nowhere near as pronounced in nearby 
Vietnam where the local Politburo only licensed the country’s first four 
ISP’s in early 1998.  In line with communist approaches to the medium, 
the Vietnamese Politburo has chosen to closely monitor all domestic web 
sites and has ensured that all local web vehicles are subject to content 
‘filtering software’ (Richtel, 1998:72).  The success of this strategy has 
been limited, however, given that restrictions of such a broad and ill-
defined nature are commonly disregarded: 
Vietnam’s Internet regulations conform to a great 
tradition of the Marxist/Leninist order, whereby laws 
are so strict that they are widely violated.  This 
makes most people into outlaws and places them at 
the mercy of police and security officials, who get 
rich turning a blind eye.  In practice, those who keep 
to themselves or are well connected can expect to 
live in peace (Case, 1997:5). 
At least the Vietnamese government has loosened its tight grip on 
domestic e-mail, after previously (prior to 1998) imposing strict censorship 
on the content of all messages sent from within the country (Case, 
1997:1).  Not that this more laid back manner is indicative of a newfound 
trust in the local netizen population.  To this point, Asian nations (or any 
nations, for that matter) are incapable of adequately scanning e-mail traffic 
due to its vast volume, but this may change in future as ‘Carnivore’ 
monitoring technology becomes improved and widely available13
 As is the case with other Asian Nations, Internet access in Vietnam is 
limited and not nearly as easy to arrange as it is in the West.  In order to 
 
(Hachigian, 2001:5).   
                                            
13 ‘Carnivore’ software has been developed by the FBI primarily in response to online acts 
of dissidence and terrorism against the American state.  Simply explained, the program 
hones-in on key words, phrases, names and addresses contained within high volume e-
mail traffic.  At the moment the FBI is the only body using the software, but this is likely to 
change once its reliability and effectiveness are firmly clarified. 
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participate online, Vietnamese netizens must first register for a licence, 
and sign an agreement making them responsible for all material that 
appears on their WWW vehicle (Everard, 2000:37).  If these impediments 
are not sufficient enough disincentive for potential users then exorbitant 
Internet access costs may be, given that they amount to roughly a third of 
the average annual Vietnamese salary (Slevin, 2000:41).  Interestingly, 
the Vietnamese Politburo has responded to the anemic condition of its 
country’s cyberspatial presence in a similar fashion to the CCP.  For the 
most part, this has encompassed the privatisation of the domestic 
telecommunications infrastructure although, even allowing for the 
government stipulations built into these privatisation agreements, it is 
difficult to foresee the Internet becoming widespread in Vietnam in the 
immediate future (Abbott, 2001:109; Everard, 2000:31; Moore, 1998:155).  
In essence, the country is wracked by too many competing domestic 
problems and is too fragile economically to make a significant impact on 
the global IT scene.  The vulnerability of Vietnam in IT circles was all too 
clearly articulated in the mid-1990s when the Vietnamese National 
Assembly passed plans for a $500 million (US) ‘world-class information 
technology industry’ project.  This initiative remains unfulfilled and 
although the country has long had exciting underground IT development 
talent, it nevertheless lacks the financial muscle and unwavering political 
commitment to bridge the expansive gap that separates Vietnam from the 
affluent Western IT power players (Case, 1997:4). 
 In the fellow Asian nations of Cambodia and Malaysia, opposition 
political parties endeavouring to overcome the disadvantages apparent in 
fighting against governments that control conventional information sources 
have experimented with cyberspatial media.  The main opposition party in 
Cambodia relies heavily on the Internet in its ongoing quest to bring 
democracy to a nation worn down by corruption and tyranny.  The party 
uses e-mail to inform sympathisers of current developments and to solicit 
support from others, with approximately three quarters of its entire 
financial support being derived from online sources (Leslie, 1999:234).   
 In spite of this, the opposition party in Cambodia has failed to gain a 
significant online advantage over the sitting government, which has proven 
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equally adept at placing its propaganda on the Internet.  This failure to 
make a viable impact is somewhat surprising given that the Cambodian 
government is less dictatorial than other Asian nations when it comes to 
cyberspace.  The situation contrasts with the happenings in Malaysia, with 
the government there openly refrained from censoring Internet use in 
1996.  The Malaysians had hoped that this would enable the country to 
outperform neighbouring Singapore, which had issued tight controls on 
citizen use of the virtual realm.  For a short while this tactic proved 
successful, with Internet use in the country failing to capture the non-
corporate imagination until the ‘Anwar scandal’ of 1998, when users 
saturated the Internet in protest over his sacking and arrest (Abbott, 
2001:104).  This would seem to support suggestions that cyberspace is a 
fertile environment for the nurturing of political ideas and uprisings, but it 
could also be argued that it is still largely dependent on real world events 
to stimulate such uprisings. 
 The Internet is thus a prized tool for nations desiring a stronger 
global presence and a sound economy with which to accompany that 
presence.  The Cold War served to largely abridge global tensions to the 
point of polar divisions between east and west, but as these divisions fade 
to the background, fresh schisms arise in their place.  It has been 
assumed that the globalisation of communications networks and economic 
markets would lead to an inevitable process of cultural homogenisation, 
but present signs indicate that the opposite is true.  The world is no longer 
delineated along simplistic capitalist versus communist lines, meaning that 
individual nations are more aware of their strengths and vulnerabilities 
(and the strengths and vulnerabilities of others) than they would have 
been some decades ago.  Rather than removing the differences between 
nations, global developments (with particular regard to media vehicles) 
have helped to afford them a greater transparency.  
 Cyberspace, as these last few pages illustrate, is a realm that 
impacts upon, and is influenced by, world developments that occur in the 
East, as well as the West.  While this thesis chooses to focus almost 
expressly on cyberspatial machinations from a Western perspective, I am 
loathe to provide readers with the mistaken impression that the virtual 
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realm is little more than a Western enclave.  Indeed there is much to be 
gleaned from investigations that serve to increase the anaemic profile of 
non-Western nations in the presently unbalanced field of cyberspace 
research.  This thesis will not be among such studies, however, partly 
because space limitations necessitate a targeted approach to the topic 
and partly because the dearth of resource material pertaining to non-
Western regions unduly restricted my capacity to support any detailed 
analysis into such regions.  It should also be noted that a targeted 
Western approach to the research is thought to best align with the 
empirical observations presented throughout the body of work. 
 
The aims of this thesis 
 
It is time to take a realistic look at the extent of the 
promises, and at the extent of the realistic dangers 
[cyberspace entails] — not in order to take a Luddite’s 
revenge, but rather to be able to plan ahead with 
knowledge and understanding of the real benefits and the 
real limitations of this awfully big adventure (Everard, 
2000:xvii). 
 
It would indeed seem that, for many people, cyberspace looms large in the 
consciousness as an awfully big adventure with an ending that is anything 
but clearly predefined.  For some, cyberspace is imbued with almost 
mythical qualities.  It is a foreign place, of profoundly arcane dimensions, 
for which they lack the time and/or inclination to explore and uncloak.  
These are the people who the computropians contend are being left 
behind by cybertechnology and, while this may well be the case, there is 
little solid evidence (at this point in time) that non-participation in the virtual 
realm is markedly restricting the capacity of human actors to function 
effectively in everyday life.  For others, cyberspace brings with it previously 
unimaginable benefits; bridging the once onerous time and space divide 
with an ease and efficiency that is a world removed from the archaic 
telegraph technology that originally preceded it.   
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 The white nationalist movement14
  The political origins of white nationalism are more difficult to clarify, 
but have been tentatively traced back to the Puritan ascendancy period of 
the mid-1600s (Barkun, 1997:5).  It would take a further two centuries 
before these early thought patterns would evolve into what came to be 
known as the British-Israelism movement
 is a prime example of a substratum 
of society that is taking full advantage of cyberspatial technology in order 
to pursue political platforms that are devoid of general acceptance in 
mainstream society.  White nationalism is an unashamedly racist ideology 
and, as is the case with racism itself, has played a role in Western politics 
and social structures from medieval times onwards.  In physical terms, 
racism arose as an obvious by product of the colonial slave trade as 
begun (in the "New World") by Portugal in the fifteenth-century (Blackburn, 
1997:102). Over the ensuing four centuries Spain, France and the USA 
would follow the lead of the Portuguese; the economic aspirations of all 
four nations helped enormously by the dehumanising commodification of 
African-born slave labour.  
15 (Barkun, 1997:7-9).  British-
Israelism would eventually make an appearance in the USA during the 
1870s at approximately the same time that the fledgling Ku Klux Klan 
organisation was beginning to grow in popularity (Bushart, Craig & Barnes, 
1998:174).  The Ku Klux Klan would gradually fade from favour and has 
not been a significant presence in American politics since the 1920s, but 
the concept of British-Israelism has proven more hardy and continues on 
as a prominent white pride doctrine in the present day.16
 The white power movement in general has also shown considerable 
resilience in the face of legal and political developments that have 
threatened its very existence.  The movement’s public standing was 
   
                                            
 
14 The terms ‘white nationalism/nationalist(s)’, ‘white pride/prider(s)’, and ‘white power’ will 
be employed interchangeably throughout this piece of work. 
15 British-Israelism worked predominantly from the viewpoint that British-born whites were 
the descendants of the ‘lost tribes of Israel’ and thus held a privileged place in the eyes of 
God. 
16 British-Israelism evolved into what is now known as the Christian Identity Movement in 
the USA.  American white pride advocates adopted most of the tenets outlined in British-
Israelism, but altered the focus so that North America was viewed as the site of the future 
‘White Israel’, not England.   
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severely diminished during the 1960s as civil rights initiatives dominated 
Western social landscapes and the accompanying prosperity of the times 
pushed right-wing racist ideologies to the back recesses of the broader 
public imagination (Walters,1987:11-12).  The organisation endured 
something of a momentum swing from the mid-1970s to the late-1980s as 
the global financial meltdown produced a backlash against affirmative 
action policies (Walters, 1987:13-14).  This backlash was further 
exacerbated as a result of the social stresses applied by the Reagan 
Administration’s championing of communitarian ideals, but by the early-
1990s white nationalism was still residing on the far outposts of Western 
political process. 
 It is my belief that the white nationalist movement was struggling for 
want of two crucial elements — a unified, cohesive intra-movement 
communications structure, and a public standing that was divested of the 
violent baggage that had long been intrinsically associated with racist 
activities and initiatives.  The latter problem was also crippling the 
movement financially with several high profile legal judgements awarding 
millions of dollars against white pride affiliated organisations (on account 
of their alleged guilt in planning and committing violent acts) during the 
1980s and 1990s (Roberts, 1999, September 11).  What the movement 
desperately needed then was an outlet through which white priders could 
freely exchange ideas, and minimise the violent symbolism that hindered 
positive acceptance of their political platforms by wider communities. 
 The burgeoning realm of cyberspace sufficed on both of these counts 
and white pride groups began to colonise the virtual world in considerable 
numbers from 1995 onwards.17
                                            
17 White nationalism had a presence in cyberspace during the late eighties, but it was 
small and primitive and the Internet (at that stage) lacked the broader public access 
capacity to make the medium a worthwhile political tool. 
 The first major portal for white nationalist 
content online, Stormfront.org, appeared during that year and it remains 
the first cyberspatial port of call for many white pride devotees at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.  Stormfront.org is more than just a 
right-wing gateway site, however, as it also exists as an Internet 
community in its own right, drawing together a wide variety of white power 
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followers and their opponents from a disparate array of countries for 
interaction, debate, and event planning.  This thesis gathers much of its 
empirical data and direction from the Stormfront.org site; underscoring 
information relating to broader cyberspatial developments with targeted 
support documentation from message post content analyses and online 
interviews with participants on the site’s discussion fora.   
 White nationalists have not been well represented in academic 
studies of online environments with McPherson’s treatise on Dixie-Net 
(2000); Whine’s writings on the far right’s Internet presence (1997, 1999); 
and Zickmund’s piece on the vagaries of cyberhate (1997) standing as the 
only investigations into the topic that I am aware of at the time of writing.  
This is surprising given that right wing groups are precisely the type of 
group that is most likely to accrue clear benefits from online participation, 
given the many hurdles that affected their fleshspace18
 I would like to emphasise here that the empirical material relating to 
white nationalists is employed only to support and provide practical 
examples of general cyberspatial phenomena.  A detailed study of white 
nationalists online would certainly make for an engrossing research project 
in its own right, but it was never my intention to prepare a predominantly 
 development 
throughout the twentieth century.  This was part of the reason why I chose 
the white pride movement as a case study subject for the empirical 
requirements of this thesis. This factor aside, the movement also offered 
the prospect of access to individuals who, to varying degrees, retained an 
appropriateness to the three key concepts of investigation (self-identity, 
community and nationalism) encompassed by the overall body of work.  
                                            
18 Fleshspace = the physical sights, structures and everyday machinations that we have 
come to commonly associate with the ‘real world’.  Throughout this thesis I will be arguing 
that cyberspace is ostensibly just another part of this ‘real world’ space and, as such, 
should not be treated as a kind of magical, mystical other world.  This argument could 
become confused were I to continually conflate cyberspace with ‘real world’ space, 
however, making it necessary for me to find another term to use here as a point of 
differentiation.  Expressed another way, I will be using the terms fleshspace and 
cyberspace throughout this body of work; with the former term refering to physical 
representations of the real world and the latter alluding to disembodied aspects of the real 
world.  It is important that the reader grasps the notion that both fleshspace and 
cyberspace are considered to be (often overlapping and interrelating) parts of ‘real world’ 
space.  Where the term ‘real world’ is used, it should be understood that both fleshspace 
and cyberspace elements are considered to be at work. 
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ethnographic body of work in order to pursue my research agenda.  As it 
stands, the relatively small number of interview/questionnaire respondents 
accessed in the methodology would have rendered a total ethnography 
unworkable in this instance anyway.  In spite of this, it is worth noting that 
an ethnography of substantial dimension is yet to be realised, in either 
cyberspace or fleshspace terms. Soldiers of God: White supremacists and 
their holy war for America (Bushart et al. 1998) is the closest thing to an 
ethnography on white nationalists in existence, and the authors of this 
work make much of the difficulties apparent in persuading white pride 
devotees to speak with outside researchers.19
 The central argument driving this study is the contention that 
cybersociety is real society or, at least, an extension of real society.  At 
times, too much effort is expended in trying to present cyberspace as an 
entity that is separate from the everyday world, but this argument is 
misguided and only succeeds in diminishing the legitimacy and importance 
of the realm as a sphere of academic study.  With this in mind, I will 
repeatedly emphasise the tendency for virtual interactions to work from 
(and in concert with) the everyday machinations that underscore normal 
human life in Western societies.
  I encountered similar 
hesitancy in recruiting subjects for this study, and while twenty-one 
respondents may seem a little on the slender side, it is nevertheless 
enough to meet the qualitative demands of the project and it is a 
reasonable figure for political activists traditionally opposed to participating 
in mainstream research processes. 
20
 This central argument will be underpinned by three subsidiary 
contentions that relate directly to the main concept areas of the thesis.  
  
                                            
19 The text by Bushart et al. (1998) was, to the best of my knowledge, one of only five 
published works covering interviews with white pride movement members in existence at 
the time of writing.  The other four being Inside organized racism: Women in the hate 
movement (Blee, 2002); “White power, white pride!” The white separatist movement in 
the United States (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000); The Racist Mind: Portraits of 
American Neo-Nazis and Klansmen (Ezekiel, 1995) and The new white nationalism in 
America: Its challenge to integration (Swain, 2002). 
20 I would like to stress that the decision to differentiate between the 'virtual realm' and the 
'real world' when discussing matters in this body of work is predicated only by the need to 
clarify the similarities between the two, and not to contribute (even unconsciously) to 
suggestions that the two are significantly removed from one another. 
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The first of these contentions will take umbrage with popular multiple 
identity interpretations of online participation, putting forward the contrary 
view that online identities are more often than not stable and singular in 
form.  This will be followed by a second contention that works in opposition 
to computropian efforts to decry the value and viability of virtual 
communities in comparison with fleshspace alternatives.  Finally, in 
switching emphasis to the concept of nationalism, I will assert that online 
patriotism provides individuals with a sense of national identity and 
ideology that has long been denied them by conventional macro-level 
(state-orientated) nationalist models. 
 The methodological dimensions of this study are presented in 
Chapter One, ‘Methodology: Outlining the approach to the research’, along 
with an accompanying discussion that reveals the place of cyberspace 
within the broader social sciences disciplinary sphere. Both anthropology 
and sociology have a prime role to play in future explorations of 
cyberspace, with the former discipline ideally suited to demystifying the 
virtual realm’s complex interactive processes, and the latter well placed to 
explicate the various influences driving these processes. 
 Chapter Two, ‘Analysing Identity: Unravelling the idiosyncrasies of 
the individual’ focuses implicitly on the construction of self-identity and the 
multifarious aspects that aid in the shaping of an individual’s unique sense 
of self.  This chapter will address a wide range of predominantly social 
science based literature relating to the notion of self-identity, with 
particular emphasis being placed on the works and ideas of Erving 
Goffman, Anthony Giddens and Erik Erikson.  These writers share an 
approach to the topic that relates in some fashion to human agency 
perspectives on the issue.  This is less obvious for Erikson as it is for 
Goffman, but the former’s ideas on role construction are similar to 
Goffman’s on closer inspection.  Further to this, Erikson adopts a line of 
thinking on individual 'ontological awareness' that corresponds neatly to 
Giddens’ employment of the notion in his theory of structuration. 
 There were obviously alternative theoretical approaches that were 
considered for implementation in this body of work.  In terms of scope, the 
thesis would undoubtedly benefit from being able to draw from a wide 
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range of multi-disciplinary theorists and lines of philosophical thought.  The 
possibilities apparent in theoretical expansion, by way of example, are 
seldom more evident than in the sub-sphere of self-identity, where the 
discipline of psychology would provide supporting material of considerable 
depth and substance.  The broad use of multi-disciplinary texts has been 
decided against in this instance, however, as the large amount of topical 
terrain encompassed by the thesis, combined with the restrictions on 
overall word limit, render an extensive theoretical treatise largely 
unworkable.   
 The reader need also understand that this thesis will not unduly 
concern itself with providing in-depth critiques of the major theorists 
presented here.  The works of Erikson, Goffman, Mead, Giddens, Simmel, 
Durkheim and the like have already been extensively debated over the 
years and it is not my intention to add unnecessary weight to this particular 
body of work.  This should not be misinterpreted as a sign that I believe 
such thinkers to be beyond reproach, as all forms of social theory can be 
seen to contain inherent flaws and weaknesses.  The theorists focused on 
in these chapters are not exempt from this way of thinking, and my 
comprehension of their respective imperfections can be inferred from the 
lines of thought that have not been included in discussions relating to their 
particular works.  Essentially, I have sought only to highlight the views of 
theorists in this thesis when their ideas have entailed significant 
contribution to the realm of cyberspace (generally) or the topical sub-
spheres (specifically). 
 Matters of theory aside, Chapter Two will also be representative of 
the first of three thesis chapters to unmistakably incorporate literature 
review conventions into its framework.  This may have something of a 
disorientating effect on readers who are schooled in the more common 
convention of locating entire literature review elements within a single 
chapter of a thesis.  This approach is definitely preferable for theses that 
encompass tight, singular topical foci, but would not work as well here, 
given the multiple interest spheres being addressed.          
 The literature review type format employed in Chapter Two acts as 
the setting for Chapter Three, ‘Internet Identities: Investigating the online 
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self’.  The content of this section expands and elaborates upon the central 
ideas expressed in the preceding chapter, transposing them onto the 
virtual landscape as a means of illustrating the ways in which online 
interactions tend to reflect those that take place in fleshspace.  The central 
argument expounded here is that whilst cyberspace creates an 
environment for people to experiment with multiple identity forms and 
expression styles, the social structures and expectations inherent in virtual 
environments almost invariably ensure that netizens maintain identity 
integrity and stability. 
 For Chapter Four, ‘Appraising Community: Clarifying a contested 
concept’, the line of thought on identity is expanded so as to include 
representations of the concept at the meso-level.21
 This chapter, entitled — ‘Cyberspace Communities: Virtual or 
virtual?’ pushes the viewpoint that cyberspatial communities are, by and 
large, equally credible as the conventional ones commonly created in 
fleshspace.  The section starts out by establishing the various online 
media via which communities can be built and maintained, before moving 
on to focus on the social stimuli encouraging their construction and the 
conventions that arbitrate participation in them.  All too often discussion on 
virtual communities is unconsciously derailed by an overt emphasis on the 
technological capabilities of cyberspatial media, but not all cyberspace 
media are appropriate for community development and the social aspects 
  This chapter mirrors 
the structural approach used in Chapter Two, providing a brief, but 
succinct outline of established sociological thought surrounding the 
community theme.  The main ideas presented here are drawn upon in the 
formation of a range of thematic variables that, in turn, direct the empirical 
observations that take place in the following chapter devoted to online 
communities. 
                                            
21 Meso, as the term is used here, refers to 'middle' and is needed to differentiate from the 
type of group that exists in the nationalist sense.  Other writers have referred to 
community as entailing a 'macro-level' phenomenon, and this is fair when assessing 
community in relation to the self, but the inclusion of nationalism in the argument 
highlights the marked difference in scope that exists between community at the localised 
level and community (particularly in the imagined sense) at the national level. 
 
 30 
 
of group interaction are always more significant than the technological 
tools that underlie them. 
 At this point, attention turns from meso-level expressions of identity 
to those that occur at the macro-level.  Chapter Six, ‘Addressing 
Nationalism: Contemplating the notion of nation’, introduces nationalism to 
the discussion via a review of literature that traces sociological thought on 
the subject back to the eighteenth century.  The chapter touches upon a 
range of co-requisite issues that impact on the shaping of individual 
identities including ethnicity, religion, language and structural symbolism.   
 Nationalism is all too often thought of as a social element that is 
extraneous to human actors at the micro-level.  For many such actors, 
however, the factors explicit in nationalist ideologies are at the forefront of 
their chosen models of ontological awareness and are integral to their 
pursuit of idealised group dynamics at the meso-level.  For this reason, I 
have chosen to assemble this thesis in a manner that accentuates the 
interweaving linkages that underscore human identity development across 
self, community, and nationalist lines.   
 The final chapter, ‘Net Nationalism: CMC and the pursuit of 
nationalist agendas online’, completes the explication of nationalism that 
began in Chapter Six.  This chapter is essentially written in two parts, with 
the first part focusing on the conventional economic-centered mode of 
nationalism that is endemic to modern nation-states and the pride of place 
that cyberspace (and assorted computerised technologies) are assuming 
in the endeavours of such nation-states to shore-up their international 
strength and standing for the twenty-first century.  The second part, by 
way of contrast, delves into the alternative expressions of nationalist 
ideology that are preoccupying contemporary activist groups within 
Western society and the role that the Internet fills in enabling and 
furthering these nationalist agendas.  
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CHAPTER 
1 
 Methodology: Outlining the 
approach to the research 
 
 
 
Basic outline of the chapter 
 When cyberspace research was in its infancy, many studies relating 
to computer-mediated communication (CMC) had their focus on multi-user 
virtual environments (MUVES) and the arcane nature of the interactions 
that occurred within them.  Because of this, early research ventures into 
cyberspace became somewhat repetitive and limited, as Jones suggests 
in writing that: 
 
For instance, it is possible that we lose sight of the fact 
that few people are generally, in fact, pioneers when it 
comes to the Internet and Internet research.  How many 
have "discovered" e-mail and written studies about it?  
How many analyses have been published or are 
underway that examine on-line discourse in MUDs (multi-
user domains), MOOs (multi-user domains object 
oriented), and IRC (Internet relay chat)? (1999:11).   
 
The proliferation of writing around these vehicles has forced some cyber 
researchers to seek out alternative online domains for explanation and 
exploration.  This subtle change of focus has encouraged researchers to 
delve outside of the confines of online participation, in the strict 
communications sense, in order to contemplate the broader social, 
political and, in some instances, practical aspects of CMC participation.  
 This chapter takes a close look at the case study employed in this 
thesis, utilising a framework that considers the appropriateness and 
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uniqueness of online research methods to contemporary cyberspace-
based research projects.  As a starting point discussion will centre on an 
exploration of the contemporary state of cyberspatial research within  
academia.  From there the chapter will provide details of the three differing 
modes by which researchers can undertake cyberspace-related research.  
Following on from this attention will turn to the four specific research 
techniques used in this study, explaining each method in sufficient detail 
and accompanying this explanation with a rounded rationale as to why 
they have been chosen for implementation here.  Finally, some closing 
thoughts will be provided as to the state of cyberspatial research 
methodologies in general, with a view to positioning this study in the wider 
context of what is clearly a neophyte and, as such, underdeveloped 
research sphere. 
 
The precarious state of socially driven cyberspatial research 
 As cyberspace continues its gradual, yet important, climb into wider 
consciousness, in the social sciences contention abounds as to whether 
established study disciplines are adequately situated to meet the 
investigative demands that the burgeoning social sphere asks of them.  Is 
it sufficient for cyberspace research to reside in vibrant, but ostensibly 
unobtrusive, corners of the sociological, anthropological and psychological 
landscapes?  Or would it be preferable for it to flourish as the centrifugal 
focus of a new and all-encompassing discipline of ‘cyberology’?  
 Within the social science sphere itself, the general state of 
cyberspatial research remains decidedly understated at best.  Helen 
Morton, in her introduction to a special cyberspace-related issue of the 
journal Social Analysis, laments the minimalist presence of social science 
based contributors in cyberspace writings when she says that: 
 
To give just two examples, Steven Jones' Virtual Culture 
(1997) has thirteen contributors, none of whom are from 
these [anthropology and sociology] disciplines, while 
David Porter's Internet Culture (1997) is a collection of 
fifteen essays, only one of which is written by an 
anthropologist.  The remaining contributors are from 
diverse fields including English, history and cultural 
studies; other publications include work from philosophy, 
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computer science, economics, media and 
communications, law politics, and, in one case, 
architecture (Morton, 2001a:2) 
 
Morton's findings mirror my own after a preliminary investigation into the 
impact of cyberspace on sociological understandings of contemporary 
society.  
 In methodological terms, this inquiry was conducted at a very basic 
level, and involved the scanning of seventeen key sociological journals 
spanning a five-year period between 1994 and 1998 inclusive.22
 This examination of journals resulted in some interesting and not 
entirely expected findings.  Not one article published in the work and 
industry, religion, family and sexuality journals throughout the entire five-
year period pertained to CMC matters in any shape or form.  Cyberspace 
fared little better in the mass media sphere where a mere two articles 
related implicitly to the virtual realm.  Discussion on cyberspace was more 
proficient in the education sphere, although it still fell well short of 
constituting a quarter of all topical material presented during this time.
 This survey was limited in scope, but it illuminated a cross-section 
 The 
choice of this method was underscored by a presumption that cyberspace 
would be stimulating considerable discussion and research among 
academics working in key societal spheres, were it really as chimerical as 
its protagonists were suggesting.  These 'key societal spheres' were 
identified as health, family and sexuality, mass media, education, religion, 
and work and industry.   The journals chosen were considered to be the 
most prominent in their particular focus field, and were drawn from 
Australia, the USA and Great Britain, with one journal in each field coming 
from each of these countries. 
                                            
22 The journals used in this preliminary investigation are as follows — Labour and 
Industry; New Technology, Work and Employment; Work and Occupations; American 
Journal of Education; British Journal of Sociology of Education; Computers and 
Education; The Journal of Religion; Religion; Religious Traditions; Media International 
Australia; Media, Culture & Society; Intermedia; Sociology of Health and Illness; 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health; British Medical Journal; Journal of 
Family Studies; Journal of Marriage and the Family. 
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of current research directions within academic sociology.  While results 
stemming from the investigation appeared to indicate that cyberspace was 
overrated as a research sphere, subsequent probes (such as Morton's) 
suggest that the problem lies more with the research practitioners than the 
research site.  This view is reinforced by the findings of two other small-
scale inquiries (conducted by this researcher) into sociological writings on 
 
Figure 1.  Discipline areas of papers presented at The Australian 
Sociological Association (TASA) Conferences [1996-2000, inclusive] 
(Total papers presented = 1069) 
 Sociological discipline area 
 
cyberspace issues.  The first inquiry [refer Figure 1] dealt with the topical 
foci of papers presented at annual conferences held by The Australian 
Sociological Association (TASA) over a five-year period. One thousand 
and sixty-nine papers in all were given during this time; a figure that is 
clearly dominated by health-related papers that accounted for 172 (or 
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16.09%) of the overall total.23
 
  Other sociological spheres such as gender, 
work and theory also fared well during this time, but cyberspace lagged 
well behind, accounting for a mere 20 (or 1.87%) of the total papers.  
These figures tend to make something of a mockery of John Dvorak's 
(1996) confident assertion that "sociologists will love the next 100 years", 
given the seemingly boundless research avenues that cyberspace opens-
up before them. 
Figure 2. The discipline areas of chapter contributors to recent texts  
focusing upon the relationship between cyberspace and society.  
(Total chapter authors = 177) 
 
 
 Discipline area 
  
The level of sociological input into cyberspatial writings looks 
equally as deficient on a global level.  The second inquiry [refer Figure 2] 
attempted to gain a sense of global developments by examining twelve 
text books that pertained implicitly to the impact and influence that 
                                            
23 There were overlaps between some of these categories.  The category headings in full 
read as follows — Cyberspace, Education, Gender, Globalisation, Health, Indigenous 
matters, Migrants, Religion, Sport & Leisure, Theory, Work & Industry, and Youth Studies.   
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Nu
mb
er
 o
f 
ch
ap
te
rs
 
 
 36 
 
cyberspace is having on the greater society.24
The reasons for this anaemic cyberspatial output from social 
scientists vary, although the most likely cause would appear to be a lack of 
technical confidence and competence on the part of the researchers.  
Hakken alludes to the heavy presence of technophobia within the 
anthropological ranks when writing of the discipline's difficulty in 
recognising cyberspace as a fertile research terrain: 
  All of these books reside in 
the social sciences section of the University of Ballarat library, yet social 
science researchers account for a just over a quarter of the chapters that 
appear in the texts.  The input of sociologists to the writing of these 
chapters is somewhat embarrassing, with only 13% of them belonging to 
writers from the discipline (almost half of these being postgraduate 
students).   
 
Among the manifestations of the difficulty is 
anthropologists' personal technophobia.  Our difficulty 
may have something to do with our individual psychic 
histories, having perhaps picked this field because it 
wasn't science or math, perhaps reinforced by personal 
self-perceptions of ourselves as "people people," not 
"geeks."  Skitishness about technology makes 
anthropologists peculiarly subject to the technicism which 
permeates modern culture, itself arguably connected to 
the tendency of humans to distance themselves 
psychically from technological dependence; schizoid on 
technology, humans tend strongly to treat it as external 
(1999: 65). 
 
Hakken is referring to American anthropologists here, although it is 
probable that the same could be said for social scientists (in general) on a 
worldwide scale.   
 
 
                                            
24 The discipline areas used are — Sociology, Anthropology, Other Social Sciences 
(Politics, social policy, womens studies), Humanities (English, Literature, American 
Studies, Medieval Studies, History, Film & Media), Communication Studies, Technical 
(Computer Studies, and the like), Other Academic fields, and Non-Academic writers. The 
books concerned, in no particular order, are — Jones (1995, 1997, 1998, 1999);  Loader 
(1997, 1998); Shields (1995); Porter (1997); Hawthorne & Klein (1999); Holmes (1997); 
Smith & Kollock  (1999); (Kolko et al. 2000).  Some authors appear more than once. 
 37 
 
The three principal modes of doing research online 
 Social science departments are clearly having difficulty in forming 
and maintaining concrete cyberspatial research links with outside 
academic bodies, but it is heartening to see that academic imperialism 
does not appear to be further constricting developments within the social 
science sphere itself.  Sociology has gained immeasurably from this 
breaking down of inter-disciplinary barriers by gaining access to traditional 
anthropological ideas and approaches that adapt perfectly to the fresh 
sphere of cyberspatial research.  Primary among these anthropological 
approaches is the ethnographic research technique, which is now 
commonly employed in social scientific incursions into the virtual realm.  
Cyberspace ethnographies (otherwise known as cyber-ethnographies) are 
popular with social scientists (Bechar-Israeli, 1995; Cherny, 1999; Correll, 
1995; Miller & Slater, 2000; Morton, 1999) given that, by and large, 
researchers are as limited in their understanding of virtual worlds (at least 
when initially embarking on their study) as the uninitiated.   
Considered cyber-ethnographies, particularly those that incorporate 
extended periods of active participant observation, allow researchers to 
develop a rounded understanding of the virtual environment itself, as well 
as an affinity for, and sometimes with, the participants within the 
environment.  Cyber-ethnographies are crucial then to studies of 
cyberspace and CMC as cultural entities, although it is important to 
remember that cyberspace and CMC can also be utilised as means of 
accessing research subjects and resources for the study of cultural issues 
of any particular type (Hakken, 1999:44; Mann & Stewart, 2000:5; Walther, 
1999:1). 
 With this in mind, it is important to be able to distinguish between 
the differing aims and approaches that exist in the broader cyberspatial 
research sphere. Morton outlines two principal modes of online research 
that help to clarify the real extent of these differences.  The first of these 
modes is known as the 'distanced' form of research, wherein the 
researcher does not necessarily make him or herself known to the 
individual(s) or group(s) being studied (2001a:7).  This mode of research 
is commonly realised through ‘lurking’ (explained in greater detail shortly), 
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content analyses of discussion forum message postings and deep 
analyses of nicknames, signatures and the like that are gleaned from 
online sites. 
 The second mode of online research is the 'involved' form, wherein 
the researcher makes him or herself known and interacts, to varying 
degrees, with others via CMC (2001a:8).  This type of research bears 
unmistakable similarity to the active participation process that has 
characterised many real-life anthropological ethnographies in years gone 
by.  In its online guise it is commonly realised through participatory news 
group observations, interactive MUD (Multi-User Dimension) studies, and 
in the implementation of realtime interviews and e-mail questionnaires, 
both of which will be detailed further below. 
 Morton's research modes are noteworthy for the manner in which 
they group a dispersed and disparate array of study techniques together 
under explanatory terms that are both apt and manageable.  It is all too 
obvious, however, that these terms are only applicable to online research 
as it pertains to cyberspace in general and cyberculture in particular.  For 
this reason, I have decided to coin a third term for the discussion in order 
to account for online research that does not automatically correspond to 
matters of cyberculture.  This type of online research is known as the 
'facilitative' form, wherein the researcher utilises CMC tools to support and 
shape studies that may or may not specifically pertain to cyberspatial 
issues.  Such research is evidenced in the use of e-mail and online 
databases to locate sources and contacts; in the employment of search 
engines of both a basic or advanced nature for the uncovering of data; by 
the use of online translators to access foreign messages and web sites 
and, more recently, through the utilisation of online hard drives and 
storage spaces for the convenient relocation of sizeable data. 
 It should be noted that these modes of online research are by no 
means mutually exclusive.  While all three modes are capable of 
underscoring a study individually, it is not rare to see overlaps occur 
between two, or sometimes all, of the different modes.  The rise and rise 
of e-mail networks and electronic databases in contemporary times has 
led to a scenario whereby precious few studies abstain from employing the 
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'facilitative' mode of research within their overall investigative framework, 
regardless of the phenomenon under review.  This makes 'facilitative' 
online research the most common of the three research types, but the 
other two are growing in prominence as the cyberspatial realm finds ever 
increasing significance within academia.  This particular study utilises all 
three modes of online research in its development, with much of the 
remainder of this chapter devoted to outlining the specific research 
techniques that were chosen for the study, along with the explicit rationale 
that influenced each selection. 
 
 
The rationale for ‘lurking’25
The first stage of the methodological process in this study entailed 
a period of lurking within the Stormfront.org web site.  ‘Lurking’ as the term 
is employed here, pertains to the unobtrusive and unannounced 
observation of discussions and interactions within a cyberspace setting. 
Some researchers prefer to explain lurking by reducing it to the act, on the 
part of Internet users, of reading online messages without responding to 
them (Denzin, 1999; Hine, 2000; Parks & Floyd, 1996; Sharf, 1999).  This 
definition is adequate in most circumstances, but it does tend to unduly 
minimise the depth and importance of the process for many computer 
users.   
 
Lurking is a significant enterprise for newbie (new Internet user), 
discerning participant and interested researcher alike; a fact that is picked-
up on by Holeton when he states that: 
 
Good netiquette requires new participants in electronic 
discussion groups to lurk for a while in order to get a feel 
                                            
25 I would like to stress to the reader, so as to avoid any confusion at a later stage, that I 
would in no way consider myself to be an ‘insider’ among the Stormfront.org ‘community’.  
On only one occasion did I post a message to the site, and this action was predicated by 
the need to give a brief rundown on myself and the research project to several members 
who had expressed concern at my e-mailed requests for interviews.  I do not hold beliefs 
that are in keeping with those of the white nationalist movement and this reality was 
made clear to every Stormfront.org member who made himself or herself available for 
questioning. 
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for the conventions of the group they're joining (1998:439-
440).   
 
Netiquette, by way of explanation, refers to the established behavioural 
protocols of online groups that must be adhered to by participants, 
transgressions of which can be met with stern censure or, in worst case 
scenarios, expulsion from the group.  By and large, netiquette protocols 
tend to correspond closely from Internet group to Internet group, but 
differences ranging from the subtle to the extreme do occasionally occur, 
and group members are not always predisposed toward guiding 
inexperienced newbies through the site's unwritten rules.  
In this 'lurking' stage I essentially acted in a ‘complete observer’ 
capacity, and the subjects of study were unaware that I was documenting 
their ideas and conversations (Babbie, 1989:266). Such an approach, 
being relatively new to the field of social research, brings both benefits and 
limitations to the study.  The major benefit of the procedure is that it allows 
the researcher to investigate “a social setting as preparation for more 
intensive study" (Singleton Jr, Straits & Straits 1993:323). Aside from this, 
the unannounced presence of the researcher allows them to gauge the 
data potential of the study group without having to make any commitments 
to the group beforehand.  It also enables the researcher to view the 
participants acting in a natural and unaffected manner, insofar as this 
occurs in an Internet setting, which is not always possible when the 
participants are aware that they are being monitored.  
At some stage, the researcher has to announce oneself and make 
the necessary commitment in order to progress one’s data gathering 
beyond an elementary level. Then the researcher moves from the role of 
complete observer to that of the ‘participant-as-observer’.  The participant-
as-observer role entails that “observers become participants in the 
activities of the group by revealing their identities and the goals of their 
research" (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996:285; see also Punch, 
1998:188-189; Robson, 1993:197).  
 The rationale for 'lurking' was essentially two-fold.  Firstly, it was 
anticipated that the subjects of study may have compromised and 
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censored their actions were they privy to my status as a researcher.  
Secondly, lurkers predominantly frequent Internet newsgroups, given that 
groups only welcome input if it is relevant and/or original in content.  For 
this reason, most frequenters of discussion fora tend to observe the 
interactions rather than actively participate in them (initially, at least).  It 
was also hoped that by unobtrusively monitoring such conversations and 
interactions over a period of three-months, I may have been able to obtain 
indicators of a community consciousness that exists independently of the 
carefully structured dimensions of the discussion fora itself. 
 
The rationale for content analyses 
 
More than just a single technique, content analysis is 
really a set of Methods for analyzing the symbolic content 
of any communication. The basic idea is to reduce the 
total content of a communication (eg. all of the words or 
all of the visual imagery) to a set of categories that 
represent some characteristic of research interest.  Thus, 
content analysis may involve the systematic description of 
either verbal or nonverbal materials (Singleton Jr et al. 
1993:381, italics in original). 
 
In the previous rationale, details were provided that outlined the initial 
'observatory' stance to be encompassed by this study. Content analysis is 
seen as the most effective and efficient method for the attributing of 
structured meaning to otherwise incomprehensible data.  A carefully 
constructed content analysis framework, derived explicitly from my working 
definitions of identity, community26
 There are several reasons as to why content analysis provides the 
researcher with an advantageous form of research method.  Firstly, the 
 and nationalism [refer Chapters 2, 4 & 
6] would provide the background information that would be crucial to an 
effective implementation of structured interviews with notable figures from 
the focus group. 
                                            
26 This content analysis framework approach was initially trialed in relation to community 
for a conference presentation cum journal article.  See (Thompson, 2001) for greater 
clarity on this. 
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content analysis approach enables the researcher to apply both qualitative 
and quantitative measures to the focus of study (Lewis-Beck, 1994:252). It 
is easy to miss valuable pieces of data during straight observation and, 
more often than not, key investigative directions do not become apparent 
to the researcher until after the observation process is over.  Accordingly, 
content analysis allows the researcher constant access to hard copy 
material from which they can formalise fresh study directions and expand 
upon pre-established ones. 
Secondly, as the method is decidedly unobtrusive to implement, it is 
likely to produce a richer quality of data given that those being studied 
would not temper their discussions in the knowledge that their 
conversations would be acutely scrutinised (Babbie, 1989:309; Lewis-
Beck, 1994:252: Robson, 1993:280, Wilhelm, 2000:90-92). This is of 
crucial importance to a study, not only on account of the rich information it 
supplies, but also for the insights that it provides as to the identity traits 
and worldviews of potential research subjects. 
Thirdly, content analysis is both cost and time effective, and does 
not present the logistical problems that can be associated with alternative 
methods; such as questionnaires and surveys (Babbie, 1989:309; Robson, 
1993:280).  For many researchers the cost of implementing questionnaires 
and surveys has to be built into the overall research framework and, 
depending on the number of participants desired, can result in hefty 
expenses for the purpose of mailing alone.  Content analyses also put the 
researcher in control of temporal aspects of the study, as the project is not 
dependent on the researcher organising data collection around the time 
schedules of the research subjects. 
 
Rationale for data-mining 
 The next step in the methodological process involved long-term 
'data-mining' of the Stormfront.org site.  Unlike the lurking process which 
was unabashedly qualitative in scope, 'data-mining' permitted the 
researcher to add quantitative measures, albeit in small scale, to the 
study.  It should be stressed that the data mining techniques employed 
here were low-level manual ones, as distinct from the high-density 
 43 
 
automatic techniques that are enabled through the use of expensive 
computer software.  Interestingly the Stormfront.org site utilises such 
software for its own record purposes, even though programs such as 
Webtrends are more commonly used by commercial sites as a means of 
keeping track of consumer patterns.   
Webtrends, as with all data mining software gleans information from 
'cookies', a computerised innovation described here by Jones: 
 
Cookies are files stored on a computer's hard drive by 
web browser software that allow web sites to silently track 
the user's movements from site to site.  They can hold 
information about the user (user name, passwords, pages 
accessed, computer type, etc.) (Jones, 1999:26).    
 
Having assembled the necessary raw data from the cookies, Webtrends is 
then capable of reorganising the information into polished tables and 
graphs that provide detailed information on a range of categories, such as: 
global regions of users, most requested pages on the site, most active 
countries, daily user activity, user density by hour and day, and so on  
(Black, 1995).   
 'Data-mining' software like Webtrends can be good for gathering 
information from.  In the case of Stormfront.org, however, it is somewhat 
limited in that it is only activated for 2-3 months of the year.  This is 
obviously sufficient for meeting the purposes of the Stormfront.org site 
owner, but it certainly leaves the researcher wanting more.  The research 
potential of software such as Webtrends is clearly evident and, for Internet 
researchers with funding dollars to spare, the possibilities for innovative 
studies are seemingly boundless.  McLaughlin, Goldberg, Ellison & Lucas 
(1999) exemplified this point with their study on Internet audiences.   In 
their study, McLaughlin et al. combined high-tech cameras with Webtrends 
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software to monitor user access to a 'virtual museum' across a nine-month 
period.27
In most situations, however, manually implemented 'data-mining' 
can be perfectly acceptable, depending on the search capabilities inherent 
in the site(s) being studied.  One of the strengths of the Stormfront.org site 
is its diverse array of search engines, which enable users to track such 
information as: past messages (by date, author or title) and registered 
users (by nickname, city, state, country or homepage) (Black, 1995). I 
found this second search capability to be exceedingly helpful in tracking 
down interview/questionnaire subjects, along with monitoring membership 
changes on the site by USA state and county. 
 
Two other small forms of data-mining were also mobilised in the 
construction of this thesis.  The first of these involved the monthly 
gathering of Stormfront.org web site figures as compiled by WebSideStory 
software contained on the Stormfront.org site.  WebSideStory functions in 
a similar fashion to Webtrends, although it tends to present its information 
in a more condensed and user-friendly form than its counterpart.  
WebSideStory allowed me to closely monitor overall attendance and 
participation on the Stormfront.org site by tracking the daily and monthly 
‘impressions’ and ‘uniques’ that the software was recording.28
The second subsidiary form of data-mining to be pursued here 
necessitated the printing-off of the Stormfront.org site's entire list of 
registered users.  This list was required for the building of a table that 
categorises online nicknames into varying typologies [refer Chapter 3].  
This table endeavours to highlight the depth and diversity of nicknames 
presented on the Stormfront.org site, drawing its methodological 
 
                                            
27 The term 'virtual' as it is used in this instance differs somewhat from the virtual that is 
commonly used to refer to completely computerised environments.  The 'virtual museum' 
constructed by these researchers was actually a fleshspace museum presented to online 
users via cameras.  These cameras were sophisticated enough to allow viewers to 
manipulate the angles from which they were viewing specific museum pieces. 
28 Hits on a website pertain to the occasions on which the particular site is accessed by 
an Internet user.  ‘Impressions’ and ‘uniques’ are both categories of hits, with the former 
relating to the number of times the site is accessed in total and the latter detailing the 
number of times the site was accessed by a new Internet user.  It is not uncommon for 
Internet users to access the same site several times in the one day. 
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inspiration from similar works undertaken by Bechar-Israeli (1995) and 
Morton (2001b). 
 
Rationale for e-mail questionnaires & online interviews 
 The final section of the methodological process involved the 
conducting of e-mail questionnaires or ICQ (online chat vehicle) interviews 
with selected Stormfront.org participants.  This process was easily the 
most problematic of the three, for several reasons.  Firstly, there was 
uncertainty over what constituted an acceptable number of research 
subjects to survey.  Given the qualitative nature of the study, it was 
eventually decided that twenty subjects would provide a viable sample 
group.  Secondly, there was uncertainty over which users would be 
chosen to participate, given the enormous number of registered users on 
the site.  In the end, an arbitrary qualification figure of 20+ (log-ons to the 
site) was chosen so as to ensure that the subjects had sufficient 
knowledge of the fora to credibly negotiate the surveys.  Thirdly, concerns 
existed as to how the desired candidates would be recruited for the study, 
given that I had remained a lurker on the fora prior to the recruitment drive.  
The final problem mentioned above was further exacerbated by indications 
(from Stormfront.org users to other inquiring researchers) that interviews 
would only be agreed to if conducted on the Stormfront.org chat server. I 
was not keen on this approach, as chat servers invariably involve multiple 
users making for a very complex and confusing interviewing 
environment.29
 ICQ is the world's largest and most popular Internet chat vehicle, 
encompassing millions of registered users worldwide.  Its diversity of 
function allows for one-to-one, one-to-few, or one-to-many 
  To circumvent this problem, I decided to recruit 
Stormfront.org members from outside of the site itself, and turned to ICQ 
to achieve this task. 
                                            
29 It was also felt that by holding interviews on the Stormfront.org chat server, the 
possibility existed of the interviewees banding together to browbeat me with ideological 
dogma.  Admittedly, this was only a possibility, but I was nevertheless keen to ensure that 
there was no chance of such a situation arising. 
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communications in either synchronous or asynchronous format. Outside of 
this diversity, the most appealing aspect of the ICQ program (from the 
researcher's perspective) is its broad internal search engine. Suitably 
impressed by the search capabilities of both Stormfront.org and ICQ, it 
occurred to me that the chance existed to revolve the recruitment process 
around each engine.  The thinking here was that the huge dimensions of 
the ICQ server made it highly probable that some Stormfront.org users 
would also be ICQ participants.  As well as this, it was also felt that white 
nationalists may be reluctant to talk to unknown researchers in the general 
scheme of things, but may be more prone to doing so in the relaxed and 
recreational setting of ICQ.30
 Semi-structured interviewing is a conventional form of social 
research, although in this instance it is rendered slightly uncommon by 
virtue of the fact that it is done entirely in cyberspace.  While this can be 
viewed as an apt technique in that a thesis dealing with cyberspace 
matters is researched largely through the auspices of computer-mediated 
technology, it is also pertinent for logistical and economic reasons.  As the 
participants of this study, with just one exception, reside outside of 
Australia, the difficulty associated with arranging and attending face-to-
face interviews would be extremely difficult to overcome.  Compounding 
this problem are the enormous costs (airfares, accommodation, meals) 
associated with executing the in-person style of interview (Schonlau, et al. 
2002:10-13). Computer-mediated technology overcomes these concerns 
by providing an interview vehicle (e-mail or chatserver) that is accessible 
by anyone with a modem, anywhere in the world, at any time of day (Chen 
  The whole premise of people joining ICQ is 
to allow them to chat with people on a global scale, so if I could locate 
Stormfront.org users on ICQ then the chances were good of getting them 
to agree to take part. 
                                            
 
30 ICQ is a 'relaxed' and 'recreational' environment in that (unlike other virtual domains) 
there are no set parameters for interaction on the medium.  Topical chatrooms and 
thematic discussion fora, by way of contrast, will commonly censure interactions between 
participants that drift from the setline of discussion pursued by the group.  On ICQ, 
however, participants are free to direct their interactions in any way they see fit. 
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& Hinton, 1999:8).  As a bonus, the only costs associated with online 
interviews are the small expenses that are incurred through the hiring of 
hours for Internet use.  Aside from these advantages, realtime interviewing 
online also offers the prospect of full automatic transcription of data to 
computer hard drive and greater subject objectivity through anonymity 
(Chen & Hinton, 1999:9). 
 For all the obvious positives that are apparent in computer-
mediated interviewing, there are also potential negatives that need to be 
considered.  Firstly, given that a defining characteristic of cyberspace 
pertains to its capacity to facilitate the cloaking and embellishing of 
individual identities, it is almost impossible to be certain that the person 
being interviewed is really who they profess to be. Secondly, in order for 
an interview to be successful “the respondents must feel that their 
interaction with the interviewer will be pleasant and satisfying" (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996:239).  Face-to-face interviews make it far 
easier for researchers to put the respondent(s) at ease, by way of 
appropriate use of body language and the deployment of smiles and 
laughter as a means of building rapport and confidence.  Conversely, the 
lack of face-to-face contact prevents the researcher from reading the non-
verbal signals that emanate from a respondent when they are annoyed by 
or uncomfortable with a particular line of questioning (Mann & Stewart, 
2000:126).  Finally, computer-mediated interviewing, as with telephone 
interviewing, provides the respondent with the capability to 'break-off' the 
interview before it is completed, by simply switching off their modem 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996:244).  It is also possible for the 
interview to be inadvertently sabotaged by a technical malfunction (ie. the 
computer crashing, or the Internet service provider unexpectedly going off-
line). 
 Initially, I had hoped to administer all of the questionnaires via ICQ 
in interview format.  Unfortunately, interviews could not be organised in 
half of the cases, meaning that ten of the questionnaires had to be 
implemented via e-mail. E-mail questionnaires are also a promising and 
effective research tool, offering advantages such as: low cost; respondent 
anonymity; minimised interviewer bias; greater reach (than realtime 
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interviews, given the broad use of e-mail); and efficient time to volume 
ratios (Sheehan & Hoy, 1999:4-5).  The drawbacks to e-mail 
questionnaires include: possibility of respondent neglecting to answer; 
difficulty with returning questionnaires due to technical glitches; and the 
prospect of e-mail addresses becoming inactive at unexpected moments 
(Sheehan & Hoy, 1999:5).   
The last factor, 'Internet churn', is an exceedingly common one, 
reflecting the dense location of Internet users in workplaces and education 
facilities where online usage is mostly free of charge or heavily subsidised.  
As workers and students leave their jobs and complete their studies their 
Internet accounts are discarded along with their e-mail addresses (Mann & 
Stewart, 2000:30).  Internet churn is also an inevitable by-product of the 
intense competition that occurs among Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
with netizens regularly changing accounts and addresses in order to take 
advantage of cost-cutting offers.31
 All of the respondents to the e-mail questionnaire and follow-ups 
reacted favourably to the process.  Ostensibly, they decided to choose the 
method over realtime interviewing because it fitted more neatly into their 
online schedules and it also allowed them greater scope to reflect on their 
answers.  From my viewpoint the information gleaned from the 
questionnaires was of a comparable standard to that arising out of the 
interviews and the time delays were largely insignificant.  It is worth noting 
that all respondents to the e-mail questionnaire also indicated a 
  Some would also suggest that the lack 
of interviewer ability to probe answers and the probability of respondent 
confusion over some questions would also count as significant 
weaknesses here.  This is true, but such limitations are easily overcome 
by the sending of follow-up e-mails, which are generally well received by 
subjects, although this can extend the timeline of the research project.  
                                            
 
31 More and more netizens are becoming aware of the pitfalls associated with 'Internet 
churn' and are combating it by signing-up for primary (or secondary) e-mail accounts with 
large online bodies such as Hotmail and Yahoo.  These e-mail accounts can be accessed 
from any Internet enabled CPU in the world and are not dependent on user affiliation to a 
particular ISP. 
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willingness to participate in future questionnaires if the opportunity arose.  
Despite this, all research subjects indicated that face-to-face interviewing 
remains the most satisfactory data gathering technique, followed by 
realtime interviewing and e-mail questionnaires, in that order. 
 
Organising and implementing the interview/questionnaires 
Having decided on this approach, I then spent a weekend switching back 
and forth between The ICQ and Stormfront.org search engines, piecing 
together a list of users that frequented both communication vehicles.  At 
the conclusion of this exercise, in excess of 70 Stormfront.org users that 
met the criteria had been located on the ICQ search engine.  I had been 
hoping for a final tally of 60 here, so the initial count exceeded 
expectations.  The feeling was that for a subject group of 20, at least 60 
invitees would be required given the tendency for most people to decline 
or ignore requests for questionnaires and interviews.  Unfortunately, the 
number fell back to 55 when subsequent investigations revealed that 
some of the ICQ accounts were no longer active. 
From here, I paged invitations to participate in the study to 55 
persons via their ICQ accounts.  Of these invitations, 10 replied within a 
couple of days to accept the offer, 5 replied in the same period wanting 
further information, 2 sent e-mails declining the invitation, and the 
remaining 38 issued no response.  Over the ensuing three weeks I 
continued negotiations with the wavering 5 (eventually convincing them all 
to take part) and entered into preliminary (ice-breaking) semi-regular ICQ 
interactions with the ten initial acceptances.  Finally, after going a month 
since the initial round of invitations, I decided to reapproach the 38 that 
failed to respond, this time directing invitations directly to their e-mail 
accounts.  From this second round of offers, 7 persons responded within a 
fortnight to provisionally accept, contingent on receiving further information 
as to the aims of the project, 1 replied after 6 weeks to accept with 
apologies for the time delay, and the remaining 30 again declined to 
respond.  
A few things are worth mentioning about this recruitment drive. 
While the ICQ server is impressive in its communication capabilities, it is 
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clearly unwise to trust in it entirely.  All 8 respondents from the second 
round of offers indicated that they had not received the initial ICQ page.  
The main reason for this is that people can have more than one ICQ 
account, which are generally linked to their e-mail addresses.  E-mail 
addresses can change frequently and subsequent ICQ accounts can 
essentially become totally removed from previous ones, particularly if the 
user concerned opts for a different ICQ nickname to the one used 
previously.  Each individual ICQ account has its own unique pager, which 
functions similarly to e-mail, delivering a message to the ICQ account 
when the user next decides to access it.  These pagers carry no links to 
the individual e-mail addresses of the ICQ user, meaning that if a user has 
opted for a new ICQ account, the page sent to the old one is rendered 
useless.  For this reason, any important approaches to ICQ users should 
be made via e-mail (where indicated), as this is clearly a more reliable 
mechanism than the ICQ pager.   
 This left me with 23 confirmed respondents and the focus then 
shifted to implementing the questionnaires and interviews.  Initially, it was 
hoped that realtime interviewing could be employed for all 23 subjects, as 
it was felt that this was the most efficient and effective technique available.  
Ten of the preselected 23 respondents eventually carried-out realtime 
interviews, which—in a positive sense—was retrospectively preferable to 
all respondents doing so, as it presented the possibility of drawing 
interesting comparisons between the two research styles.  All 10 appeared 
to enjoy the ICQ process, with each of them indicating that they would 
happily do another realtime interview in future (if asked to do so).   
The main difficulty associated with the interviews (from my side) 
was actually getting the interviews started.  Respondents would faithfully 
indicate firm starting times only to be no-shows when the time finally 
arrived.  Others would provide overly flexible timeframes, ensuring that the 
researcher often spent long periods online for no result.  Fragile 
technology also hindered the interview timetable, with the researcher's ISP 
failing to provide access to the Internet on two vital occasions; a problem 
that also affected 2 of the respondents at their end.  Surprisingly, the one 
to one and a half-hour suggested time for completion of each interview 
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proved decidedly optimistic, with interviews ranging from two to four and a 
half-hours in duration.  This exemplifies another potential pitfall of online 
interviewing.  Some of the respondents refrained from devoting their entire 
attention to the researcher during the interviews, preferring instead to 
maintain several conversations with other users throughout the interview.  
This obviously served to elongate interview times, as lengthy delays 
accompanied the return of each question while interviewees took the 
opportunity to intermittently answer communications from others. 
 In spite of these difficulties, the information gleaned from the 
interviews was most encouraging.  I did, however, receive interesting 
criticism from my supervisory team with regard to the delivery style 
employed for the interviews.  It was suggested that I had fallen down 
slightly in four areas — providing too much, and possibly inappropriate, 
feedback to some answers, behaving in too ‘familiar’ a manner with the 
subjects, missing key opportunities to probe further on answers, and 
lapsing—on occasion—into self-deprecatory statements.  
On one level, these criticisms are valid ones that probably bear 
witness to the relative inexperience of the interviewer, in what is really a 
very specialised research technique.  On the other hand, the comments 
also reflect the supervisors' lack of familiarity with the ICQ environment 
and the laidback climate that characterises interactions that take place 
within it.  It is also worth noting that considerable preparation went into 
these interviews, by way of sharing information and anecdotes (both ways) 
with the research subjects.   
The employment of an extended informal ‘lead-up’ stage to online 
realtime interviews can be an important investment for researchers that 
are keen to probe their subjects deeply for answers, as Mann & Stewart 
suggest when writing: 
 
(t)hat mutual sharing online can increase trust and 
emotional connection and may even allow interviewers to 
tap into areas which might be difficult to address FTF 
[face to face].  It should be noted that researchers 
themselves may also find it easier to be relaxed and to 
open up online than FTF…  Technical ease of contact in 
CMC gives the option of repeating interview interactions 
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over time.  There is evidence that trust and warmth in 
CMC relationships increases over extended interactions 
(2000: 138). 
 
The understandable perception (on the part of the supervisors) that I was 
acting somewhat flippantly and "giving too much of myself" to the 
interviewees was thus, in some way, precipitated by their lack of access to 
this ‘lead-up’ stage.  Put simply, the researcher was aware that his actions 
could be viewed by some as being ‘lowbrow’ in tone, but was nevertheless 
keen to maintain established interaction conventions for the sake of 
respondent confidence and comfort. 
  
Ethical matters 
 Ethical concerns, in relation to this study, only appeared 
problematic with regard to the processes of lurking and interviewing.  In 
the end, however, it was decided that such concerns would not prove 
morally or legally insurmountable, a belief that was shared by the 
University of Ballarat's Ethics Committee.  There were two mitigating 
reasons for arriving at this decision.  In the first instance, most contributors 
to newsgroup discussions are identifiable only by nicknames or first 
names, ensuring that their true identities cannot be compromised; in the 
second instance, any recording of information related in these discussions 
is documented in a manner that ensures the anonymity of the participants 
concerned.   
 The University of Ballarat Ethics Committee adjudicates on the 
ethical elements at play in all major research projects conducted by 
University staff and students.  This study was the first cyberspace related 
project to go before the Committee and the lack of clearly prescribed 
ethical guidelines for investigating the virtual realm made the methodology 
used in this thesis difficult to approve.  The Committee was unfamiliar with 
'lurking', but reluctantly allowed for its implementation upon ascertaining 
the frequency by which 'lurking' occurs in virtual environments.  This aside, 
the Committee was also troubled by the implication that I would be able to 
ascertain participant stress levels via the Internet.  The committee 
stressed that interviews and/or questionnaires be ceased upon the first 
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sign of respondent distress and, unlike in fleshspace scenarios, this can 
be hard to pick up on whilst online. 
 In most circumstances, copyright laws protect the written works of 
individuals, but this does not automatically apply to written material on the 
World Wide Web (WWW), as Mann & Stewart explain: 
 
absolute copyright is also mitigated by the concept of 
'implied licence'.  For example, each individual may own 
the messages they transmit in CMC, but if copyright were 
to be enforced literally no one could download or view the 
message.  In sending the message there is an implied 
licence to read, or even archive, the information it 
contains (2000:46). 
 
'Implied licence' is often formally encouraged on web sites wherein the 
webmaster concerned places a disclaimer on the site warning netizens 
that anything they choose to post on the site will automatically become 
public domain property.  This is true of the Stormfront.org site and stands 
as the third reason why concerns over confidentiality or anonymity did not 
serve to hinder the methodological direction of this thesis. 
In spite of this, it must be noted that ethical safeguards are not only 
designed to protect the interests of those being studied, as researchers 
can also find themselves compromised by elements of the research 
process.   'Lurking', for instance, does carry with it the slight risk that 
participants within a focus group could react with hostility towards the 
observing researcher.  At a medium level such hostility could result in 
verbal attacks on the researcher (flaming), or–alternatively–group 
members could lobby the group manager in the hope of having the 
researcher blocked from accessing the group.  In a worst case scenario 
such hostility could lead to group members sabotaging the computer 
equipment of the observing researcher.   
It should be emphasised here that the probability of such negative 
reaction to the study was always negligible, with most newsgroup hostility 
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being directed towards ‘Bashers’.32
Studies of this type, as is the case with most cyberspace research, 
should require profound researcher sensitivity to ethical concerns.  Up 
until now, it has been considered acceptable for cyber researchers to 
proceed with lurking and message post gathering methods purely on the 
basis that online communications are public domain property, thus 
absolving the researcher from consultation with the individual(s) 
responsible for creating the data, prior to employing it in the study.  If 
cyberspace is to be fully accepted as real world space then research 
practices such as this need to be carefully reconsidered.  As a general 
rule, social science research projects employed in everyday circumstances 
almost invariably require the researcher(s) involved to make the subject(s) 
of their study aware that they are part of a study project.  At the very least, 
it is decorum to inform subjects that writings or comments attributable to 
them are likely to appear in the finished piece of work.   
  The concerns outlined above are 
entirely contingent on group users being opposed to the prospect of 
having lurkers present in their domain.  With particular regard to 
‘Stormfront.org’ it was not perceived that the group would display such 
hostility, given their propensity for allowing non-regulars to log-on to the 
group as (observe only) guests. 
 Sharf (1999:252-255) has constructed a five-step process aimed at 
bringing cyber researchers into synch with fleshspace ethical practices.  
Sharf’s steps are a promising starting point for concerned scholars 
wanting to heighten the professional image of cyberspace investigators.  
In keeping with this objective, such scholars would be well advised to 
ignore Sharf’s afterthought suggestion, which infers that some online 
subject groups (child pornographers and racists, by way of example) 
should be automatically exempted from ethical conventions.  I can 
understand the sentiment behind this view, but without wishing to defend 
either of the aforementioned groups, I would nonetheless express concern 
                                            
32 ‘Bashers’ are people that log-on to newsgroups with the sole intent of harassing, 
abusing or insulting the regular group users.  Correll coined this term in her study of the 
Lesbian Café, and it will also be employed where necessary in this thesis (1995:12-13). 
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at any ad hoc approaches to deciding who is worthy of ethical 
consideration and who is not.  It is expected that, wherever possible, a 
conscientious researcher will adopt a pragmatic and objective approach to 
their study.  Such an approach should also carry over to the research 
subjects focused upon for the study.  If you are willing to ask an individual 
to take part in your study then that person must be accorded the same 
respect and rights that other participants receive.  Research subjects can 
be difficult to recruit at the best of times and good researchers, aside from 
constructing quality research projects, are duty bound to ensure that the 
available subject pool is not further depleted by inconsistent and overtly 
subjective research practices. 
 
Closing thoughts 
 As participation on the WWW continues to burgeon and the funding 
opportunities for universities (particularly in social science disciplines) 
continues to recede, the need for time efficient, cost effective, and wide 
reaching research techniques will only increase.  While the methods 
presented in this thesis have their limitations, it is nevertheless felt that 
they offer sufficient advantages and deviations from conventional 
approaches, to at least ensure their consideration in appropriate future 
projects.  Because of this it is hoped that greater energies will be devoted 
to online research methodologies during the coming years. 
 While matters of content are extremely important in cyberspatial 
studies, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Internet is first and 
foremost an information and communications network.  Many academics 
tend to lose sight of this point, which hinders their ability to identify and 
utilise CMC vehicles to the fullest.  This is a shame, given that the use of 
vehicles such as ICQ is actually quite easy with a little practice, but they 
remain largely hidden from academic view.  It is the role of interested 
online researchers to bring such vehicles into the academic environment 
for inspection and considered debate. 
 Results emanating from the aforementioned research 
methodologies will be interspersed throughout chapters three, five and 
seven of this thesis.  For now, however, attention will be shifted away from 
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methodological concerns and placed firmly on notions of identity as they 
have developed historically within the social sciences.  The following 
chapter will focus implicitly on identity as it pertains to the individual, 
pushing a line of investigation that considers the intricate construction of 
self as influenced by a range of qualifying aspects, such as: familial 
upbringing, corporeal matters, and gender concerns.  
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CHAPTER 
2 
 
Analysing Identity: Unravelling the 
idiosyncrasies of the individual 
 
 
Introducing identity 
 This chapter will begin the three-part discussion of identity by 
proffering an explication of the key ideas and issues that are applicable to 
the concept of self-identity.  It focuses primarily on aspects of ‘embodied’ 
identity, which will provide ample background material for the following 
chapter, where the impetus will move toward online identities.  In terms of 
structure, the section will open with an outline of the social theorists who 
have been chosen to explore the self-identity problematic and, in some 
cases, the wider conceptual terrain inherent in this thesis.  From here the 
commentary will centre upon the divergent ways in which identity is formed 
within individuals; giving careful consideration to a range of contributory 
elements, such as interaction with others, familial upbringing, bodily 
influences, occupational effects and gender concerns.  
 The discussion on self-identity that is presented here will pave the 
way for an exploration of the ways in which aspects of self both shape and 
influence the behaviour and actions of individuals online.  In turn, these 
behaviours and actions contribute to the 'extensions of self' that are 
actualised by netizens in their pursuit of community and nationalist 
belonging.  In this way, all three key concepts addressed in this thesis can 
be seen to share the same single common denominator — identity.  Self-
identity thus becomes the first point of contention in a line of thought that 
stretches from the individual at the micro-level, through the individual 
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among other individuals at the meso-level (community), on to the grouping 
of individuals among other groups of individuals at the macro-level 
(nationalism).  Cyberspace provides a fascinating environment in which to 
investigate this multifarious construction of identity, but before discussion 
can turn to the way that this is achieved in the specialised sphere of CMC, 
it is essential that guidelines for the investigation be plotted from a 
preliminary analysis of the wider identity landscape.   
The term self-identity will be expressed throughout this study by 
way of a varied range of substitutable terms.33
 
 These will include sense of 
self, individual identity, personal identity, personality, subjective identity 
and persona.  It is understood that each of these terms implies a differing 
meaning when applied to a differing context, but—other than on occasions 
where their usage is alternatively specified—in this body of work they will 
all refer to the one same concept. 
Outlining the theorists 
There are restrictions apparent in pursuing an investigation of self-
identity from a sociological/anthropological paradigm. Self-identity, not 
surprisingly, lends itself more explicitly to the realm of behavioural 
sciences and the discipline of psychology in particular.  Sociology, by way 
of contrast, has been largely ambivalent about inquiring into self-identity, 
as McCrone makes clear in writing that: 
 
Until recently, sociology had little new to say about 
identity.  The term had largely migrated into the reserve of 
micro-sociology, where it was inextricably bound up with 
social psychological notions of 'self'.  In the rest of 
sociology, it became quite unproblematic (1998:31). 
 
This is the reasoning behind the somewhat peculiar decision (on the 
surface, at least) to include a discussion on the ideas of Erik Erikson 
throughout this section.  On the one hand, Erikson—having written 
extensively on the subject of individual identity—would be difficult to 
                                            
33 It is also worth noting here that the research subjects encountered in the empirical 
framework of this study also had a tendency for referring to self-identity in a variety of 
forms. 
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overlook in a serious study of this topic, regardless of the discipline 
employed.  On the other hand, Erikson's prominent reputation as a 
psychoanalyst adumbrates his subsidiary interests in the social sciences 
(more broadly) and social anthropology (in particular).   
 Some branches of psychoanalytic thought have, as a general rule,  
tended to approach the concept of self-identity from a constrictive 
framework that unambiguously aligns to a belief that 'the child is the parent 
of the adult.'34
The criticisms of Frosh and Elliott suggest that this approach is 
deficient for four clearly definable reasons.  Firstly, it falls victim to social 
determinism by suggesting that self-identity develops in children during a 
specific period of the life-cycle and that this process will be binding 
throughout the individual's entire existence.  Secondly, it fails to 
adequately account for those individuals who achieve seemingly well-
adjusted adult lives after having endured decidedly inadequate childhoods.  
Thirdly, it limply expresses self-identity as a static reactionary mechanism, 
which is incongruous when assessed against the predominantly dynamic 
proactive nature of the human being.  Finally, it affords no scope (outside 
of the primary care givers) for external influences to play a part in the 
emotional shaping of the individual and their life experiences.   
  In this way, identity formation is viewed as a finite function 
that occurs only in the early formative years of the child (Frosh, 1989:63). 
The unspoken premise of this approach is that the child, in concert with its 
parents, or primary care givers, will absorb, in toto, the necessary moral 
and ethical information on which it will base all of its future decisions as an 
adult.  It is presupposed, therefore, that a child can only evolve into a 
healthy, viably functioning adult if its primary care givers performed 
capably in fulfilling their nurturing role(s).   
                                                                                                                       
 
34 It should be stressed that, whilst this framework is common to psychoanalytic theory, it 
is by no means indicative of the entire terrain applicable to the discipline.  There are at 
least eight different ways by which psychoanalytic theory can assess notions of self-
identity.  Elliott lists these as: the structural division of ego, id and superego; topological 
structure of consciousness, preconsciousness and the unconscious; defence-
mechanisms motivated by ego-organization; organary drives which are 'object-seeking'; 
the conjecture of 'true' and 'false' selves; the process of splitting ranging from paranoid-
schizoid positions to depressive positions; an imaginary structure of misrecognition and 
illusion; and a process of linguistic closure in which repression is constituted.  See Elliott 
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Notwithstanding these criticisms, psychoanalysis still provides 
insights into the human condition that could prove very useful here.  With 
this in mind, it is proposed that the ideas of Erikson will be utilised at 
appropriate junctures of this thesis. On a basic level Erikson approaches 
the broad concept of identity by expressing it in terms of four mutually 
exclusive, yet regularly intertwining, sub-categories of the term: 'sense of 
individual identity'; 'continuity of personal character'; 'ego synthesis'; and 
'inner solidarity' (Erikson, 1959:109). 
 'Sense of individual identity', as the term suggests, refers to the 
capacity of a human individual to arrive at a conscious state of self-
realisation.  The 'continuity of personal character' qualifier flows-on from 
the state of self-realisation process, whereby the individual carefully 
maintains a personality that unambiguously portrays his/her sense of self 
to others.  Elliott explains this neatly when he writes of how: 
 
Implicit in this is the belief that there is something stable 
and durable about the self.  I believe myself to be the 
same 'self' as I was yesterday; and, for purposeful social 
life to be possible at all, I must also believe that others 
have a fairly coherent sense of their own identity (1994:5). 
 
The third category, 'ego synthesis', basically amounts to the thoughts and 
actions around which the continuous personal character is constructed, 
organised and maintained.   
Erikson's perspective on identity construction unambiguously 
presupposes the need for stable and solid points of reference from which 
individuals can assess and moderate their unique senses of self.  This 
view runs contrary to contemporary cyberspatial interpretations of identity 
construction that present virtual selves as identities in crisis.  As these 
writers see it, virtual identities are removed from stable referents, 
incoherent in shape and form, contradictory in function, and subject to 
multiplicity of representation (Cheung, 2000; Robins, 1996; Turkle, 1995).  
I will be arguing against such standpoints on virtual identity, contending 
instead that virtual selves commonly develop from like stimuli to 
                                                                                                                       
(1994:8-9) for further discussion.  
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fleshspace identities, and will thus necessarily employ the same stable 
and solid points of reference that Erikson alludes to. 
When Erikson's three elements are successfully realised by the 
individual, they will then reach the stage of 'inner solidarity'.  At such time 
the individual has arrived at a point where they feel confident about the 
solidity and stability engendered in their sense of self, while also realising 
that this composed persona has become sufficiently developed to enable 
them to comfortably position themselves within a wider group (community) 
identity (Erikson, 1959:109).  Fundamentally, the process of identity 
construction that Erikson espouses is one that seeks, as its overriding 
goal, a competent level of ontological awareness for the individual 
concerned.  It is likely, however, that the robustness of such ontological 
awareness could not be fully assessed until the persona in question was 
trialed within a wider group dynamic; which presents an appropriate 
opportunity to bring Goffman into the argument. 
Erving Goffman devoted much of his career to analysing and 
explaining the dramaturgical dimensions of everyday human interactions.  
The dramaturgical approach borrowed from William Shakespeare's 
assertion that "all the world is a stage", by aligning the concept of human 
interaction with the notion of role-playing as it exists in entertainment stage 
plays (Abercrombie et al. 1994:127; Branaman, 1997:xlviii; Burns, 1992:6 
Waters, 1994: 27).  
 As such, Goffman's main intention was "to show that individuals are 
not simply passive receptors of social definitions of their identity.  They 
actively manage the impressions that they wish others to receive from 
them" (Waters & Crook, 1993:105).  This action-centred approach to social 
situations is synonymous with the theoretical discipline of 'symbolic 
interactionism'.  Symbolic interactionism was inspired by noted American 
sociologist, George H. Mead (1863-1931) who argued that:  
 
The self is something which has a development; it is not 
initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social 
experience and activity, that is, develops in the given 
individual as a result of his (sic) relations to that process 
as a whole and to other individuals within that process 
(1934:135). 
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According to Mead, a "self-conscious human individual" would absorb and 
reproduce the social norms and mores of the particular social group, which 
he/she was most favourably predisposed toward (1934:156).  The choice 
of social group could alter at any time, however, as the individual 
concerned found his/her 'life goals' better suited to those being actively 
sought by alternative social bodies.  In this way, the individual tailors their 
surroundings as best they can to meet their preferred circumstances 
(Willis, 1993:100). 
Functionalist theory dominated much sociological thought during 
various stages of the twentieth-century, but at the turn of the century 
symbolic interactionism (in general) and Erving Goffman (in particular) are 
enjoying a new period of academic favour and intellectual respectability.  
Structure is no longer a source of comfort for many individuals.  The 
prosperity that symbolised capitalism in the post-World War 2 decades has 
been replaced by a seemingly endless cycle of recession that has resulted 
in disturbingly high levels of unemployment.  A strict adherence to 
administrative bureaucracy has also led to a state of paradoxical 
widespread inefficiency where citizens are commonly ignored and 
overlooked in preference for clinical expediency.  Put simply, individuals 
have become disenchanted with state imposed control measures and are 
seeking greater control over their own destinies.  For symbolic 
interactionists human action provides a basis for optimism, whereby 
individuals actively create and recreate society in accordance with their 
own perceptions of free will, goal setting and subjective motivation (Willis, 
1993:99-100). Where rigid institutional structure fails, flexible human 
action prevails, or so the interactionists would have us believe.   
 Flexible human action, as Goffman articulated it, is carried out in 
the everyday world by way of role-playing.  Individuals, in the course of 
their routine lives, find themselves playing a range of carefully constructed 
roles in order to successfully negotiate a range of specific tasks and 
expectations.  These roles are made necessary as a consequence of the 
structured, and somewhat ceremonial, nature of human interaction, which 
enables individuals to place themselves within a societal context in 
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accordance with the actions and appearances that are conveyed by those 
around them.35  As such, these roles are not of a fixed nature, but rather 
are flexible and set in response to the physical and/or emotional climate 
that an individual inhabits at any given time.36
 Erving Goffman has investigated the intricate nature of human 
expression at length.  It is for this reason that the thesis will draw 
theoretical inspiration from two of Goffman's works, The Presentation of 
the self in everyday life (1959) and Stigma (1963).  Whilst these studies 
(circa 1960s) predate the contemporary computer-mediated 
communications phenomenon, they nevertheless remain integral for the 
insights they provide into carefully constructed and subtly manipulated 
modes of human interaction.  More specifically, Goffman's ideas on role 
playing and team performance will underscore my own discussion of 
virtual identity and community, wherein elements such as netiquette and 
group behavioural conventions serve to moderate individual 
understandings of, and participation in, online environments.  The need for 
netizens to conform to the requirements of the group so as to participate in 
it effectively further detracts from the 'multiple selves' approach to virtual 
identity, with most online users showing a greater tendency toward 
singular expressions of self that more readily gain acceptance from other 
group members (Kendall, 1999:65; Morton, 2001b:77). 
 
 There are three main reasons why Anthony Giddens has been 
selected as the third key theorist on which to build a broader discourse of 
the concept of identity.  Firstly, he will provide the discussion with a 
dimension that is decidedly contemporary and unmistakably sociological. 
                                            
35 Goffman’s view is necessarily founded on the notion that individuals rely on a sound 
comprehension of both self and others in order to successful negotiate human 
interactions in everyday life.  The importance of consciousness, expressed as an 
indicator of individual competence links Goffman to Giddens, as evidenced in the writings 
of Domingues.  “[Human interactions] are processes that are to be understood as the 
outcome of the conscious action of individual actors — notwithstanding the fact that...  
actors command always limited knowledge of conditions and consequences of their 
action.  Giddens is entirely committed to a conception of social life in which the 
‘constitution of society’ depends on the ability of individuals and, therefore, he 
characterises it as '‘skilled achievement' (1995:25; italics in original). 
36 The overtones of George Herbert Mead are difficult to miss here.  As Baldwin 
(1986:105) puts it — “Mead saw role taking as an important means of socialization, 
bringing people together and increasing understanding.  Not everyone becomes highly 
proficient in role taking; but Mead believed that developing our capacity for role taking 
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Secondly, Giddens' ideas have been influenced by Goffman's, but tend to 
extend out from them insomuch as they do not attempt to ignore the role 
of social structures in both mediating and being mediated by the vagaries 
of human action.  Finally, his views on social structure ensure that his 
usefulness will not be confined to notions of individual identity alone, as 
his work will also be incorporated into the chapter on nationalism. 
 If each of these theorists can be linked in some fashion it is in the 
fact that each of them, to varying degrees, aligns to a human agency 
model of social behaviour.37
 This last point is worth expanding upon here, as it is illustrative of 
the gulf that separates the machinations of contemporary Internet, from 
  The human agency approach has an aptness 
to the sphere of cyberspace for reasons that are three-fold.  Firstly, the 
splintered and dispersed nature of the cyberspatial environment is such 
that it encourages individuals to act with considerable autonomy when 
within its confines.  This is not to contend that cyberspatial interaction is 
entirely devoid of structural concerns, but rather that it is only minimally 
affected by them.  In social relations there are seven forms of external 
restrictions that are placed on human actions and interactions: economic 
embargoes, political motivations, bureaucratic conventions, behavioural 
norms, judicial law, policing measures, and physical qualifiers.  For the 
online citizen, however, it is generally only the 'behavioural norms' 
restriction that appears to apply (via netiquette).  Secondly, the lack of an 
established system of judicial law and associated policing measures in the 
virtual world has enabled some online actors to conduct themselves in a 
manner that pays little heed to established societal conventions and 
institutions.  Thirdly, and this point flows nicely from the previous one, the 
inability of Western governments to set and agree upon viable policies and 
legislation pertaining to cyberspatial conduct has also served to promote 
self-regulation among Internet users (Slevin, 2000:224-226). 
                                                                                                                       
would help in creating a better world.” 
37 As I mentioned in the introduction, this is less obvious for Erikson than it is for the other 
two.  Erikson does not officially belong to the social sciences, much less the human 
agency sphere, but I choose to align him with the approach here as a matter of critical 
interpretation.  Many of his key ideas carry remarkable similarity to those of Goffman, 
which may suggest that the social sciences and the behavioural sciences are not nearly 
always as removed from one another as some would care to believe. 
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the bygone inspirations that influenced its initial creation.  It is indeed a 
strange paradox that the Internet should now present world governments 
(the United States in particular) with immense problems relating to matters 
of regulation and control.  There could be few more conservative 
institutions than the American military, and it was certainly the intention of 
this governmental body to create a communications/information network 
that could be carefully controlled and administered.   
Cyberspace, originating from the American state apparatus (The 
US Department of Defense) in the late 1960s, has since been 
predominantly overseen by scientific bodies in the 1970s, academic 
influences in the 1980s, and—most recently—corporate interests.  Such 
fluctuating and loosely articulated control mechanisms have afforded 
netizens almost unprecedented management over their own affairs.  The 
high levels of online confidence and competence attained by netizens 
throughout this prolonged period of self-determination should see 
individuals strongly positioned to actively mediate their place in the 
scheme of things when the state, inevitably, moves to tighten regulation of 
the virtual sphere. 
 At this point Giddens' central argument that societal structures 
serve to both constrain and enable the activities of social actors becomes 
critical to the discussion.  Giddens contends that humans structure 
societies in accordance with three pregiven resources, these being: 
"meanings (things known, the stock of knowledge), morals (value 
systems), and power (patterns of domination and divisions of interest)" 
(Giddens, 1976:118). The first two resources and, in some instances, 
power, as well, are also manifest in symbolic interactionist accounts of 
human agency.  These inter-weaving stimulants of individual development 
and expression nurture and nourish the peculiar social patterns that 
constitute everyday human existence.  In simple terms, we are referring to 
notions of routine, wherein the sustainment of regular procedures is as 
crucially meaningful to any analysis of the process, as are the origins of 
the procedures themselves.   
 This point is emphasised by Ira Cohen when writing on the 
emergence of social structures: 
 66 
 
 
configurations of relations between social agents do not 
emerge from social conduct, but rather remain embedded 
in the ongoing course of activity.  The routine repetitions 
of institutionalised modes of interaction between agents is 
not something apart from the patterns they form; it is the 
very stuff of which these patterns are made (1989:77; 
original italics removed).  
 
Elaborating on this view, Giddens further implies that the reification of 
these routine repetitions results in the constitution of broader social 
structures at the macro-level, which, in turn, reinforce the constitution of 
social action at the micro-level (Giddens, 1984:25-28).38
The theories of Giddens, in conjunction with those of Goffman and 
Erikson, will provide a fertile theoretical platform on which to construct a 
broad-based overview of the self-identity concept.  I have shown over the 
preceding pages the manner by which the views of each theorist implicitly 
recognise, then build upon, the ideas of the previous one.  Erikson informs 
us of his belief that notions of self formulate within the individual, but how 
can the individual comprehend their sense of self without a frame of 
reference to operate from?  Goffman, following on from this, suggests that 
such a framework is evident in the everyday interactions between 
individuals, wherein one's sense of self is formulated internally, but 
validated externally as the individual positions themself in response to the 
behavioural traits of others, and of their responses and reactions 
(Goffman, 1961:168).  Giddens, goes on to contend that these interactions 
 The circular 
connotation apparent in this concept consolidates human agency theories 
by collocating the social action process to applicable social structures, 
rather than treating both elements as mutually exclusive phenomena; as 
proponents of the theory have been roundly criticised for doing in the past 
(Browne, 1993: 138-139; Holmwood & Stewart, 1991:100).   
                                            
 
 
38 The influence of Goffman is also on display here, with Giddens’ perceptions of the 
manner in which individuals stabilise set societal roles around devotion to time-space 
routinisation of these roles working from Goffman’s prior assertion that individuals must 
be capable of reifying their societal roles around commonly acknowledged cultural and 
historical understandings in order to successfully participate in social situations (Gregory, 
1989:211). 
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allow individuals to imprint their needs and wants onto the political 
agendas of social institutions (structures), whose machinations—in turn—
mediate and modify the actions and desires of individuals in what is 
essentially an ongoing cyclical relationship.  Such cyclical relationships are 
clearly in evidence online, be they between netizens and moderators 
developing an online community, netizens and corporations negotiating 
viable markets, or netizens and government bodies forming faster and 
more open lines of communication and exchange. 
 
Defining Self-Identity 
 The forthcoming chapter on Appraising Community emphasises the 
complications that are apparent in attempting to define a term (community) 
that is so profound in its breadth of scope and meaning.  Much of this 
complication stems directly from the considerable argument that has 
endured (within the social sciences) over several decades regarding the 
respectability and plausibility of the community concept as a whole.39
 Throughout the twentieth century notions of self-identity tended to 
emphasise the overriding sense of 'sameness' that is characterised in the 
unique relationship that a person establishes with their persona (Turkle, 
1995:12).  This sense of sameness was implicit in Erikson's understanding 
of personal identity, wherein an individual was able to simultaneously 
perceive "of one's selfsameness and continuity in time", along with "the 
fact that others (also) recognize one's sameness and continuity" (1959: 
  It is 
ironic, therefore, that the marked lack of attention devoted to the concept 
of self-identity during this same period has led to similar difficulties in 
defining the terminology for this chapter.  The problematic nature of the 
defining process has been exacerbated even further by the recent rise to 
prominence of virtual or 'online' identities.  This development is welcomed 
for the manner in which it has indirectly thrust self-identity back onto the 
social science agenda.  In qualifying this statement, however, it need also 
be understood that online interactions have served to further confuse 
attempts at refining the broader self-identity concept. 
                                            
39 This point will be explicated in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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22).  Richards echoes this theme in alluding to the paradox of subjective 
identity, whereby individuals simultaneously evaluate their notions of self 
through being able to comprehend their difference from, and sameness to, 
other individuals (1994:79).  Working from this the concept of self-identity 
(traditionally) has been largely reducible to the act of attaining a sound 
comprehension of one's internal thought processes and everyday external 
actions.  Giddens puts this thought forward with greater elegance when 
suggesting that: 
 
We begin from the premise that to be a human being is to 
know, virtually all of the time, in terms of some description 
or another, both what one is doing and why one is doing it 
(1991:35).40
 
  
Cyberspace has brought into question the veracity of this viewpoint; 
however, with some social commentators arguing that self-identity can no 
longer be safely expressed via the simple criteria of sameness and 
singularity of being.  "In terms of our views of the self, new images of 
multiplicity, heterogeneity, flexibility and fragmentation dominate current 
thinking about human identity" (Turkle, 1995:178).  Because of this, it 
becomes necessary to delve beyond the limited confines of the individual 
and their character traits, focusing instead on the complex ways in which 
such traits are influenced and sustained by a range of external sources. 
 Recent works highlight the need for fresh interpretations of the self-
identity concept.  Richards argues that an individual really consists of two 
peculiar forms of self-identity, the 'official' (bureaucratic) identity and the 
'subjective' (personal) identity (1994:78). Under this system, personal 
identity exists as a necessary subsidiary category to social identity, 
affording individuals the scope required to adequately distinguish 
themselves from their social similars (1994:81). Personal identity, as 
Richards sees it, "refers to the particular qualities, weaknesses and 
resources that are unique to the individual as a result of the unique 
                                            
40 Giddens makes it perfectly clear, in his own words, that this view has its origins in the 
work of Goffman when he writes that — “Goffman points out that to be a human agent is 
not just to be in command of what one is doing (in some sense or another), but is also 
routinely to display to others that one has such command” (1989:255; italics in original). 
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relationships within which that individual grew up" (1994:81). Ostensibly, 
Richards is explaining self-identity as entailing a mode of self 
management wherein the individual maintains their projected personality 
separate from, yet simultaneous to, their expected social actions (or roles).  
Such an explanation finds a mirror in the words of Castells, who states 
that: 
 
For a given individual, or for a collective actor, there may 
be a plurality of identities.  Yet, such a plurality is a source 
of stress and contradiction in both self-representation and 
social action.  This is because identity must be 
distinguished from what, traditionally, sociologists have 
called roles, and role-sets (1997:6). 
 
The roles of which Castells speaks here pertain explicitly to individual 
referents such as: father; baker; footballer; and so forth (1997:7). They 
should not be confused with the types of roles that Erving Goffman 
espouses. 
 When Goffman speaks of roles he is not alluding to status 
indicators, but rather he is describing the manner in which human actors 
present themselves to others within their specific society.  While it is 
necessary that an individual must adopt a role of some description whilst 
interacting with another (or others), it does not automatically follow that the 
individual should comprehend the veracity of this role.41
                                            
 
  An individual may 
perceive their actions as being natural and unprejudiced or, alternatively, 
they may be fully aware that they are shaping their actions for the benefit 
of others (Goffman, 1959:15).  An individual will base their role playing on 
a number of underlying factors, but essentially these factors are reducible 
to two dominant behavioural stimulants — 'belief' and 'cynicism' (1959:16).  
An individual displays genuine 'belief' in the sincerity of his/her role when 
41 It should also be noted here that individuals are not necessarily the principle ‘authors’ 
of their interactions, as Verhoeven explains in greater clarity when writing that 
“interactions take place in a particular historical sequence, which means that there is 
already a meaning given to this reality.  Moreover, there are unintended acts that are part 
of the encounter without constituting the main parts of the encounter, e.g coughing and 
sniffling.  However unimportant they seem to be, they are part of reality, which is out 
there” (1985:76).  This point is especially pertinent in that it would appear to mark the 
juncture point at which the key thoughts of Goffman and Mead overlap. 
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trying to please another person, and unabashed 'cynicism' when trying to 
deceive, manipulate or curry favour with another person.  In certain 
circumstances these two factors can exist interchangeably within the same 
set character role (1959:18). Internet vigilantes provide an example of this 
when they pose as children in order to attract and titillate paedophiles 
whilst, at the same time, deceiving them into exposing their criminal 
tendencies (van Bakel, 1996). 
Symbolic interactionist perspectives of self-identity challenge the 
validity of psychoanalytic interpretations of the concept by stressing the 
ongoing nature of individual development, sternly questioning lines of 
psychoanalytic thought that privilege childhood primalism theories.  By 
way of response, Erikson employs 'identity diffusion' as a means of 
explaining instances where post-pubescent individuals struggle to fulfil, 
and effectively adapt to, their (ever evolving) social roles and actions.  
'Identity diffusion' occurs when overwhelming doubts as to the veracity of 
their ethnic and/or sexual identities dramatically weaken the individual's 
control over their overall self-identity (1959:97).  Although it is not 
expressly stated here, the underlying implication of this notion is that 
individuals can battle with post-pubescent roles and expectations when 
their pre-pubescent 'life education' has been inadequately imparted to 
them by the responsible care givers.  
The importance of the care giver is thus reinforced and 
reconstituted as the parent makes the transition from trusted mentor to 
maligned other. This opinion gains support from Richards who believes 
that feelings of isolation and hostility (particularly toward one's parents) 
appear to be an integral component in the construction of personal identity 
(1994:85).  In stark contrast, Giddens agrees with Erikson on the impact 
that uncertainty over sexual identity can have on the self-identity of an 
individual, but he nevertheless disagrees as to the central cause of such 
uncertainty.  Working from his structuration model Giddens asserts that 
the twentieth century privatisation of passion vis-à-vis the marked social 
delineation between public sexual discourse and private sexual practice 
has unsettled people's confidence in their sexual identity, resulting in 
further confusion regarding self-identity (1991:205).  
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The corporeal self 
In simplistic terms, Giddens defines the concept of self-identity as 
standing for "the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of 
her or his biography" (1991:53). At a glance this statement is somewhat 
misleading in the way in which it appears to insinuate that self-identity is 
purely an inherent psychological construct. The imperativeness of one's 
corporal being to the broader constitution of their self-identity is addressed 
by a range of writers participating in the relatively fresh ‘sociology of the 
body’ sub-discipline.  This approach suggests that the body is central to 
any viable discussion on the self-identity concept for a variety of reasons, 
three of which carry particular pertinence to the issue.  At a primary level 
the body is unavoidably co-aligned to an individual's sense of self-identity 
because, as Shilling imparts — "In addition to the possibilities of agency 
that exist by virtue of us having bodies, we are also constrained by the 
brute fact of being bodies" (1993:23, italics in original).  At a secondary 
level, the body is a crucial player in identity formation because it acts as 
the apparatus through which personal symbolism is formulated and 
expressed, making it possible for the individual to appropriately transact 
with their external environment (Dutton, 1995:12).  At a tertiary level the 
ability to control and comprehend one's body is an essential prerequisite 
for being able to reflect beyond the self, so as to attain more expansive 
levels of personal growth and meaning (1995:12).42
The relationship between the body physical and the body social is 
also one that is underscored by a long line of historical development.  
Bryan Turner refers to this line of development in his book The Body and 
Society: 
 
 
                                            
 
42 This view builds from the early musings of Mead, who saw reflective thought as a 
primary element with which to differentiate humans from animals.  As Mead saw it, an 
animal was unable to separate mind from body (thought from action) and would thus act 
immediately to physical stimulus.  Humans, on the other hand, were capable of reflective 
thought wherein they could temporarily put their bodily actions on hold so as to access a 
memory base in order to find an appropriate response (Baldwin, 1986:84-85; Ritzer, 
1996:338-339).  
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The king's sacred body was symbolic of the coherence 
and continuity of the whole society; the king's person 
embodied the body politic so that regicide was an attack 
on the person of the king and on the society as a whole… 
[Also] When persona in Roman law came to equal the 
'self', it still excluded slaves who did not own their bodies, 
had no personality and had no claims over property…  
[Thus] From a sociological point of view, it makes sense 
for the person to have two bodies, since the person is 
both a thing and a sign...  [For] In socio-historical terms, 
'the body' is not necessarily the individual animate 
organism, because what will count as a body is an effect 
of social interpretation (1984: 55-56; italics in original). 
 
To some extent, such social interpretation of body and self is an 
appreciable by-product of the long-term religious sovereignty over 
Western societies.  With humans, according to Judeo/Christian scripture, 
being shaped in God's image and everyone existing, to differing degrees, 
as servants of God, it is unsurprising that people's senses of self should 
have become bound by broader social expectations and conventions.  For 
all intents and purposes the only option available to individuals wanting to 
construct their sense of self outside of this framework was to challenge 
theocratic ideals, which was likely to result in isolation or expulsion (at 
best) from the wider community.   
It is true that citizens in the contemporary world are also obliged to 
attune their personalities to those commonly exhibited by the wider society 
in order to find acceptance; although it is clear that greater tolerance now 
exists for individual attempts to transgress the boundaries of mainstream 
conventions.  This tolerance is qualified, however, by the extent of the 
transgression, which is why cyberspace has become such a popular 
environment for those seeking an outlet through which to reside outside 
the set social mainstream (Hill & Hughes, 1998:137).  This is also the key 
reason behind much of the mistrust and apprehension that some citizens 
have towards cyberspace, wherein such citizens view it as a dangerous 
vehicle for subversive and anti-social behaviour.  In cyberspace the 
human body is hidden along with the signs that it otherwise nakedly 
conveys and it is basic human nature for individuals to fear what is hidden. 
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The fact that, in real-life situations, every act we commit and every 
expression we portray invokes an immediate physical transaction with 
others is often overlooked on account of the 'oblique obviousness' of 
human interaction.  It is for this reason that self-identity is often 
rudimentarily dismissed as being a construct of the mind, which 
erroneously neglects the fact that identity requires avenues of expression, 
as well as modes of absorption, in order to be successfully managed.  
Such presumptuousness would appear to be common to the psychological 
realm, although 'self schema theory' exists as a clear exception to this 
rule.  This approach contends that individuals gauge their sense of self by 
way of the reflective processes that arise explicitly in response to their 
perceptions of how other people choose to perceive of them.  Working 
from these perceptions, an individual is then able to isolate inherent 
personal attributes that appear to be most valued in their social 
environment (Grogan, 1999:101).   
Ostensibly then, self-identity pertains implicitly to obtaining 
confidence in one's ability to understand the requisite nuances of one's 
social world, along with achieving sufficient corporal coordination and 
control to effectively convey oneself to others.  In essence, self-identity 
seeks legitimacy through control, which in turn provides some scope for 
personal empowerment.  This is particularly evident when viewed from a 
wider social vantagepoint, whereby sovereignty over self permits 
comforting (albeit small) degrees of authority to individuals who are 
otherwise powerless in the face of societal subjugation (Shilling, 1993: 7). 
 
Fronts 
This transactional angle on human interaction relates neatly to 
Goffman's role-play analogy, which provides an excellent lead-in to further 
comment on the dramaturgical approach to identity.  According to 
Goffman, for individuals to be able to play out specific roles, it is necessary 
for them to provide a backdrop for their performances.  Goffman refers to 
this backdrop by the term ‘front’, which he describes thus: 
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It will be convenient to label as ‘front’ that part of the 
individuals performance which regularly functions in a 
general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those 
who observe the performance.  Front, then, is the 
expressive equipment of a standard kind intentionally or 
unwittingly employed by the individual during his 
performance (1959:19). 
 
Front, in the first instance, involves the setting in which a role is played out 
and revolves around elements that are generally fixed in dimension, such 
as geographical locale and props (eg. houses, offices, shops) (1959:19). 
Front, in the second instance, pertains to personal presentation and is 
divided into two categories — appearance and manner.  Appearance, as 
the term suggests, deals with personal identifiers, such as: age, sex, race, 
weight, height and so forth.  Manner, on the other hand, relates to action 
identifiers, such as: looks, expressions, body language, mannerisms and  
tone of voice (1959:21). 
Fronts tend to carry with them certain expectations and are 
generally chosen by individuals, not created by them.  For example, when 
a woman joins the police force she does so on the express understanding 
that she will have to imbue a persona that is relevant to the rigours of 
police work.  This is not a persona she can create from scratch, moreover 
she will adopt a persona based on socially acceptable notions of police 
demeanour that have been carefully devised and reinforced over several 
generations (Goffman, 1959:24).  
 For Goffman there are three principal players for any given 
performance.  Firstly, we have the individual (as previously outlined 
above) or team-based actors in their several guises.  Secondly, in order to 
have a performance it is therefore essential that an “audience” exists for 
whom the individual or team-based actors perform. Thirdly, as these 
performances are only geared to a select group of people who, by 
definition, encompass the “audience”, it is necessary to have another 
group that is removed from both the giving and receipt of a performance.  
Goffman refers to this group as being the “outsiders’, as they reside 
outside of a performance scenario. 
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Team performances 
 Not all performances are given on an individual basis, as many of 
our everyday interactions are presented within a group dynamic.  Goffman 
describes group-based role playing by the term ‘performance team’ (‘team’ 
for short), and justifies its significance by contending that: 
 
Whether the members of a team stage similar individual 
performances or stage dissimilar performances which fit 
together into a whole, an emergent team impression 
arises which can conveniently be treated as a fact in its 
own right, as a third level of fact located between the 
individual performance on one hand and the total 
interaction of participants on the other (1959:69). 
 
Team performances can be utilised for the purposes of inclusion, as is the 
case with staff infrastructures where familiarity with co-workers and 
established routine is essential for productive and efficient job 
performance.  Conversely, team performances can also be geared toward 
exclusivity, as is the case with membership infrastructures (eg. white 
nationalism) that allows for certain individuals to be kept removed from the 
specialist team environment.  Team performances can also provide a 
means for sustaining societal expectations of how individuals should exist 
in a group environment (Branaman, 1997:lxiv-lxv).  Many office managers 
emphasise this point by referring to their secretaries by Christian name in 
private, but calling them by their surname when strangers enter the office 
(1959:69).  
 Team performances can be empowering for individuals in so much 
as they instil them with a knowledge base and resource network of which 
“audience” members are deprived.  On the other hand, team 
performances place pressures and obligations upon individual members 
that, in turn, place constant stress on the ongoing viability of the team 
itself.43
                                            
43 Goffman’s ideas on team performances also find their genesis in the earlier works of 
Mead, most specifically his emphasis on the distinction apparent between the ‘I’ and ‘me’ 
in any given sense of self.  “On the one hand, the self may enter into conduct as a 
meaningful stimulus for the intelligent control of action.  In this case the self functions as 
an object; this is what Mead had in mind when he spoke of the “me”...  “On the other 
hand, as Mead’s discussion of subjectivity makes clear, the human individual may also 
enter into conduct as an agent of reconstruction...  The self-functioning in this latter sense 
  Should an individual act inappropriately during a team 
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performance then the veneer that the team has built in order to shield it 
from outsiders may be weakened or destroyed entirely (Goffman, 
1959:71). Similarly, should some team members withhold information from 
other team members re: how they should conduct themselves during a 
performance, then again it is possible for the group dynamic to be 
corrupted (1959:77).  
  Teams need also be wary of initiating new members who, in the 
past, have been on the receiving end of the group’s performance.  If, for 
example, a shop-based team performance has been centred on selling 
merchandise to particular customers at inflated prices, it would be 
inadvisable for this team to enlist such a customer as a new member 
(employee) (1959:81).  It should also be noted that team performances, in 
spite of their unmistakable clique overtones, are not always reliant upon 
the existence of wilful fraternity among individual members.  Goffman 
explains this paradox when he writes that: 
 
the isolate in the factory who becomes a rate-buster is 
none the less part of the team, even if his productive 
activity embarrasses the impression the other workers are 
attempting to foster as to what constitutes a hard day’s 
work.  As an object of friendship he may be studiously 
ignored, but as a threat to the team’s definition of the 
situation, he cannot be overlooked (1959:72). 
 
Thus, some individuals are unavoidably incorporated into a team 
performance just as surely as others are deliberately removed from it.  The 
most common reason for such instances of exclusion surrounds concerns 
that certain individuals will (innocently or otherwise) act in a manner that is 
inconsistent with, or contrary to the aims of, the team performance.   
 
  
Audience and outsiders 
                                                                                                                       
is what Mead meant by the “I”(Cook, 1993:54).  Assessed against Goffman’s team 
performance notion, we can see that an individual need necessarily have a sound grasp 
of his/her objective (me) identity in order to appreciate the expectations placed on him/her 
by the rest of the team; as well as an equally solid grasp of his/her subjective (I) identity 
so as to have the necessary confidence and assurance to negotiate the role. 
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 If we are to accept the notion that human beings express 
themselves through (individual and/or team-based) performances, then we 
need also recognise that another group should also exist in order to view 
such performances.  Goffman continues the 'stage' analogy for this group 
when he refers to it as the 'audience'.  On the surface, the role of the 
audience in relation to the performer(s) appears straightforwardly defined, 
but some overlaps exist in this regard that require further explanation.  
Firstly, the audience in observing a performance is also, paradoxically, 
playing a role itself.  In effect, the particular role chosen by a performer will 
often be tailored so as to suit the needs or expectations of the audience 
unto which it is given.  Secondly, it is not always an easy task to 
distinguish the performer(s) from the audience.44
 The concerned individual could thus also be interpreted as 
constituting a member of the audience, although they are also removed 
from this classification on account of the fact that none of the 
conversations observed are being staged implicitly for their benefit.  As 
such, the individual is effectively fulfilling the role of the 'outsider', and is 
neither the performer nor the audience.  In a perverse way, however, the 
outsider is also both performer and audience.  This is the most intriguing 
  Ostensibly then, the 
roles of performer and audience are often interchangeable and 
intertwined, and can only be accurately differentiated by taking note of the 
individual(s) that is conversing or gesturing at any given moment.  This is 
especially true when the interactions concerned are occurring in 
cyberspace, and the normal visual cues that form an integral aid to the 
communication process are sorely missing (assuming a webcam is not 
being used). 
                                            
 
 
44 This is made all the more problematic when the ‘performers’ concerned are enacting 
roles in a cynical manner.  “Two such [adverse audience] roles are essentially those of 
the impostor (one who poses as a member of the team and so is allowed backstage, 
where he may acquire information which can damage the impression the team seeks to 
create) and the shill (someone who acts as a member of audience but is in fact in league 
with the performers).  There are also what might be called accredited imposters: those 
who police the goings-on at performances and displays as the official or unofficial agents 
of an otherwise unsuspecting public (Burns, 1992:136; italics in original).  This last form 
of ‘imposter’ has resonance in cyberspace where online fora are commonly inhabited by 
monitors who both participate in discussions and police the group interactions taking 
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facet of human interaction; the capacity for the individual to fulfil multiple 
roles at any one time, as Goffman explains: 
 
the performer comes to be his own audience; he comes to 
be performer and observer of the same show.  
Presumably he intracepts or incorporates the standards 
he attempts to maintain in the presence of others so that 
his conscience requires him to act in a socially proper 
way.  It will have been necessary for the individual in his 
performing capacity to conceal from himself in his 
audience capacity the discreditable facts that he has had 
to learn about the performance; in everyday terms, there 
will be things he knows, or has known, that he will not be 
able to tell himself (1959:70).  
 
Regions 
 Up until this point the discussion on human interaction has dealt 
specifically with the individual actors themselves, along with the 
idiosyncrasies that are apparent in acts of human expression.  This would 
therefore be an appropriate juncture at which to apply a sense of setting to 
the art of social interaction and to explain the significance of region to the 
careful manner by which individuals (and groups) construct their 
exchanges.  Goffman speaks of three specific types of region in his books; 
the 'front region', 'back region', and the 'outside region'. The front region, 
by definition, is where the individual or team-based actors deliver their 
performances to the audience (1959:93).  By way of contrast, the back 
region provides an audience-free sanctuary for the actor(s): 
 
it is here that illusions and impressions are openly 
constructed.  Here stage props and items of personal 
front can be stored…  Here the team can run through its 
performance, checking for offending expressions when no 
audience is present to be affronted by them; here poor 
members of the team, who are expressively inept, can be 
schooled or dropped from the performance.  Here the 
performer can relax; he can drop his front, forego 
speaking his lines, and step out of character (1959:97-
98). 
 
The back region, as with the front region, implicitly denotes the setting for 
a performance.  This performance may be of an informal nature (as for the 
                                                                                                                       
place. 
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back region), or a formal nature (as per the front), but either way these 
regions are defined by levels of performance.  Conversely, the outside 
region is explicitly removed from the performance sphere, and exists solely 
as a locale in which individuals, who are neither actor nor audience in a 
specific performance, reside (1959:117). 
 The careful negotiation of front and back region performances has 
become a particularly troublesome characteristic of contemporary white 
pride politics insofar as movement leaders are concerned.  Kathleen Blee 
alludes to the precarious nature of the ‘public’ front and ‘private’ back 
regions in white pride environs when she writes that: 
Relying on the Klan’s reputation for racial violence to 
attract avidly racist members and at the same time 
recruiting mainstream whites for a “new Klan” is a delicate 
balancing act, and the contrast between the Klan’s front 
and back stages has created dissatisfaction and 
factionalism in some Klans (2002:170). 
 
Tara McPherson reported similar findings from her own study of ‘Neo-
Confederate’ online groups, where the public face exuded by such groups 
was clearly a cause for considerable angst among the webmasters 
charged with winning new converts to the movement: 
 
Often, the pages express dismay (some seemingly 
genuine, others less so) over the continued perceptions 
that protecting Southern heritage means one must be 
racist.  Hence, these sites abandon the overt racism  of 
the Lost Cause era for the more palatable covert racism 
characteristic of the post-Civil Rights era (2000:124). 
 
For many white pride organisations, the WWW has become the public 
front office for their operations and, just as it is in fleshspace, this front 
region is accessible to friend and foe alike.  While many key figures within 
the broader white pride movement would not see strong negative 
reactions to alternative races as being a negative thing they nevertheless 
recognise the limitations imposed upon them by stringent racial vilification 
legislation (the Internet is not removed from such laws).  As such, it is 
unsurprising that white pride web sites should be showing a preference for 
expounding positive messages about white masculinity as distinct from the 
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negative outbursts about blacks and Jews that have preoccupied 
movement figureheads in past times.   These sites have to give people a 
reason to embrace racialism and emotive rhetoric on heroic white struggle 
can prove just as appealing to the deluded and bereft as savage 
exhortations about Jewish conspiracy and modern society’s affliction with 
‘black’ cancer.   
   
Places 
 The above mentioned discussion on regions outlines the manner in 
which Western social conventions frame human interactions within 
carefully selected and clearly delineated spatial boundaries.  These 
regions are pertinent to interactions that occur within the greater societal 
spectrum, but Goffman also refers to the spatial boundaries that insulate 
stigmatised groups from the broader community landscape.  These 
boundaries are known simply as 'places', and are briefly defined by 
Goffman as entailing: 
 
Forbidden or out-of-bounds places, where persons of the 
kind he (the stigmatised person) can be shown to be are 
forbidden to be, and where exposure means expulsion…  
There are civil places, where persons of the individual's 
kind, when known to be of his kind, are carefully, and 
sometimes painfully, treated as if they were not 
disqualified for routine acceptance, when in fact they 
somewhat are.  Finally, there are back places, where 
persons of the individual's kind stand exposed and find 
they need not try to conceal their stigma, nor be overly 
concerned with cooperatively trying to disattend it 
(1963a:81). 
 
Forbidden places are contrived and politically charged spaces that allow 
non-stigmatised individuals to isolate the stigmatised from access to 
vehicles of power and influence.  Back places provide stigmatised 
individuals with a sanctuary through which they can interact with similarly 
outcast persons and, in some instances, organise themselves as a viable 
political unit.  Civil places, by way of comparison, exist ostensibly as 
neutral territories in which stigmatised individuals can interact, albeit under 
the tacit control and patronage of the non-stigmatised.  The rise of the 
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Internet has impacted heavily upon these interactive spaces of 
humankind, with the most profound change occurring in relation to back 
places, around which political activist groups are organising their activities 
largely free of governmental and police interference.  
 
Stigma 
 The symbiotic relationship that exists between aspects of identity 
formation and established units of social institution can result in the 
formation of negative identity traits within individuals.   When Giddens 
speaks of negative identity traits he does so from a bipolar framework that 
distinguishes between the levels of pride and shame that reside within 
individuals.  As he sees it, "(s)hame bears directly on self-identity because 
it is essentially anxiety about the adequacy of the narrative by means of 
which the individual sustains a coherent biography" (1991:65).  For 
Giddens, a sound degree of personal pride is of paramount importance to 
the construction of a healthy self-identity in individuals.  When an 
individual is capable of feeling pride in oneself, then they are capable of 
acknowledging their 'ideal self'.  The 'ideal self' constitutes a key segment 
of the self-identity construct by serving as a driving force for individuals, 
providing them with the impetus to formulate aspirations (which are often 
directly oppositional to those prescribed by peers and care givers) and to 
challenge the restrictive limitations of their immediate environment (1991: 
68).  When personal pride gives way to feelings of shame, however, the 
capacity for the individual to successfully negotiate his/her social world is 
dramatically reduced. 
 Erikson believes that negative identity traits can arise for either of 
two reasons.  In the first instance, they can arise via the subconscious 
selection of identities perceived to be either undesirable or dangerous 
(1959:141). This happening usually fulfils the individual's unconscious 
need to attract the attention that they feel they are being deprived of in the 
course of their everyday life.  In the second instance, negative identity 
traits act as a defence mechanism against the excessive ideals pushed 
upon an individual by over zealous relatives (1959:142).  Both of these 
explanations appear to be reasonable enough, although they fail to 
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explicate the tendency for societies (by way of law, policing agencies, and 
community mores) to impress negative identity traits upon individuals.  By 
returning our attention to Goffman we can better appreciate the role of 
societal institutions and conventions in stigmatising individual citizens, and 
the effects that such stigmatisation has on those afflicted by it. 
 Negative identity traits can corrupt an individual's capacity for 
social interaction in three noteworthy ways.  Firstly, they can impact by 
way of what Goffman refers to as ''blemishes of weak will" (Goffman, 
1963a:4).  With this form of stigma, undesirable character "stains" such as: 
criminal records, violent tendencies, dishonesty, addiction to alcohol or 
drugs, and so on, leave the "impaired" individual in constant threat of 
rejection from participation in social scenarios.    Likewise, the existence of 
a "tribal" stigma can also result in social rejection for the "afflicted" person 
(1963a:4).  A tribal stigma refers to the taint that accompanies an 
individual's affiliation with (predominantly minority) races, religions or 
political causes.  Finally, if a person's body fails them, or somehow 
becomes branded as undesirable, then that person's standing in society is 
greatly diminished, and their sense of self consequently weakens and 
constricts (Shilling, 1993:85).  When this occurs, we have what Goffman 
terms 'abominations of the body' (1963a:4).  These debilitating physical 
afflictions such as: gross disfigurement, communicable disease, physical 
handicap, and the like, leave the "restricted" individual at risk of non-
acceptance into social settings.  Even where circumstances allow for the 
tentative acceptance of such an individual, the fragile nature of their 
acceptance will often see them banished to the peripheral boundaries of 
group interaction where they exist as ignored spectators to the event, 
rather than bona fide participants in it.  The import of shame and stigma to 
the concept of self-identity will be elaborated upon in the ensuing chapter, 
where the commentary will focus upon the attraction that the Internet holds 
for individuals wanting to pass on their real-life identities. 
  'Passing' refers to the act of suppressing unsavoury elements of 
one's persona (Goffman, 1963a:42). This can occur on the Internet, and 
netizens will commonly conceal their racial and/or ethnic origins for fear of 
appearing backward or having their ideas disregarded by closed thinking 
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Westerners (González, 2000:29).  Interestingly, this type of passing also 
occurs on sites like Stormfront.org, where participants are often forced to 
pass on ethnic and regional information for fear of being rejected as "non-
white".45
 Recent studies on the white separatist movement have given 
prominence to the ways in which movement leaders (and everyday 
disciples) have sought to diminish the sense of stigma attached to their 
beliefs.  The most common tactic is to wear the white pride mantle as 
something of a badge of honour, effectively turning the stigma back on 
their opponents, as Ezekiel exemplifies in quoting from a movement 
leader’s speech at a white pride rally in the early 1990s: 
 Although it is somewhat uncommon, on certain occasions an 
individual may choose to indulge in a show of 'reverse passing' by 
deliberately concealing creditable facts about oneself (Goffman,1963a:42).  
This can also happen in virtual spaces like Stormfront.org, with law 
enforcement officers often needing to withhold information on their 
education and training so as to gain the confidence of the white priders 
that they are observing and monitoring. 
The children of Satan, he reports, are in rebellion 
against Christ.  They want to change us.  They hate 
us because we love our nation, our morals, our 
families.  We look at what has happened in the last 
twenty-five or thirty years — the abortions, the 
homosexuality, the race mixing.  We can see that the 
idea of the Jews is to change us; that the United 
States will be ruled by God or by tyrants (1995:44). 
The white nationalist movement offers a fascinating case study of stigma, 
as it involves a societal minority projecting shame onto the broader 
majority, when almost invariably stigma is projected in a one way direction, 
the opposite way.  It is also true that white pride devotees have sought to 
position themselves within the wider political mainstream in recent years, 
seeking to increase the power base of the movement by making their 
beliefs appear more central and normal to everyday voters (Dobratz & 
                                            
 
45 The diverse and often dubious criteria that differing white pride devotees apply to the 
notion of "whiteness" are worthy of a major research study in their own right.  It is very 
common, however, for devotees from the larger Western nations to adopt a somewhat 
supercilious and patronising approach to devotees from smaller regions.  
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Shanks-Meile, 1997:212).  After enduring countless decades on the 
frustrating and ultimately fruitless periphery of political action and idealism, 
it would seem that key figures within the organisation have accepted the 
truism that it is almost always only mainstream political entities that raise 
the power required to impact on mainstream social institutions (Marx & 
McAdam, 1994:121). 
 
The monitored & manipulated self 
 The preceding pages have sought to establish the primacy of the 
body in the construction, maintenance and expression of human self-
identity.  This credo is indicative of a contemporary revision of the self and 
differs noticeably from previous ideologies on self-identity dating back to 
the Enlightenment period that perceived of the self more in terms of inner 
feelings and emotions, rather than physical expressions, established 
regimes of acting, and routine control over one's body (Giddens, 1991: 
171).  The disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis are still 
somewhat committed to this viewpoint, but researchers within the social 
sciences can ill afford to overlook the effect that the body has on both the 
individual and their surroundings.  As Giddens contends, routines and 
"regimes are of central importance to self-identity precisely because they 
connect habits with aspects of the visible appearance of the body" (1991: 
62). To put this another way, routinised forms of action, display and 
expression reinforce an individual's command over their sense of self, and 
minimise potential confusion in others as to their continuity of being. 
 It should be noted that the continuity of one's being becomes less 
and less fixed in accordance with an increasing array of choices in regard 
to bodily presentation.  Shilling throws further light on this subject when he 
writes that: 
 
We now have the means to exert an unprecedented 
degree of control over (our) bodies, yet we are also living 
in an age which has thrown into radical doubt our 
knowledge of what bodies are and how we should control 
them (1993:3). 
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Featherstone builds upon this contention by presenting the body/identity 
relationship from a consumer-orientated angle: 
 
Within consumer culture the body is proclaimed as a 
vehicle of pleasure: it is desirable and desiring and the 
closer the actual body approximates to the idealised 
images of youth, health, fitness and beauty the higher its 
exchange-value.  Consumer culture permits the 
unashamed display of the human body (1982:177). 
 
Market forces are encouraging people to reassess their perceptions of self 
by reconsidering the manner in which they present their physical bodies to 
the world.  Health service institutions and medical technology innovations 
are also aiding in the malleability of contemporary self-identities by 
allowing people to revise themselves (mentally and physically) through 
psychiatric counselling, self-help programs, diet programs, hypnotherapy, 
plastic surgery, artificial limb and joint replacements, and the like (Marx, 
1997:490-491). 
In Western capitalist societies the territorial expanse that divides 
individualist notions of self-identity from a society saturated with an 
ideology of consumerism is bridged by the loosely defined term — 
'lifestyle'.  The idea of lifestyle is significant to self-identity, as the 
routinised practices that are axial to the lifestyle bolster an individual's 
inherent sense of worth and being (Giddens, 1991:81).  The socially 
constructed dimension of self-identity, as exemplified by the conterminous 
elements of consumerism and lifestyle, increases the value of Giddens' 
correlative actor/structure theory of human agency.  An individual's self-
identity is thus explicitly tied-up in their inherent sense of self-worth, which 
in turn, is implicitly dependent on their standing within the wider social 
setting.  
      Self-identity, therefore, exists largely as a tandem feature of the 
actor's social identity and relies heavily on constant social interaction and 
awareness so as to maintain congruity with the actor's particular 
communal environment.  While this suggests that self-identity demands 
flexibility to allow for fluctuations within the actor's societal sphere 
(Giddens, 1991:52), it must also be settled enough to ensure solid 
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comprehension of one's individual biography, and to permit scope for the 
actor to participate in the 'life-planning' process.  Life-planning involves 
reflexive preparation for future events and entails the internal construction 
of a life calendar that details significant junctions in one's life (Giddens, 
1991:85). To this end, self-identity forges intrinsic links to elements of self-
discipline, whereby an actor must constantly be aware of who they are, 
why they are, where they are, and where it is that they are heading.  Such 
thinking also underscores Castells' suggestion that the real issue 
surrounding identities is not that they are constructed, but rather how they 
are constructed, from what, by whom, and for what? (Castells, 1997:7) 
 The sheer diversity of the self-identity question clearly supports an 
actor/structure approach to human agency.  This reality is only further 
reinforced when one looks beyond everyday institutionalised structures 
such as: families, peer groups, educational institutions, and market forces; 
to consider the influence that state procedures have on individual 
perceptions of self.  In the centuries that have followed the Industrial 
Revolution (in Britain), identity formation within Western capitalist nations 
has predominantly been structured around strict liberal conventions.  To 
offset this slightly, universal perspectives (such as communism and 
socialism) have acted as counter-hegemonic ideals to liberalism and its 
associated capitalist mechanisms.  This has afforded citizens access to a 
counter-culture around which they could formulate individual notions of 
identity in accordance with their own peculiar "lived experiences” 
(Aronowitz, 1995: 116).  In the context of this thesis, it is fascinating to 
note the manner in which white nationalist adherents appear to be building 
a counter-culture (heavily augmented through CMC vehicles) that stands 
in defiant opposition to communism, socialism and liberalism. 
 Movements, such as those concerned with the cause of white 
nationalism, can be very significant to notions of individual identity 
because they show that people's lives have a "world-historical" meaning 
(Aronowitz, 1995:117).  This point not only reverberates Giddens' stance 
on the 'ideal self', but it also fortifies the links that bind notions of self-
identity to the wider realm of community.  At a basic level, community 
formation relies implicitly on individuals having a tangible sense of self; a 
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willingness to express this sense of self to others; and, most importantly, 
an understanding of linear historical developments that were only 
achievable through processes of carefully considered human interaction.  
Political motivations and concerns have thus been central aspects in 
identity formation, although the transitory nature of some political 
ideologies leaves citizens at risk of being disenfranchised from a crucial 
self-identification mechanism.   
Aronowitz, who claims that the recent decline of the "ideological 
left" has robbed some individuals of the alternative means through which 
they could form their personal identities, supports this view.  He qualifies 
this statement, however, by stressing that new social and cultural 
formations (nationality, race, gender and sexuality) have arisen as 
potential replacements for these lost political identifiers (1995:116).  For 
Aronowitz, the avenues to identity formation are becoming more and more 
plentiful, largely as a consequence of globalisation, but the one singular 
common denominator inherent to the whole process remains — identity 
via others.  "In this framework, identity entails a metonymic selection of 
certain characteristics—race, gender, or whatever—that are taken as 
irreducible and privileged over all competitive claims" (1995:122).  Such a 
framework also carries relevance for discussion pertaining to group 
identities and will certainly be revisited amid Chapters Six and Seven 
when the focus switches to nationalism and online activism.  
 
Matters of gender 
Earlier in this chapter it was indicated that an individual's body 
could not be removed from the identity formation process principally 
because, to all intents and purposes, an individual is his/her body and 
vice-versa. The physiological certainty of the body/identity union provides 
a fascinating point of comparison with its psychological counterpart — the 
gender/identity relationship.  Gender, and the sexual aspects imperative to 
it, is a structural qualifier that every human actor must requisitely factor 
into their everyday thoughts, behaviours and actions.  For just as one's 
body will not let you forget it is there, neither will one's acquaintances 
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(subconsciously or otherwise) let you neglect your specified gender and 
the normative ways of being that are necessarily derived from it.  
 In the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution Western men came to 
have their senses of self moulded implicitly around what Erikson refers to 
as their 'occupational identities' (Erikson, 1959:97).  This had a sweeping 
effect on male self-identities that thereafter became routinely associated 
with the personal attributes of practical skill, self-sufficiency and material 
worth (Buchbinder, 1994:11).  Conversely, women were effectively limited 
to playing supporting roles, which firmly affixed their perceptions of self-
identity to the personal attributes of nurturance, empathy and non-
competitiveness (Grosz, 1994:84).  In recent times, however, men have 
been forced to reconsider their senses of self via alternatives to 
occupational qualifiers, hence the alleged evolution of the SNAG 
(Sensitive New Age Guy).  Buchbinder is very suspicious of the SNAG, 
questioning whether his appearance is indicative of an admission that 
change is needed among the sexes, or merely a cynical male attempt to 
maintain the patriarchal status quo by stealth (Buchbinder, 1994:19).  For 
their part, contemporary women are finding it difficult to convert their newly 
acquired social and political legitimacy into cultural and material 
significance, as long established patriarchal impediments prove 
increasingly onerous to negotiate (Grint, 1991:212-238). 
 In spite of the changes that are occurring en masse across the 
gender terrain, it is still the age-old Western preponderance for sexual 
classification that dominates in so far as identity formation is concerned.  
Connell laments the tendency for Western cultures to trivialise the gender 
debate, when he writes: 
 
Social practices that construct women and men as distinct 
categories by converting an average difference into a 
categorical difference - 'men are stronger than women' - 
negate the major pattern of difference that occurs within 
sexes rather than between them (1987:80). 
 
This clear cultural tendency for generalising behaviour and attributes 
among the delineated sexes is substantial grist for the self-identity mill, 
particularly when one considers how such identities are fundamentally 
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posited upon the establishment of differentiation from those who are 
similar.   
 Social norms also seek to ensure that self-identity, in gendered 
terms, "is acquired at least in part through the repudiation of homosexual 
attachments" (Butler, 1995:25).  This social construction of gender, as it 
applies to homosexuals, contradicts conventional "two-sex" explanations 
of being by portraying men as feminine and women as masculine entities 
(Connell, 1987:80).  This contradiction has encompassed a double impact 
for homosexuals who have found themselves divested of their true 
physiological means of identification; whilst simultaneously having the 
legitimacy of their psychological perceptions of self debased and 
discredited.  In this way, social norms act as barriers of exclusion for 
socially minded individuals.   
In the case of homosexuals, exclusion from the social mainstream 
is further reinforced by community hysteria over the Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic. This scenario may have as much 
to do with human insecurity over body image and its capacity to bolster or 
diminish one's sense of self, as it does with worries pertaining to illness 
and death.  With the onset of rampant consumerism (circa 1960s), notions 
of body image became central to the thinking of many Westerners, thanks 
largely to its prominence in media advertising campaigns.  These 
campaigns encouraged a celebration of the body that continues to excite 
consumer imagination in the present day, although such excitement has 
been tempered by the subsequent surge of eating related disorders and 
AIDS-related illnesses from the 1980s onwards.  Media advertising 
privileges the body as a site of sensuality, vitality, sexuality and 
expression; ingredients that are desired by all individuals and are 
attainable by most, providing that the body stays healthy.  AIDS, by way of 
contrast, erodes these ingredients, rendering the body weak and 
undesirable, diminishing the afflicted individual's sense of self in the 
process (McDowell, 1999:36).  
The combined potency of consumerist ideals and media marketing 
have served to ensure that the notions of gender, body, self and 
community are rarely too far removed from one another. Despite this, 
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recent developments in technology and medicine are enabling individuals 
to combat the debilitating impact of marketing on their fragile senses of 
self, as McDowell explains: 
 
Perhaps the most radical change now possible is gender 
reassignment, in which the association between sexed 
identity and embodiment is altered.  Indeed, some critics 
have identified the body as the last frontier in 
postmodernity, the most challenging arena in which to 
achieve variation (1999:37).  
 
The real effect of such 'variation' remains limited, however, given that 
identity formation that is structured around biologically determined gender 
differences simply does not allow for those who do not correspond to 
physiological and psychological mores; with homosexuals, transsexuals, 
and eunuchs46
 Feminist writers such as Judith Butler are devoted to the task of 
debunking these cultural conventions.  As Butler sees it, gender is neither 
a natural nor internal phenomenon, but rather it is socially inscribed on the 
body and acted out to others through "performative acts, gestures and 
enactments" (Butler, 1990:136).  She then goes on to expand upon this 
line of thought in writing that: 
 prominent among those outcast (Connell, 1987:81).  In 
accordance with this, extreme steps such as gender reassignment are 
only likely to impact positively on an individual's sense of self for as long 
as the person concerned is able to keep secret their prior gender status.  
Gender has come to be seen as an entity that is organic to human 
development, so that even when an individual comes to inhabit a physical 
body that, to the naked eye, clearly represents the identifiers common to a 
specific sex; the capacity for this individual to find acceptance in this 
altered state is almost invariably negated by resilient cultural conventions 
that perceive of gender as an inherent biological characteristic that can be 
masked, but never completely or acceptably overturned. 
 
                                            
 
46 This is a reference to the small population of unfortunates who have been divested of 
their genitalia through accident, injury, illness or crime, and NOT to the social subclasses 
that once existed in regions like China and the Middle East. 
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Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or 
locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, 
gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, 
instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition 
of acts.  The effect of gender is produced through the 
stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as 
the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, 
and styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an 
abiding gendered self (1990:140, italics are my 
emphasis). 
 
Such a view borrows intellectually from Goffman’s interpretations of 
carefully prescribed and enacted role playing, along with Giddens’ 
accounts of the manner in which such role-plays are culturally reified via 
processes of routine and repetition.  It is important to fully comprehend 
Butler's argument, given that it helps (albeit indirectly) to explain 
cyberspace's popularity as a medium in which gender identities can be—
temporarily, at least—manipulated and modified to meet with individual 
preferences.  In essence, this capability to override restrictive social 
conventions acts as a much needed 'release valve' for individuals who are 
frustrated and/or disillusioned by their senses of self, but unwilling to risk 
permanent alteration in the form of gender reassignment. 
  Uncertainty over gender also arises in cyberspace with specific 
regard to how an individual goes about expressing him or herself to 
members of the opposite sex.  McDowell talks of how patriarchal 
dominance has long characterised interactions within general social 
environments wherein "men are [endowed with] presence in space and 
women are [seen as encompassing] insignificance” (1999:41).  In line with 
this, men have been seen to commonly reinforce this perceived 
dominance in cross gender conversations by ‘interrupting’ female 
speakers whenever possible so as to shape the discussion in accordance 
with their own needs or agendas (Aries, 1996:92).  Subsequently, the act 
of interrupting has become synonymous with notions of power, meaning 
that confident (usually well-educated) men will interrupt less forceful men 
and confident (high powered) women will most likely do likewise to less 
forthright women (Aries, 1996: 93-95).  In cyberspace, a netizen's gender 
is not always immediately recognisable, which helps to minimise the 
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instances of 'interruption' that occur purely in response to visual gender 
cues.  To this end, it is fair to argue that cyberspace is an empowering 
vehicle for women, although it does fall short of indicating that women are 
openly modifying their communication styles when online. 
Cyberspace, it is often said, pays no heed to the constrictive 
categories that limit and mediate an individual's participation in real-life 
societies, but such a suggestion is questionable to say the least.  Men and 
women cannot leave the internal residue of lifelong adherence to such 
categories at the modem when they log-on to online chat groups.  Nor can 
gender power inequalities be ignored in cyberspace when men are 
predominantly responsible for creating and maintaining virtual 
environments, and where males, with few exceptions, frequent these 
online sites in greater numbers than their female counterparts (Norris, 
2001:83).47
The sexual and gender dimensions of identity expression in virtual 
environments, while not central to this study, are nevertheless worthy of 
isolated mention here.  There are three significant aspects to online 
gender — the power issue implicit in male/female usage levels of 
computer technology (Herring, 1993; Norris, 2001:82-84; Spender, 1995); 
the virtual cross-dressing phenomenon wherein the Internet has allegedly 
become a prime site for sexual experimentation (Foster, 1997; O'Brien, 
1999:83-84; Stryker, 1995); and the less obvious factor of female netizens 
using cyberspace as a means of transcending the gender-based 
impediments that limit their actions and interactions in face-to-face 
situations.  The last aspect is as intriguing as it is under-researched and 
will provide much of the impetus for the section on gender that appears in 
the following chapter.  This section will take a close look at female users 
    
                                            
 
 
47 This is, admittedly, a source of great debate among cyber researchers.  Many studies 
are showing that the once pronounced gender gap is decreasing, although few (if any) 
would be willing to contend that male users no longer constitute a clear majority of overall 
Internet users.  A major study of Internet usage across fifteen European nations by the 
Eurobarometer organisation revealed that male users were more prominent in all fifteen  
nations.  The difference was minimal in countries like France and the UK, but was very 
pronounced in nations like the Netherlands and Luxembourg.  Meanwhile in the USA, it is 
believed that male users outnumber female users by 5% and upwards — Norris 
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on the Stormfront.org website, highlighting the paradoxical disparity that 
distinguishes their online behaviour from their offline devotion to white 
pride ideology and gender conventions. 
 
A working definition of self-identity 
 While the aim of this chapter centred upon the presentation of a 
critical and operational overview of the self-identity terrain in both its 
historical and contemporary guises, it was also intended that the content 
of the chapter would inform the development of a working definition on the 
self-identity concept.  The production of a 'working definition' framework for 
use in each of the online-based chapters [3, 5 & 7] occurs in each of the 
lead-up chapters [2, 4 & 6] and corresponds to the same format in each 
instance.   
 As a starting step, the working definition decides upon a meaning 
for the concept under review that reflects, and is instructed by, the 
literature material related in the chapter.  With regard to self-identity, the 
meaning of the term that is central to its deployment in this thesis is 
expressed as follows.  The continual process of internally comprehending 
and externally expressing culturally mediated forms of belief, emotion, 
desire and knowledge that are ontologically fundamental to an individual's 
everyday state of being.  This definition of self-identity borrows heavily 
from the ideas of the three main theorists outlined earlier in this chapter. 
Firstly, it owes much to the early works of Erikson for its slant on internal 
comprehension.  Secondly, it carries with it unmistakable overtones of  
Goffman by way of its focus on external expression (role-playing).  Finally, 
it proffers allusion to Giddens on account of its firm emphasis on everyday 
processes of continuity (routine and repetition).  This meaning differs from 
most conventional definitions of the self-identity concept in that it is at 
pains to recognise and stress the presence of external influences in the 
formation of an individual's sense of self.  The recognition of culturally 
mediated influences on identity development is crucial if personae are to 
                                                                                                                       
(2001:69). 
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be explained as non-static and potentially multi-dimensional entities, as 
would certainly appear to be the case in online environments. 
 The working definitions also incorporate a range of investigative 
variables that serve to drive much of the explication surrounding each key 
concept.  These 'variables' are not utilised in the rigid statistical fashion 
that underscores most psychological exploration of phenomena; rather 
they perform the duty of shaping the ensuing discussion around explicit 
thematic lines, which is more in keeping with qualitative approaches to 
research.  The four variables selected for use in the following self-identity 
chapter are presented here as follows — 'regulation of identity', 'inspiration 
for identity', 'sovereignty of identity', and 'identity problematics'. 
 The 'regulation of identity' variable is concerned with the number of 
identities that netizens choose to employ in the virtual realm, the extent to 
which they coordinate these identities, and the instances of these 
identities being used in real-life interactions.  Identities, as they pertain to 
cyberspace, are predominantly conveyed via the nicknames (also known 
as 'handles') that a netizen chooses as his/her point(s) of identification in 
the online realm. Considerable academic attention, particularly from 
postmodernists, centres around the propensity for modern day individuals 
to fragment their expressions of self through the creation and 
implementation of multiple personal identifiers (Ewing, 1990; Moore, 1994; 
Turkle, 1995; Gergen, 1996; Kolko & Reid, 1998).  An opposing scenario 
can also be evidenced, however, in online interactions whereby netizens 
afford considerable primacy to the one overriding handle.   In light of this, it 
is possible to perceive of cyberspace as an environment wherein 
individuals can express a singular, stabilised sense of self, as well as a 
flexible, transitory variation of the concept. 
Online nicknames carry deeper import than the everyday names 
that serve to label individuals in the 'bricks and mortar' world.  This is not 
to contend that such real-life names exist only as superficial terms of 
distinction, as individuals clearly invest them with greater personal import 
than this, but rather that online nicknames are almost invariably more 
colourful and descriptive.   This is primarily due to the fact that such 
identifiers can not rely on bodily features and expressions to imbue them 
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with additional strands of character and meaning. One's body and 
behaviours contribute markedly to one's expression of self through the 
largely unconscious signs one admits to others.  In cyberspace, such 
physical expressions are practically impossible (outside of video 
conferencing and webcams) so it is the job of the nickname to fill in here 
as best it can.  The second variable to be more closely implemented in the 
discussion on online identities seeks to analyse the implicit meaning 
attributable to online nicknames.  I have termed this category the 
'inspiration for identity' variable and it primarily aims to provide a better 
sense of the multifarious stimulants that underscore a netizen's choice of 
nickname(s).   
 Following on from this initiative, the 'sovereignty of identity' variable 
is employed in an effort to divulge the level of attachment netizens display 
towards their online nicknames.  Do netizens feel a similar level of 
attachment to their online handles as they do towards their real-life 
names?  How flexible are they in relation to creating and using alternative 
identifiers in situations where online participation on a site demands this 
be done?  How much respect do netizens accord to the handles employed 
by fellow Internet users?  Will they be more likely to refer to them by name 
or nickname if the chance to use either identifier arises?  These are the 
questions that drive the operationalisation of the 'sovereignty of identity' 
variable. 
 A significant portion of this chapter was devoted to a commentary 
on the ways in which certain cultural conventions influence and impact 
upon the process of self-identity construction.  The final variable, 'identity 
problematics', works from this commentary, exploring the levels to which a 
range of cultural elements (gender, occupation, education, race and 
ethnicity) shape and arbitrate the personae that netizens come to express 
online.  This variable, as with the others, delves into data gleaned from the 
empirical investigation [refer Chapter 1], along with information uncovered 
from the study of cyberspatial texts, as well as from the content material of 
this chapter. 
 
Closing discussion 
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 The ensuing chapter takes over from where this one leaves off; 
keeping discussion focused on the topic of self-identity, but shifting the 
content focus from fleshspace to the virtual realm.  All of the major lines of 
inquiry alluded to in this chapter are elaborated upon further, along with 
fresh lines of thought that are presented from literary works relating 
specifically to cyberspace and CMC.  The four variables outlined above 
are operationalised throughout the following section, with a greater 
emphasis placed on empirical observations of identity formation as it 
occurs on the Stormfront.org white nationalist website.  
In summation, the content presented in the following chapter 
endeavours to address the following key research stimuli.  Firstly, I offer a 
brief insight into the structural conventions that serve to oversee, organise 
and nurture identity development in online environments.  Secondly, I 
address the ways in which online identities can be seen to diverge from 
the patterns implicit in the construction of real-life identities. Thirdly, I 
highlight the role that nicknames play in the expressing and affirming of 
online senses of self.  Finally, but most significantly, I seek to challenge 
the commonly held belief that netizens freely and prominently adopt 
multiple identity tenets and signifiers when participating in cyberspace. 
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CHAPTER 
3 
Internet Identities: Investigating 
the online self 
 
 
Putting the 'you' in CPU (Central Processing Unit)  
 The significance of preserving face in online interactions is a 
prominent factor in discussions of virtual identity, with netizens in general 
taking considerable care to nurture and protect their particular strands of 
public self-image.  The desire to be "liked, valued and understood" 
(Harrison, 2000:69) is, it could be argued, intrinsically common to human 
beings; although such desire is necessarily heightened in an environment 
such as cyberspace, where romanticised notions of personal growth and 
freedom are part and parcel of the attraction that draws many new users 
into the realm.  In cyberspace it is possible to have "as many electronic 
personae as one has time and energy to create" (Donath, 1999:29).  As I 
will contend later in this chapter, however, the ability to create multiple 
personae is a largely self-defeating exercise if these personae are 
ineffectively implemented.  Accordingly then, persona development in 
cyberspace is essentially similar to persona development in fleshspace. 
The main objective for an individual here is to adequately coordinate their 
comprehension of the world around them, whilst simultaneously ensuring 
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that this comprehension of worldview is competently conveyed to other 
individuals during everyday social interactions (Giddens, 1984:25-28).48
 This process becomes decidedly more problematic in cyberspace on 
account of the dearth of transactional cues and supportive information that 
are normally provided by the physical body.  Donath explains the 
importance of this supportive information and the need for netizens to find 
alternative ways of expressing it when she writes that: 
 
 
Identity cues are sparse in the virtual world, but not non-
existent.  People become attuned to the nuances of email 
addresses and signature styles.  New phrases evolve that 
mark their users as members of a chosen subculture.  
Virtual reputations are established and impugned.  By 
looking closely at these cues, at how they work and when 
they fail, we can learn a great deal about how to build 
vibrant online environments (1999:30). 
 
The cues that Donath speaks of are many and varied, but they all interlink 
and interweave to assist netizens with the ongoing transaction of their 
online identities with other Internet users.  Thus, if a netizen wishes to 
effectively convey his or herself to an online community then he/she would 
need to, even at a preliminary level, incorporate some understanding of 
online communication aids.  The most commonly employed 
communication aids in the virtual realm are emoticons and online 
abbreviations. 
 
Emoticons and online abbreviations49
 The virtual realm is often mistakenly spoken of by the uninitiated as a 
reckless, lawless environment wherein netizens have carte blanche to 
utilise cyberspatial media in a completely ad hoc and anarchic manner.  In  
 
                                            
48 As will be shown later in this chapter, many of the interview/questionnaire subjects 
used more than one online handle for their interactions in the virtual world.  In spite of 
this, these users still tended to use just the one nickname whilst participating on the 
Stormfront.org site.  Poster credibility (for both proponents of white pride and agitators)  
on the Stormfront.org site is largely dependent on operating from a single, established 
and clearly identifiable handle.   
49 Some online researchers prefer to use the term 'acronym' here, which is suitable for 
most instances wherein the modifier is used, but descriptors such as ZZZ [refer Table 4] 
are not acronyms, hence my preference for running with the term 'abbreviations'. 
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Table 3.  Emoticons and the feelings they are used to express. 
 
Typical US/European                     Typical Japanese 
:-)   regular smile                                 (^-^)         regular smile 
:^)  happy                                            (^o^)         happy 
;-)   wink/mischievous                         (^ . ^)        girl’s smile 
:-o  wow                                              (*^o^*)      exciting 
:-|   grim                                              (^o^;)         excuse me! 
:-||  anger                                              (-o-)           I’m sorry 
:-(   sad                                                 (;-;)            weeping 
:^(  unhappy                                        (^ ^;)          cold sweat 
.oO thinking                                        (^-^;;)         awkward 
Source: Adapted from Aoki (1994). 
 
Table 4. Examples of online abbreviations 
AFK Away from the keyboard 
BRB Be right back 
BTW By the way 
CUL8R See you later 
FAQ Frequently asked questions 
IMHO In my humble opinion 
LOL Lots of laughs 
MorF? Male or Female? 
RTFM Read the F***ing manual! 
URAQTINVU You are a cutie, I envy you 
ZZZ Boring, hurry up! 
Source: Adapted from Third Age Media (1997). 
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reality, however, netizens must conform to the etiquette requirements that 
are in place for the specific community in which they are participating.  The 
most unique aspect of netiquette, as it pertains to a broad range of online 
environments, surrounds the use of 'emoticons' to supplement and hasten 
the conversations and interactions that take place within the domain.  
Emoticons enable netizens to enrich and dramatise their conversations by 
substituting keyboard symbols for the "voice inflection, eye contact, and 
body mannerisms" that accompany fleshspace conversations (Kitchin, 
1998:7).  Emoticons are many in number and vary from one online domain 
to another, but Table 3 provides a working example of this particular mode 
of communication. 
 Online communications are also regularly complemented by the 
judicious addition of 'online abbreviations' [refer Table 4] that fulfil a similar 
function to emoticons.  Whereas emoticons are limited in the sense that 
they must in some way act as symbolic representations of human facial 
expressions and associated body language, abbreviations are ostensibly 
boundless in that they can represent all manner of human actions, feelings 
and/or idioms.  Some abbreviations, LOL in particular, are used far more 
commonly than others, but the lexicon of abbreviated online language 
continues to grow in accordance with ever increasing Internet usage and 
the seemingly constant cyberspace predilection for speed and efficiency of 
communication exchange (Leaning, 1998:35). 
 On the surface emoticons and abbreviations appear to be little more 
than trivial asides, but they do fulfil substantial duties when utilised by 
netizens.  In the first instance, the ability to use and comprehend a range 
of emoticons and abbreviations can serve to identify the netizen 
concerned as an experienced Web user, as opposed to an uncertain 
newbie.50
                                            
50  Some site facilitators are providing a diverse range of emoticons that can be inserted 
into the text.  These tend are mainly basic ones, however, as creative users constantly 
add new emoticons and abbreviations to the ever growing online communication lexicon.  
Newbies can often also be identified through overuse of symbols, and are in danger of 
doing so when site facilitators make them so easy to implement.  Similarly, the more 
common abbreviations are becoming more readily accessible from media articles 
pertaining to the Internet/WWW.  Again, these articles tend to predominantly focus upon 
abbreviations that are ‘stock standard’ across a range of online fora. 
  By extension, if a user is recognised as having 'net savvy' then 
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he/she is also likely to be more easily identified and/or accepted as a 
viable member of a given online community.  'Net savvy', it should be 
noted, is not always a guarantee of acceptance into a particular online 
community, as in certain circumstances, Internet competency and 
knowledge is seen as a decidedly less valued commodity than devotion to 
the political cause at hand.  This is especially true of white pride web 
groups such as Stormfront.org, as will be made clear later in the chapter. 
 On a secondary level, emoticons and abbreviations are a key 
communicative tool for netizens as they help to distinguish genuine posts 
from 'trolls'. Trolling carries with it clear overtones of Goffman's (1959) 
'team performance', as discussed at length in the previous chapter.  The 
cliquey team-like nature of human groupings is often very evident in online 
communities; where participating individuals place great stock in attaining 
a privileged position in the group and jealously guard such status by 
surrounding themselves with others of similar community standing.  Once 
these alliances are formed they are thereafter maintained via regular 
recognition of fellow "team members" which is, barring unforeseen 
circumstances, repaid by these members in kind.  It must be remembered, 
of course, that one's place in the "team" is neither automatically nor 
indefinitely granted.  As such, an individual needs to establish him or 
herself as a worthwhile addition to the community in question, and this can 
not always be accomplished in online environments by unswerving 
devotion to the group's particular shared aims and beliefs alone.   
 Trolling is fast becoming an integral part of the Internet landscape, 
yet, at the time of writing, it remains surprisingly under researched by 
cyberspace investigators.  In accordance with this, it is also very difficult to 
happen across a firmly detailed definition of the term, although it would 
appear that online trolling occurs in the following three ways.  Firstly, it is 
realised through an act of deception by a computer user who posts a 
message online with the intent of tricking other netizens into believing that 
the message originated from someone else (Bond, 1999:5).  Secondly, 
trolling involves the pretence of inhabiting an online domain and passing 
yourself off as sympathetic to its beliefs and aims, whilst simultaneously 
agitating and unsettling other group members with posts and comments 
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that surreptitiously work in opposition to these beliefs and aims (Donath, 
1999:45). 
 Such versions of trolling centre on the destructive and, in some 
cases, criminal aspects of the process, but the third and most common 
way is used for decidedly less sordid purposes.  On such occasions 
trolling involves the asking of stupid questions or the posting of subtly 
sardonic posts as forms "of joke used to distinguish group insiders from 
outsiders" (Baym, 1998:53).  An example of this common form of trolling is 
outlined in Figure 3.  Five postings from a single message thread involving 
58 posts have been included in this figure.   
 The first post from 'Dragonette' expresses her joy at the prominent 
role that female fans are playing in contemporary rugby league by 
attending matches and involving themselves in discussion about the 
game.  The second post from 'grays' also shows support for women in 
rugby league, but does so in a patronising manner, ignoring the place of 
female fans at the "coal face" of the game; preferring instead to focus 
attention on the support role that women have played for men involved 
with the sport over the years.  The third post from 'ozbash' (highlighted in 
grey shade) is the troll, with the writer recognising the patronising 
overtones of the previous post and replying to it with overstated sarcastic 
wit.51
 
  'Dragonette' (the original poster) remains completely oblivious to the 
troll in post four and it is significant that she opens this message with a 
reference to her inexperience on the forum, given that regular users would 
be unlikely to mistake the intent of ozbash's post.  One of these regulars, 
‘Billy the pig’, closes out the example by outlining his amazement at the 
inability of other members to recognise the troll in the final post. 
 
                                            
 
37 It should be noted that one would require some prior knowledge of the 'ozbash' online 
persona to be able to identify this post as a troll.  I found such identification to be easy, 
having conversed with ozbash on several occasions prior to this posting and from having 
perused his posts over a prolonged period of time.  This serves to further highlight the 
importance of the 'lurking' process  (discussed in Chapter One) for netizens and online 
researchers, as it helps the reader/viewer to get a clear sense of the posting styles of 
various participants, minimising one's chances of mistaking troll posts for serious ones. 
103  
 
Figure 3.  An example of a 'troll'.  (Source: NineMsn, 2000)52
 
 
Started by: Dragonette Sent: 22/03/2001 9:58 AM 58 Replies  
I must say that having read through a lot of the discussions that are going on, 
escpecially from the girls out there, that i am very proud to be a "footy chick".  
Not only are we voicing our opinions and thoughts on "our teams" should's 
and should not's, but we are getting involved in the technicalities of the 
game. I hope that the men out there will take our thoughts and opinions 
seriously, and not scoff and assume that we are all "butchy lesbians".  
 
From: grays Sent: 23/03/2001 9:46 AM 9 of 58 
Dear Dragonette us guys would all agree that the women form a large part 
of the Rugby League world, your support over the years is absolutly 
outstanding, to all the mums who put up with the washing ,mending the 
scatches, having a shoulder to cry on when young johny or fatty comes 
home crying cause his side lost again to the wives who support there 
husbands through the good times and the bad 10 out 10 well done . i do 
beleive you women deserve a pat on the back and keep up your support for 
the league. Oh and a special thankyou to all those lovely cheer girls too, 
keep those pom poms twirling.  
 
 
From: ozbash Sent: 23/03/2001 9:56 AM 10 of 58 
you,re onto it there grays.a womans place is in the background as a support 
person.they are not ideally suited to offering opinions about footy as they 
have little or no understanding of the game and usually only repeat what they 
have heard from us.also,a womens brain is smaller and less likely to be as 
efficient as a males. so i think the majority of sheilas do a great job in the 
background,washing,ironing ,cooking,,,,,,,,,,,, 
 
From: Dragonette Sent: 27/03/2001 10:08 AM 36 of 58  
Well, after 2 or so weeks on the "world of rugby league" i can spot the 
genuine league fans from the uneducated sloths to the smart asses who have 
nothing better to do with their time than sledge everything that wasn't THEIR 
idea. Thanks to everyone who loves the game for what it is, and not who it 
should represent. As for Ozbash and the other ignorant males, it is quite 
obvious that you are one of those males who do nothing but denegrate 
women, yet you can't stand one night alone without them. I won't comment 
further with respect to the likes of the ignorant out there, as I have an 
education and can expand my mind further than which sex is better than the 
other. 
 
From: Billy the pig Sent: 27/03/2001 12:36 PM 41 of 58  
Ozbash, It is a serious worry to me that so few 'get it.' Perhaps they have not 
had the grounding in feminism that you and I would get from working in an 
industry dominated by militant feminists.  
CyberKev, Thank God you understood, I was begining to think there was 
something I was missing here.  
                                            
52 Postings taken from empirical observations of online environments will be presented in 
this thesis as they were originally written.  The large number of grammatical errors 
inherent in these posts render the ‘sic’ function inappropriate in this instance. 
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 In a realm like cyberspace unblinking group devotion is applicable to 
the majority of participants, meaning that even those netizens with the 
best of intentions can get lost in the crowd.  This comes as an unpleasant 
surprise to many who naively embrace cyberspace as a haven for the 
building of relationships in defiance of restrictive social and cultural 
qualifiers, only to discover that the virtual realm is an equally unforgiving 
place for those found lacking in communication skills.  Confident and 
colourful self-expression is thus a prized commodity in the virtual world, 
which is why humour is so often injected into online interactions: 
 
Humor creates and transforms the social structure of the 
community.  It is in part through humorous performance 
that particular posters overcome the seeming anonymity 
of the computer medium to develop their own voices.  In 
an ongoing parade of screens of posts that look almost 
identical, strong individual voices emerge, gaining 
recognition, status and enhanced power to shape group 
consensus (Baym, 1995:21). 
 
The seemingly constant presence of humour has led to the Internet 
evolving from a sterile, austere environment, as per the early science 
dominated days of online interaction, to what Danet et al. have come to 
describe as the "inherently playful medium" of the present day (1998:41-
44).  The playful nature of the virtual arena clearly suits some netizens 
more comfortably than others and is a somewhat surprising aspect of 
cyberculture, given that the medium lends itself more openly to speed and 
efficiency of information and communications exchange. 
 Humour and playfulness can be helpful assets for netizens 
attempting to shape an impacting identity for themselves in a virtual 
community but, in general terms, they are largely insufficient in and of 
themselves to guarantee a netizen solidity of place within that community.  
Ostensibly, humour and playfulness act as powerful supplements to 
identity structures founded upon knowledge competencies (both in terms 
of Internet usage per se, as well as the understandings pertinent to the 
aims, beliefs and intentions of the virtual community concerned) and the 
personal capacity to effectively express this knowledge to others.  It is at 
this point that the use of "high style", described simply as the ability to 
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employ language elements elegantly, constructively, creatively and in a 
way that reflects favourably on the assumed intelligence of the writer 
(Goffman, 1981:189) becomes something of a double-edged sword.  This 
point is neatly articulated by the following message posts extracted from 
the 'Stormfront.org' unmoderated discussion forum:53
 
 
Jesse Jackson: Make your invective more effective.  Tell 
'em Jesse sent you …  It has come to my attention that 
many of you have poor English writing skills.  Unless 
something is done quickly employers will not be able to 
tell you from the Niggers you hate so much…  When you 
finish the course [I propose for you] you'll be able to read 
books like The Turner Diaries and The Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion just like a pro.  Imagine being able to talk 
about Niggers, Kikes, Chinks, Japs and other minorities 
without embarrassing grammatical errors  
Euroman: Well hello Jesse "Headmaster" Jackson!  Your 
enormous love for us White folks is indeed touching.  
Thank you kindly Jesse for that information.  Just one 
more thing there "Headmaster" Jesse…  Do you have 
more of an urge to play basketball or play the stockmarket 
[given your combined negro and Jewish genes]?  
Anonymous: Hey Jesse I see I have gotten you riled up 
now would you like to discuss factual differences between 
the negroes and caucasoids…  How come most of africa 
can't pull itself out of the stone age except of course south 
africa but that doesn't count because the white man built 
that.  P.S. this is a computer message board not a english 
composition paper for college…  MUCH DISRESPECT 
GARY  
  
 In white pride fora such as 'Stormfront.org' the employment of 'high 
style' expression by community members is treated with equal parts 
indifference and disdain due to the manner in which it is regularly used as 
a weapon against the movement.  Message posts like the one put forward 
by 'Jesse Jackson' are commonly directed at Stormfront.org participants, 
                                            
53 The reader is advised that quotes presented in this manner throughout the thesis have 
been expressly from one of two possible sources.  Some will have been taken from 
messages posted on the Stormfront.org unmoderated discussion forum between the 
months of February and April (inclusive) of 1999, with this period representing the 
‘lurking’ stage of the thesis.  The quotations not derived from observation of the lurking 
stage have been gleaned from the interviews/questionnaires conducted with 
Stormfront.org members during September 2000. 
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and carry with them the underlying subtext that white pride followers are 
uneducated rednecks.  
 Posts in the vein of Jackson’s and the predictable white nationalist 
responses to them carry extra venom in that they are indicative of left 
versus right political struggles and the ongoing attempts of each to obtain 
the upper moral ground.  It is therefore not uncommon for those aligned to 
the left to dismiss their right-aligned opponents as uneducated, racist and 
selfish.  The willingness to disparage along these lines is no less 
pronounced in cyberspace as it is in fleshspace, but the process of 
haranguing an opponent for their alleged knowledge deficiencies is made 
all the more easy when poorly written posts appear on the screen for all to 
see.  It should also be noted that a key tenet of white nationalist thought 
surrounds the idea that non-white persons (Blacks and Latinos in 
particular) are inferior to white persons on account of their poorer levels of 
performance in I.Q. tests (Bushart et al. 1998:143-144).  As such, 
opponents of white pride can use posts like Jackson’s as a means of 
turning the inferior intelligence argument on its head.  Conversely, persons 
who are sympathetic to right-wing ideologies will readily counter claims 
that they are racist and poorly educated by dismissing their left-aligned 
foes as mischievous elitists.  In this way, online white priders launch 
counter attacks on their antagonists by mocking the 'high style' language 
employed in their posts and suggesting that the authors are attempting to 
hide insubstantial ideas and deceptive agendas behind deliberately 
obscure forms of prose.  
  Online language use does not have to be structured in 'high style' 
format and nor does it, in most cases, have to be grammatically polished 
to find acceptance from other community members.  In spite of this, it is 
very evident that language use online encompasses its own unique forms 
of 'register'54
                                            
54 Register = the differing types of language that can be used for the purposes of writing 
and speaking. 
 and that such forms will necessarily alter when the 
communication being transmitted is in asynchronous format, as distinct 
from synchronous format.  Online communication in the synchronous 
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sense (i.e. Internet chat, video conferencing, MUD participation) favours a 
style of communication use that economises language in order to replicate 
face-to-face interaction as closely as is possible (Wallace, 1999:11).  By 
way of contrast, asynchronous online communication is seen to closely 
resemble "the public interview style of speech" wherein netizens post 
lengthy and detailed messages, knowing as they do so that the message 
is being viewed by a wide audience and that they are not going to be (as is 
often the case with face-to-face interactions) interrupted prior to 
completing it (Wallace, 1999:12). 
 Online language use is, at the basic level, dependent upon the 
netizen's 'communicative competence', described by Cherny as the things 
"a speaker needs to know to communicate appropriately within a speech 
community and how (he or) she learns it" (1999:23).  In order to attain a 
viable level of communicative competence it is necessary for the netizen 
concerned to familiarise themselves with the basic communicative idioms 
of other participants within the community and to obtain a working 
understanding of what is and is not acceptable to other members on the 
site.  This inevitably results in a circular action whereby "discourse 
processes generate social structures, which in turn affect discourse 
processes" (McLaughlin et al. 1995:94). 
 It is at this point that individual identity, as expressed through online 
communication, becomes immediately identifiable as a key stimulus and 
reinforcing agent in Giddens' process of structuration.  It is structuration 
theory that ties all three major concepts of this thesis to the broader over-
arching concept of society, as outlined in the diagram that I constructed 
below [Figure 4].  While I have already discussed the major tenets of 
structuration theory in the preceding chapter it is intended that this 
diagram will help to isolate the integral ways in which the theory is serving 
to underscore and influence this overall body of work.  The dualisms 
apparent in the diagram are central to Giddens’ assertion that human 
action influences institutional development and is not, as structural 
functionalists would contend, wholly directed by the vagaries of 
institutional development. 
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Figure 4. The reflexive and regulative processes of structuration.55
 
 
 
 On a basic level structuration theory is aimed at providing 
explanations for how "interaction should be conceptualized and its relation 
to (societal) institutions" (Giddens, 1984:xvi).  In a broader sense it is 
designed for the linking of human actors (at the micro level) to the 
overarching entity that is human society (at the macro level), taking into 
account the many institutional and political bodies (at the meso level) that 
nurture and mediate these links. 
 From the above diagram we can see that the links between the 
individual and the community are characterised by strong levels of 
practical and discursive consciousness on the part of the former.  Self-
identity is predominantly concerned with the plausible development of 
each consciousness so that the individual is competently able to 
comprehend the "conditions of their own actions" (Bryant & Jary, 1991:8).  
With regard to community, an individual will use this developed sense of 
consciousness to negotiate their presence and standing in a group 
                                            
55 The abbreviations ‘Sys’, ‘Str’, and ‘Ide’ stand for ‘System’, ‘Structure’ and ‘Identity’ 
respectively.  ‘System’, in this instance, relates implicitly to the broader human processes 
that are realised through human interaction.  ‘Structure’, in accordance with this, pertains 
to the laws, rules, regulations and physical infrastructures that mediate between 
individual human actions and these broader system processes.  ‘Identity’, as the term 
suggests, alludes to the development of human identity in its multifarious micro, meso 
and macro level forms. 
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dynamic of which they want to be a part.   This community will demand 
things of the individual and will provide things for them in return, but—for 
all intents and purposes—the individual is generally free (in the virtual 
realm, at least) to withdraw from participation in the community if he/she 
feels inclined to do so.  The community will apply intended measures of 
regulation to ensure that individual idiosyncrasies do not serve to 
overshadow or diminish the harmony and cohesiveness of the group 
dynamic and these regulatory measures will in turn be influenced by the 
needs and preferences of the individual. 
 Virtual communities, for the most part, run on a majority rules basis 
and individuals tend to accept this on account of their personal 
preferences generally corresponding to those of most other members of 
the group.  Webmasters, by and large, accept that the viability of the 
virtual communities they create is implicitly dependent upon enough 
members sharing a favourable view of the group regulation practices that 
he/she has put in place.  Individual netizens approach these regulations 
reflexively, putting forward possible amendments where they see fit and 
either conduct themselves in a manner that conforms to these conventions 
or seek out alternative options elsewhere.  If too many netizens choose 
the latter option then the community will collapse, which is also the likely 
result should a community fail to maintain group stability through adequate 
implementation of regulation.   
 As is the case with community, nationalism undergoes contested 
processes of regulation when linked directly to the broader social system 
of society.  'Contested' as the term is employed here is drawn from what 
Giddens' calls 'homeostatic loops', where regulation of human action is 
influenced by structural developments that are derived from unintended 
consequences and unacknowledged conditions (Bryant & Jary, 1991:8).56
                                            
56 Bryant & Jary (1991) refer to these "contested" processes as unintended 
consequences and unacknowledged conditions of action.  The main point behind 
Giddens' stressing of intended and unintended factors was so that he could clearly 
highlight the central weakness (as he saw it) of structural functionalist approaches to self-
identity.  This weakness being that structural functionalism does not allow for individual 
human actor influence in the creation and maintenance of social systems and structures.  
For structural functionalists, the impact of social systems and structures on human actors 
are entirely beyond their control or influence.  The above diagram shows that this is not 
  
110  
 
Nationalism also provides states with the opportunity to incorporate 
reflexive modes of thinking and acting into their governing practices. This 
allows the governing bodies in such states to deeply assess and analyse 
the nationalist objectives of counterpart states prior to finalising their own 
policy regulations.  The state is essentially a body of institutions and is 
thus a world removed from the organic construct that is the human 
individual.  In spite of this, the state can still be seen to operate (at times) 
along reflexive lines in a manner akin to the way in which human actors 
assess and formulate their unique senses of self.  
  
More than just a (nick) name 
 In the online realm, as is the case with real-life, the starting point for 
any viable expression of self-identity begins with a name(s).  The act of 
naming people and objects is, in the first instance, a crucial activity 
through which human beings come to distinguish between other people 
and objects via the process of labelling.  In a less obvious manner the act 
of naming is also used as a means of diminishing fear of, or apprehension 
with, someone or something by applying a comforting title or label to 
them/it (Bechar-Israeli, 1995:6).  In the computerised world such name 
usage is common, but when it comes to cyberspace, the user is usually 
quite competent with the technology and will generally choose a name that 
either suits their character or carries with it some sort of attention grabbing 
content. 
 At this point it is worth dwelling on the possible reasons as to why 
most netizens do not choose to run with their real-life names while online.  
Security and privacy factors obviously play a considerable part in the 
decision to select a virtual nom de plume, with four potential pitfalls in 
                                                                                                                       
entirely true and that scope does exist for human actors to impress themselves (to 
varying degrees) on the broader social landscape.  I have preferred to run with the 
overriding term "contested" in this instance, as I feel that the contested nature of 
social/structural policy and development is the main reason for these processes having 
unintended consequences for individual human actors.  "Contested", as it is used here, 
also allows for situations that arise whereby the impact of social structures/systems on 
the individual actor is—by and large—in accordance with the individual's expectations; in 
so much as they either override the consensus of the community of which the individual is 
a part, or in that they are arrived at by means that are largely incidental to the individual's 
particular knowledge/reading of the situation. 
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particular preventing netizens from being openly forthright with their true 
details.  Firstly, there is the possibility of being stalked by another user 
who would not only know of your online specifics (were they suitably 
versed on Internet and computer technology), but could also track your 
movements in real-life.  Apprehension over an unresolved stalking 
situation almost led to the termination of one of my online interviews, as 
seen in the following exchange: 
 
Vamp 88: you aren't local to me are you?  
CyberKev: Not unless you class Australia as being a 
state of the USA....  Some do, apparently :) 
Vamp 88: well Aussie was the best I could trace you to, 
but still i know proxies… I'll be blunt I've have had a cyber 
stalker locally the entire time I've been online which is one 
of the reasons for the nick change…   I'm serious 
interview over if I find this guy on my steps. 
 
Vamp 88's predicament illustrates the potential for virtual occurrences to 
cross-over into an individual's real-life, when the illusion of global 
anonymity gives way to the reality that other geographically proximate 
individuals can also surf the same Internet (Horn, 1998:45).  This would be 
an exception to the rule, of course, with most instances of cyberstalking 
being confined to the virtual realm, where difficulty remains in convincing 
large sectors of society that "crimes of the mind" are genuine crimes 
nonetheless (Spender, 1995:209).57
 Some netizens also suppress their real-life identities out of concern 
at the prospect of their online life and activities being traced back to their 
   
                                            
57 It is only recently that cyberspatial regulators have seriously turned their attention to 
cyberstalking and confusion still remains as to exactly what constitutes the offence.  
According to a 1999 report published by the US Department of Justice, cyberstalking 
refers "to the use of the Internet, e-mail, or other electronic communications devices to 
stalk another person. Stalking generally involves harassing or threatening behavior that 
an individual engages in repeatedly, such as following a person, appearing at a person's 
home or place of business, making harassing phone calls, leaving written messages or 
objects, or vandalizing a person's property."  Cyberstalking is complicated further by: 
netizen uncertainty as to whether they have been offended against; netizen confusion 
over who to report a suspected offence to; the tendency of law enforcement officers to 
downplay the offence; and—in cases where such officers do treat the report seriously—
law enforcers not possessing the technological knowledge and competency to adequately 
deal with the problem (Attorney General to the Vice President, 1999). 
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everyday professional lives.  This concern can present itself in two 
differing manifestations.  Firstly, as fear at the prospect of being 
disciplined by one’s employer over overt use of online vehicles during 
work hours and/or improper use of such vehicles for the pursuit of 
gambling, random chat sessions, or pornography.  And secondly, the 
concern can be a largely political one, where the individual is afraid of 
having their employers discover (and react unfavourably toward) 
revelations that they have been supporting causes online that run contrary 
to the practices and ideologies of the employers. 
 With regard to netizens who frequent online sites that openly foster 
and encourage right or left-wing political views, the need to suppress one’s 
real identity is also a necessary step in avoiding possible prosecution from 
government or police agencies.  Members of the ‘Stormfront.org’ online 
discussion fora are acutely aware that the site is being monitored by 
police, governmental and ‘anti-hate’ bodies as evidenced in replies to the 
following interview/questionnaire question:58
 
 
If you had to use your real name to participate 
on the Stormfront.org forum, would you be 
willing to do so? Why or why not? 
 
YES = 10,     MAYBE = 4,     NO = 7 
 
Redshift: No.  Since it is currently “socially unacceptable” 
to be “racist”, this might have negative repercussions in 
the form of termination of employment or expulsion from 
university.  Also, with the lack of freedom of speech in 
Germany, to which I intend to relocate soon, it may even 
lead to a jail sentence. 
Njord: Probably [although] I tried to keep a lower profile 
for a while on the grounds that my home country 
[Germany] issued an arrest warrant against me, 
threatening me with long-term imprisonment for 
[advocating] politically incorrect thoughts. 
                                            
58 The reader is advised that questions displayed in these grey-shaded boxes throughout 
the thesis have been reproduced from the interview/questionnaires undertaken with 
Stormfront.org members.  A full reproduction of the question list that was implemented in 
order to direct these interview/questionnaires is displayed at the conclusion of the thesis 
[refer Appendix B]. 
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Madame Blavatsky: Absolutely not.  That site is 
monitored so heavily by hate groups: JDL [Jewish 
Defense League], ADL [Anti-Defamation League], etc.  I 
only reveal my real identity to people I know and trust, 
and they are few and far between on the Internet. 
 
While the above comments are reasonably instructive of standard white 
pride approaches to online participation, it is interesting to note that ten of 
the interview/questionnaire subjects were unfussed by the prospect of 
revealing their real-life names online.  If this indifference is to be taken at 
face value then it serves to add further speculation as to why an individual 
would choose to forego their real-life name and identity in preference for 
fabricated alternatives. 
 
Comparative name studies 
 The reasoning behind a netizen’s decision to forego their real-life 
name and some of the persona elements that are associated with it, can 
often be revealed in the nicknames that they use when interacting in the 
virtual realm.  Bechar-Israeli (1995) delved heavily into the study of online 
nicknames and argued that these nicknames operated with noticeable 
similarity to the ‘stage names’ (used by celebrities) and ‘graffiti tags’ (used 
by youths) in fleshspace. These names and tags act predominantly as 
links between the individual and their mode of performance.  With 
entertainers this is often characterised by a switch from a run-of-the-mill 
real name to a romantic sounding stage name that proffers the opportunity 
of sophistication and fame (Bechar-Israeli, 1995:8).  Graffiti artists differ 
slightly in that they normally select a tag that relates implicitly to their 
personality, or other people’s perceptions of their personality (Bechar-
Israeli, 1995:9).  For the most part these names and tags are used to put 
individuals firmly in the spotlight, but sometimes they are employed to help 
the individual with ‘passing’ on their identity (Goffman, 1963a:42), as 
Bechar-Israeli makes clear in alluding to the tendency of 19th century 
women writers to hide their female identities behind masculine pen names 
in order to find acceptance as authors during this overtly male-centred 
period of history (1995:9). Online nicknames thus act similarly for netizens 
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in that they provide individuals with an element of sovereignty over their 
privacy when participating in what is a very public domain. 
 Bechar-Israeli’s study of online nickname typologies encompassed 
an analysis of 260 handles taken from IRC (Internet Relay Chat) 
participants across four differing channels on the medium.  Initially these 
handles were organised into sixteen individual categories before Bechar-
Israeli ultimately collapsed the data down into seven pertinent typologies, 
consisting of six peculiar nickname identifiers and a leftover category 
pertaining to real names [refer Table 5].  Of the 260 handles originally 
analysed, only 231 would remain for the final results table as 29 were 
found to be unclassifiable. 
 We can see from this study that by far the most popular nicknames 
for IRC users are those that relate back to their personality or character in 
some fashion.  Danet et al. (1998), in earlier discussion, informed us of the 
inherently playful nature of IRC, which appears to link neatly to Bechar-
Israeli’s allusion to the similarity between entertainment ‘stage names’ and 
online handles.  Perhaps there is also something to be made of the 
relationship that exists between online “play” and the individual self, 
whereby the former can be seen to arise more freely and effectively from 
embellishments of personal knowledge and experience than from 
uninformed invention.  This would be in keeping with the textual nature of 
IRC communications where netizens essentially function as both readers 
and writers of life story narratives of varying lengths, genres, and levels of 
historical accuracy.  In this way IRC users have much in common with 
authors and poets who also prefer to draw inspiration for their narratives 
from events lifted directly from personal life experiences.  It is thus likely 
that a large part of IRC’s attraction to netizens can be found in the 
medium’s capacity for enabling individuals to make themselves the 
message of the media; a point that is representative of Marshall 
McLuhan’s (1994) famous assertion "the media is the message." 
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Table 5. Six types of Nicks*. (Bechar-Israeli, 1995:15) 
 
CATEGORY NUMBER PERC 
Real names 
 
18 7.8% 
Self-related names 
 
103+1 45.0% 
Names related to medium, technology 
and their nature 
33+6 16.9% 
Names of flora, fauna or objects 36 15.6% 
Play on words and sounds 
 
20+6 11.3% 
Names related to figures in literature, 
films, fairytales and famous people 
13+1 6.1% 
Names related to sex, violence and 
provocation 
8+1 3.9% 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
231+15 
 
106.6% 
 
*Totals add up to more than 100% because of multiple coding.  
 
   
 The other figure that is worthy of mention from Bechar-Israeli’s study 
is the one that accords to names structured around the (CMC) medium, 
overall technology, and their nature.  This figure indicates that roughly one 
in every six IRC users either hails directly from the computer industry, is a 
person who embraces computer technology as a hobby, or is a 
college/university student doing a degree in the information technology 
sector.  There is definitely much to be made of the ties that bind an 
individual’s self-identity to their occupational identity.   
 Writing in the later stages of the 1950s, Erik Erikson (1959:97) spoke 
of youth rebelliousness as an occurrence that could be effectively traced 
to youth uncertainty and frustration over their place (or lack of it) in the 
workplace.  The ‘performances’ of “computer geeks” on IRC and 
associated CMC vehicles could be seen as a contemporary manifestation 
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of this occupational uncertainty and frustration.  This is to contend that the 
information technology sector, for all of its potential earning possibilities, is 
in many cases a dull and inflexible working environment for young people 
with even the most rudimentary desire for creative expression.  Internet 
media offer a vibrant outlet for such creative expression and are especially 
attractive to individuals from within the computer industry, given that such 
people almost invariably have the necessary equipment (or access to it) 
and the computer literacy to participate regularly and confidently online.   
 Morton (2001b), using Bechar-Israeli’s work as her inspiration, 
launched an investigation into the identity structures of users of the Kava 
Bowl (a predominantly Tongan Internet discussion forum) during the later 
stages of the 1990s.59  Morton's study revealed a downturn in the 
percentage of Kava Bowl users running with real names in 1998, 
highlighting the differences of intent that are often apparent between 
synchronous and asynchronous modes of CMC. Synchronous forms of 
CMC (such as chatrooms, ICQ, IRC and MUDs) pitch netizens into an 
often crowded textual space wherein they will generally have to compete 
frenetically with other netizens for a fair share of the attention.  
Asynchronous alternatives (such as discussion forums, BBS and e-mail 
exchange), by way of contrast, do not pressure netizens into the intense 
performance prized environment, allowing them instead to adopt a more 
relaxed and considered approach to their interactions.  It is true, of course, 
that on certain asynchronous vehicles the capacity to out “perform”60
                                            
 
 
 
59 The Kava Bowl differs slightly from the IRC channels researched by Bechar-Israeli 
(1995) in that it is a Bulletin Board System (BBS), meaning that it deals with 
asynchronous exchanges of message postings, as distinct from the synchronous chat 
sessions that occur on IRC.  Morton adopted a similar methodology for her study, 
however, choosing to break her nicknames down into categories.  Eventually she settled 
upon six distinct typologies, with 'real names' being included in this grouping [refer Table 
6]. 
60 Matters of performance are significant, although it is also worth keeping in mind 
Morton’s view that the larger than normal presence of ‘real names’ on the Kava Bowl 
implies that users fear they may not be taken seriously unless they post under their actual 
name (2001:73).  Such a scenario is in line with Tongan approaches to communication 
and also highlights the manner in which fleshspace conventions commonly cross-over 
into the virtual realm. 
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others can lead to your attaining of elite status within the group, and this 
will be spoken of further in Chapter Five. 
Table 6. Six variations of online name. (Morton, 2001b) 
CATEGORY No. '96 % '96 No. '98 % '98 
Real names 306 74.09 27 27.27 
Nicknames 51 12.35 40 40.40 
Descriptive names 26 6.29 20 20.20 
Tongan words 19 4.60 8 8.08 
Group names 8 1.94 0 0 
Tongan identifying 3 0.73 4 4.04 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
413 
 
100 
     
99 
 
100 
 
 While the overall numbers of participants employing nicknames 
within the Kava Bowl may be small in comparison to other chat and MUD 
vehicles, the fact that such nickname use more than tripled on the site 
inside of two years is worthy of mention here.  This would appear to 
indicate that netizen cross-over between varying synchronous and 
asynchronous CMC vehicles is becoming more common and that 
discussion forum participants are tending to find it easier and preferable to 
locate their overall online interactions around single handles (Danet, 
1998:137).  The following extracts taken from the interview/questionnaire 
process support this point: 
 
Viking: Viking is me, that’s how everyone calls me, 
because of my interests and my deepest origins.  
Viking88 is viking + something that distinguish user viking 
from the same user viking in other occasions.  88 is a 
good number to attach to my name...  I’m always Viking, 
at school, on my cds, when I write a message to a friend. 
Njord: [With regard to online nicknames I only use] Two.  
Because someone else registered ‘Njord’ on DALnet. 
Bryn: The nickname I use allows others surfing the Net to 
make certain assumptions about my political/cultural 
leanings.  Using an overtly nationalist/racialist nickname 
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allows me to attract and make contact with other 
nationalists or those interested in nationalist thought. 
Raine: I only use one [nickname] on stormfront, and one 
other name [when online], because my normal handle is 
sometimes taken... 
  
Frustration pertaining to a netizen’s inability to use their preferred 
nickname on a forum due to it already having been taken by someone else 
is commonplace on the Internet.  For Bechar-Israeli, nicknames on IRC 
exist under protection of unofficial ‘copyright’, with disputes over naming 
rights generally being settled by awarding sovereignty of a nick to the 
netizen who has been using it online for the longest period of time 
(1995:18).  On other occasions, name disputes are resolved by site 
moderators on the advice of an aggrieved party toting considerable 
support from the community rank and file.61
 Security matters aside, the tendency for virtual communities to limit 
nicknames for use by individual netizens serves to only further depict 
online identities as being closely linked to notions of performance.  One of 
the most noticeable aspects of films, plays and television programs is the 
way in which they almost unerringly cast characters that do not share the 
same onscreen/onstage name as a fellow character.  This is, of course, 
very much removed from conventional reality where individuals are 
regularly expected to interact with multiple others sharing the same name 
during the course of their everyday life.  The main difference between real-
 It would be exceedingly rare 
for community members to side with an interloper on such an issue, as 
netizens invariably view nicknames as sacrosanct individual identifiers; 
given that they are reliant on knowing exactly who is who on their site for 
their own comfort and security (Myers, 1987:240).   
                                            
 
 
 
61 In April 2001, an antagonistic newcomer entered the ‘World of Rugby League’ (WORL) 
forum and began to post flame trolls using the handle of a long-term netizen on the 
forum.  The newcomer was quickly identified, however, as his version of the handle in 
question differed to that of the original user in that it ended in a fullstop (on WORL two 
people can not use the exact same identifier).  In response to the posts, the original 
“owner” of the handle sought support from other community members, leading to a 
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life and the ‘world on the screen’ is that with the latter, people are, in most 
cases, acutely aware that the actors involved are treating them to 
performances.  Erving Goffman (1959) went to considerable lengths to 
inform us that everyday interactions, in and of themselves, are also 
performances. Despite this, it would seem that the media (and associated 
entertainment world) has done too good a job of conditioning people to the 
viewpoint that performances are something removed from the everyday; 
exercises in escapism to be watched and enjoyed, as opposed to merely 
endured.  As a consequence, few people take films and television 
programs seriously, which may also help to explain why some people in 
today’s society treat the Internet, with its heavy emphasis on performance 
elements, with disdain and/or indifference. 
 
Inspiration for identity 
 In the previous chapter I proposed a plan to devote critical sections 
of this chapter to the task of investigating online identity in line with four 
specific analytical variables.  The first of these variables — ‘inspiration for 
identity’ will build upon the groundwork laid by Bechar-Israeli (1995) and 
Morton (2001b) in their respective studies into online naming practices.  
Similarly to these two researchers, I present below a discussion that 
revolves around the differing stimuli that led members of the 
Stromfront.org discussion fora to choose the nicknames that they did in 
order to participate on the site.  This discussion is also interspersed with 
relevant material gleaned from the interviews/questionnaires that were 
conducted with selected members of the Stormfront.org community.  
 In December 2000 the Stormfront.org website was subject to 
damage by hackers, which forced the closure of the site’s discussion fora 
for four weeks while the site owner repaired the damage.  At the time of 
the site’s closure it had 20,000+ members (registered users) on its 
database, a figure that I saw as being too large to comfortably 
accommodate a nickname analysis of the type constructed by both 
                                                                                                                       
collective lobbying of site assistant managers (moderators) to ensure the removal of the 
interloper. 
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Bechar-Israeli (1995) and Morton (2001b).  The site problems over the 
summer of 2000/2001 helped to solve this dilemma, however, as when the 
fora reopened in mid-January 2001, it became necessary for people to re-
register on the site in order to resume their membership to the site.  In 
accordance with this, the overall site membership figure had dropped to 
2500+ when it came time for me to conduct the name analysis in early 
March 2001.  Even this figure would have served to make the procedure 
unwieldy, but fate again intervened to render the site search engine faulty, 
meaning that I could only access 909 (36% approx) of the total nicknames 
available on the fora.62
 In keeping with asynchronous media conventions, the quota of ‘real 
names’ (33.82%) recorded in my analysis was significantly closer to 
Morton’s (2001b) BBS readings (27.27%) than Bechar-Israeli’s (1995) IRC 
ones (7.8%).  This would certainly seem to back-up the results recorded in 
the interviews/questionnaires, where almost half the respondents claimed 
that they would be unfazed by the prospect of using their real name on the 
site.  As was the case with Morton’s 1998 sample, however, a clear 
minority of the real names in my analysis were full names (17% 
approximately, compared with Morton’s 30%); with first or last names 
constituting 43% (approx) of those analysed, and modified names 
accounting for roughly 40% of the entire real name sample.  A not 
inconsiderable number of nicknames from the ‘modified names’
 Of these 909 names, a further 155 were excluded 
for being effectively “unclassifiable”, leaving a grouping of 754 (30% 
approximately of overall total) names for the final analysis. 
63 sub-
grouping also crossed-over into the category pertaining to white pride 
related handles (22.81%).  The modifiers “white”, “race”, “pride”, “14” and 
“88”64
                                            
 
 were commonly coupled with real names, which may suggest that 
62 The site search engine would bring up all 2500+ nicknames, but it would only do so on 
a page by page basis (25 names to a page).  This was fine, but at random moments a 
glitch in the search engine would lead to the displaying of the same 25 names across 
several pages.  In spite of this, it is felt that the 909 nicknames finalised upon were 
diverse and random enough to provide a viable sample for the final analysis.  
63 'Modified names' are those that contain part of the individual's real name accompanied 
by a descriptive modifier.  The nickname 'Ryan88' is an example of a modified name. 
64 14 stands for the 'fourteen words' — We must secure the existence of our people and a 
future for white children.  88 is the numerical sign for Adolf Hitler, which is derived from 
121  
 
some users are more at home with keeping their fleshspace names online, 
making slight additions where necessary to ensure that other users are 
aware of the depth of their affiliation to the group or cause at hand.   
 Interestingly enough, in the process of searching the ICQ database 
for potential Stormfront.org interview subjects, I happened across four 
examples of Stormfront.org members who were simultaneously operating 
two ICQ accounts.  In all of these cases, the individuals concerned 
reserved one account for white pride activities and the other for general 
interactions, enabling them the flexibility to interact with a large section of 
global chat enthusiasts while, at the same time, ensuring that white pride 
aficionados could trace them (to the second account) via the interests and 
hobbies component of the search engine.  It is occurrences such as this 
that lead me to contend that netizens are not so much embracing multiple 
identities online, as they are tailoring specific elements of their self-
identities to complementary Internet vehicles and communities.  This view 
needs to be explicated further and I will return to it again shortly, but for 
now I would like to return attention to the names analysis.  
 By far the most popular variant of handle employed by Stormfront.org 
members in the sample was the one that centred around ‘self-related 
names’ (46.29%).  Self-related nicks are those that refer to aspects of the 
user’s: personality (Katie Alpha-Bitch), appearance (asian_beauty), 
espoused qualities (Equality_and_Justice) or sphere of interest 
(Europhile).  Self-related names were also the most common type to be 
found in the Bechar-Israeli (1995) analysis (45%), indicating a profound 
human tendency for attempting to “personalise the impersonal machine” 
(Bechar-Israeli, 1995:6).  On top of this, self-related nicknames also permit 
netizens to present themselves to the virtual world in a manner that is 
denied them by their real names in fleshspace: 
 
A person’s first name is one of the most obvious 
components of his or her identity.  Whereas family names 
usually help establish one’s group identification (e.g., 
tribe, old/new stock, religion), first names mirror parents’ 
                                                                                                                       
HH (Heil Hitler) expressed in two eights that work from the understanding that H is the 
eighth letter of the alphabet. 
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hopes for their children and often possess an emotional 
quality that may or may not be related to phonetics.  
Semantic associations of names elicited from various age 
groups, such as students and young children, have 
tended to be invariant across samples, suggesting that 
first names have a stereotypic nature (Dinur & Beit-
Hallahmi, 1996:1). 
 
Table 7.  Stormfront.org nickname types.* 
CATEGORY NUMBER % 
Real names 
 
255 33.82 
Self-related names 
 
349 46.29 
Names related to medium, technology and 
their nature 
8 1.06 
Names of animals, objects, and 
miscellaneous culture 
97 12.86 
Play on words and sounds 
 
87 11.54 
Names related to famous figures & events 
from history, literature, mythology & film 
70 9.28 
Names related to sex, violence and 
provocation 
19 2.52 
Names indicating affiliation or opposition to 
the white nationalist movement 
172 22.81 
Names that are place or region specific 
 
60 7.96 
Names related to notions of colour, creed, 
age and occupation 
126 16.71 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
754+(489) 
 
164.85 
* Percentage totals exceed 100% on account of  
  multiple coding 
 
 
The stereotypical overtones apparent in first names serve to imbue 
individuals with perceived characteristics that may well be out of sync with 
the actual personality of such individuals.  Mehrabian (2001) conducted a 
study into the “characteristics attributed to individuals on the basis of their 
first names” and discovered that the sound and structure of names was a 
noteworthy factor in the way that people form impressions of individuals 
whom they have never met. 
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 The overt influence of biblical, historical and entertainment world 
figures on contemporary naming practices and the impact that such 
names have on the broader society is all too apparent in this study.  For 
males, biblical names such as Moses, Jonah and Jacob extend to others 
the largely subconscious impression that the individual concerned 
possesses a more ethical and caring attitude than can be found in men 
sporting names like Adolph, Buck and Zeke.  Conversely, names such as 
Charles (used by many English monarchs) and Duke (the nickname 
attributed to tough guy actor John Wayne) inspire impressions of success 
and masculinity, respectively, in the minds of unfamiliar strangers.  When 
it comes to women, names such as Hope and June conjure images of 
ethical and caring people, while alternatives like Roxanne (linked to 
prostitution through popular rock band ‘The Police’) and Brandy (bearing 
unmistakable overtones of alcohol) are almost invariably looked upon in a 
less favourable light.  With this in mind, it is little wonder that parents 
deliberate so carefully over the selection of a child’s name. 
 While discussion to this point has revolved principally around the 
name types that were most common to the Stormfront.org fora, much 
remains to be said about the two categories that were the least common.  
In stark contrast to Bechar-Israeli’s (1995) figures (16.9%), a mere 1.06% 
of the Stormfront.org handles analysed bore a relationship to the (CMC) 
medium, technology and their nature.  The marked disparity between 
these two figures is probably attributable to the more serious nature of the 
Stormfront.org environment, although this does not account for the 
similarities between the two studies with regard to (seemingly) frivolous 
categories, such as — names that play on words and sounds 
(11.3%/11.54%) and names of animals, flora, fauna, objects and 
miscellaneous culture (15.6%/12.86%).  
 Perhaps a more viable explanation for the disparity between levels of 
technology-inspired names on each site can be found in the age of the 
Bechar-Israeli (1995) study. Seven years, the span between Bechar-
Israeli’s (1995) study and mine, is almost an eternity in the realm of 
computerised technology and associated media.  Not surprisingly then, 
Bechar-Israeli (1995) was implementing her analysis at a time when CMC 
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was barely past its formative development stage and the cyberspatial 
landscape was still dominated by computer industry types.  This is not to 
suggest that such users have diminished online over the past seven years, 
but rather that the spread of technology throughout society has led to a 
firm increase in netizens from outside of the computer industry.  It need 
also be mentioned that the glamour and gloss has worn-off many aspects 
of computerised technology as people have grown somewhat blasé about 
technological advancements, making technology related nicknames 
considerably less attractive propositions than they were in the earlier days 
of the cyberspace revolution. 
 Of greater surprise is the figure pertaining to ‘names related to sex, 
violence and provocation’ (2.52%), which comes in behind Bechar-Israeli’s 
(1995) statistic of 3.9%.  This is surprising insomuch as one would expect 
to see a greater number of these name types in white pride fora with some 
tendencies toward aggression and violent behaviour, as distinct from 
generalised chat servers that are more openly inclined towards fun, play 
and laidback conversation.  As Tara McPherson reveals, however, the 
tone of the white pride movement is definitely less fearsome and 
aggressive in the present day as it was in the halcyon days of the Ku Klux 
Klan: 
 
Gone (from white pride media) too is any overt imaging of 
blackness or explicit expression of racism.  A concern 
with white masculinity and its preservation replaces 
representations of blackness, and almost all of the sites 
decry any racism, hate-mongering, or Klan or neo-Nazi 
activity (2000:124). 
 
Recent racial vilification laws (with particular regard to the United States of 
America) have helped to force the white pride movement’s hand in this 
regard, given that advocating white supremacist ideology is likely to result 
in legal prosecution, while pushing white separatist views, in most cases, 
only serves to make you unpopular.65
                                            
65 White separatists call for the creation of separate states for different races, whilst white 
supremacists desire the eradication of “mongrel” (non-white) races. 
 For this reason, even most white 
supremacists online are likely to be cloaking themselves under the less 
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provocative banner of white separatism; ensuring that for every 
‘Kill_Jew_Scum’ nickname on Stormfront.org, there are likely to be 
another fifty names of a decidedly gentler nature. 
 None of this is meant to foster the impression that nicknames (or 
names in general, for that matter) are the be all and end all of self-identity 
construction.  It is nevertheless explicitly clear that names and online 
nicknames cannot be removed from the identity equation, as they serve as 
the “shopfront” for individual views and personality traits around which an 
individual’s sense of self is implicitly created.  Names are in one-sense 
labels, but in another way they differ significantly from labels in that they 
are almost invariably invested with emotive connotations.  When a child (in 
Western cultures) starts out in life they are given a name by their parents, 
although in most cases the name itself is chosen by the mother (Khatib, 
1995:2).  At a later stage it is not uncommon for young children and 
adolescents to have a (generally affectionate) nickname bestowed upon 
them by peers and schoolfriends.  Online handles are somewhat unique in 
that the individual chooses the name for him or herself, which affords 
considerable license for the individual to set-up an identity “shopfront” that 
most accurately conveys a key sense of his/her personality and/or 
character.  If anything, online nicknames are even more inextricably linked 
to an individual’s self-identity due to the lack of distracting elements such 
as body and mannerisms that assist people with fleshspace interpretations 
of others.  In the virtual realm there are only pieces of text attached to a 
nickname, which undoubtedly invests the latter with extra levels of mystery 
and potency, when the body is not in frame to belie the views and 
suggestions being put forward. 
 
Regulation of identity 
 The second thematic variable, ‘regulation of identity’, deals implicitly 
with netizen construction and maintenance of their online identity(s).  It is 
at this point that I would like to further challenge the notion that the virtual 
realm is awash with individuals looking to experiment with multiple forms 
of identity.   
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 Kenneth Gergen (1996) was one of the first writers to devote page 
space to the concept of identity fragmentation.  As he sees it, citizens 
need four particular social conditions to be in place in order for them to be 
able to preside over “an identifiable and pivotal psychological interior” 
(1996:129).  The first of these requirements is a clearly articulated and 
understood ‘ontological configuration’ wherein an individual is familiar with 
the “basic distinctions (of vocabulary) necessary for describing or 
explaining (his/her) mental conditions” at appropriate times (1996:129).  In 
today’s world, however, the ‘ontological configuration’ capacities of 
individuals have been eroded by the onset of ‘multiple ontologies’; with 
“social saturation”66
 The second peculiar social condition to which Gergen refers is known 
as established ‘modes of expression’.  The overtones of Giddens
 extending the social vocabulary of individuals to the 
point where individuals no longer have the security of "a single satisfying 
intelligibility within which to dwell" (1996:132). 
67
 The third factor that Gergen brings into play with regard to credible 
conditions of self relates closely to the previous one.  ‘Context of 
expression’ is a crucial element in the overall ontological awareness of an 
individual, who not only needs to be able to command a strong knowledge 
of expressive traits, but must also be competent at comprehending  
 are all 
too evident here, with this notion effectively mirroring his preoccupation 
with ‘ontological awareness’ and the requirement for individuals to be 
competent in the art of soundly internalising popular forms of behaviour 
and expression as a precursor to externalising these actions in social 
interactions with others (1996:130).  This act of internalising has come 
under threat in recent times though, with social saturation also being 
blamed for the rise of ‘contested expressions’ that obfuscate the meaning 
of behaviours and expressions in line with competing cultural 
interpretations of human action (1996:133). 
                                            
 
66 The largely technological inspired situation that has seen individuals put into contact 
(via cyberspace and the mass media) with a range of events, cultures and people that 
they previously wouldn’t have come into contact with. 
67 I am suggesting here only that Gergen's ideas are of a similar vein to those of Giddens, 
and NOT that Gergen has been influenced intellectually by the works of Giddens. 
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appropriate times for such traits to be employed (1996:130).  This 
condition is also thought to be on the wane, however, with cultural groups 
reshaping the behavioural and expressive traits of others to suit their own 
needs and purposes — ‘appropriated usage’ (1996:133-134).  Such 
appropriation, in turn, repositions these actions and behaviours in the 
broader society in diluted and diminished meaning, further agitating and 
disorientating human actors in need of stability. 
 The final condition of which Gergen speaks of is that of ‘valued 
goals’, whereby “homogeneity in the language of value (what action is  
likely to result in a positive outcome), buttresses commitment to a given 
ontology” (1996:131).  Once again the merging of cultures and peoples 
has allegedly undermined this necessary strand of human actor 
understanding, with the increasing politicisation of society resulting in 
development of ‘controversial goals’ that blanket the language of value 
beneath cynical and undeclared political ideologies and motives 
(1996:134). 
 There is little doubt that the onset of the information age and the 
accompanying overlap of cultures have presented individuals with new 
ontological challenges, but it remains doubtful as to whether these 
challenges have served to alter dramatically human actor approaches to 
self-identity.  The rise in Internet participation rates is both recent (being a 
phenomenon of the 1990s) and overstated in global population terms, and 
yet much of the support for the multiple identity argument stems directly 
from academic perspectives on cyberspace.  This preoccupation with 
generalising from what is still a markedly under-researched social realm 
ignores the long-term trend (since the Industrial Revolution) of human 
actors attuning their senses of self to constantly evolving social 
circumstances.   
 Katherine Ewing refers to this ongoing identity modification process 
in proposing her model of ‘shifting selves’ whereby: 
 
(i)ndividuals are continuously reconstituting themselves 
into new selves in response to internal and external 
stimuli.  They construct these new selves from their 
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available set of self-representations, which are based on 
cultural constructs (1990:258).  
 
The external stimuli experienced by human actors throughout the hundred 
year period that preceded the rise of Internet communications more than 
sufficed in conforming individuals to this ‘shifting selves’ model.  The 
inception of electrical power, onset of public transport, move to suburban 
living, developments in reasonably affordable overseas travel, global pain 
of war, growth of mass media communications, the dramatically altering 
nature of work and education practices, and increasingly volatile political 
landscapes ensured that citizens of the twentieth century (generally 
speaking) endured arguably the most complex period of social upheaval in 
human history.  In defiance of this understanding, however, some 
contemporary social commentators still insist on addressing the human 
struggle for self-cohesion as a fresh by-product of the virtual realm.   
     Western societies have changed constantly over the last two and a 
half centuries, with the opportunities for, and pressures on, individuals 
increasing in line with this constant change.  Not surprisingly then, the 
human need for devising and testing new ways of adapting to social 
change has led to greater instances of ‘identity experimentation’ during 
this time.  Wallace highlights the psychological significance of identity 
experimentation to human actors when she writes that: 
 
Experimenting with identities is an important part of 
lifespan development, and those identity crises we 
experience, particularly in our youth, are valuable to 
personal growth.  If we don’t try things out, we never know 
what fits best.  That exploration is not confined to 
adolescence, as many people assume.  Especially in fast-
paced industrial countries where lifestyle and career 
options are abundant and change quickly, many of us 
return again and again to questioning our values and 
beliefs, and then re-establish a firm commitment to a set 
of life goals (1999:47). 
 
To a certain extent, scholars of postmodernity (Ewing, 1990; Moore, 1994) 
are correct in arguing that identity construction is not contingent on unitary 
understandings and expressions of one’s essential self.  Where they tend 
to fall down, however, is in the finer detail of the term ‘unitary’ which, in 
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postmodern vocabulary, is all too often reducible to notions of limitation 
and singularity.  Wallace’s comments are significant here in that they 
outline the objective nature of human identity traits, which are firmly 
geared to directing the individual concerned toward the achievement of a 
series of pre-ascertained goals.  These goals are many and varied and the 
means of achieving them are similarly diverse, but the individual will 
nevertheless attune their self-management methods to nurturing the 
personality traits that best facilitate the successful pursuit of these life 
aims. 
 In this way, the term ‘unitary’ takes on an extended meaning that 
explains self-identity as a process that is underlined by the human need 
for locating individual traits and expressions under a unified, but 
nevertheless flexible, psychological umbrella.  Self-identity is thus a 
necessarily fragmented concept, but in the majority of cases it is only 
fragmented to the extent that it best meets the broader social needs of the 
‘shifting self’.  Surprisingly enough, everyday people appear more adept at 
understanding the distinction between ‘controlled identity fragmentation’ 
and ‘ad hoc identity multiplicity’ than some cyberspatial researchers are.  
Individual understandings of friends and family members are 
conventionally formulated on the knowledge that such persons will 
conduct themselves in line with certain traits, emotions and behaviours 
that are unique to their particular persona.  Such individuals are viewed as 
multi-faceted beings and it is anticipated that some elements of their 
personae will gradually alter to meet changing times and personal 
circumstances.  Yet, for the most part, we perceive of friends and family 
members in accordance with expectations of them behaving in a fashion 
that is consistent with their clearly delineated personality traits and our 
intricate knowledge of such traits.  As such, when a friend or family 
member acts in a manner that is not in keeping with their peculiar brand of 
‘controlled identity fragmentation’, we perceive of them as being somehow 
‘out of character’. Given that individuals depend on solid support networks 
to aid in the achievement of life goals it is highly unlikely that the individual 
concerned would want to step too far out of character, as this could lead to 
estrangement from those who are close to them. 
130  
 
 
How many different nicknames do you use online? 
 
ONE = 3   TWO = 8    THREE+ = 6    SIX+ = 3   TEN+ = 1 
 
 The stable/fragmented selves debate has been at the forefront of 
social-based cyberspace research for over five years now although, in 
recent times, many scholars have viewed the issue as more of a fait 
accompli than a genuine bone of contention.  The above response to a 
question from my interview/questionnaires with Stormfront.org members68
 
 
appears to, on the surface, provide considerable support for the notion of 
netizens’ employing multiple identities online, but it is nonetheless 
misleading in this sense.  The question seeks to establish the number of 
nicknames that the interview subjects use in the virtual realm, which is 
markedly different to asking how many modes of identity such individuals 
put into action when online.  Nicknames are certainly significant to 
analyses of how individuals interact when online, but they should not 
automatically be freely and wholly interchanged for the rounded identities 
that they serve to promote.   
Sovereignty of identity 
 The argument for ‘multiple identities’ has, it would seem, been 
advanced in a manner disparate to its true plausibility.  The first reason for 
this pertains to the difficulty some cyber researchers have had in 
accurately distinguishing between the number of nicknames netizens have 
employed online, as opposed to the number of identity constructs these 
netizens have chosen to implement.  In the second instance, the argument 
has also been aided by the inability of these same researchers to fully 
differentiate between online interactions that regularly occur in MUDs and 
                                            
 
 
68 This response links neatly to the material outlined in Figure 4, but does not operate 
from the same raw data.  The findings from Figure 4 are in keeping with broad scale 
quantitative measures as gleaned from the three-month observation of the discussion 
forum, whilst the figures here are more qualitative in scope having been taken only from 
the interview/questionnaire process. 
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MOOs (and assorted chatrooms), as distinct from the more grounded 
interactions that commonly occur in discussion fora, on newsgroups, amid 
listservers, and in chat environments that are less inclined toward aspects 
of play and performance.   
 Kevin Robins laments the tendency for cyber researchers to 
exaggerate the reach and importance of MUVES when he writes of how: 
 
All this rhetoric of ‘age-old’ dreams and desires—which is 
quite common among the cyber-visionaries—is 
unspeakably vacuous and devoid of inspiration.  It is a 
familiar old appeal to an imaginative space in which we 
can occupy new identities and create new experiences to 
transcend the limitations of our mundane lives.  It is the 
aesthetic of fantasy-gaming; the gag-end of a Romantic 
sensibility (1996:80). 
 
MUVES were initially derived from fleshspace Dungeons and Dragons role 
play games and, even to this day, most online MUVES revolve implicitly 
around fantasy role playing.  Dungeons and Dragons provided individuals 
with the opportunity to step outside of themselves, for brief moments, and 
to pursue a fantasy existence secure in the knowledge that they were only 
playing a game.  Many cyberspace studies, particularly in the early days, 
focused upon role playing MUVES, as they were not only fresh terrain (in 
study terms), but they also constituted a prominent portion of overall online 
interactions at that time.  The subsequent rise and rise of miscellaneous 
chat rooms and assorted bulletin board, news group, and discussion fora 
vehicles have markedly altered the broader state of online interactions 
since then, but MUVE vehicles continue to dominate thinking on identity 
construction in virtual environments. 
 Netizen communications on the varied asynchronous vehicles of the 
Internet tend to largely defy suggestions that individuals are utilising 
cyberspace as a haven for rampant identity play.  This point is supported 
by the following quotes taken from the interview/questionnaires process: 
 
EmperorCS: Yes [my handle] is the sole nickname that I 
use for all my Internet participation...  The only reason I 
use the same [handle] is that I like having an identity that 
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is fixed and my level of responsibility must remain high 
because I am the same wherever I go. 
Bryn: I feel it’s important that people take a stand for their 
belief system.  Using a “fake name” allows you to insulate 
yourself a bit too much occasionally.  Using a real name 
definitely promotes a higher degree of responsibility. 
Diabloque: Well it would not kill me [changing handles], 
but most people know who I am and ident me and know 
my real name when I use diabloque or one of the others 
[nicks], yet they would soon find out who I was even if I 
did change my nick. 
cain_1798: The more one feels part of a community the 
harder it is to change [handles].  I have one or two 
nicknames that would have to be pried from my cold, 
dead hands before anyone got to them, but cain_1798 is 
not one of them. 
MadameBlavatsky: I would never change my 
nickname...  [To me it is] Very important!  It is my online 
identity. 
Raine: It wouldn’t bother me that much [changing 
handles], but it would some [others], since everybody 
knows me by this [nickname]. 
 
There are several key aspects of the online identity issue to emerge from 
these quotations.  Firstly, the decision of netizens to run with single 
nicknames is seen as providing them with credibility on “serious” 
discussion fora, with stability of projected persona promoting responsible 
behaviour among community members and leading to respect from other 
users (Donath, 1999:30).  Cyberspace is no different from fleshspace in 
that most relationships are built over time, with adherence to set modes of 
expression and behaviour being central to this development.  Echo (online 
chat community) founder, Stacy Horn, describes this process eloquently in 
writing: 
 
Over time, personality and character is inevitably 
revealed, reputations are established.  [Also, Echo is not 
anonymous. Here, everyone knows your real name].  In 
the end, people can’t help being themselves.  I once 
heard Maya Angelou comment on Thomas Wolfe’s idea 
that you can’t go home again.  Her take was: You can 
never leave.  The first thing we do when we get online is 
recreate the world as we have always known it (1998:10; 
italics in original). 
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Secondly, the maintenance of a stable identity online is important for 
netizens wishing to be recognised by others for their ideas, beliefs, wit and 
overall world view.  In the words of Bechar-Israeli: “(I)f our relationships 
with Netters whom we have met by chance and who know us solely by our 
nickname are important to us (and most IRC friends are made by chance), 
then we will usually keep our nickname as though it were an important part  
of our identity” (1995:19).69
 
  Finally, the dominance of identity over 
nickname is highlighted by Diabloque, who contends that other users 
would quickly identify her by her new handle, given their familiarity with her 
particular modes of expression, writing and behaviour.  The name used is 
thus not crucially significant in itself, but it is integral to users wishing to 
create and nurture a recognisable ongoing “online biography”.   
Identity problematics 
 Earlier in this chapter I spent some time situating the concept of the 
self within the broader setting of society using structuration theory as my 
theoretical guide.  During this part of the discussion it was suggested that 
the individual connects to elements of community within his/her society via 
symbiotic processes of ‘intended regulation’ and ‘intended reflexivity’.  
Much of this reflexivity and regulation surrounds the cultural elements 
(body image, gender, race and ethnicity) that shape an individual’s place 
in society and their standing in relation to other members of the society.  
The self cannot be fully constructed without the individual having first 
taken these elements into account, as it is a major role of the self-identity 
to react and respond to cultural stimulants, and to signpost the individual’s 
stance on a range of cultural issues.  Giddens refers to these elements 
(along with cultural bodies and institutions) as influences that both 
constrain and enable the activities and actions of human actors 
                                            
 
 
 
69 The identity is clearly more significant (in the beginning) than the nickname that gives 
presence to it.  Some people choose online handles randomly, but find that they cannot 
part with it once others come to recognise them by the nick.  This reinforces the above 
comment from Raine, who would baulk at changing her nick only because it could 
unnecessarily agitate fellow netizens who are familiar with her through this handle. 
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(1976:118).  The remainder of this chapter will focus on the ways in which 
specific cultural elements enable and constrain human actors in the virtual 
realm. 
 The human body is a crucial element in an individual’s identity 
structure on account of how it allows one to have command over their self, 
permitting a sense of control when individuals face inevitable moments of 
helplessness and uncertainty over their tenuous place within the greater 
society (Shilling, 1993:7).  In real terms, a netizen’s nickname substitutes 
for his/her body in the virtual setting, which is another reason why users 
tend to become overtly protective of their online handles.  Not only is a 
nickname used for expression and identification, but it also permits a user 
significant control over their place in cyberspace.  The gulf that separates 
the human body from the netizen handle is further diminished in some 
MUVE environments wherein users utilise avatars (computerised 
representations of objects) in order to “embody” themselves whilst 
interacting online (Dodge & Kitchin, 2001:161-162). 
 Avatars can be minimalist in nature, or they can be elaborate 
constructs that mirror human body forms.  It is with avatars, more than 
self-identities that netizens are most likely to take liberties with the 
presentation of self that they choose to convey to others.  In contemporary 
times, the availability of cosmetic surgery has resulted in considerable 
numbers of people making alterations to their body parts they deem 
undesirable (Marx, 1997: 490-491).  This is indicative of the enabling 
aspect of “physical embodiment” in the virtual realm, but even avatar 
creation has its constraining elements: 
 
For example, as with many other websites, visitors to the 
site (Bodies@INC) must agree to recognize and abide by 
various copyright restrictions, legal disclaimers, and limits 
of liability — including liability for disappointment in the 
outcome of the body one constructs (González, 2000:36; 
italics in original) 
 
Such ‘disappointment’ can also be rendered by the limitations placed on 
the netizen in his/her attempts to structure a satisfactory avatar.  Science 
fiction representations of cyberspace have already delved into scenarios 
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whereby the quality of one’s avatar is directly proportionate to the level of 
computer technology available to the user concerned (Clark, 1995:124-
125).  This could be the natural virtual extension of a flesh and blood world 
where contemporary ideals of physical attractiveness are often linked to 
an individual’s capacity to afford the necessary cosmetic substances and 
surgery required to “perfect” the body.  In some MUVE environments it has 
long been the norm for site owners and creators (Wizards) to oversee 
online representations of self that are essentially “godlike” in comparison 
to lower tier site users (Cherny, 1999:46-47; Reid, 1999:109-111). 
 CMC appears to instil an individual with a sense of dissociation from 
their body, radically revising modern tendencies toward acute ‘self-
relatedness’ of one’s body to one’s overall sense of self.  In one sense, 
this tendency looms as a revisitation of the gnostic “body as garment” 
metaphor, wherein the netizen casts of their inhibitions along with their 
physical shell (Frank, 1991:52).  The existence and continuing 
development of avatars serves to qualify this viewpoint, however; 
reminding us “that human bodies continue to be the material and visible 
form through which human subjectivities are defined and contested today, 
despite the now popular belief in cyberspace as the ultimate realm of 
disembodiment” (González, 2000:48). 
 Question marks also surround the Internet’s perceived place as a de-
gendered space, in spite of the medium’s capacity for cloaking gender 
determinants.  As Stacy Horn sees it, gender differences online are limited 
to the ones that can be “expressed with words” (1998:81).  This may be 
so, but given that the lion’s share of inter-gender interactions involve 
spoken or written communication, it is unlikely that women stand to make 
significant gains in the virtual realm.  For feminists, much of their concern 
with the status of women in contemporary society has stemmed from 
irritation at women being seen predominantly as women, and not as 
‘persons’ in the same way that men are (Graham, 1999:143).  Power 
issues come into play here with men long having dominated the political, 
financial and occupational sectors of society and women finding 
themselves valued as individuals largely in accordance with how they 
position themselves in relation to male partners and work peers. 
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 Considerable contention exists as to how well placed female netizens 
are in the cyberspatial realm.  It is commonly thought that fewer than 30% 
of netizens are women (Whittle, 1997:271), but a recent report on Internet 
usage in America has downplayed this view, intimating that gender 
difference is mainly located “among men and women who are not working 
outside the home” (Nie & Erbring, 2000).  It is probable that the latter 
interpretation is correct, with impressions of a male dominated cyberspace 
standing as residue from the proliferation of MUVE-based studies during 
the early to mid-1990s.   
 Participation rates aside, the most pressing concern pertaining to 
gender difference on the Internet appears to relate to the treatment of 
females online.  Some women users, particularly in MUVE and discussion 
fora settings, are often forced to behave like “one of the boys” online in 
order to fit in with the pro-male group and avoid obnoxious male flirting 
and sexism (Kendall, 1999:65).  Online nicknames that are openly 
feminine in nature will undoubtedly garner significantly more attention from 
male netizens in MUVE and chat environments, leading some women 
users to ‘virtual cross-dress’ as a form of defence-mechanism (Whittle, 
1997:271).   
 Some feminist scholars do not like assertions that women are 
vulnerable online, however, as they are seen to reinforce patriarchal 
notions of women being subordinate communicators and reliant on male 
protection (Silver, 2000:26).  In light of this it is interesting that virtual 
cross-dressing is largely frowned upon by MUD users on account of the 
way that male users exploit ‘female’ identities as an avenue to obtaining 
special privileges from “chivalrous” male users (Reid, 1995:180).  This 
may help to explain high rates of gender swapping in MUVES (outside of 
the obvious curiosity excuse), with a study of one large Japanese MUD 
showing that 80% of the participants were men, but only 67% of the 
characters on display within the MUD adhered to a male gender (Turkle, 
1995:212).   
 Some MUVES have actively sought to dimish gender inequities 
online by implementing software that enables users to employ non gender-
specific language conventions in their interactions (Danet, 1998:141-144).  
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This is achieved in a varying range of ways, but—at its simplest—usually 
involves the substitution of gender specific terms (he/she) with ambiguous 
determinants such as ‘per’ (for person).  Initiatives such as this lead Danet 
to contend that women users may utilise synchronous CMC vehicles as a 
means to the eventual overthrow of gender subordination online 
(1998:136-137). The perception that females are more adept at 
synchronous communication techniques and the heightened female 
presence in online chat rooms may provide significant support for this 
assertion. 
 That is, of course, provided that a genuine gender disparity does 
actually exist online.  Dale Spender (1995) believes that there is a 
communication gap that is serving to subordinate females unto male 
netizens online, outlining four differing ways in which this gap is being 
reinforced.  Firstly, men are tending to dominate discussions, meaning that 
they are talking more often and for longer, and that they serve to set the 
topical agenda of these discussions.  Secondly, men are dismissive of 
women who disagree with them in conversations and will commonly 
interrupt female speakers/writers in order to correct them and realign the 
discussion to their point of view.  Thirdly, men (according to studies) 
appear to encompass 70%+ of overall online conversational space on the 
Internet.  Finally, men are far more likely to get aggressive and resort to 
insults if corrected or denied primacy on the conversational front (Spender, 
1995:193-195). 
 Wallace (1999), by way of contrast, adopts a differing standpoint on 
this issue, citing a range of studies that suggest the gender disparity online 
is decidedly less prominent than many academics think.  In the first 
instance, women do not tinge their posts with emoticons to a noticeably 
greater degree than men posters.  This also helps to weaken another 
stereotype that has men being more inclined to information driven 
message posting, as distinct from women users who are allegedly seen to 
prefer posts relating to emotion and opinion.  Recent studies to the 
contrary appear to be showing that men and women users bear 
remarkable similarity in the content of their message posts online.  Thirdly, 
and most surprisingly, women are displaying an equal tendency toward 
138  
 
flame posting as men, and are also more likely to employ ‘opposed-
variant’ posts (replies to messages that oppose the view of the initial 
poster) than men who regularly initiate ‘align-variant’ posts (replies to 
messages that support the view of the initial poster) (Wallace, 1999:215-
217). 
 On white pride websites, as in the fleshspace white nationalist 
movement itself, there appears to be considerable contradiction as to the 
role of women within the organisation.  White nationalist ideology 
invariably positions whites at the vanguard of human progress and the 
technological successes of Western societies are constantly put forward 
as evidence of white persons being God’s chosen people.  This seemingly 
reverential awe of progress must necessarily be kept in check, however, 
given that the ramifications of progress have impacted negatively, in the 
eyes of some white priders, on other key aspects of white existence — 
Christian religion and the family in particular.  It is therefore the unwritten 
role of white women within the white pride movement to lead the way in 
responding to and rectifying ongoing social decay. 
 For white pride devotees, feminists rank only slightly lower than Jews 
and white liberals on the overall disdain scale.  As they see it, feminism 
has helped in the decline of Western societies by corrupting the innocence 
of women.  This ‘corruption’ has been achieved through the seduction of 
white women that has led to their alienation from femininity, distanciation 
from God, permissive attitudes toward sex, willingness to pander to the 
false idol of materialism and, most tellingly, contribution to the decline of 
the nuclear family.70
                                            
70 All of these factors are highlighted on the ‘Women for Aryan Unity’ website that can be 
located at — http://www.stormfront.org/crusader/texts/wau/wau2.html [2001, December 
2]. 
  The erosion of traditional family forms is of extreme 
concern to the movement, given that it is identified as the gateway to 
single mother situations that deprive children of important male role 
models; gay couple scenarios that decrease moral values and increase 
the risk of the children becoming homosexual; and interracial pairings that 
result in further dilution of the recessive white gene (Ferber, 1997). 
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 In response to this, white women on sites such as Stormfront.org are 
urged to rail against feminist beliefs and objectives, as evidenced by the 
following exchanges: 
 
LMcLoughlin: Then we had the “new Jew” feminist 
movement which sought to tell parents they could wait 
until 40 and still have time for kids.  They told parents kids 
NEEDED day care.  They alleviated parental GUILT and 
allowed women to pursue their selfish desires...  Now 
when a woman says she wants to be a stay-at-home 
mom, she is shunned and debased...  When did not 
raising children become fashionable?  Why have we 
allowed our families to be torn apart?  For whites, it is 
IMPERATIVE that we stop dividing ourselves [off] from 
our men.   
Sick Of Bigots: Yeah ladies, Let’s go back to the dark 
ages where we are nothing more than baby making 
machines!  Let’s go back to having men tell us that our 
place is in the kitchen barefoot and pregnant.  While we 
are at it, let’s bow down and cower to men whom view us 
as nothing more than their personal slaves! 
New Order: There is no cause more noble than 
protecting, with force if necessary, the integrity of our 
blond white womanhood.  She is the fount of civilization, 
the Holy Grail.  Prize of all nations, beloved of all men, the 
blonde white woman stands as a symbol of purity and 
beauty. 
Pure_race: Not all of us are born gods/goddesses L, and 
it is immature to base your opinion of someone on how 
they look...  You might not like the ‘mix’ L, but don’t fool 
yourself, you are a mix as well ...  Strawberry blond?  
Seems like you have Celt in you.  Maybe you are only fit 
to breed with people with strawberry blond hair? 
LMcLoughlin: You [pure_race] have exaggerated what I 
said and hounded me the way the inter-racial people do.  I 
am TIRED of it.  You men are supposed to support and 
validate, not attack from within.   
 
These snippets are instructive for the way in which they shed light on the 
confusion and uncertainty that regularly accompanies inter-gender 
interactions on the Stormfront.org site.  In the first instance, white “warrior” 
women demand respect for their strength, virtue and purpose, but 
nevertheless find cause to castigate men for not rushing to defend them 
when their views are challenged.  Secondly, women Aryans consistently 
deride the feminist movement for promoting unabashed sexual promiscuity 
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in contemporary societies, and yet flirtatious and suggestive banter is rife 
within the discussion fora.  Finally, women on the site commonly post 
under aggressive warrior-type handles, yet they also hasten to position 
white women within traditional homemaker roles that are openly 
submissive to males.  
   
Closing thoughts 
 For all the talk of cyberspace entailing a bold new electronic frontier 
to which people can retreat in sanctuary from cultural constraints; it would 
appear that it also serves equally as well as a space in which individuals 
can embrace the enabling elements of their life and share in them with 
others.  Stacy Horn offers a beautiful summation of the primacy of identity 
traits and stimulants to Internet users when she writes: 
 
we can’t leave ourselves behind when we get online.  
Even when someone is just playing around or in disguise, 
something true is revealed, it is never completely 
invented.  I’ve never met someone who was faking it who 
wasn’t still disclosing something.  People are incredibly 
tenacious when it comes to their personalities.  If 
anything, people open up more (1998:6). 
 
There are people who are indeed tenacious when it comes to their sense 
of self.  Just as certain individuals take enormous pride in small material 
objects that mean little to others, purely because they are theirs, so to do 
certain individuals place great stock in the protection and preservation of 
identities that are theirs and theirs alone.  Even those aspects of our 
selves that we find somewhat unpleasant are difficult to abandon entirely 
as they remind us of the struggles we have endured in reaching this 
particular point in our life history.  On top of this, they also play a part in 
directing the course of the forthcoming acts in the Goffman-like reality play 
that is our everyday existence.  My studies show that it is advisable that 
we approach talk of discarded and freshly invented Internet identities with 
considerable caution.  For at this stage, more extensive research is clearly 
needed to prove that such identity constructs are anything other than 
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stress relieving incursions into MUVE worlds by creative individuals in 
search of leisure and play.  
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CHAPTER 
4 
Appraising Community: Clarifying a 
contested concept 
 
  
Introducing community 
 What is community?  Few questions could be so simple to ask, yet 
complex to answer.  From a sociological perspective, at least, it is 
encouraging to see that it is once more a question considered worthy of 
concerted intellectual debate in academic circles.  For many decades 
during the twentieth century this was not the case as the concept of 
community was overlooked in social policy and political debate in favour of 
the more prominent concepts of family and state.  Given the greater 
obvious visibility apparent in the latter concepts, it is hardly surprising that 
they should have proved more successful at raising and maintaining 
researcher interest.  This scenario has been discouraging enough for the 
sphere of community research, but of greater concern has been the 
tendency for the concepts of family and state to misdirect investigations 
into community, rather than overshadow them.  This is to argue that in 
recent times the community debate has found itself unnecessarily clouded 
by the attempts of some social scientists to overtly extend or restrict 
dimensions of the concept by making it practically interchangeable with 
the complementary, but nevertheless separate, concepts of society and 
family (Stacey, 1974:14). 
 In essence, these bygone attempts to, consciously or otherwise, 
obfuscate, simplify or diminish the dimensions of the community concept 
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were a predictable response to academic uncertainty over a term that has 
historically been "notoriously vague and indefinite" (Kautz, 1995:2).  Such 
uncertainty was underscored by the post-war favouring of structural-
functionalist models of social inquiry.  These models served to politically 
legitimate notions of family and state as distinct from community, which 
was too elastic, and therefore contested, to fit neatly into a consensus 
view of harmonious society.   
 It is somewhat ironic then that political machinations have resulted in 
a renewed interest in the concept of community in recent years.  In the first 
instance, this political reinvigoration has occurred as a direct consequence 
of the ongoing struggle between liberal and communitarian ideologies that 
arose in the early 1980s as a response to the Reaganist and Thatcherite 
policies of the time (Etzioni, 1993; Kautz, 1995; Newman & de Zoysa, 
1997; Watson, 1999).  This development will be elaborated upon further in 
the sub-section ‘Community as a political sphere’ that appears at a later 
stage of this chapter.  In the second instance, interest in the community 
concept has been rekindled due to the highly politicised nature of the term 
and the growing trend of groups and individuals choosing to employ it as a 
means of establishing or reaffirming their hegemony over others (Watson, 
1997).  The political potency attached to the community moniker should be 
foremost in the minds of social scientists engaged in explication of the 
terrain and it is an aspect of the debate that will be revisited throughout 
this piece of writing. 
 Political aspects aside, the other major factor that has brought the 
community concept back into the intellectual limelight has been the 
exponential growth of cyberspace over the latter stages of the twentieth 
century.  Cyberspace exists predominantly as an information and 
communications network. This means that regardless of its numerous 
subsidiary functions its primary role in contemporary society has been to 
stimulate and facilitate human interaction on a broad scale.  When this 
statement is assessed in conjunction with the initial meaning of the word 
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community and its unambiguous association with human communication71
 Interestingly, the conflict between liberals and communitarians over 
fleshspace communities has found a mirror in the arguments among 
computopians and computropians over virtual communities.  Both sets of 
combatants can be seen to share an interest in notions of community with 
a specific focus on how the concept can best meet the needs of 
individuals at the micro-level.  Computopian ideals are commonly found in 
the press releases of politicians, the glossy advertisements of global 
corporations (particularly those implicitly linked to computerised 
technology), infotainment magazines (e.g. Wired) and in the writings of 
social commentators who champion the impact of computerised 
technology on the greater human population (Dyson, 1997; Horn, 1998; 
Rheingold, 1993; Whittle, 1997).  Conversely, computropian sentiments 
invariably arise from many conventional Christian groups, organisations 
and campaigners concerned with environmental matters, and social 
commentators who are extremely critical of cyberspace's impact (Brown, 
1997; Postman, 1992; Slouka, 1995; Stoll, 1995). 
, 
the reason for cyberspace's profound contribution to the rejuvenated 
debate over community becomes clear.   
 From the above discussion it can be seen that any suggestions of an 
Internet inspired ‘community of the future’ need to be approached with 
considerable caution.  With this in mind it is necessary for such a claim to 
be dissected and analysed acutely.  As such, before any discussion can 
take place on the reshaping of communities, it is imperative that the 
concept of community itself be explored in greater depth.  A considerable 
portion of this chapter will be devoted to this task, wherein a four-layered 
outline of the community concept will be depicted in preparation for the 
empirical observations that follow.  It is hoped that this multi-layered 
design will flesh-out the concept in sufficient detail, finding something of a 
middle ground between Kenny's (1994) intuitive, albeit restrictive, dual 
                                            
71 The word community stems from the word communicare, as does the word communis 
(to share material goods or ideas, meanings, information), the term from which 
communication is derived. See - Bouissac (1998:132) and Williams (1983:75-76). 
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faceted definition of the term and Hillery's (1955) comprehensive, but 
decidedly laborious, ninety-five tiered treatise on the subject.   
 
Community as geographical entity 
 The notion of community as geographical entity is one of the oldest 
and most commonly utilised explanations of the concept (Bell & Newby, 
1974; Bender, 1978; Frankenberg, 1994; French, 1969; Kenny, 1994; 
Minar & Greer, 1969; Poplin, 1972; Sanders, 1966; Stein, 1960; Warren, 
1972; Wild, 1981; Williams, 1983).  This is perhaps the easiest way in 
which to define a community due to the relatively clear existence of 
arbitrary perimeters and parameters.  Yet it is probably also the most 
fragile means of designation in that it weakens the import of the concept 
by privileging inanimate elements over the inherent interactions and 
relationships that uniquely characterise them.  In spite of this, the 
geographical explanation maintains solid contemporary currency on 
largely socio-economic grounds, wherein governments and corporations 
employ census and surveys to target policy and product initiatives around 
quantitatively established "communities of need".  In this way, current day 
geographically-based interpretations of community serve to further 
dehumanise a concept that, for all intents and purposes, undervalued the 
significance of the individual in the construction of community from the 
very beginning.   
 Recent interpretations of community prefer to stress the emotive and 
psychological aspects of the concept, whereas geographically-based 
explanations of the term presuppose the existence of physical structure 
and are easily attuned to studies that involve empirical observation. At a 
basic level, this approach defines "community as a geography or territory, 
that is, a finite and bounded physical location" (Wild, 1981:14).  As well as 
this, the geographical approach also gives understated credence to 
peripheral aspects such as landscape and available resources.  
 To a large extent the significance of landscape and resources to 
bounded communities can be seen to be self-reinforcing.  Communities, 
regardless of type, necessarily involve the presence (in some shape or 
form) of a group dynamic.  In the normal scheme of things, human group 
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dynamics generally congregate around landscapes that are easily 
assessable and hospitable to comfortable and convenient living (Poplin, 
1972:10).  As humans gather in these places of common suitability, 
cultural resources and institutions arise in tandem to furnish the needs of 
the growing group dynamic.   
 In the words of Warren, "the larger the cluster of people, the more 
numerous and varied the institutional services in the area" (1972:22).  As 
the resources develop in a particular region so does the surrounding 
population inevitably expand, as others encouraged by the facilities on 
offer, relocate to the area.  Extending out from this it is not uncommon for 
residents of a region to increase their affiliation with a particular 
geographical province through reshaping and renovating it to suit personal 
taste (Poplin, 1972:11).  Such underlying motives and stimulants are 
unlikely to register with most site-dependent quantitative studies into 
community, but they clearly support assertions that the community concept 
cannot be reducible to sterile notions of place and boundary. 
 Gary Marx (1997) outlines the manner in which technological 
innovations are prompting societal institutions and groups to transgress 
and redefine the borders that have previously restricted their peculiar 
modes of being.  According to Marx, this redefinition is affecting a variety 
of personal and societal borders, which he describes as being four-fold in 
nature.  Firstly, the globalisation of economic and market forces is eroding 
physical, spatial and geographical borders, resulting in the subsequent 
decline and fragmentation (in certain European, Russian and African 
areas) of the traditional ‘nation’ state. This decline in the fixity of place on a 
global scale has also been reflected at local levels, with innovations such 
as: telecommuting, modems, mobile phones, and fax machines leading to 
the widespread dispersal of populations (between cities and rural areas) 
and the accompanying breakdown of traditional home/workplace 
distinctions (Marx, 1997:485-486). 
Secondly, the borders of senses and perception are being 
constantly revised and expanded at both a societal and individual level.  In 
this instance, Marx is talking of “a cognitive or experiential border between 
the known and the unknown, or the experienced and what can only be 
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imagined”. Thirdly, the rapid advancement of information and 
communication technologies has impacted markedly on long-standing 
forms of temporal borders. Time has duly ceased to be a problematic 
issue as news can be related as it happens, individuals can converse with 
one another simultaneously regardless of location, and events can be 
recorded (by electronic means) conveniently and efficiently.  Finally, and 
most importantly, the borders of the body and the self are no longer the 
sole preserve of the individual. Some governments, social institutions and 
large corporations accumulate vast computer databases that profile the 
key details and personal information of often-unwary individuals.  A 
corresponding growth of psychiatric services and rapid advancements in 
medical technology has also allowed some individuals to change faulty or 
undesirable body parts and thought processes (1997:487-491).   
 In short, spatial and physical borders are breaking down en masse, 
but community is not necessarily eroding with them.  The perception that 
diminishing boundaries are leading to diminishing communities is a 
contemporary manifestation of nineteenth century sociological writings that 
all but dismissed community as a traditional (agrarian) entity made extinct 
through the "disruption of communal life" by industrialisation and 
urbanisation (Bender, 1978:15-16; Lyon, 1987:13-14).  The recent onset of 
cyberspace and the fervent debate over virtual communities has thus been 
particularly opportune in providing a modern example of community's 
ability to transcend both time and place.  While geographical-based 
interpretations of community were crucial in that they "helped to launch it 
[community] on its career"; their days of dominating discourse on the 
concept are over (Elias, 1974:x). 
  
Community as a space for interaction 
 Community as a space for interaction is also a dominant strand of 
thought within the field of community research (Bell & Newby, 1974; 
Bender, 1978; Giddens, 1990; Kenny, 1994; Lyon, 1987; Minar & Greer, 
1969; Poplin, 1972; Sanders, 1966; Tönnies, 1974; Warren, 1972; Wild, 
1981).  This perspective deals implicitly with the notion of association, 
itself an indistinct term of reference in community studies.  Association is 
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most commonly known for the manner in which it was applied by 
Ferdinand Tönnies (1974) in his celebrated early work on gemeinschaft 
(community) and gesellschaft (society).  Tönnies employed association in 
a dualistic fashion, on one level referring to it as encompassing the 
peculiar relationships and actions that both characterise and result from 
everyday instances of human interaction (1974:37).  This explanation 
appears to use association as something that modifies human behaviour, 
but that nevertheless is in some way equally attributable to each concept.  
On a secondary level, however, some social commentators have used the 
term to firmly differentiate between community and society, ensuring that 
association only relates to the latter concept.  In this way, the community-
association relationship has been favoured as a means through which 
contemporary Western societies could "return to an earlier stage in the 
development of societies where life was simpler and appeared to possess 
all those desirable qualities that are missed in the present" (Elias, 1974:xi). 
This overt romanticism would effectively banish Tönnies from the 
intellectual landscape during the halcyon days of structural-functionalism 
(circa 1950s & 60s).72
Tönnies ideas on community were gratefully received by a cross-
section of audiences of the day, but Elias suggests that this may have had 
more to do with the timing of the publication than its contents.  This was 
due to a backlash against industrialisation and technological progress and 
showed that the romanticising of community was as much reflected, as it 
was promoted by social commentators (Elias, 1974:xiii).  In this way, 
romanticised views on community serve the understated purpose of 
providing individuals with a source of nostalgia and comfort in the face of 
uncertain times.  This may go some way to explaining the surge in 
community research and writings that occurred (most prominently in 
America) during the prosperous, but anxiety-riddled post-war decades of 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
 Yet, ironically, it is the romantic attraction of 
community that keeps the concept fresh and desirable in the public mind. 
                                            
72 This is not to suggest that Tönnies' ideas were entirely disregarded at this time.  Talcott 
Parsons derived his "pattern variables" formulae from elements of the 
gemeinschaft/gesellshaft typology.  See - (Bender, 1978:21) for more on this. 
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 Foremost among these writings were the works of American and 
British sociologists (Frankenburg, 1994; Stein, 1960; Warren, 1972) eager 
to explicate the broad community concept by way of focused case studies 
that firmly aligned community to tighter subsidiary notions of town and 
suburb.  The influence of such studies was helped in no small part by 
concurrent social developments that placed the ‘suburb’ at the hub of 
rhetoric pertaining to idealised notions of the ‘Great American dream’: 
 
In this historical context, neglect of the past by present-
day adolescents and repudiation of the past by their 
parents becomes intelligible.  More so than ever before, 
energies have been thrust into creating a worldly paradise 
based on material acquisition.  This version of the 
American Dream is embodied with greatest clarity in the 
prosperous suburb and can therefore be studied most 
conveniently in that setting (Stein, 1960:282). 
 
To this end, the suburb obtained something of a mythical status, proffering 
the opportunity for individuals to find a comfortable haven from inner-city 
crime and ascension to a “hyperactive social life” revolving around regular 
interactions with similar others (Berger, 1974:230-231).  From the 1930s 
onwards the suburb became symbolic of twentieth-century American living 
and loomed large in the domestic consciousness as the new American 
'frontier' (Donaldson, 1969:147-171).  The impact that it would have on the 
American people would prove even more pronounced than the fabled 
Western frontier of the previous century, and the disparity between both 
settings could scarcely be more marked.  Just as the nineteenth-century 
West had appealed to potential settlers on account of its sense of mystery 
and guarantee of privacy, so too did the new vogue suburb with its 
alternative emphasis on stability and safety in numbers.  These 
differences aside, the two settings did share one very significant 
commonality with one another — an abundance of available and 
(relatively) affordable land on which new family units and aspiring couples 
could realise an impressive quality of life (Thorns, 1973:66).  In theory, at 
least, the suburb appeared likely to stimulate new and profound forms of 
community, but close proximity did not necessarily result in close 
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relationships, hence the essential flaw in geographically orientated notions 
of community.73
 With regard to 'association' then it is the meaning of the term as 
evidenced in recent media portrayals of the term, more than Tönnies’ 
explanation that carries greater currency in present day debate over 
community.  Susan Kenny gave voice to this revised perspective of 
association when writing: 
 
 
The first notion of community is based on reflections of 
differences in kinds of human association…  Community 
comprised (of) direct, personal forms of human 
association, formulated around notions of sharing, mutual 
commitment, common interests and a sense of belonging 
(1994:2). 
 
In its modern incantation, association has evolved from entailing human 
interaction at an indifferent and distant level, to encompassing human 
interaction of a personal and mutually beneficial nature.  As such, 
association is no longer representative of Tönnies' antithesis to 
community, but rather it is now evocative of the late writer's much desired 
model of community itself. 
 The ambiguity apparent in the term association means that it is 
awkward to employ it (on its own) as a description/definition of community.  
Neither is the association cause helped by the unconscious neglect it has 
for the structural elements that are integral to human organisation and 
purpose.74
                                            
 
  This is to argue that community in its association guise 
encompasses significantly more than the mere arranging of human actors 
into cliques in accordance with their mutually shared likes and interests.  
73 This is evidenced by Gans' findings from his in-depth study of the Levittown suburb.  
These findings disputed the (then) common city planner assertion that physical 
components of community were the key determinants of community development and 
maintenance; suggesting instead that community ties almost invariably formed around 
commonly shared aspirations and class/cultural indicators (1967:289).  
74 This is largely a semantic matter, but Kenny's views on association tend to focus 
noticeably on the positive aspects of community that are achieved when the individual is 
most comfortable with his/her group dynamic and when his/her interactions within the 
group are at their most personally rewarding and favourable.  To some extent, community 
is being romanticised here also.  Community cannot be made reducible to positive 
outcomes or extraordinary instances of group interaction only, it must be accountable for 
the less favourable outcomes and everyday interrelations as well. 
 150 
 
In real terms it also involves the seemingly mundane processes of 
everyday human interaction, with all its highs and lows and the necessary 
interplay with others that may not share your particular interests or views 
of the world.  For community is as much about exclusion as it is about 
inclusion75
 Notions of inclusion and exclusion as they pertain to community 
groupings figured conspicuously in the works of several classical 
sociologists.  Georg Simmel, by way of example, wrote of the importance 
of elements of association as a means by which smaller community forms 
could be distinguished from the larger “mass” of society.
, thus association needs to take into account the crucial nature 
of all interactions as media for rounding one's own view of community, 
reshaping this view to keep it abreast of evolving circumstances, and 
setting the parameters for community by identifying those with whom the 
individual has little in common. 
76
                                            
 
  Simmel, while 
not specifically referring to the term ‘community in these writings, was 
nevertheless an early pioneer of the association model of the concept.  As 
he saw it, humans were compelled to interact with one another and that 
this interaction was necessarily organised around symbiotic dependencies 
between superordinates and subordinates (Frisby, 1984:117; Ritzer, 
1996:161).  As such, association was also a key vehicle through which the 
individual came to be embedded within various forms of social structure, 
wherein the framework of superordinate and subordinate behaviours was 
intrinsically located.  At this point, however, Simmel’s ideas on agency and 
structure veer considerably from those espoused later by Giddens.  While 
the idea of a two-way relationship between the individual and social 
institutions would become central to structuration theory, Simmel could 
only envisage a mono-directional connection between the two; with 
75 Traditional approaches to community unerringly refer to communities as entities that 
incorporate a class structure that is inclusive of practically all inhabitants.  In reality, 
however, the larger the mass the more exclusive communities tend to become.  See  
Simpson (1974:315-316) for a broader explication of this theme.   
76 Simmel would be an influence on Giddens work on account of his keenness for seeking 
broader associations between individuals and the larger society (Frisby, 1984:49-50 & 
1992:8; Ritzer, 1996:157). 
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individuals helping to form structures, but being helpless to impact upon 
them from that point onward (Ritzer, 1996:159). 
  Simmel is important to this thesis in that he was one of the first key 
thinkers to lucidly articulate the idea that larger groupings within society 
(communities, by way of example) were implicitly mediated by—and 
emerged out of— lower tier formations, that took their starting point at the 
individual (Ritzer, 1996:157).77
 By way of contrast, the need for communities to be exclusive entities 
stems from the desire of inclusive groupings to viably compete with those 
social groupings whose inherent worldview deviates markedly in tone.  It is 
this idea that constitutes a cornerstone in Simmel's broader platform of 
conflict sociology where group exclusivity is realised in ongoing 
competition that incorporates the following three factors.  Firstly, the 
guiding elements of a particular group are centralised so as to unite the 
group in adverse situations, and clearly defined so that competing groups 
can easily isolate possible bargaining points should inter-group negotiation 
be possible or desirable (Turner et al. 1989:265).  Secondly, competition 
between groups leads to heightened levels of solidarity within groups as a 
response to the threat posed from rival groups, and also results in 
increased levels of intolerance for the individuals within these rival groups 
(Turner et al. 1989:265-266).  Finally, competition between groups can 
lead to situations where rival communities form ‘coalitions’ with one 
  For Simmel, societal groupings 
(communities) will generally run on relatively simple and clearly articulated 
guidelines, given that it is imperative that group objectives are “accessible 
even to the lowest and most primitive among them” (Wolff, 1950:93).  This 
is in keeping with the inclusive dimensions of community and the common 
human need to forge interactive relationships with like-minded people who 
share one’s worldview.  It is also indicative of the historically developed 
need for humans to maintain hierarchical divisions, even in social 
groupings where the differences between members are decidedly minimal. 
                                            
 
77 Interestingly enough, Simmel also had ideas on identity that would appear to constitute 
precursors on Goffman’s notion of ‘roles’.  He saw individuals as being organised into 
‘types’ based predominantly on their relationship to the interactional structure (to provide 
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another as a means of improving their broader powerbase (Turner et al. 
1989:266-267). 
 Simmel’s ideas on competition and conflict are particularly pertinent 
to communities, such as right wing and white power groups that form in 
the present day around nationalist concerns.  According to Simmel, 
‘radical’ communities must necessarily remain small in order to 
successfully maintain and promote radical objectives (Wolff, 1950:94-95).  
This can cause considerable angst, however, when such small groupings 
are linked together with others in order to form political coalitions of the 
type described above.  White pride groups have been largely segregated 
from one another by physical distance for the best part of a century, but 
this tyranny of distance has recently been overcome as a result of 
information communication developments.  The miles between them may 
have eroded, but the policy differences accrued through years of separate 
activity remain steadfastly in place, making the construction of a united 
white nationalist movement a near impossibility. 
 Max Weber also addressed the community issue, although the depth 
and significance of his views on the concept are understandably 
overlooked on account of his more pressing interest in matters of religion, 
economy and bureaucracy.  For Weber, communities, which he referred to 
as ‘communal relationships’, were predicated upon the “subjective feeling 
of [interacting individuals], whether affectual or traditional, that they belong 
together” (1978:40).  This is clear illumination of Weber’s favouring of an 
“association” model of community, a fact that is only further reinforced by 
his decision to refer to such social relationships as being “associative” in 
tone.  Weber also alludes to the inclusive and exclusive nature of 
communities in writing that communal relationships are nominally open to 
anybody wishing to join, but often closed to anyone who is unlikely to 
provide the group with goods, services, or ideas that will improve and/or 
support its overall situation (Weber, 1978:43). 
 Other writers have also chosen to locate notions of association within 
a broader terminological framework.  Poplin (1972) provides an example 
                                                                                                                       
Internet examples, moderators and netizens) and their orientation to the world at large 
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of this when he refers to the concept of ‘community as a unit of social 
organisation’.  In doing this he allows scope to talk of association as a 
structural dualism.   On the one hand, he is able to mirror the views of 
Kenny (1999) and Wild (1981) by speaking of community as a 'social 
group', that is a body of members with shared interests and mutual 
obligations and expectations in relation to prescribed roles and set norms 
within the group (1972:13).  Outside of this, he can also speak of 
community as a 'network of interaction', which recognises the necessary 
everyday interactions between individuals, groups and institutions that 
serve to isolate, establish and reinforce the dimensions of the community 
in question (1972:16-17). 
 
Community as political sphere 
 Community as political sphere pertains specifically to the power 
relationships encapsulated in the everyday relationships and interactions 
that underline conventional community processes.  It was the political 
aspect of human interrelations that played a major role in Tönnies’ 
decision to construct the notion of association in opposition to his view of 
community.  As Tönnies saw it, all persons were "alike in one respect: they 
want the means or the power which guarantees them, through their very 
use, as much of the pleasures as they desire" (1974:146).  For Tönnies, 
such motives were so maligned as to be incompatible with his 
romanticised take on community. This view, however, only served to 
obfuscate the fact that political power plays are often formulated at the 
micro and meso levels of society and therefore cannot be isolated from the 
community process, as appealing as this ideological separation may 
appear. Having had the opportunity to view the terrain in retrospect, 
Giddens’ structuration approach to the concept is far more useful in that it 
accepts Tönnies’ premise of 'individual political will', but explains it as 
                                                                                                                       
(for example, trolls & antagonists).  See Ritzer (1996:158) for more on this. 
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something that can be (and is) challenged and mediated by acting selves 
supported by constraining and enabling forms of institutional apparatus.78
  Irwin Sanders, writing under the banner of ‘community as allocation 
of power’, expressed power relations within communities as having three 
atypical faces: reputational, positional and decisional (1966:442-443).  
With regard to reputational modes of power, members arise to positions of 
privilege within group dynamics through the references of community 
members who respect their potential for progress and leadership.  By way 
of contrast, positional modes of power are designated through a 
community member arising to a position of respect and authority through 
prescribed institutional processes (promotion, long-term involvement in a 
particular field, and so forth) that are not explicitly dependent on finding 
favour with the rank and file members of the greater group dynamic.  
Decisional modes of power, conversely, are reliant on individuals 
comprehending the processes by which decisions are institutionally 
arrived at and using this understanding as a means of informing and 
consolidating their own interactions within the community. 
 
 This line of thought is also expanded upon by Warren, who neatly 
summarises the power perspective into a pithy statement that reads as 
follows: 
 
[the growth of community power-structure analysis] has 
been a means of coming to grips with the observable fact 
that certain individuals in the community exercise much 
more influence on what goes on than do others (1972:40). 
 
This approach to power mechanisms within communities was particularly 
widespread in community research circles prior to the 1980s.  It is an 
approach that still has present day applications, although over the past 
fifteen years discussions on power structures in community studies have, 
by and large, switched tack to assess the concept in terms of the scope 
                                            
78 It is here that undertones of 'conflict theory' arise, but Giddens prefers to see such 
contestations of will as examples of contradiction.  Contradiction being the "opposition of 
structural principles, such that each depends upon the other and yet negates the other; 
(and also the) perverse consequences associated with such circumstances."  Expressed 
another way, power plays within communities are reliant on knowledge of—and access 
to—particular resources and rules apparent in specific institutional structures.  
Paradoxically, however, such resources and rules can also be utilised by others to restrict 
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and facilities available for individuals to utilise community as a means of 
social empowerment.  Kenny (1999:152-153) talks of community 
empowerment as a concept that is realised when hitherto subordinate 
groups in society reach a heightened awareness of their tenuous status 
and use this understanding as a springboard to increased levels of 
democratic participation within the community.  Empowerment overlaps 
with ideological standpoints on community, but cannot prove to be of any 
practical value unless disadvantaged groups have the courage and 
confidence to fight for their own affairs. 
 Kenny's perspective is reiterated and expanded upon by Lynn 
(1997), who writes of community as being either a ‘vehicle’ or a ‘problem’ 
depending on the social condition and outlook of its members.  A 
community can serve as a vehicle of change if its members participate 
actively in the group’s actions, or if it contains members that hold 
significant power in a wider society setting.  Conversely, community can 
also be seen as a problem if its constituents experience "loss of control 
over the decisions affecting it, or loss of identification [with the community], 
leading to apathy or socially dysfunctional behaviour" (Lynn, 1997:330). 
 Lynn's ideas provide an ideal point of entry into the 
communitarian/liberalism debate that has monopolised discussion on 
community power in recent years.  During this time, struggles over 
community (particularly in the USA) have been reducible to contests 
between parties wanting to preserve traditional family and religious values, 
and parties wanting to free citizens from the restrictions that are alleged to 
exist in such traditional communities (Kautz, 1995:5).  Once again the 
binary dualisms that are so characteristic of broader community studies 
terrain come into play.  Outside of this, debate over community appears to 
agree on only two points; that community is "essential to the smooth 
functioning of civil society and that it is intangible… an idea, a belief, or set 
of values" (Champlin, 1997).  From this point on, however, there is little 
that liberals and communitarians seem to have in common on the topic.   
                                                                                                                       
or moderate these power plays.  See -  (Giddens, 1984:373) for more on this. 
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 A considerable portion of the contemporary dissension surrounding 
the concept of community stems directly from the widely held Western 
predilection for liberalism.  A central tenet of this thought surrounds the 
view that progress is invariably to the good of humankind and that "history 
is a more or less continuous emancipation of men (sic) from despotism 
and evil" (Nisbet, 1970:214).  Communitarians, on the other hand, indulge 
a mindset that is essentially polar to liberal ideology; it is a way of thinking 
that is—at least in part—nostalgic for past ways of being and decidedly 
romantic in tone.  Newman & de Zoysa summarise the ideological 
cornerstone of communitarian thinking in writing that: 
 
The movement deplores the decline of the family and of 
community life, it condemns isolation and the loss of a 
clear faith, while resolutely setting its face against the 
immorality that is blamed for the decline in public morale 
(1997:1). 
 
Thus, in so far as the communitarians are concerned, progress has not 
brought humankind emancipation, but rather it has led to (Western) 
community decay through the onset of: capitalist greed, pornography, 
homosexuality, flexible attitudes to parenting, rampant unemployment and 
an ever worsening drug crisis.   
 For their part, those of the liberal faith would not necessarily be eager 
to openly support any of the aforementioned elements (capitalism 
excepted), although they are steadfast in supporting the basic human right 
to participate in them.  The notion of individualism is seminal to liberal 
ideology, resulting in unabashed support for "freedom of membership in 
groups of all sorts, freedom of belief and speech, even freedom of action 
in any area that did not obviously hurt another" (Robertson, 1986:187).  
When it comes to community the concept is generally incorporated into 
liberal thought via 'individualisation', which occurs through the pursuit and 
creation of social capital79
                                            
79 "The idea of social capital begins from an interest in people's ability to associate with 
each other.  It refers to features of social organisation, such as trust, reciprocity, norms 
and networks that increase a society's productive potential.  Social capital facilitates 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit."  Kenny (1999:63-64). 
 (Champlin, 1997).  
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 The threat of war or dispute promotes community formation wherein 
humans "seek allies because they have enemies" (Kautz, 1995:32).  The 
tone of these larger allied communities is then often forged in reaction to 
the opposition, more than in overt agreement with the other group 
members.  For liberals, community provides a means of ensuring peace 
and order in their world, the cost of which is paid by their public 
moderation of activities and opinions80
 From the above discussion it is difficult to conceive of the two warring 
parties finding any common ground in the debate.  Bradley Watson (1999) 
is one social commentator who is willing to argue that communitarianism is 
more favourably inclined towards liberal views than its devotees would 
care to admit.  As he sees it, communitarians are happy enough to let 
individuals dictate for themselves in some cases, but nevertheless 
demand state intervention into communities in others.  This raises two very 
pertinent questions as to how accommodating society should be in 
acquiescing to communitarian "demands" over community development 
and policing.  Firstly, "which communities are worthy of special protection 
against the universal norms of liberal neutrality?"  And secondly, "should 
any self-styled group be able to define itself as a community?" (Watson, 
1999).  Both of these questions will carry particular aptness as social 
commentators continue to explore the contentious realm of virtual 
community in ever growing numbers. 
 (Kautz, 1995:43).  Such enforced 
moderation is indeed precarious, however, given the classical liberal belief 
that humans "constitute our [own political] communities; they do not 
constitute us" (Kautz, 1995:32).  Liberals are convinced that community in 
the ideal sense is a purely private entity and thus can only be hindered by 
unwanted and unnecessary state involvement in its processes (Champlin, 
1997). 
  The online world would appear to represent fertile ground on which 
communitarians could continue their push for "changes in values, habits, 
and public policies that will allow us [communitarians] to do for society 
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what the environmental movement seeks to do for nature: to safeguard 
and enhance our future" (Etzioni, 1993:3).  They will need to markedly 
alter their approach to impress Watson, however, as he is very critical of 
key proponents (such as Etzioni) of communitarianism.  Watson's criticism 
relates implicitly to his assertion that communitarian spokespersons are 
bereft of soundly articulated or clearly delineated theory, espousing 
instead an incoherent jumble of reactionary grievances toward alleged 
liberal excesses (Watson, 1999).  Kautz is more accepting of 
communitarian values though, contending that: 
 
the task of contemporary partisans of community is to 
constitute a political order that can satisfy the powerful 
human longing for unstinting attachments to other human 
beings, among the other moral advantages of community, 
and yet accommodate citizens who "have learned" from 
liberalism, "to think of themselves as individuals" 
(1995:21). 
 
The Internet is clearly capable of facilitating both of these specified tasks 
and much contemporary political activism will necessarily be formulated in 
community groupings at the meso-level.  In spite of this, it is nonetheless 
apparent that cyberspace can also act as a bridging agent between the 
proactive (but essentially impotent) individual at the micro-level and the 
decreasingly autonomous state ruling bodies at the macro-level. 
 
Idealised and imagined communities 
 Idealised and imagined forms of community cut across several other 
spheres of the community territory, not the least of which is ‘community as 
political sphere’.  On a simple level it stands to reason that anything 
pertaining to political process must, by definition, be underscored by a 
governing ideology no matter how loosely articulated.  The main barrier 
that separates these two strands of community thinking is that ‘community 
as political sphere’ presupposes the obligatory implementation of 
participatory action on behalf of community members, whereas idealised 
                                                                                                                       
80 This means simply that aspects of contemporary society, such as public welfare, are 
endured with relative silence by liberals as a means of maintaining public goodwill and 
security of state. 
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and imagined forms of community are perfectly capable of existing in 
theoretical format only. 
 Idealised and imagined forms of community lack the research profile 
of most other strands of community thought, yet several key writers cover 
it in their work (Anderson, 1991; Cohen, 1985; Turner, 1967; Wild, 1981).  
Anderson's interpretation is by far the best known of the four, although he 
has written it largely with the notion of nationalism in mind.  This brings two 
aspects of the community concept firmly into focus.  On the one hand, if 
Anderson is to be taken seriously as a guide, then community must be 
interpreted as entailing a vital preliminary stage in the eventual 
development of nationalist sentiment.  Following on from this, if 
membership of a nation-state has, as Anderson suggests, become 
dependent on individuals "imagining" commonalities with fellow citizens 
(thus severely downgrading the physical manifestations apparent in 
conceptions of community and nationalism) then surely the plausibility of 
virtual communities is more readily acceptable than many social scientists 
would care to admit. 
 If Anderson's musings lean heavily toward the nationalism end of the 
spectrum, one need only turn to Wild in order to relocate the discussion 
back in the community sphere.  According to Wild , community as ideology 
is one of the most intriguing of all community categories, existing "as an 
expression of what should be rather than what is" (1981:14).  This 
definition bears some similarities to Anderson's, although Wild's refers 
unambiguously to structural and institutional concerns, whilst Anderson 
alludes mainly to individual thoughts and actions.   
 Idealised and imagined forms of community, particularly as 
expressed by Wild, can also stand accused of romanticising notions of 
community in that most imaginings of what community could be are 
generally predicated on wistful recollections of what community allegedly 
was.  Community in this guise also takes a 'back to the future' approach to 
the community concept, although it is less concerned with romanticising 
past ways of being as it is with defending past (and present) ways of being 
from enforced extinction (Cohen, 1985:104).  
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 It is at this point that aspects of symbolism become crucial to 
individuals whose communities are under threat from larger, dominant 
cultures.  Rituals and festivals are indicative of primary ways by which 
beleaguered cultural groups attempt to preserve and transmit elements of 
community in defiance of mounting global pressures.  Anthropologist 
Victor Turner has conducted deep research into rituals and festivals and 
provides ample explanation of their crucial significance to contested 
notions of culture and community.  Ritual, as Turner sees it, is a 
transformative procedure, which subtly reshapes the role and place of 
individuals within a wider social network, whilst simultaneously legitimising 
the network in question and the individual's participation in it (Turner, 
1967:95).  Festival, while often confused with ritual, fulfils a confirmative 
role within a culture, giving visual representation to cherished and 
idealised functions of the community to which the festival pertains, once 
more legitimising the group dynamic through shared involvement and 
performance (Turner, 1967:95). 
  Rituals and festivals provide evidence of the ways in which groups 
can confirm and reaffirm inherent notions of community identity on a semi-
regular or cyclical basis.  In some circumstances, however, it becomes 
imperative that a group dynamic can have an ongoing visual and spiritual 
referent(s) on which to base its sense of shared community heritage. To a 
certain extent, this process can be facilitated through storytelling and the 
regular relating of historical anecdotes from generation to generation.  The 
use of symbols is another avenue that groups can take in order to satisfy 
this objective.  A symbol is most conveniently defined as "any gesture, 
artefact, sign or concept which stands for, signifies or expresses 
something else" (Abercrombie et al. 1994:421).  This is really only part of 
the equation, however, as Cohen illustrates in writing that: 
 
Symbols, then, do more than simply stand for or represent 
something else.  Indeed, if that was all they did, they 
would be redundant.  They also allow those who employ 
them to supply part of their meaning… Community is just 
such a boundary-expressing symbol.  As a symbol, it is 
held in common by its members; but its meaning varies 
with its members' unique orientations to it.  In the face of 
this variability of meaning, the consciousness of 
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community has to be kept alive through manipulation of its 
symbols (1985:14-15). 
 
The use of symbols as a means of preserving and transmitting community 
identity is exemplified in the activities and movements of white nationalist 
movements on a global scale.  This is especially true of white pride groups 
online and will be talked about in greater detail in the following chapter. 
  Community as a form of ideology can also be viewed as a temporal 
bridging agent although this is perhaps the least commonly articulated 
form of ideological community.  This extension of community thought 
overlaps with the symbolic expressions of the concept outlined above and 
is explained succinctly by Arensberg & Kimball when they write of how: 
 
Communities, animals and human, exist over time.  Each 
one of several stages of an individual's life span is 
represented in its membership at any one point in time.  
But the community extends backward and forward in time 
beyond the life history of any one individual.  The 
biological expression of this transgenerational quality is 
generalized in the concept 'gene pool'.  Its cultural 
expression is contained within the knowledge and 
behaviour generalized in customs, institutions, and 
values.  Temporal succession, however, presents no 
smooth, unvarying pattern.  The rhythms and periodicities 
of individual group move within recurring cycles of altering 
relationships and the processes of natural history 
(1974:340-341). 
 
It is these "altering relationships and processes" that are causing angst for 
subordinate cultures attempting to find a place for their own brand of 
community in a world that is shifting rapidly towards commonly preferred 
Western capitalist models.  Community as temporal bridging agent is 
perhaps more effectively applied to group dynamics in a broader historical 
sense, wherein it relates more closely to matters of transitional process 
than transitional being.  Ostensibly, the inability of past social scientists to 
accept the survival capacity of community has stemmed directly from their 
inability to see it as entailing a continuous process "in the course of which 
one type of society (transforms) itself into another, and still transforms 
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itself into another under our very eyes" (Elias, 1974:x).81
 
  In this way, it is 
easy for investigators to empirically observe practical changes to a society 
and to express this as change in toto, without realising that considerable 
psychocultural residue remains below the surface.   
 
The structuration of community 
 The structuration of community carries with it overtones of 
community as a space for human interaction, but the focus here is 
implicitly on institutional structures within a society, rather than the 
everyday interactions between group members. It must be stressed that 
this is not meant to downgrade the import of the everyday interactions, as 
it is these interactions that simultaneously direct and reproduce 
institutional processes as they exist within a particular community.  It is at 
this point of the community debate that human agency approaches to the 
concept break down, as the individual is forced to assess their position 
and actions from a standpoint that is influenced by unavoidable external 
factors.  Human agency is untenable here as it fails to give adequate 
recognition to the role of societal institutions in shaping individual 
interaction, but structural functionalism is equally unacceptable in that it 
refuses to respect the role of the individual in mediating institutional 
process and reform. 
 Where both of these theories fail, structuration theory succeeds in 
finding the middle ground.  It does so largely on account of Giddens' 
decision to address human actions and institutional structures not as an 
opposing dualism (as per structural functionalism), but rather as entailing a 
complementing duality (Browne, 1993:139; Swingewood, 2000:209).  It is 
noticeable that Giddens, in spite of his acceptance of institutional 
influence, nevertheless favours, however slightly, the acting self (human 
agent) as being the crucial stimulant in community creation and 
development (Giddens, 1976: 74).  Institutions, as Giddens sees it, are 
                                            
81 This way of thinking is, of course, also indicative of the popularity and longevity of the 
evolutionist heritage within the social science sphere, with Spencerian theories on 'natural 
selection' finding continued favour well into the twentieth century (Ritzer, 1996:35). 
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neither forceful manipulators of human will, nor autonomously functioning 
vehicles directing human action. Moreover he contends in a manner 
"reminiscent of Weber, that social institutions and structure have no 
meaning apart from the actions they embody" (Swingewood, 2000:209). 
 For the most part, the actions embodied by institutions in 
contemporary communities serve the vital purpose of enabling or 
constraining the activities of the acting self, as Cohen alludes to in writing: 
 
It directly follows from viewing structural constraints as 
implicated in opportunities for action that they not only 
limit possibilities for activity and the generation of 
outcomes vis-à-vis individuals, but they also appear to the 
agent as pre-structured enablements associated with 
opportunities for action which remain open to them 
(1989:220). 
 
Expressed most simply, societal institutions proffer enabling opportunities 
to community members through facilitation of required resources and 
regulation of actions (among community members) so as to permit 
individuals to negotiate their social world in a secure and effective fashion. 
At the same time, however, societal institutions can constrain community 
members by ensuring that they adhere to behaviours and actions that 
have been normalised and regulated by previous actors. 
 Warren (1972) also writes of community in terms of its symbiotic 
relationship with institutional structures.  Referring to this type of group 
dynamic as ‘community as shared institutions and values’, he finds 
overlapping links between geographically-based (on a local scale) and 
interaction modulating communities, with institutional processes and 
resources serving as the glue that holds each element together: 
 
the function of making accessible locally the various 
institutional facilities for daily living needs is, from the 
ecological standpoint, the chief reason for existence of the 
community.  If these institutional provisions are conceived 
broadly, they go far beyond the provision of employment 
opportunities, stores, and personal or professional 
services.  In aggregate, they constitute a total pattern of 
living, involving the comprehensive organization of 
behavior on the locality basis (1972:32). 
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Once again we can see that while notions of place are significant to the 
concept of community (mainly for ease of identification and empirical 
investigation), community is nonetheless more accurately related as an 
(ongoing) experience, of both a physical and psychological nature, more 
than a place (Bender, 1978:6). 
 The import of structuration theory to discussions on virtual 
community will be emphasised in the following chapter.  In past times, 
studies into cyberspace have regularly incorporated human agency 
thought into their investigative frameworks, and these approaches have 
invariably emphasised the 'enabling' features of CMC participation for 
newly empowered individuals.  There is validity in this line of thinking, but 
it is also crucial that cyberspace studies devote similar attention to the 
'constraining' elements that are implicit in online interactions.  Community 
leaders (moderators) and participants themselves can apply these 
constraints, as with netiquette and group guidelines, or they can be 
enforced externally, as evidenced by recent legislation outlawing 'hate' 
propaganda in virtual environments. 
 
An operational definition of community 
 This chapter was not meant to encompass the terrain of 
'community' in its entirety, nor was it intended to stand as the final word on 
the concept.  Moreover it was intended that this chapter would serve as an 
investigation into the term community, and the marked variety of ways in 
which it is defined and interpreted.  The early twenty-first century is an 
interesting time for the study of community, with its gradual return to 
serious academic debate after having endured "unforgiving critiques" 
throughout the 1970s & 1980s (Kenny, 1994:2). This reversal of fortune is 
reinforced by the steady growth of interest in virtual communities and the 
accompanying need for a plausible working definition of the concept.  It is 
the aim of this sub-section to provide such a definition, and to utilise it as 
the core problematic on which this study is based. 
 The definition of community that is employed here will concern itself 
implicitly with the notions of ‘community as a space for human interaction’ 
and ‘community as political sphere’.  At its most straightforward, this 
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definition will be explained as the regular interacting of like-minded 
individuals for the express purpose of sharing similar interests and/or 
pursuing common objectives; and the structures and processes through 
which this interaction is formalised and mediated. 
 This definition borrows heavily from Kenny's notion of "community 
as a form of human association" and Wild's interpretation of "community 
as a particular kind of human association or relationship irrespective of 
location."  The emphasis upon human association or relationship is seen 
as integral if the term community is to be clearly distinguished from 
alternative concepts, such as group, town, suburb, club, and so on.  A 
functioning community can encompass any or all of these entities, but 
without adequate clarification, none of these entities can accurately be 
alluded to as forms of community.  To express this thought another way, 
suburbs are often referred to as being communities, even though the 
majority of residents within suburbs have little if any social interaction with 
other residents.  As a consequence, such residents generally hold few ties 
to the suburb and are divested of all links to it upon moving to an 
alternative region.  A suburb can, however, be classified as a form of 
community provided that a significant portion of its population initiate and 
exchange regular social contact with fellow residents.  In this way, a 
resident will most likely retain ties to the suburb, courtesy of friendships 
and acquaintances, should they choose to take-up residence elsewhere. 
 Ostensibly then, the concept of community resides within the 
spiritual and emotional confines of the individual and exists independently 
of spatial boundaries, such as site and locale.  This interpretation of 
community is therefore removed from Kenny's alternative perspective of 
"community as a geographical location or social space (site)" and Wild's 
similar portrayal of  "community as geography or territory."  This is not to 
suggest that the notion of community as site no longer has any validity or 
use, but rather it is a realisation that site has little relevance to the virtual.  
This realisation is particularly significant in relation to the choice of 
structuration theory as the underlying theoretical base for this study. As 
virtual communities have no firm boundaries, and are not subject to the 
institutional interference and control that sometimes impacts upon, and 
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initiates, embedded communities, they are essentially dependent on 
human agency for their construction and maintenance. 
 As a working model, this interpretation of community will be 
endeavouring to identify evidence from a concerted analysis of the 
following elements.  Firstly, the level and extent of communication 
between individuals will be assessed as a means of gauging the solidity 
of, and depth of commitment to, the alleged community.  This element will 
be referred to as the 'regular interaction' variable and, for the most part, 
will be concerned with supplying quantifiable data on the frequency of 
instances of interaction among group members. 
 Secondly, the tendency of group affiliates to pursue and maintain 
links with other group members (and belief sharers) outside of the 
confines of the focus group will be ascertained and documented.  This 
aspect of the working definition will be known as the 'external relations' 
variable and, contrary to its regular interaction counterpart, will contain 
elements of both quantifiable and qualifiable data.  In this instance, the 
quantifiable aim is to assess the numerical frequency with which the out-
of-group exchanges take place; whilst the qualifiable aim is to provide a 
clearer sense of why the exchanges took place.  For example, are these 
extra-curricular rendezvous for the express purpose of reinforcing the 
group's beliefs, or do they afford group members the opportunity to share 
intimate and personal moments with one another? 
 Thirdly, the degree of reverence that individual group members 
bestow upon the primary beliefs of the group will be investigated.  This 
factor will be alluded to as the 'ideological solidarity' variable and, given 
that any analysis of human thought and emotion is almost necessarily of a 
subjective nature, will concern itself implicitly with the accrual of qualifiable 
information.  This category will be particularly relevant to the scrutiny of 
White Nationalists, given that these individuals are splintered into a range 
of affiliated sub-groups in accordance with the degree of commitment that 
they uphold toward the pursuit of a 'White Israel'.  As such, some White 
Nationalists adopt an aggressive action-orientated political approach to the 
issue, whilst some prefer a non-violent stance that relies upon the 
widespread dissemination of their peculiar brand of religious doctrine.  By 
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way of contrast, others are driven less by religious or political leanings and 
employ White Nationalist ideology as a means of affording structure to 
their blatantly racist beliefs.   Differentiating between individuals on 
account of their ideological leanings will be an important exercise 
insomuch as it will offer indications as to the underlying motives that are 
promoting and sustaining the alleged community.  Are the group members 
primarily maintaining contact with the group on account of their ideological 
beliefs, or are they merely using their sympathetic status as an excuse for 
prolonged contact with other individuals regardless of creed?   
 Finally, an attempt will be made to isolate etiquette guidelines that 
are inherent to the focus groups.  This element will be referred to as the 
'identifiable customs' variable and will necessitate the outlining of a list of 
behavioural conventions that are enforced by the groups in question.  In 
an embedded community, failure to abide by the behavioural conventions 
that apply to the overall group will result in censure, punishment, or 
expulsion from participation in the community.  This reality also applies to 
virtual communities, although in cyberspace the etiquette requirements are 
less numerous and even less well defined.  The process of articulating the 
'identifiable customs' that are intrinsic to the focus groups will be a crucial 
act in portraying these groups as carefully structured and legislated 
communities, as opposed to loosely integrated gatherings.  The tendency 
for individuals to appreciate these peculiar behavioural conventions and 
staunchly adhere to them would also highlight and reinforce this point. 
  
Conclusion 
  The ensuing chapter shifts emphasis from discussions of 
community in conventional forms, to addressing the concept of community 
as it exists online.  This chapter combines literature on online communities 
with empirical observations gleaned from the three-tiered methodological 
procedure outline in Chapter One.  Using this material as a guide, the 
chapter endeavours to assess the veracity and validity of online forms of 
community within the working definition framework presented here earlier.  
The impetus of the chapter is decidedly multi-faceted, although three 
simple guiding sub-issues serve to instruct the direction of the piece.  
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Firstly, there is considerable justification for arguing a case for virtual 
communities equating to fleshspace communities on account of both 
sharing a particular style of associative group dynamic.  Secondly, the 
appeal of virtual forms of community to netizens is profound enough to 
belie computropian assertions that cyberspace is a weak environment for 
the obtaining and maintaining of firm interpersonal ties.  And finally, some 
thought is given to the ways in which members of online communities 
reconcile these group dynamics to the conventional strands of community 
of which they are also a part.  The anxiety shown by many group members 
when the Stormfront.org discussion boards were forcibly shutdown late in 
the year 2000 exemplified the emotional and psychological significance 
that netizens can attribute to virtual communities.  For such individuals, the 
collapse of an online community, for whatever reason, could have a telling 
impact on their particular sense of self and society. 
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CHAPTER 
5 
Cyberspace Communities: Virtual or 
virtual? 
 
 
Politicising Community 
 
Consider the following question: why argue about an 
online forum being a community or not?  Why does such 
a debate matter?  That is not a cynical question.  If we 
can get to the heart of the answer, we may find the tools 
with which to resolve the seemingly endless “yes-it-is; no-
it-isn’t” debate.  Is there some power to be had in claiming 
a word like “community”? (Watson, 1997:102). 
 
This quote was also used in the closing stages of a previous piece of work 
(Thompson, 2001) in which I addressed the political connotations apparent 
in contemporary perspectives on community and advocated the need for 
further investigation into this aspect of the concept.  It will be the aim of 
this chapter to continue the exploration of online community that began in 
that journal article.  The chapter itself will essentially be one of two halves, 
with the first section focusing purely on the ‘technical’ aspects apparent in 
virtual communities and the second part delving more deeply into the less 
obvious social elements.  My guiding belief for this section of the thesis is 
that cyberspatial communities, in certain contexts, are every bit as viable 
as the fleshspace communities to which they have come to be seen as 
inferior.    
 The main problem with denying legitimacy to online communities lies 
not in the dimensions of the media itself, but in the difficulties associated 
with clarifying and ratifying the term community.  The previous chapter 
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highlighted the way in which a community’s “validity” is often directly 
proportionate to the level of socio-political potency engendered in its 
membership.  At this point in time cyberspatial interest and support groups 
clearly lack the overall weight of numbers, social respectability and 
political presence to have obtained the firm credibility necessary to wear 
the ‘community’ label.  In spite of this, many of these online groupings can 
be seen to be communities in all but name.  
 With regard to cyberspatial communities it would appear that many 
commentators have shown a preference for referring to them in keeping 
with the “insubstantial” version of the term ‘virtual’.  For some writers, 
cyberspatial communities are seen to be somewhat suspect on account of 
their apparent impersonality and lack of physical exchange (McLaughlin et 
al. 1997:146; Stoll, 1995:43).  This alleged deficiency is further 
compounded for other writers by their belief that cyberspatial communities 
are limited to trivial exchanges of likes and dislikes with scant regard for 
the broader social concerns that occupy “real” communities (Miller, 
1996:334; Nunes, 1997:171).  Willson (1997:159) continues this line of 
thought in deriding virtual communities as vehicles that serve to detach 
individuals from their “political and social responsibilities” in fleshspace 
settings.  The list of negative views toward the virtual community concept 
is too large to exhaust here, but I would like to introduce two of the more 
prominent ones.  Firstly (and this is also endemic to community 
explorations in general), they are tending to write of community as if it 
were an entity that is singular and monolithic in its dimensions.  This is 
misleading in the sense that most individuals would not consider 
themselves to be part of a community, but rather they would see 
themselves as having largely unspoken membership of several 
communities.  To talk of community as entailing a singular platform from 
which individual human actors conduct their multifarious social interactions 
is to inadvertently conflate the term with the related concept of society.   
 Such errant conflation is also common to contemporary political 
figures, many of whom regularly speak of community in impossibly broad 
and abstract terms, enabling them to allude to an entity that is 
paradoxically nowhere and yet everywhere simultaneously.  Thus, when 
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Australian Prime Minister John Howard refers to the ‘Australian 
community’ he is ostensibly making a sweeping statement about the 
Australian people as a whole — the Australian society.82
 On a secondary level cyberspatial scholars have shown a disturbing 
tendency for demeaning the virtual community cause by focusing too 
heavily on technical aspects of the CMC medium at the expense of the 
social ones, as Slevin lucidly articulates in arguing that: 
  The monolithic 
concept of society conflates a range of elements into its overall makeup, 
including: social communities, geographical terrain, political ideology, 
common currency, and a clearly articulated legal system.  The extent of its 
overall scope and diversity of its integral functions ensure that society 
should never be mistaken for the concept of community and vice-versa.  
Aside from this, the concept of society is removed from its community 
counterpart on account of its perceived inclusiveness.  Communities, be 
they virtual or otherwise, are necessarily exclusive entities and this is a 
key point that will be explored further at a later stage of this chapter. 
 
We cannot properly acknowledge the opportunity for new 
modes of relationship if we focus primarily on the 
attributes of the technical medium while ignoring the 
structured social relations and contexts within which 
information and other symbolic content are produced and 
received (2000:113). 
 
This is not to contend that the technical aspects of CMC are not interesting 
in and of themselves, but rather that to concentrate on such aspects is to 
proffer an unbalanced perspective on the everyday way in which they are 
commonly being utilised.  For example, the capacity for chatrooms to 
enable identity play and cloaking among participants should be addressed 
separately from the actual instances of netizens using them for this 
purpose.  Over the ensuing pages I will spend some time explicating the 
various CMC vehicles through which virtual community may be pursued, 
constructed and developed.  None of these media are communities in and 
                                            
82 “And we certainly don’t want a community in this country where the advantages of the 
Internet and the advantages of information technology are only fully available to people 
who live in Melbourne or Sydney or Brisbane and the other large population centres of 
our nation” — Howard (2001, September 6). 
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of themselves, but each of them could be used by netizens to promote 
community infrastructure if desired. 
 
Virtual cities  
 The first type of CMC vehicle that lends itself neatly to the potential 
construction of community forms online is the ‘virtual city’.  Virtual cities 
are constructed in a variety of formats in order to serve a variety of 
differing requirements.  In the first instance, they are sometimes created 
by municipal councils as a means of making local government more 
accessible to its constituents.  Some of these “cities” are constructed 
purely as information databases, although they tend to be more successful 
if they allow for “citizen to citizen communication”, along with the capacity 
for citizens to actively partake in debate over issues that are central to the 
city’s developmental agenda (Rheingold, 1993:272).  
 Conversely, other municipalities also like to create electronic 
versions of their cities, but not for the express purpose of informing and 
governing their own populations.  These versions of virtual cities are 
implicitly concerned with tourism, and presenting a broad spectrum pen 
portrait of the positive aspects pertaining to the real city on which they are 
based.  The most prominent example of such a virtual city is ‘The Digital 
City’ of Amsterdam, which electronically promotes its real city as a series 
of “town squares”.  Each of these squares provide the viewer with a 
glimpse of Amsterdam’s unique local culture, with squares focusing on 
technology, education, homosexuality, television, politics and sport.83
 Few virtual cities show such a predilection for representing intrinsic 
local culture, however, with most choosing to focus on street maps, 
bookstores, restaurants, local attractions, travel agencies, accommodation 
venues, public services and assorted factors [refer Figure 5] that are most 
likely to interest potential visitors (Carter, 1997:145-146).  Dodge et al. 
(1997) suggest that virtual cities come in four differing formats, including 
‘web listing’ style (as per Virtual Manchester, which makes “no attempt to 
  
                                                                                                                       
 
83 This site can be accessed in six different languages: Dutch, German, English, Spanish, 
Italian & French. See – http://www.dds.nl/. 
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Figure 5. The virtual city of Manchester (www.manchester.com) 
 
 
represent the built form of cities”) and ‘flat’ style constructs (such as Virtual 
Shinjuku — refer Figure 6) that arrange their web material around “flat 
map” representations of established cities (Dodge et al. 1997:1).  These 
variants aside, virtual cities can also be seen in three dimensional form 
(which is more for architectural and software modelling purposes) and may 
one day be seen in ‘true’ format: 
 
“True” Virtual Cities are ones which are an effective digital 
equivalent of real cities, providing people with a genuine 
sense of walking around an urban place.  To fulfil this 
demanding criteria a true virtual city must have a 
sufficiently realistic built form interface, a rich diversity of 
services, functions and information content, and crucially, 
the ability to support social interaction with other people 
(Dodge et al. 1997:2; italics in original). 
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Ostensibly, ‘true’ virtual cities would combine a range of currently existing 
cyber technologies (three dimensional platforms, avatars, and MUD style 
communication vehicles) in an attempt to most accurately recreate real 
city living in a virtual setting (Dodge et al. 1997:4).   
 
FIGURE 6. The virtual city of Shinjuku (www.shinjuku.or.jp/) 
 
 
 As with the WWW itself, virtual cities have both their supporters and 
their detractors.  The former see virtual cities as providing “a new public 
sphere supporting interaction, debate, new forms of democracy [which 
lead to] a renaissance in the urban, social and cultural life” (Graham, 
1996). The latter see virtual cities as indicators of erosion of public spaces 
that mirror “communities riddled with violence, fear, crime, mistrust and 
widening gaps between rich and poor” (Graham, 1996).  While it is fair to 
argue that public spaces are diminishing and that virtual cities are out of 
reach of those in the lower socio-economic bracket of Western society, the 
links between virtual cities and crime are tenuous at best.   
 175 
 Virtual communities and virtual cities are by no means one in the 
same, with the former involving regular interaction between human actors 
around one or more shared interest spheres, and the latter facilitating 
infrequent “visits” from human actors seeking information or advice on 
civic/political matters. This aside, there are very few (if any) virtual cities 
that contain a strong commercial/corporate element and it is primarily 
dotcom sites that are afflicted by instances of cybercrime (hacking, credit 
card fraud and multi-level marketing scams).  There is also little solid 
evidence to support assertions that virtual communities are environments 
“riddled with violence, fear, mistrust and crime.”  Were such comments 
aired in relation to conventional communities, they would be derided for 
being generalist and alarmist in tone, and yet it is not uncommon for social 
commentators to freely disparage virtual communities along similar lines. 
 In some ways virtual cities are serving to steer discussion on virtual 
communities back toward seemingly obsolete geographical perceptions of 
the concept.  To be a worthwhile contributor to ‘Virtual Manchester’ it 
stands to reason that you are going to have pressing concerns that are 
driving you to participate in its ongoing maintenance and development.  As 
a natural extension to this, if you are going to have such pressing 
concerns then it is highly likely that you are going to be a citizen of 
fleshspace Manchester.  Because of this, sufficient doubts need exist as to 
the nature of cyberspace as a medium that disintegrates borders and 
subjugates the local beneath monolithic expressions of the global.  This 
point will be explicated further when discussion turns to online nationalism 
in Chapter Seven. 
  
Multi-User Domains (MUDs) 
Another prominent cyberspace vehicle for the construction and 
maintenance of virtual communities is the Multi-User Domain (MUD).84
 
  
Lori Kendall provides the following definition of MUDs: 
                                            
84 These sites can also be referred to as MUSEs (multiple user social environments), 
MUSHes (multiple user social hosts) and MOOs (multiple object-oriented domains).  See 
Kitchin (1998:7) for more on this. 
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MUDs are a form of interactive, online, text-only forum.  
MUD originally stood for Multi-User Dungeon, based on 
the original multi-person networked dungeons and 
dragons-type game called MUD.  MUDs are also 
sometimes referred to as Multi-User Domains or 
Dimensions.  As in other online chat programs, people 
use Internet accounts to connect to mud programs 
running on various remote computers. They can then 
communicate through typed text with other people 
currently connected to that mud.  MUDs also allow 
participants to create programmed “objects,” which 
facilitate the feel of being in a place, thereby adding 
richness to the social environment.  There are hundreds 
of muds available on the Internet and through private 
online services.  Many still operate as gaming spaces.  
Others are used for meetings, pedagogical purposes, and 
as social spaces (1998:3).  
 
MUDs exist as a hybridisation of the Internet newsgroup medium and the 
WWW chatserver forum.  Both of these entities serve as discussion 
vehicles in a wide variety of interest areas, with newsgroups entailing a 
considered exchange of emails and chatservers facilitating the more 
immediate process of conference style conversations between two or 
more computer users.  Unlike MUDs, however, neither newsgroups nor 
chatservers concern themselves with the cyberspace environment itself, 
and see no need for creating artificial settings for the express purpose of 
promoting familiarity and reassurance among their users.   
 In the case of MUDs, however, great care is taken to create and 
nurture a sense of setting that is not only unique to an individual MUD, but 
also a source of comfort to its members.  Shelley Correll emphasises this 
point in her descriptions of the Lesbian Café MUD: 
 
The LC was clearly created to resemble a bar…  TJ (the 
LC founder) described the bar using features that 
everyone would recognise as a bar.  There was the bar 
itself, highly polished so that she could slide drinks down 
to her patrons.  The pool table was to be a gathering 
place, but “no one is to knock the balls off the table.”  She 
added a fireplace and a hot tub, making this bar “a place 
more grand than any lesbian bar that actually exists”…  
the setting evolves as patrons discuss new features of the 
bar or fail to discuss old ones.  For example, one day a 
patron mentioned in the public post that she was sitting in 
the rocking chair by the fireplace.  Never before had a 
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rocking chair been part of the features of the café 
(1995:5). 
 
Some MUDs (particularly those that employ café or bar backdrops) 
choose to employ “bots” within their settings as a means of promoting and 
mediating interactions between members.  “Bots”, expressed most simply, 
are computer programs that run within MUDs, and their primary purpose is 
to act as servants and guides for MUD participants.  Sherry Turkle refers 
to these computer programs when she writes – “When you enter a virtual 
café, you are usually not alone.  A waiter bot approaches who asks if you 
want a drink and delivers it with a smile” (1995:16).  
 Essentially then, the setting and “staffing” of a MUD are devised in 
order to achieve two outcomes.  In the first instance, the setting instills a 
sense of calm and familiarity into the participant due to its virtual 
representation of a real-life place.  The participant can then use their 
knowledge of real cafes and bars as a signpost to their activities, actions 
and conversations within the virtual environment.  The participant may, for 
example, enter a secluded corner or backroom of the bar so as to conduct 
a quiet and personal conversation.  Alternatively, they could position 
themselves in the centre of the bar where the flow of conversation is 
heavier and more boisterous in tone. 
 In the second instance, the staffing and object-placement that 
characterise virtual bars and cafes prompt participants to become active in 
the MUD, as well as providing them with reference points for their 
conversations and actions.  Shelley Correll highlights this point, when she 
writes: 
 
A green bean bag chair was created in a similar manner 
(to the rocking chair) and quickly became the coveted 
spot for early arrivers [sic].  Patrons would enter the café, 
read the notes posted thus far that day, and determine 
whether anyone was sitting in the green bean bag.  If it 
was found to be empty, a patron would occupy it by 
posting a note such as this one: “I’m over here in the bean 
bag, waiting for all the ladies to arrive…  where is 
everyone???” (1995:6). 
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 MUDs can also be clearly differentiated from newsgroups by virtue of 
another key characteristic – the incorporation of fabricated participant 
identities.  For some users this fabrication extends no further than the  
 
Figure 7. An example of a text-based MUD. 
(SOURCE:http://mud.lysator.liu.se/java/Telnet/)   
 
deployment of a nickname to protect their fleshspace anonymity.  For 
others the capacity to devise a new identity enables them to bypass a 
range of fleshspace boundaries and restraints, such as: physical 
appearance, occupation, educational background, gender, race, class and 
age (Reid, 1995:178-179).  
 MUDs can be either purely textual [refer Figure 7] or they can 
encompass graphical elements such as “physical objects” and avatars 
[refer Figure 8].  The vast majority tend to correspond to the former type, 
however, given that the imaging demands of graphical MUDs warrant 
access to servers of greater speed and bandwidth than textual MUDs, 
which commonly operate from clumsier, but decidedly less resource 
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Figure 8. Screenshot of a graphical style MUD.  
(SOURCE: http://www.realmsofkaos.com) 
 
  
intensive, Telnet vehicles.  MUDs are also more commonly utilised for 
game playing, but small pockets of the WWW have recently arisen 
wherein netizens utilise MUDs as social environments.  These types of 
MUDs can be akin to the type outlined earlier by Correll and Kendall, 
encompassing ad hoc socialising amid virtual cafe or bar surrounds. 
Alternatively, they can involve role-playing interactions that are “more akin 
to improvisational acting in an ensemble than [the pursuit of] individual 
identity exploration” (Cherny, 1999:7). 
 The interactive capabilities of graphical MUDs could revitalise future 
perspectives on virtual community as netizen numbers inevitably rise and 
individuals become sufficiently comfortable with, and educated about, the 
use of cyberspatial vehicles.  Whilst gaming MUDs per se appear to offer 
little of substance to the community debate on account of the highly 
focused and individualised nature of gaming endeavours, it is not so easy 
to dismiss the claims to community that are presented by social-orientated 
MUDs.  In the first instance, these MUDs could facilitate links between 
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dispersed fleshspace bodies and institutions via the training and 
development capacities apparent in the ‘virtual reality’ like spaces of MUD 
environments.  Such scenarios would also be open to everyday 
individuals, bringing them into social networks and situations that may 
otherwise be denied to them in fleshspace situations.  A prime example of 
this is the ‘Virtual Writers Community’ MOO (VCWMOO), which allows 
potential writers to interact with other writers and graphical representations 
of stories and/or possible plot ideas.  In this case, the environs are the 
same as for game players, but the emphasis is on community spirit 
through the forging of contacts and sharing of ideas and pieces of work.  
The emphasis on future developments should not, however, be seen as 
an admission of the limited use and nature of MUDs in the present day.  
For those netizens currently involved in MUDs of the type mentioned 
above the community feeling already runs deep, it is just that at this point 
in time MUD environments lack the broad user knowledge and 
understanding to be more widely used for the fostering of community ties 
and interactions.  The basis for such MUD usage is unlikely to change 
dramatically in future years, but a marked increase in employment of the 
media for broader communal purposes, as distinct from recreational 
gaming, remains a very real possibility. 
 
Newsgroups, bulletin boards and listservers  
 Newsgroups and listservers constitute the third major mode available 
for the purpose of creating online communities.  Neil Barrett gives a 
succinct explanation of how a newsgroup functions: 
 
News items—‘articles’—are gathered into ‘groups’ of 
related items depending upon the topic.  Users submit 
articles, rather like electronic mail messages, to a 
particular newsgroup.  These messages then appear in 
the list of articles when subsequent users examine the 
contents of newsgroups to which they subscribe.  There 
are many tens of thousands of newsgroups with topics 
ranging from the sublime to the ridiculous; from the most 
esoteric elements of advanced programming languages, 
to blow by blow reports on TV soaps (1996:23-24). 
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Unlike some chatrooms, newsgroups are always structured around a 
particular topic or interest area.  Most newsgroups are open to any 
individual that chooses to contribute, but others permit entry only after a 
strict screening process is conducted by the person(s) responsible for 
inaugurating the group.  These newsgroups often also employ an editor to 
censor and filter messages so that obscene, disrespectful and spammed 
messages do not contaminate the carefully ordered confines of the group. 
 ‘Spamming’ is the most prevalent form of etiquette abuse to be found 
amid newsgroups.  Rob Kitchin outlines the spamming phenomenon when 
he writes that: 
 
Spamming involves sending the same message to many 
lists.  This practice is discouraged, because it needlessly 
multiplies traffic, occupying valuable bandwidth.  
Community administered ‘punishments’ consist of other 
users mail bombing or mass flaming the offender’s mail 
account or a vigilante programmer deleting offending 
messages from a list on behalf of everyone else (1998: 
104). 
  
While spamming can involve the mass posting of obscene or offensive 
material, for the most part it encompasses the wide-scale distribution of 
advertising for a multifarious range of goods and services.  The aggressive 
response that net users afford to spammers is fascinating insomuch as it 
represents a backlash against the ‘free speech’ that cyberspace 
protagonists loudly trumpet as being the prime virtue of computer-
mediated communication.  In some ways, this anti-spam response can 
also be looked upon as a form of ‘defense mechanism.’  Prior to the 
1990s, the Internet existed largely as a medium that was removed from 
the corporate sphere of commercial interests.  As the new millennium 
unfolds, however, commercial enterprises are focusing their attentions 
toward Internet trading en masse.  By protecting their newsgroups from 
advertising material, netizens are creating a sanctuary from what they 
perceive as a rabid consumer machine that plagues their fleshspace 
existence. 
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Figure 9. An example of a browser based newsgroup. 
(SOURCE: alt.politics.white-power) 
 
 
 Newsgroups are conventionally accessible from Internet browsers 
[refer Figure 9], although they can also be viewed via the WWW, a method 
that is growing gradually more common. Notwithstanding the obvious 
costs associated with maintaining an Internet service, some netizens are 
willing to pay the price for WWW access because the groups that they 
wish to participate in are not always available on their Internet vehicle.  
The availability of newsgroups in browser mode is dependent on them 
being carried by the ISP that is overseeing the Internet account in 
question.  Internet service providers will often leave certain groups off their 
listings due to their lack of overt popularity (meaning that they are not 
worth carrying for the stress they put on system resources), or on account 
of their somewhat 'unsavoury' nature, for example, some pornographic 
and right-wing aligned groups.   
 Cyberspace is by no means the haven for free speech that many of 
its protagonists would readily have us believe.  Control of cyberspatial 
vehicles is widely spread, unlike control of conventional mass media 
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outlets, but whilst this increases the prospect of free speech on the one 
hand, it just as easily decreases the probability on the other. This is 
primarily because ISP operators invariably lack the power that broadcast 
media moguls enjoy and are decidedly more prone to the pressures 
brought to bear by public opinion and moral standards.   
 Newsgroups can successfully accommodate community 
infrastructures, but only if two factors are present and accounted for.  
Firstly, the group need have a solid core of regular participants serving to 
direct and moderate the informational input and social fabric of the group 
in question (Smith, 1999:210).   While communities imbue a distinctly 
egalitarian bent in regard to ideological concerns, they are nevertheless 
dependent on key individuals taking charge.  Ad hoc machinations 
diminish community solidity given that human actors intrinsically require 
sound levels of control and direction in their everyday lives.  Thus 
community members gain considerable confidence and comfort from 
adherence to firmly articulated modes of social form and structure.  
Secondly, the group should have a low “thread-to-post ratio”, meaning that 
its message threads are mostly long and indicative of extensive levels of 
diverse and ambiguous interaction (Smith, 1999:210).  Such groups would 
appear to be in the minority, however, and it is likely that newsgroups are 
less directed toward community ties as they are concerned with pure 
information and announcement exchange. 
 Listservers (also known as ‘listservs’ or ‘mailing lists’) are similar to 
newsgroups in the way that they are built around specific spheres of 
interest.  Where they differ from newsgroups is in the alternative manner 
by which they are administered and accessed.  Listservers “automatically 
move written discussions around to those who subscribe; the latest rounds 
of every discussion show up in the subscribers’ electronic mailboxes, and 
the subscribers can send responses around to the rest of the list by 
replying to the email” (Rheingold, 1993:264).  Whereas newsgroups take 
individuals to the discussion, listservers bring the discussion to the 
individual.  Despite this key difference, however, listservers tend to mirror 
newsgroups in the manner by which they are often inundated by spam 
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mail.  For this reason, many mailing lists are edited and made available 
only to carefully scrutinised subscribers (Mann & Stewart, 2000:13).  
 Mailing lists are invariably smaller than most newsgroups 
participation wise, given that they are rarely advertised with any 
prominence and normally require some research to find or, in certain 
cases, an invitation to join.  For Susan Clerc, this gives support to her 
reasoning that listservers are more inclined toward community nurturing 
than newsgroups: 
 
Although some newsgroups manage to attain a sense of 
community, mailing lists are more likely to do so because 
of the way in which they are set up: few people post to 
them, so there is a feeling of familiarity (sometimes you 
wanna go where everybody knows your name)...  In 
contrast, newsgroups have more posters and more 
anonymity (1996:222). 
 
This view has merit, but should still be treated with considerable caution.  
Personal experience with academic-orientated listservers has taught me 
that such vehicles are more openly employed as a means of transmitting 
information and solving isolated problems than encouraging interpersonal 
warmth and routinised interaction.  More research is needed to better 
clarify this issue, but I have some difficulty in accepting the premise that 
mailing lists, by and large, are significant contributors to the virtual 
community debate. 
 Bulletin board systems (BBS), also known as discussion boards or 
fora, are similar in design and intent to newsgroups, but are generally 
linked to websites and are accessible from the WWW [refer Figure 10].  
BBS, for all intents and purposes, are usually better situated to promote 
community ties than listservers are.  This has much to do with the location 
of BBS in cyberspace, with many of them existing in close proximity (in 
terms of HTML links) to associated chatservers and information databases 
that relate implicitly to the central theme of the participatory group.  
Whereas newsgroups and listservers exist as relatively isolated social 
spaces, BBS normally provide users with the opportunity to reinforce and 
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extend interactions with fellow users through associated links and CMC 
vehicles.   
 
Figure 10. Visual representation of a Bulletin Board. 
 
(SOURCE: http://webboard.stormfront.org:8080/~1/guests) 
 
 
 This capability should not be undervalued as a stimulus for 
community spirit and sentiment, especially as it is not uncommon to see 
messages on BBS inviting users to participate in chat sessions with fellow 
members.  This interchange between asynchronous and synchronous 
modes of social interaction online can be a significant factor in the building 
of closer personal relationships and provides individuals with the 
opportunity to expand their understandings of fellow members through 
immediate (and noticeably less structured) exchanges with them.  BBS 
also promote community “feel” by establishing stable, but loosely enforced 
codes of conduct; clearly articulated strands of netiquette; and tight, 
uniform expressions of culture within their confines (Gattiker, 2001:24-26). 
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IRC and assorted chatservers 
 The final major mode of communication to be found on the WWW is 
the chatserver (also known as the chatroom).  Chatservers exist in a 
variety of forms and offer “synchronous communication on a one-to-one, 
one-to-few and one-to-many basis” (Kitchin, 1998:13).  The most popular 
chatserver outlet to be found in cyberspace is Internet Relay Chat (IRC), 
described by Reid as being “a mode of interaction on the Internet in which 
people are able to communicate synchronistically on different ‘channels’ 
from disparate locations” (Reid, 1992).  It is the synchronous nature of 
chatrooms that differentiate them as a medium from email and 
newsgroups.  By way of comparison, email and newsgroups are 
asynchronous entities that deal in one-to-one and many-to-many 
communications respectively (Kitchin, 1998:13).  This synchronicity of 
conversation is more closely identifiable with the interaction that takes 
place within MUDs and MOOs.  Chatserver groups are not, however, 
predisposed toward the elaborate construction of setting and placement of 
“objects” that MUD groups conventionally devote such intricate detail to. 
 In spite of this, chatservers closely resemble MUD environments by 
virtue of their capacity for encouraging and promoting the use of virtual 
identities by their members.  For chatroom devotees, it is this ability to 
escape from the confines of their fleshspace identities and to reside 
instead in an anonymous “role-play” that attracts them to the IRC.  For 
Rheingold, these “role-plays” are constructed in accordance with three 
fundamental elements: “artificial but stable identities, quick wit, and the 
use of words to construct an imagined shared context for conversation” 
(1993:176). 
 As is the case with fleshspace meetings and get-togethers, 
chatserver interactions necessitate the adoption of colourful and 
expressive behaviour as a means of making an impression and garnering 
attention.  The IRC offers individuals a clear advantage in that they are not 
hindered by the impediments of age, race, class, and gender that are often 
unavoidably revealed in face-to-face meetings.  This advantage is 
counterbalanced by the narrow scope that exists for IRC users to choose 
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a viable identity, to have this identity accepted, and to successfully 
maintain the required demeanour of the identity over a prolonged period of 
time.  For writers such as Turkle, the success of individuals in creating 
virtual identities can often come at the expense of fleshspace identities: 
 
As more people spend more time in these virtual spaces, 
some go so far as to challenge the idea of giving any 
priority to RL at all.  “After all,” says one dedicated MUD 
player and IRC user, “why grant such superior status to 
the self that has the body when the selves that don’t have 
bodies are able to have different kinds of experiences?”  
When people can play at having different genders and 
different lives, it isn’t surprising that for some this play has 
become as real as what we conventionally think of as 
their lives, although for them this is no longer a valid 
distinction (1995:14).  
   
Figure 11. An example of a chat interface. 
(SOURCE: http://www.advancedchat.com/maturechat/) 
 
 
This is not to suggest, however, that all chatservers exist as recreational 
havens for individuals that have grown disenchanted with their everyday 
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personae.  Chatservers can also be utilised for one-to-one conversations 
in place of the telephone, saving the participants from considerable 
interstate or international telephone call fees.  Chatservers also prove 
highly effective conferencing tools, given that they are both cost-effective 
and removed from the logistical problems associated with assembling 
every delegate in the same physical location. 
 Chatrooms are wonderful media for the building of relationships in 
defiance of time and space restrictions, but not overly effective 
mechanisms with which to pursue the construction of virtual community.  
This is largely due to the fact that chatrooms, when densely populated, 
require considerable skill to negotiate competently.  Essentially, a netizen 
will only get value out of a densely populated chatroom provided they have 
three prerequisite qualities — efficient typing skills, an inherent knack for 
rapidly filtering condensed information, and the capacity for hastily 
preparing articulate and intuitive replies to the comments and questions 
aired by fellow participants.85
 
  Such stresses and the inability of many 
netizens to cope with them ensure that chatrooms rarely reach the level of 
group cohesion, coherence and clarity necessary for the formulation of 
binding community ties.  Chatrooms also carry limitations in that, unlike 
discussion fora, they are entirely reliant on individuals being present in 
order to facilitate interaction.  As such, many chatrooms are used 
infrequently because individuals regularly enter into them when they are 
empty and do not linger waiting for a potential chat partner to arrive 
(McLaughlin et al. 1999:170). 
Virtual spaces are still real world places 
 While cyberspace is increasing in presence as a research area, it 
continues to be hindered in its quest for academic recognition as a direct 
                                            
 
 
85 Chatroom screens flash by quickly when the traffic is heavy, causing slow and/or 
inexperienced users to swiftly lose track of the interactions taking place.  When more than 
six users are participating simultaneously in a chatroom it becomes a taxing task to 
remain constantly aware of who is who and who is actually talking to you.  Because of 
this, it is not uncommon for many netizens to prefer the more sedate and sensibly paced 
BBS and listserver vehicles as online communication media. 
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consequence of some commentators unwisely choosing to portray the 
virtual realm as a space that is somehow removed from ‘real world’ 
spaces.  James Slevin reinforces this point when he writes of how 
cyberspatial authors: 
 
consistently cordon off these forms of association [virtual 
community] from the real world.  Rheingold refers to them 
as self-defined electronic networks.  Reid regards them as 
an alternative virtual world where social boundaries have 
become deconstructed.  Turkle sees them as occupying a 
space that we can only reach by a ladder which we must 
later discard (2000:107). 
 
Such views present another example of cyberspace researchers slanting 
their discussions too heavily in favour of the technical aspects of assorted 
CMC media.  The inevitable ramifications of this approach assist in the 
devaluing of virtual communities in the eyes of other social theorists who,  
not without some justification, take the approach that if virtual communities 
are not of the “real” world then they are not entities of any firm substance.  
This is in keeping with the romanticised perspectives of community that 
were alluded to in the previous chapter. 
 The romanticisation of community all too often gives the surface 
impression that places and spaces are foremost in the minds of 
community members, but this is somewhat misleading.  Recent cinematic 
offerings such as Fever Pitch (1999) — English soccer; Mystery, Alaska 
(1999) — ice hockey; Celtic Pride (1996) — American basketball; Field of 
Dreams (1989) — Baseball; and the voyeuristically insightful documentary 
on Australian Football — Year of the Dogs (1997) provide subtle 
illustrations of this point.  Each of these films addresses the concept of 
community from varying angles that range from Field of Dreams' portrayal 
of a whimsical loner ostracised from his community and ultimately 
reconciled with it through their collective love of baseball; through Fever 
Pitch's portrait of a disparate collection of soccer fans merged into a 
community through their combined passion for the Arsenal team; to Year 
of the Dogs' real-life drama of battlers united through a common link with a 
football team and a shared working-class heritage. 
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 The common thread of community that ties these films together is 
symbolised by the almost spiritual reverence to place displayed by the 
main players in each movie.  John Bale refers to such displays of 
reverence as being representative of topophilia, or "love of place" (1994: 
chapter 6).  With regard to communities constructed around sport, this 
love of place will be expressed through an overt fondness for sporting 
grounds, buildings and stadia and individuals will commonly articulate their 
feelings and emotions via explicit reference to the sporting sites 
themselves.  In many cases, however, what the individual concerned is 
really expressing is not so much a love of place, but a love of what that 
particular place has come to represent.  It is clear that sport has had a 
regular tendency to mediate communities in fleshspace settings over the 
past century.  As online groups continue to pop-up around sporting 
interests it will indeed be interesting to track their development, to see if 
the virtual environment can be as successful as the bricks and mortar 
stadium in symbolising community for future generations of sport 
devotees.   
 This will be for other researchers to investigate, but these sporting 
films share some common ground with cyberspace when it comes to the 
concept of community.  In watching films an individual is not journeying 
anywhere in the physical sense, but they are being taken on a 
metaphorical journey that is directed by their unique emotions.  With CMC 
vehicles the situation is markedly similar, although the experience is 
necessarily heightened (in the short-term) for the individual concerned on 
account of the added capacity for interactivity that cyberspace brings to 
this process.   
 It is also important that we comprehend that neither of these 
scenarios can be viewed as being somehow extraneous from the “real” 
world in which they take place.  Films can certainly contain fantasy 
elements and may present the illusion of otherworldliness, but they still 
necessarily exist in this world and are viewed in accordance with 
fleshspace understandings of real world places and events.  The same is 
true of cyberspace which, regardless of its marked absence of visual face-
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to-face interaction, is still very much physically rooted in the real world and 
dependent on fleshspace conventions and delineators.   
 Perhaps the most important notion to grasp from this section of the 
discussion is that community exists within individuals and not, as 
conventional perspectives of community would have us believe, outside of 
them.  External factors will certainly impact upon the individual’s creation, 
maintenance and comprehension of ‘community’, but for the concept to 
have any significant value to a person it must be experienced, moderated 
and expressed from within.  This is why human actor-based interpretations 
of community are so crucial to investigations into the concept, as they 
build our knowledge of the phenomenon from the point at which it 
originates — the micro-level stage of identity realisation and development. 
 Goffman (1959) knows this only too well, as it constitutes a key 
plank in his broad platform perspective on human socialisation and 
interaction.  Thus, when he speaks of roles he is referring explicitly to the 
constantly evolving understandings of one’s peers and circumstances that 
an individual incorporates into their everyday life and the express way in 
which they convey these understandings to those around them (1959:15-
18).  Giddens, extending out from this view, sees such roles as entailing 
routinised and repetitive processes that served to link individuals to other 
social actors and institutions (1984:25-28).  For both, community was 
indeed internally experienced insomuch as it was founded on individual 
appraisal of social stimuli and the comfort and confidence that human 
actors gleaned from the stable and repetitive nature of the environment 
they regularly inhabited.   
 By adopting the ‘internal’ explanation of community we can also 
provide a fresh reasoning for the ongoing popularity of ‘geographical’ 
perspectives on the concept. There would certainly appear to be 
considerable truth in the view that ‘geographically-based’ versions of 
community are normally the most tight-knit.  This is primarily the case due 
to individual’s conducting almost all of their daily routines and interactions 
within the geographical sphere that is “home” to them.  If we are to accept 
the premise that community is formulated and maintained through the 
comprehension and enacting of repetitive roles and routines then it should 
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hardly be surprising that most community ties would be formed in these 
localised contexts.   
 Accordingly, when an individual deviates in some fashion from the 
carefully prescribed confines of their localised context, the prospect of 
having to endure disorientation and discomfort increases considerably.  
Such disassociation can be temporary, as is the case when one takes in a 
movie, or extended when one takes an overseas holiday and is forced to 
adapt to fresh surrounds and unfamiliar persons.  We can see from this 
that while geography is not entirely insignificant, in such instances it is not 
removal from place and people that causes the major angst, but removal 
from established roles and routines.  Thus, if an individual were to move 
overseas it would seem as if they were moving to another world (at least in 
the short-term).  This may also be true of persons branching out into 
cyberspace for the first time, given that the technical aspects and social 
expectations of the virtual realm are clearly extraneous to those that 
occupy individuals in the world of bricks and mortar.  And yet leaving your 
home in Australia for cyberspace is no more indicative of leaving the ‘real’ 
world than is leaving your Australian home for Luxembourg.  In either 
scenario, once the roles and rules of the new terrain are identified and 
learnt, the individual is able to reposition their modes of community to 
attune with their particular living environment and requirements. 
 Of course, this should not discount the similarities evident in both 
scenarios with regard to the elements of risk involved.  Risk has always 
been prevalent in all manner of human action and interaction wherein such 
action has been predicated upon the making of decisions and the 
consequences (sometimes unintended) that arise from these choices 
(Beck, 1999:3-4).  Risk is also a calculable process in that it has 
“something to do with anticipation, with destruction that has not yet 
happened but is threatening” (Beck, 1992:33).  The possible threats 
apparent in travel are never far from the minds of human actors 
conditioned to the prospect of ‘worse case scenarios’ by the global 
tragedies portrayed by global media outlets on a daily basis.  The vast 
majority of travel plans are enacted without undue incident, but there is 
always the unsavoury prospect of having one’s flight hijacked, of having 
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one’s plane crash, of falling foul of unfamiliar laws, of being robbed and/or 
assaulted, and so forth.  The implicitly physical nature of overseas travel 
ensures that the risks associated with it are suitably transparent to human 
actors, but online participation is also prone to the realisation of 
unintended and undesired consequences. 
 “An increasing dependence on information and communication 
systems results in a decreasing capacity to understand, represent and 
control risk” (Van Loon, 2000:173).  When a netizen goes online they do 
so with little (if any) fear of falling victim to death or physical harm.  This 
lack of foreseeable physical peril can be comforting, but it can serve to 
obscure the risks associated with online participation.  As such, many 
netizens give little thought to the possibility of being misrepresented 
online, of having their credit card details fall into the wrong hands, of being 
tracked by an unknown stalker, and the like.  In an odd way, however, the 
risks inherent in online participation only serve to further rebut the view 
that the virtual world is somehow removed from the real world in a critical 
fashion.  If online participation proceeds on the understanding (albeit 
sometimes obscure) that decisions must be made by netizens and that 
these decisions will carry with them the prospect of very real 
consequences, how then can we seriously downplay the validity of the 
virtual world and deride it as being little more than an elaborate play 
space? 
Urs Gattiker (2001) is one of the first cyberspace writers to devote 
significant attention to the place of risk in virtual environments [refer Table 
7].  Risk, as he sees it, can be broken down into two distinct typologies — 
'systematic risk', which involves controlled hazards that can be planned for 
and (to some extent, insured against); and 'unsystematic risk', which 
involves unforeseeable hazards from which individuals cannot be 
protected (2001:200).  For the most part, online risk falls firmly into the 
latter category and, the prospect of cybercrime aside, is conventionally 
realised in the following three ways. 
Firstly, in structural terms online risk impacts at both micro and 
meso levels through occurences of hacktivism and associated instances of 
electronic malice (Brown, 1997:202-203; Lupton, 1995:486).  This has 
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been regularly evidenced on the Stormfront.org site in recent years, with 
hackers focusing on politically contentious websites in their endeavours to 
disturb and transgress networked security systems.  Secondly, it has long 
 
Table 8. Potential opportunities and risks associated with cyberspace   
              culture. 
 
People will be Able to Advance/Improve 
or Increase/Decrease: 
People will Face the Challenge/Risk or 
Opportunity to Cope with a Situation 
Offering Them an Increase/Decrease of: 
 
Experience (visual, cognitive and others) 
 
Loss of reality, social relatedness, 
friendship 
 
Creativity and imagination Influence and wealth 
 
Communication and knowledge transfer 
through the processing of additional 
information 
 
Too much of too little information and 
productivity 
Independence and loneliness 
 
Internet or cyberspace use/addiction 
Cooperation and dependence 
 
Privacy 
Efficiency and effectiveness Variety in consumer demands 
 
Direct participation in the political process Dependency on having the financial 
resources to afford surfing the Net 
 
Access to data and information 
 
Confusion and apathy 
(SOURCE: Gattiker, 2001:171) 
  
been presumed that instances of online risk arise in web environments 
that are loosely monitored and poorly regulated in terms of group 
behaviour (Gattiker, 2001:138).  It is for this reason that almost all 
websites relating to regular group interaction have adopted particular 
forms of netiquette and behavioural guidelines as a means of formalising 
modes of conduct and reducing the instances of malicious and unethical 
CMC use.86
                                            
 
  Finally, online risk can also be seen to involve issues 
pertaining to user morality and privacy, with the enabling aspects of online 
freedom being counterbalanced by the wide viewing audience that online 
posts can be distributed to.  There are two sides to this morality issue also, 
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with individuals necessarily risking compromise to their own peculiar 
worldviews during online participation, and individuals risking censure or 
disadvantage as a result of their online interactions running contrary to the 
moral preferences held by those in positions of influence and power. 
  
Stormfront.org  
 To this point in the chapter, the discussion on virtual community has 
been broad spectrum in dimension, but from here on in I would like to 
narrow the focus in order to discuss the concept from a case study 
perspective.  The Internet, unlike previous media that have existed 
essentially in one-to-one or one-to-many mode, has unmistakable 
potential for political organisations wanting to increase and interlink their 
membership bodies in defiance of mainstream social restrictions.  With 
this in mind, it is surprising that so little research (to this point) has been 
conducted into right wing political groups in virtual environments.   
 Susan Zickmund (1997) was one of the first writers to branch into this 
topical area when she wrote of the ways in which “radical others” were 
using the Internet as a means of “waging war” on those who would oppose 
their views or challenge the way of life to which they would like to become 
accustomed. Michael Whine (1997) also took a look at this phenomenon, 
going into particular detail with regard to political developments and 
closing his article with a discussion on possible legal remedies with which 
to combat right wing cyberactivism. By way of contrast, Tara McPherson 
(2000) broke new ground in this area by focusing attention on ‘neo-
confederates’ and the manner by which they were using cyberspace as a 
means of reshaping and representing their particular vision of the southern 
United States to fellow neo-confederates and potential converts.  
McPherson’s study is the one to which my own will most closely 
correspond.  Yet, unlike McPherson's and to the best of my knowledge 
any other studies on online right wing groups, my investigation into the 
‘Stormfront.org’ white pride website will include views and commentary 
from site members themselves. 
                                                                                                                       
86 There is also the related issue of webmasters being held legally liable for the content 
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 The Stormfront.org website [refer Figure 12] is the oldest and largest 
white pride related site on the WWW.  In its halcyon days it entertained a 
registered membership of more than 20,000 users, but following its 
December 2000 restructuring has steadily risen to a revised membership 
quota of 13500+ (as of December 2002).  Prior to the restructuring 
Stormfront.org was gaining new members at the rate of between 30 to 40 
per day and it is interesting to note that the new discussion boards are 
attracting newcomers at a similar rate.  Stormfront.org’s discussion boards 
offer a prime example of the ‘core group’ users outlined earlier by Smith 
(1999), with the site’s list of ‘top ten posters’ encompassing members who 
have posted between 700 and 1200 messages to the boards within a six-
month period.  Some of these core group posters also fulfil the role of 
board moderators on the site.  Moderators are like the police officers of the 
virtual environment, upholding the laws of the group in question, ensuring 
that posts are appropriate for the boards (both in terms of content and 
language use) and dealing with errant group participants.  As is the case 
with fleshspace police, moderators on Stormfront.org are regularly 
disparaged by group members for being over zealous in their treatment of 
chatroom and discussion fora users.  In spite of this, they are tolerated by 
the rank and file as a necessary evil in keeping the site respectable and 
viable for white pride devotees. 
 Stormfront.org can be looked upon as encompassing a viable virtual 
community for a varied number of reasons.  Firstly, the presence of 
moderators and core group posters provide fellow users with a focused 
and comforting environment in which to pursue their ideological beliefs. 
The moderators are the policing agents in these virtual environments, the 
managers of risk.  Van Loon writes of the paradoxical relationships that 
exist between “the unknown predications [that accompany virtual risks] 
and the identified ‘need’ to control or limit them” (2000:173).  It is indeed 
true that online participation carries with it the added attraction of greater 
freedom to express oneself and to interact outside of carefully established 
offline conventions (to a degree), but such freedom could lead to anarchic 
                                                                                                                       
that appears on the sites that they oversee. 
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chaos if allowed to go entirely unchecked.  The moderators are therefore 
responsible for ensuring that personal liberties do not run contrary to 
group cohesion and harmony, although it is often difficult for individuals to 
accept the need for such protection from risk.  
 Secondly, the structure of the site is diverse to the point of catering 
for most white pride needs no matter how eclectic (Bushart et al. 
1998:236).  This structure incorporates a host of discussion boards that 
are pertinent to white pride issues in specific countries or regions; the 
scope for participants to access the site in English, German or Spanish 
languages; fora that address members’ entertainment (music), parenting 
(home schooling), romantic (white singles), theological (religious issues) 
and political (white activism) requirements; and a large array of links to 
web material on all aspects of white nationalist practice and ideology.  As 
a final point, Stormfront.org also allows users access to powerful yet user-
friendly search engines and paging devices that put them in constant 
touch with fellow registered members on the site. 
 
Figure 12. Screenshot of the Stormfront.org website. 
(SOURCE: http://www.stormfront.org/)  
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Regular interactions 
 At the conclusion of the previous chapter I outlined a four-tiered 
working definition model of community that I planned to implement in this 
investigation into virtual community.  The first of these thematic variables 
to be explored in this chapter looks primarily at the consistency with which 
users of the site avail themselves of the site’s fora and take the chance to 
interact with other registered members.  Community, at a basic level, is 
heavily contingent on communication between its members, and while 
CMC vehicles are prime avenues for communication exchange, not all of 
them facilitate modes of communication sharing that would be considered 
profound enough to inspire and stimulate community ties. 
 One of the more startling aspects to arise out of the 
questionnaire/interview phase of this study surrounded the contention that 
existed in regard to clarifying a user’s status on the Stormfront.org site.  
The following quotations taken from the questionnaire/interview transcripts 
stand as firm testimony to this: 
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How long have you been a member of Stormfront.org? 
 
0-1 yrs = 4;   1-2 yrs = 6;   2-3 yrs = 5;   3+ yrs = 3;   Undisclosed = 3 
 
Jager65: Ok, to verify I am not a “member” per se, I do 
however use the Stormfront webboard and discussion 
rooms to converse with like minded people. 
Jacklynch: well, let’s say 2 yrs although i’m not clear as 
to my “member” status. 
Nordic Fury: I am not aware of Stormfront being an 
official organization that has members.  I am not a 
member. 
Vamp88: 3 years.  And BTW [by the way] it is not an 
organisation it is a meeting place (non-profit) for White 
Nationalists to contact each other. 
Njord: I’m not a member of SF or anyhow associated.  I 
use its communication facilities—the webboard and the 
chat—sometimes to exchange thoughts, ideas and news. 
 
The descriptive term ‘member’ was employed in my survey in a very 
subjective fashion, so as to distinguish between participants on the site 
and “guests” who do nothing more than lurk.  There were obvious 
shortfalls in this approach, not the least of which being that this form of 
categorisation also served to classify me as a “member” of the site, when 
this was patently not the case.  Nevertheless, most interview subjects 
were unfazed by the choice of terminology, making it all the more 
interesting when the occasional interviewee did choose to object. 
 
 
a) How often do you access the Stormfront.org site?  
DAILY = 9;     WEEKLY = 4;     MONTHLY = 2 
REGULARLY = 2;   RARELY = 1;   INFREQUENTLY = 3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
b) Are you a regular poster (contributor) on the site? 
REGULAR = 4;  IRREGULAR = 14;  HEAVY = 2;  SEMI-REGULAR = 1 
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 The mere fact that some individuals did not consider themselves to 
be members of the site does not serve to damage its claims to community 
status.  It is unlikely that most individuals would adequately grasp that they 
are members of a particular community, given that individuals are 
commonly more predisposed toward physically participating in the 
community, as opposed to philosophising about their role or place in it.  It 
need also be noted that several of the respondents who queried their 
status as members of the Stormfront.org site, still managed to place 
themselves among the majority of respondents who described themselves 
as regular participants on the fora.  Equal intrigue centered on the high 
proportion of respondents who claimed to be irregular posters to the site, 
with a considerable number of the high access grouping putting 
themselves in this category.   
 Some would probably contend that high access rates coupled with 
low posting rates would result in high thread to post ratios, weakening the 
argument for virtual community status in this instance.  It is possible to 
counter this contention, however, by suggesting that the act of posting is, 
in some circumstances, an individualistic process where the poster wishes 
to display themselves to an audience with little pressing interest in the 
thoughts and well-being of fellow users.  Conversely, if individuals are 
willing to regularly access CMC vehicles without needing to be the central 
focus of the interactions taking place around them, it could be argued that 
they are involved with the group principally to partake in what it has to 
offer.  This explanation is definitely in keeping with the sharing-centered 
definition of community that I outlined in the previous chapter. 
 One of the biggest criticisms of virtual communities, when depth of 
participation becomes a key piece of criteria, pertains to the huge numbers 
of lurkers who saturate online chatrooms and discussion boards.  In earlier 
cyber times lurking was looked upon with almost total disdain by Internet 
users (hence the unpleasant nature of the term), but more recently it has 
achieved respectability—if not unconditional acceptance—in the eyes of 
the greater cyberspatial population (Whittle, 1997:60).  Some netizens still 
take a dim view of lurkers on ideological grounds—cyberspace is a 
communication vehicle so people should be using it to communicate, not 
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eavesdrop—but it is groups such as Stormfront for whom lurking remains 
a significant cause for concern.   
 Stormfront.org, as with other right wing websites, is under constant 
surveillance from policing agencies and so-called anti-hate organisations 
(Brown, 2000).  This reality does serve to reinforce the community spirit 
within the environment, however, by establishing limits on participant 
postings (no allusions to violence, no advocating of illegal activity) and 
cementing the “us versus them” mentality on which much present-day 
white nationalist sentiment is fuelled.  The lurkers who inhabit 
Stormfront.org would certainly not consider themselves to be part of the 
Stormfront.org community, but Katie Argyle contends that lurkers are not 
so easily excluded from the greater virtual community picture: 
 
The default method for coping on the Net then lies in the 
choice between writing or lurking.  Lurking is participation 
by watching without revealing your presence to the group.  
The catch is, others may not know you are there, but you 
know you are, and so you are as involved as they are.  
You are still part of the group (1996:137). 
 
This is indeed true, although even when it comes to lurkers there are 
differing degrees involved with their level of online participation in a group.  
Wallace identifies this factor well when she suggests that some lurkers 
would be better described as ‘deleters’, meaning that they delete more 
messages than they actually read (1999:35).  Deleters would, one 
suspects, be very prominent on mailing lists (where the messages are 
brought to the user), but less common on discussion boards where the 
netizen has made the effort to register and must (of his/her own volition) 
return to this site to remain abreast of the interactions taking place there. 
 An indication of the number of users making repeated visits to the 
Stormfront.org website can be gleaned by inspecting the number of ‘total 
impressions’ and ‘unique’ hits that were made on the site87
                                            
 
 [refer Figure 
87  Impressions are the total number of hits made on the Stormfront.org website each 
month, while Uniques are the total number of hits made each month from a “unique” 
CPU.  For example, during the month of May 68,838 hits on the Stormfront.org website 
were registered from different individual computers.  For the same month, 106,021 hits 
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13].  Over the year 2000, a combined total of 1,484,184 hits (impressions) 
were registered on the Stormfront.org website, with 973,011 
(approximately 66%) of these hits being unique in nature.  The percentage 
of unique hits made on the site remained fairly constant from month to 
month, ranging from a low of 62% in November to a high of 73% in July.  
The consistency of these figures throughout the year allows for the 
deduction that regular participation on the Stormfront.org site is limited to a 
maximum of one-third of all users choosing to access the site.  Small 
number users (less than 5 message posts in total) do have to be taken 
into account here, however, and it is probable that regular participation on 
the website is likely to run at a figure that is between 10-20% of the overall 
site usage for the year.  This estimate would closely align to the number of 
non-lurkers utilising the site, but it is impossible to draw a firm correlation 
between these sets of figures from the level of data available.  
 
Figure 13. User ‘hits’ on the Stormfront.org website during the year  
          2000 expressed in terms of total impressions and uniques. 
           [SOURCE: www.stormfront.org]88
                                                                                                                       
were registered on the Stormfront.org site in total.  From this we can see that 37,183 hits 
were made by users returning to the site on two or more occasions. 
 
88 The data for this graph was derived from the monthly usage statistics as generated on 
the site via WebSideStory software. 
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External relations 
 Stormfront.org appears to hold up strongly in regard to matters of 
regular user access to—and interaction with—the site’s content.  This is 
not unusual for a densely populated web forum, but—in concrete terms—it 
does not offer support for the virtual community argument beyond the 
pejorative “banal affirmation of likes” description put forward by Nunes 
(1997:171).  To expand the exploration further I will now enter a new 
thematic variable into the discussion — ‘external relations’.  This variable 
will look implicitly at Stormfront.org’s capacity for facilitating and 
encouraging extra-curricular interactions and relationships among its 
membership base. 
 The expectation that netizens will meet in an online environment and 
use this as a springboard to a face-to-face relationship outside of 
cyberspace is a largely unrealistic one.  Cyberspace is hailed as a 
faceless, anonymous medium and many netizens find themselves 
attracted to the medium for this very reason.  Fleshspace interactions do 
occur between online acquaintances, but these interactions usually only 
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arise when the theme of the Internet forum frequented by the 
acquaintances is neatly linked to a certain geographic location.  This is 
best exemplified by CMC vehicles such as ‘World of Rugby League’ and 
‘Big Footy’, both of which pertain specifically to elite level football in an 
Australian context.  In fora such as these, it is not uncommon to see rugby 
league fans arranging to meet at a weekend game in Sydney, or 
Australian football devotees making similar arrangements in Melbourne.  
 Stormfront.org may endeavour to be a flagship medium for the cause 
of “White Pride Worldwide”, but there is little doubt that it remains an 
American preserve with between 50-70% of its registered membership 
residing in the United States.89
 White nationalism, in its American context, has long been associated 
with the Southern States due largely to their long-term participation in the 
slave trade and the difficulty that some sectors of these States had in 
coming to terms with the demise of slavery at the end of the American 
Civil War.    It is true that openly racist behaviour was in evidence on 
American shores as far back as the seventeenth century, when the 
earliest reports of tension between Northern American settlers and Native 
American tribes came into being (Kemp, 1999; Stock, 1996:5).  In a more 
refined sense, however, racial extremism would not become a noteworthy 
  The remainder of its membership quotient 
is dispersed across the globe, with Canada encompassing the second 
largest membership body accounting for 3-5% of the overall 
Stormfront.org population. A density breakdown of the Stormfront.org 
population across the United States of America [refer Figure 13 a)] 
strengthens this assertion, with several medium density membership 
pockets residing in close geographical proximity to each other.  Its also 
worth noting that 37% of members who gave the United States as their 
country of residence neglected to nominate the state in which they were 
living, ensuring that the figures outlined here are almost certainly lower 
than they would otherwise be. 
                                            
 
89 The global nature of ISPs ensure that these sort of figures are difficult to clarify with 
any certainty.  30% (approximately) of the sites registered membership stated that they 
were from outside of the USA, while 50% stated they resided inside the USA.  The 
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part of the United States political landscape until around the middle of the 
nineteenth century with the rise of the nativist American Party, consisting 
predominantly of multi-generation locals opposed to increasing 
immigration levels (Swain, 2000:82).  Interestingly enough, it was during 
roughly the same time period that the first appreciable signs of British-
Israelism were detected on the American continent, marking the birth of 
what we have now come to know as the Christian Identity Movement 
(Barkun, 1997). 
 The commonly-held perception of the American South as a white 
pride stronghold also derives impetus from the black romanticism that has 
long accompanied media-fuelled general public impressions of the Ku Klux 
Klan (KKK).  Bushart et al. (1998) provide a succinct account of the history 
of the KKK in the USA when writing that: 
The Ku Klux Klan came into existence in 1866... [and 
was] Founded as a “social club” for Confederate veterans, 
the Klan soon became politicized to combat the harsh 
policies of Reconstruction...  Outlawed during 
Reconstruction, though certainly not neutralized, the Klan 
resurfaced in 1915 and reached its apex in the 1920s 
when it was indeed a source to be reckoned with on the 
political scene.  The Klan of the Roaring Twenties was 
strong enough to have members elected to public office, 
to sway elections and to influence political policies...  
However, after this brief period of glory, the Klan once 
again faded into the background of American society90
The white pride movement retains a firm presence in the South, although 
there does appear to be a general attempt to move away from radical KKK  
 
Figure 14. Density breakdown of a) Stormfront.org membership levels 
in U.S. States and b) estimated white nationalist fleshspace 
participation in U.S. States [as at December 2000].91
 
 
                                                                                                                       
remaining 20% did not state their country of residence, although it is likely that most of 
them were Americans. 
90 The Klan retains a presence to this day, but common public impressions of the KKK as 
white nationalist movement flagship are misguided, as it is just one small (albeit colourful) 
section of the broader white pride organisation.  It is estimated that the Klan accounts for 
approximately a sixth of the overall movement in the USA (Swain, 2002:78-79). 
 
91 The figures for map a) have been adapted from the raw data that I compiled from the 
Stormfront.org website during 2000.  The figures for map b) have been adapted from data 
gleaned from the Southern Poverty Law Centre.  The groups (602 in total) from map b) 
constitute a variety of white pride organisations including the Ku Klux Klan (110); Neo-
Nazis (180); racist skinheads (39); Identity Christians (32); Black separatists (48); neo-
confederates (88) and other miscellaneous groups (105). 
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a) 
b) 
 
 
a) Stormfront.org b) Fleshspace 
WHITE (low)   = 0 – 49 persons 
BLUE (medium)   = 50 – 149 persons 
     RED (high) = 150+ persons 
WHITE (low) = 0 – 10 groups 
   BLUE (medium) = 11 – 20 groups 
     RED (high) = 21 – 40 groups 
 
beliefs and activities in order to afford the organisation a more public 
friendly image in the region (McPherson, 2000:124-125).    Southern 
Poverty Law Centre data indicates that hate groups still have a higher 
concentration in the South, with States such as Alabama (39); Florida (39); 
Texas (38); Georgia (30); California (29) and Mississippi (27) accounting 
for roughly a third of all known American white nationalist groups in 
existence during the year 2000 [refer Figure 14 b)].  This finding is 
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reinforced by data mined from the Stormfront.org website during the same 
year, which also shows that a third of all ‘known’ North American 
participation on the site originated from users residing in the six above 
mentioned U.S. States92
 The problem with geographical proximity is just one factor impeding 
the successful pursuit of fleshspace relationships between online 
acquaintances.  On another level, the possibility is hampered by the time 
needed to form relationships online, as opposed to face-to-face situations.  
Online interactions are usually slower than face-to-face ones, given that 
most of them occur in asynchronous format and are commonly restricted 
by Internet participation costs and the subsequent need to rush oneself 
online so as to make best use of limited access hours (Wellman & Gulia, 
1999:180).  Accordingly, it takes longer to get to know people intimately 
online and longer to trust them sufficiently enough to make a fleshspace 
meeting viable.  There are also some netizens who refrain from allowing 
online acquaintances to cross-over into fleshspace settings for fear that it 
will diminish the online relationship.  This is to be expected, as online 
relationships are commonly invested with more naked trust and emotion 
than real-world ones as a direct consequence of the confidence that is 
gleaned from sharing intimate details with someone physically removed 
from your everyday life. 
 [refer Figure 14 a)].  Historical factors may well be 
a strong factor in the continuing development of the white pride 
movement, although it would be difficult to argue this line firmly without 
being privy to similar data from past eras.  
 
a) Do you keep in contact with other Stormfront users on a regular       
      basis?  
YES = 12;    NO = 9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
b) Have you mixed socially with other Stormfront members in a ‘real  
      life’ setting? 
 
                                            
92 Again it need be emphasised that approximately 37% of the 5621 North American 
based users on the site during this year declined to provide a State of residence when 
registering.  Of the 3523 North American based users that did provide this information, 
however, 1154 were seen to come from Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, 
Mississippi and Texas. 
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YES = 10;   NO = 11 
 
 
 External relations were surprisingly common for the Stormfront.org 
members interviewed for this study.  The nature of these relations is 
outlined in the following quotations taken from the interview process: 
 
Diabloque: Yes on a daily basis [and] I also keep in 
contact with members which once went and no longer go 
to Stormfront...  Yes I have met many of them [Stormfront 
members] in person and continue to keep contact in 
person and by phone on a regular basis. 
Raine: A lot [of my contact with other Stormfront users] is 
just through IRC, but I'm friends "in real life with a few 
members".  Actually, my boyfriend and I met on 
Stormfront, around 3 years ago, but he’s not on there 
much anymore.  I’m in a group that some other Stormfront 
members are in too, so we see each other then...   At 
meetings of another group and also as friends.  We had a 
party last summer, and a lot of the younger members 
(teens and 20s) from #skinheads on Stormfront IRC 
attended. 
Alex: [Do I mix socially with other Stormfront users?] Yes 
and not.  I am talk[ing] with aders [other] member of 
Stormfront in web IRC, ICQ & email but Stormfront is not 
a community...  (i)t is a instrument for talkin like ICQ... I 
am never say with proud “I am a member of ICQ (etc) 
group!”  Stormfront forums [are usually just] an 
instrument...  We have a party “Russian Action” and some 
people of us use Stormfront.  
 
The first key aspect implicit in the extra-curricular relationships maintained 
by Stormfront.org members centres on the importance of location.  The 
majority of respondents who claimed to enjoy relationships with fellow site 
users outside of the virtual realm were Americans, but two Europeans, one 
Canadian, and one Russian also answered yes to this question.  Not 
surprisingly, all respondents who answered in the positive made it known 
that they only socialised with fellow Stormfront.org users from their own 
continent.  It was also interesting to note that the majority of the ‘yes’ 
answers were accompanied by further information that indicated that the 
socialising usually took place in fleshspace gatherings held by (region 
specific) white nationalist orientated political groups.  When assessed in 
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conjunction with one another, the previous two points cast fresh light on 
the immense difficulty confronting the white pride movement as it attempts 
to contain long engrained nationalist preferences and sentiments under a 
single, global ‘White Israel’ umbrella.  This line of thought will be expanded 
upon as discussion turns to online nationalism in Chapter Seven. 
 For the most part, however, interaction between Stormfront.org 
members took place within the confines of the site itself, or in other virtual 
environments that also related to white nationalism.  In spite of this, 
several of the respondents intimated to me that while they did not maintain 
ties with fellow Stormfront.org users, they did embark on “relationships” (of 
varying degrees) with netizens whom they met in other (non-white pride) 
sites.  It is also significant that all twenty-one respondents were diverse 
Internet users in the sense that they maintained virtual presences on 
generalised CMC vehicles such as ICQ and IRC.   
 ICQ and IRC are problematic to discussions on virtual community as 
a consequence of their being colonised by transient netizen populations 
(Kitchin, 1998:88).  This is certainly true of many ICQ and IRC users, but it 
need be said that such transience is not confined to cyberspace alone, 
with human actors constantly moving from relationship to relationship until 
they find one(s) that best provide for their individual needs.  Often, this 
search will result in a netizen forging ‘intimate secondary relationships’ 
online whereby he/she nurtures “informal, frequent and supportive 
community ties that nevertheless operate only in one specialized domain” 
(Wellman & Gulia, 1996:181).  This is true of many white nationalists 
online, but there are still Stormfront.org users who like to employ 
cyberspace as an entry point to deeper personal relationships.  
 
Ideological solidarity 
 One of the strongest inhibitors to the successful creation of white 
nationalist communities in recent times has been the diverse array of 
beliefs and ambitions that inhabit the greater white-pride movement: 
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QUESTION — Do you have a problem with the differing 
viewpoints (among white nationalists) on the 
Stormfront.org site? 
Madame Blavatsky: Yes, I do find it disturbing that there 
are so many disparate groups.  Most of them have the 
same goals, but each group seems to have its own 
egotistical leader who wants nothing to do with the others.   
SSkingirl: Yes, many, because almost all the kids in 
Stormfront don’t know what they are talking about, many 
of them look like they are skinheads or Nazis because 
they saw it like a fashion, and it is really sad [that I] saw 
that things, and when I heard that kind of things I really 
get #$%%#$# (well you understand it :O))! 
Njord: I still insist that the most unpopular speech 
deserves the highest protection...  once you are in the 
free speech movement, you will find that you waste most 
of your time defending morons; because “hate speech 
laws” are made primarily for morons...  but one has to 
stop the infringement of freedom where it starts. 
MarktheTopGeezer: Certainly, I have had many 
disagreements over the IRA with many American 
sympathisers that try to convince everyone that the IRA 
are a nationalist organisation when I know that they are a 
bunch of murdering Marxists. 
 
The Stormfront.org terrain is an ever volatile one, thanks largely to the 
wide range of controversial topics that white nationalism necessarily 
covers, including home schooling, aggressive or non-aggressive activism, 
religion, degrees of whiteness, attitudes to law enforcement, expectations 
of women and representations of history.  On the one hand, this overt 
contentiousness increases the viability of Stormfront.org as a virtual 
community by presenting plentiful material for the members to exchange 
views on.  On the other hand, such volatility threatens the creation of 
community by impeding the development of trust and consensus within the 
group environment. 
 
Is it too easy for people to participate on the Stormfront site? 
 
YES = 7;    NO = 14 
 
  This last point is of particular concern to the moderators on the 
Stormfront.org site, who attempt to lessen the destructive impact of intra-
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group dissent by subtly manipulating group antagonists.  Stormfront.org, 
as with any political organisation seeking improved rates of membership, 
is (initially, at least) welcoming of individuals who oppose and/or decry 
white nationalist doctrine.  This allows the group to portray itself as free 
thinking and open to debate, which is true—to some extent—but in the 
main this ‘open book policy’ serves a markedly less generous purpose: 
 
antagonists are not part of the subversive community, 
[but] their responses may serve an important function.  
Antagonists allow group members to counter-attack and 
to support their own peers, thus strengthening the internal 
cohesiveness.  The language game of rudeness and 
insults allows the style of the radical culture to more 
forcefully emerge (Zickmund, 1997:203). 
 
Ironically then, anti-white pride antagonists on the Stormfront.org site are 
probably doing more good than harm to the group they so desperately 
wish to weaken.  Essentially, group moderators allow antagonists to post 
almost anything, all the while goading them on, provoking retaliatory 
responses from group members in the process.  This process continues 
for a short undefined period until the moderators perceive that the 
antagonist has overstepped the mark or outlived their usefulness.  It is at 
this point that the antagonist is swiftly and unceremoniously K-Lined 
(forcibly expelled) from the Stormfront.org site; an event that is often 
accompanied by considerable fanfare from the moderator responsible and 
much mirth from the antagonised members. 
 This would go some of the way to explaining why most 
Stormfront.org members are content with the seemingly lax entry 
requirements stipulated by the site owner.  Such requirements propagate 
the illusion of inclusiveness that almost all communities pretend to 
embrace, but Stormfront.org is as exclusive an entity as all other forms of 
community inevitably prove to be.  A community must be exclusive for 
membership of it to carry value, purpose and meaning; which is another 
reason why society should never be interchanged for the term community.  
Virtual communities are all too readily disparaged for involving netizens 
who are too closely affiliated by their particular likes and preferences; a 
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criticism that absurdly neglects the reality that such affiliation is the metal 
on which contemporary communities are invariably forged.  To this end, 
virtual communities are probably purer than their fleshspace counterparts 
in that they do not commonly ‘imprison’ individuals in geographical, 
occupational and familial cells as some bricks and mortar communities are 
prone to do to unwilling, accidental members. 
 
Identifiable customs 
 The final thematic variable to be discussed in this chapter is the one 
that applies to the shared customs inherent in a virtual community.  Emile 
Durkheim put forward the idea that an individual could only truly be free if 
they accepted certain conditions and regulations (constraints) under which 
this freedom would be enacted (Ritzer, 1996:102-103).  This was the line 
of thought that would later come to influence Anthony Giddens as he 
searched for a way to interactively connect human actors to societal 
structures.  In structuration theory, Durkheim’s views on individual freedom 
came to be encapsulated in Giddens’ notion of constraint and enablement 
(1984:163). As Giddens saw it, an individual accepted prescribed social 
and institutional rules and laws as constituting the means by which they 
could most safely and efficiently negotiate their everyday world.  As was 
the case with other aspects of structuration theory, it was understood that 
the individuals would not merely conform to these rules and laws, but 
would play a part in their continuing evolution through their responses and 
reactions to the regulatory guidelines set in place. 
 With regard to cyberspace, the regulations and conventions that bind 
individuals to the virtual communities that interest them are commonly 
referred to as ‘netiquette’.  Netiquette exists primarily as a prescribed set 
of customary laws that seek to “balance individual and collective 
rationality” within an online group (Kitchin, 1998:104).  Netiquette does not 
protect the individual per se, but rather it safeguards the group from 
displays of individualism that would threaten the social fabric of the virtual 
community.  In essence, it is meant to “facilitate efficient and effective 
communications and minimize the distractions that are caused by our 
[netizens] inherent sensitivities” (Whittle, 1997:105). 
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 In the first instance, netiquette serves to outline a range of 
communication conventions that enable individuals to produce online 
interactions that are brief in tone and length but, at the same time, 
intelligent, clever and unambiguous of meaning.  The emoticons and 
abbreviations referred to in Chapter Three are key tools in the expression 
of netiquette for this purpose.  Effective participation within specific virtual 
environments can often depend upon comprehension of these 
conventions, which are sometimes manipulated in order to restrict and/or 
stratify group memberships.  Virtual communities are no different to 
conventional communities in that they also utilise specialised forms of 
“language to erect barriers to membership” (Bailey, 1996:38).   
 In the second instance, netiquette also accounts for the expected 
levels of politeness, civility and geniality that netizens display toward fellow 
users within the group (Mann & Stewart, 2000:59).  This also extends to 
unspoken agreements among netizens where individual nicknames are 
viewed as sacrosanct totems of stable identification, and interactions 
proceed on the understanding that the people using the handles are the 
same people that have always used the handles (Willson, 1997:50).  
Again, this is to safeguard the group more than the individual, with 
community security being compromised by abuse and misuse of individual 
identities, a situation that is particularly perturbing for online groups such 
as Stormfront.org.   
 A final role of netiquette is “to counteract the worst effects of low-
bandwidth text-only forms of communication” (Everard, 2000:78; issue is 
also discussed in Smith et al. 1998:97).  Online groups are inevitably at 
risk from self-interested and commercially-affiliated individuals who see 
the opportunity to exploit the cheap and broad-reaching capabilities of 
CMC vehicles as a means of increasing personal exposure and/or profit.  
Spam posts not only detract from the community content wise, they also 
antagonise and upset members who may withdraw from the environment if 
too many breaches of this type occur. 
 It is for these reasons that netiquette is of such importance to virtual 
communities, with group moderators commonly employed to enforce the 
conventions laid down by the community.  Of course, netiquette can also 
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be enforced by group members themselves who sometimes shame errant 
users into compliance and/or apology for transgressions to group 
regulations and guidelines (Baym, 1998:61; Mabry, 1998:14).  Netiquette 
policing (be it by member or moderator) is not always objective, however, 
nor is it necessarily unproblematic or fairly implemented.   
 Susan Herring (1993) expressed concern with what she perceived as 
the “maleness” of netiquette constructs, which she saw as being 
responsible for “oppressive power arrangements that disadvantage 
women and non-adversarial men.”  There is little doubt that male users 
dominate Stormfront.org, but there has been little sign to this point that 
females are the ones being predominantly scared away from the site by 
virtue of its netiquette requirements.  If anything, netiquette conventions 
would appear to work against netizens with overtly forceful personalities 
and creative streaks that struggle with the demands of operating within 
narrow and strictly defined guidelines.  From the other angle, 
particularised forms of netiquette are exceedingly difficult to maintain as a 
CMC vehicle grows exponentially in terms of both population and global 
reach (Gattiker, 2001:28).  It is at this point that the viability of the 
community is at its most tenuous, as the comfort and confidence of the 
group must necessarily take a back seat to the community’s need to 
develop and expand its membership base. 
 Netiquette is by no means uncritically accepted by the members of 
virtual communities, however, as it is not uncommon to see netizens 
challenging the necessity of unpopular group conventions.  By and large, 
Stormfront.org members are happy to be involved with the site and readily 
conform to most of its regulations, but the interview process did identify 
the following points of dissension: 
 
If you were in charge of the Stormfront.org site, would you change 
anything about it? 
 
YES = 15;    NO = 6 
 
Diabloque: [I would] change the web board so that they 
[users] were not allowed to bicker like little children 
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because a person does not like another person, but limit it 
to strictly messages regarding the first post. 
Vlad Tepes: I would use my waning 1st Amendment rights 
to lift restrictions on chat/board content, and counter-sue 
any legal attacks thereupon. 
Jacklynch: Yeah I’d change most things simply put.  I 
think they go about things all wrong actually, [and] I am 
rather unclear as to their purpose. 
EmperorCS: Yes, I would.  I would make it a forum where 
the discussion of whiteness and race would be grounded 
in intellectual rigor as there are many books (available 
even on Amazon.com) that relate to these studies.  [As a 
consequence] members could become educators and 
students of whiteness and Identity politics in general. 
Lycia: I would make all of the web board conferences 
moderated so that all posts would have to be approved for 
public viewing.  I would also update the information 
regarding mailing lists and fix the broken links on the site. 
Madame Blavatsky: Its hard for me to say.  Don Black 
must have some valid reasons for the draconian 
restrictions in the chat [room].  I do think that the entire 
WP movement should tone down and be more pro-White 
than anti jew or negro, because we do have a really 
positive message for our people. 
  
The splintered nature of white nationalist beliefs, coupled with the highly 
subjective nature of individual approaches to web presentation ensure that 
the Stormfront.org website is an ever contentious virtual environment for 
its members.   
 There are five specific aspects to this contention, which I will outline 
briefly.  Firstly, Stormfront.org users are at times frustrated by the loosely 
defined direction in which white nationalist doctrine appears to be heading 
on the site.  This is an inevitable by product of trying to cater for a diverse 
range of interests on the one site, and would suggest that smaller could be 
better in so far as right wing websites are concerned.  
 Secondly, it is obvious that some registered members feel hamstrung 
by the limitations placed on their language use and topic choices on the 
Stormfront.org fora.  Such restrictions are forced upon Stormfront.org by 
political legislation, but it is clear that an element within the white pride 
movement detest the tendency for sites like Stormfront.org to accept such 
restrictions without concerted defiance.   
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 Thirdly, the regular instances of intra-site bickering between white 
pride followers are prompting some members to reconsider their 
participation in the Stormfront.org fora.  Argument and debate is seen as 
both necessary and desirable for the movement to move forward, but the 
Stormfront.org site has shown a tendency for such argument to turn 
hostile and personal in recent times, sapping the confidence of many 
participants in the process.   
 Fourthly, for those members who wish to provide the movement with 
academic respectability, the heavy emphasis toward personal attacks and 
repetitive unsubstantial comments on the web boards is seen as a 
hindrance to the cause’s progress.  This is the main reasoning behind the 
ever present push for increased monitoring of postings to the site, with 
these members preferring tighter censorship and surveillance to minimal 
controls that (as they see it) only serve to subjugate the movement to 
uneducated liabilities.   
 Finally, several of the interview respondents and considerably more 
users during the lurking phase of my research were critical of the 
moderation standards in place on the Stormfront.org chatserver.  The 
general feeling was that policing of the server had become so regimented 
that it was impossible to pursue constructive discussions on the vehicle.   
 For a community, virtual or otherwise, to carry any significance for its 
members they must be able to look upon it as an entity that they have 
considered input into (even to a small degree).  Thus, while Stormfront.org 
has had its fair share of detracting elements in its pursuit of community 
ties over the years, it nevertheless showed its “grassroots” face to the 
world at the beginning of 2001 when the webmaster responsible for the 
site decided it was in need of major revamping.  In line with this, Don 
Black shut down the original chat and discussion boards on the site, 
effectively cancelling all memberships to Stormfront.org in the process.  
From early January, anyone who attempted to access the site’s discussion 
fora met with an announcement that they would need to re-register on the 
site in order to participate, and a request for advice and suggestions on 
how the new discussion fora could be structured and regulated.  Black 
conceded that—like many Stormfront.org participants—he was unhappy 
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with the way the fora were being used and the direction in which the site 
was heading.  It was therefore left open to the membership as to how they 
would best like to have “their” site run, and Stormfront.org entered into a 
member-driven second stage of its online existence. 
 
Discussion 
 Investigations into virtual communities all too often polarise the 
concept by either treating it as a fait accompli, or, at the other end of the 
scale, blanketing it beneath narrow perspectives that show bias toward 
‘fleshspace’ communities (mainly on account of their greater political 
respectability).  Regardless of whether the commentators concerned are 
pro or anti virtual community, however, it has regularly been the case that 
the inquiry being conducted has placed too great an emphasis on the 
technical capabilities of the media being utilised, more than the social 
configurations being created and pursued.  Perhaps the most telling factor 
about the investigations we have seen to this point, however, is that 
almost none of them have bothered to ask the netizens themselves 
whether or not they look upon their virtual environment as a community. 
 There are two major points that I would like to impart to the reader at 
this stage of the thesis.  The first one of these being that no manner of 
investigation and no deluge of data pertaining to the virtual community 
concept will prove substantial if the express thoughts and feelings of the 
netizens at the coal face of these online environments are not taken into 
account.  It was for this reason that I asked the following question of my 
interview subjects, with the most revealing answers to it reading as 
follows: 
 
When you’re participating on Stormfront.org do you feel as if you’re 
part of a community? 
YES = 8;    NO = 7;  Unsure = 6 
 
EmperorCS: Actually no I do not, because the divergent 
views led to many schisms and constant arguments, 
therefore without strongly shared beliefs and viewpoints it 
was a group of individuals not a community. 
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Alan: Yes I do.   [Italics are interviewer response] This is 
really interesting.  You say you feel like you’re 
participating in a community when on Stormfront, yet you 
also say that you have precious little contact with other 
Stormfront users.  What does community mean to you?  
People with similar goals and attitudes. 
Njord: No, not really.  I’m an elitist...  There are few 
participants with whom I share most of my views; with the 
overwhelming majority I do not...  Nor do I feel part of their 
‘community’. I hardly want to be associated with them; 
although there are, of course, some common grounds 
with them. 
Bryn: Yes, Stormfront is one of the few sites where, when 
I participate, I can chat and exchange ideas with people 
from all over the world and from all factions of nationalist 
thought.  Stormfront illustrates that national, geographic 
and cultural boundaries are easily bypassed in the name 
of nationalism/racism. 
  
If nothing else, this little exercise did highlight that we are indeed still a 
long way from verifying the existence of virtual community in a concrete 
sense (assuming that such proof would be possible, or even desirable).  
The disparate array of answers that the respondents provided to the 
question may have made the whole exercise look pointless, particularly as 
the individuals themselves appeared to be uncertain as to exactly what 
was constituted by ‘community’.  Such confusion, far from being futile, gets 
to the very crux of the human actor approach that I have brought to the 
community debate.  If we can neither firmly prove or disprove the 
existence of virtual communities in the cyberspatial realm then maybe it is 
time that we stepped back from the impotent indicators that have failed us 
up until now. Maybe we could do worse than to switch focus to the Internet 
users themselves for the answers, as open as these findings may prove to 
be. 
 The second point that I would like to broach is that virtual 
communities should not be disparaged purely as a response to the 
seemingly ‘narrow’ focus of their pursuits.  It is too easy to look at 
community from a multi-focal standpoint, whereby the 'community' in 
question is seen to fulfil a major role in numerous aspects of an 
individual’s everyday life.  Once again, however, I would stress that with 
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such a view we are really looking at “communities” in these instances, not 
community in the singular.  Almost all human beings participate in several-
to-many overlapping and divergent communities, all of which provide the 
individual concerned with an accumulated network of contacts, support 
mechanisms, and associated resources that enable them to competently 
assume their place in the greater society.  Virtual communities more than 
capably fill this role for many online users on an everyday basis and 
warrant increased attention and regard from researchers and social 
commentators as a consequence. 
 
Closing thoughts 
 In the earlier chapters of this thesis I have provided discussion on the 
development of human identity from the base level of the self through the 
continuum that leads to group identity in communities.  The final two 
chapters conclude the identity exploration, focusing upon the way in which 
identity is expressed through nationalism at the macro-level of society. 
 The next chapter centres on representations of the nationalism 
concept as social commentators throughout the twentieth century have 
commonly expressed it.  It begins by positioning the concept as a 
contemporary issue of significant political and media importance.  From 
here the discussion moves to a historical angle, alluding to primordial 
approaches to the concept and providing reasons for the resilience of such 
explanations in defiance of changing academic understandings of the 
subject.  This discussion then leads into an explication of more readily 
accepted treatises on nationalism, starting with the standpoints adopted in 
the sociological canon — Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim.  
The theories of these great figures is then counter-balanced by the more 
recent offerings of key commentators in the field, easing carefully through 
pre-industrial, industrial and imagined variations on the phenomena.  
Throughout the piece attention is necessarily diverted to the separate, yet 
interconnected concepts of ethnicity and globalisation, and the manner in 
which they both impact upon (and are impacted upon by) nationalist 
sentiment.  Finally, the chapter concludes with the construction and 
description of a working definition of nationalism; complete with three 
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thematic variables that are pursued in the final chapter as a means of 
more intricately assessing the virtual nationalism terrain. 
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CHAPTER 
6 
 
Addressing Nationalism: 
Contemplating the notion of nation 
 
 
Introducing nationalism 
 The concept of nationalism bears remarkable similarity to the fellow 
concepts of identity and community that share the focal spotlight of this 
thesis.  Until recently, much of the debate surrounding the concept of 
community implied that it was at best too loose an entity to treat seriously, 
at worst a fanciful notion that could not be empirically proven to have 
existed in a concrete sense.  This is not to contend that community did not 
have its ardent supporters, but rather that it did not have them in 
significant numbers until 1980s political machinations returned the 
community debate to public and intellectual prominence.  The 
liberal/communitarian dichotomy preceded these machinations by some 
years in the theoretical sense, but prior to this time it had lacked the 
political impetus and the policy directives necessary for nourishing the 
practical implications on which it could grow and thrive.  
 The concept of identity can be seen to have had similar legitimacy 
problems to community and nationalism in a historical sense, although 
recent social and political developments have nonetheless served to 
endow it with rejuvenated research energy.  The perception that 
geographical and structural boundaries are somehow disintegrating 
carries with it the implication that personal identifiers are being constantly 
reshaped in order to attune to these revised social circumstances.   
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 This last point carries with it a pair of subsidiary questions that are 
contentious enough to occupy social researchers for many years to come.  
Firstly, the suggestion that geographical and structural boundaries are 
eroding as a direct consequence of globalisation gains most of its present 
credence from educated assumption rather than observable evidence.  It 
is a contention that is regularly found in contemporary texts relating to 
globalisation and nationalism, yet few of the key writers on each subject 
are willing to argue in support of it.  In most instances where the 
contention is supported, the level of support falls short of trumpeting the 
demise of nationalism, preferring instead to contain the argument along 
distinct economic lines.   
 Such an argument is commonly expressed in global system terms, 
where widespread Western financial deregulation and laissez-faire 
approaches to economic markets by national governments are seen to 
have resulted in the subsequent rise of multi and trans-national companies 
that dominate and direct economic developments on a global scale 
(Castells, 1996; Giddens, 1990; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Suter, 2000).  
Even within this framework, however, writers such as Castells and 
Giddens hasten to distance themselves from claims of economic 
determinism; choosing instead to make it clear that the development of 
global markets has been reliant on governmental initiatives and policies at 
the national level.  By doing so, these writers are essentially locating 
themselves within a broader sphere of nationalist thought that emphasises 
the essentialness of nation-states in the governance and mediation of 
cultural and political machinations at the regional level (Friedman, 1994; 
Holton, 1998; McCrone, 1998; Robertson, 1992).   Francis Fukuyama 
(1992) stands out as an exception in that he writes of a world that is 
rapidly succumbing to liberal democratic rule.  Waters (1995) agrees with 
this contention, although he prefers to view it as being more of a possibility 
than a probability at the current time. 
 Secondly, just as globalisation cannot firmly be spoken of as new 
phenomena, neither can the geographical and structural boundaries of the 
pre-1980s be retrospectively represented as having been unambiguously 
stable.  Stable borders stand as the bedrock on which forms of individual 
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identity are composed and maintained, if romanticised treatises on identity 
construction are to be fully trusted. In spite of this, world history (circa 
1880-1980) is heavy with instances of colonialism, imperialism, wide-scale 
war, civil skirmishes, political upheavals, and the like; ensuring that 
instability was rife during this time, particularly throughout the African and 
European regions.   The world of today is thus no less stable than it used 
to be (Hirst & Thompson, 1996:chapter 1), making it somewhat uncertain 
as to why individuals would be experiencing disjuncture of identity, on 
socio-cultural cohesion grounds, any more acutely than they may have (or 
should have) been in the past.93
 These questions are not outlined here in the hope of obtaining firm 
answers, but rather to provide a basic sense of the integral ways in which 
identity, community and nationalism interweave and interlink as 
sociologically noteworthy concepts.  Such a revelation should not be 
surprising, although it is decidedly rare to see cyberspace texts that are 
willing to address these micro, meso and macro-level entities in the same 
self-contained text. It is far more common for cyberspace writers to 
conventionally focus on single level elements, or discuss identity and 
community in isolation from nationalism.  At the beginning of the twenty-
first century, academic works relating to the role of nationalism in 
cyberspace (and vice-versa) are surprisingly sparse.  Community appears 
to be monopolising researcher attention at this time, which is to be 
expected, given the plethora of potential focus groups that exist online.  
These make for cheap and plentiful study matter, particularly in light of the 
time and cost restrictions that frame most contemporary research projects.   
   
 Nationalism must not be ignored here, however, as it symbiotically 
connects with community as inextricably as community interconnects with 
identity.  Community is indeed more highly visible.  People commune with 
one another on an extremely regular basis, whereas individual identity is 
rarely displayed in its totality, and nationalism (with few exceptions) 
occupies human thought and action in a semi-regular fashion at best.  Yet 
                                            
93 I am not wishing to argue that the world is more stable at the turn of the twenty-first 
century than it was at the turn of the twentieth, or vice-versa.  Rather I am merely 
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all three concepts share the same common denominator in that they are 
all expressions of identity.  Individual identity does not lead to community 
and then to nationalism in a carefully graded process of linear 
development, however.  Furthermore an individual is required to exhibit 
micro, meso or macro level identity traits in accordance with the specific 
situation he/she find themselves in. 
 This identity selection process also underscores the manner in which 
some cyberspace users choose to express themselves in virtual 
environments.  The tendency for some netizens to adopt multiple strands 
of identity during their life online understandably captures the imagination 
of researcher and layperson alike, but it can also lead to the mistaken 
impression that such identity construction is wholly a product of the 
information age.  Multiplicity of identity certainly preceded the inception of 
the WWW, although cyberspace has afforded netizens greater freedom 
and comfort to experiment with this process. 
 The relationship between the media of cyberspace and the concept 
of nationalism will be further explicated in the following chapter.  This 
chapter will set the scene for the one that follows by summarising the key 
themes that characterise the concept of nationalism in its offline guise.  As 
was the case with the earlier chapters on identity and community this 
section will be too brief to enable an all-encompassing explanation of the 
nationalism terrain.  Rather it will focus implicitly on the main ideas and 
developments to have occupied the sociology of nationalism field up until 
the end of the twentieth century.   
 
Clarifying the nationalist typology 
 For all intents and purposes there are three overriding types of 
nationalism that exist at the beginning of the twenty-first century — 'social', 
'ethnic'  (Kellas, 1998:59) and 'stateless' nationalism.  The first type is 
common to contemporary Western societies and while it encompasses a 
variety of cultural elements in its make-up, it is nevertheless intuitively 
concerned with matters of market and economy.  The second type is 
                                                                                                                       
suggesting that significant doubts arise as to the relative levels of socio-political stability 
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noticeably less driven by fiscal matters as it is by a range of pressing and 
often historically reified issues such as religion, race and territorial 
sovereignty.   In many ways, this dual faceted approach to modern day 
nationalism mirrors that which was evidenced in the bygone era of 
imperialism; with social strands of nationalism substituting for that which 
was once displayed by the colonisers, and ethnic strands of nationalism 
standing for that which was once the preserve of the colonised. 
 These two types of nationalism do share common ground in the 
sense that they both tend to be contested in macro-level arenas and are 
considered to be legitimate political ideologies, even allowing for the 
tendency of 'ethnic' strands to antagonise the state sanctioned status quo.  
The third nationalist type, 'stateless' nationalism, differs from its 
counterparts in that it is rarely permitted a voice in macro-level debates 
over state policy.  In conventional political arenas, stateless nationalism is 
almost always only a fringe phenomenon, hence the need for proponents 
of the stateless typology to seek out alternative vehicles for the 
dissemination of their worldviews and objectives. 
 Cyberspace, given its relative affordability, speed and efficiency of 
communication, and widespread availability (in Western nations, at least) 
makes an excellent media vehicle for stateless nationalists.  This is hardly 
surprising, given that cyberspace is itself a "stateless" entity, although 
another fascinating paradox can be identified in the use of CMC for online 
patriot causes.  For the most part, stateless nationalism encompasses a 
clear focus on domestic issues and its proponents only seriously consider 
international matters when they can be seen to threaten the security and 
stability of the 'home' country.  Stateless nationalism is thus a very 
prominent ideology among right-wing organisations, many of whom 
believe that their home country has been adversely compromised by the 
foreign and human rights policies of their government. 
 At this point, it is probably worth emphasising the point that stateless 
nationalism should not be confused with anti-state or state-free 
                                                                                                                       
that has existed during each of these eras. 
 225  
 
organisations.  There are groups such as these in existence94
 
, but 
stateless nationalists are not seeking the abolition of state governance, 
just a revised and introspective new model of it.  In a similar vein, 
cyberspace itself should not be seen as a state-free entity on account of 
the heavy and broad nation-state involvement within its confines [as 
outlined in the Introduction to this thesis].  The stateless form of 
nationalism, as it exists online, will be the central focus of the ensuing 
discussion in Chapter Seven.  It is, however, unwise to explicate 
unconventional stateless nationalism without first outlining the dimensions 
of conventional state nationalism out of which it has arisen and against 
which it is opposed.   
The resilience of 'primordial' explanations of nationalism 
 The debate over nationalism is one that is fought across three 
particular spheres of social and political inquiry.95
 
  In the first instance, 
disagreement arises with regard to the origins of nationalism and whether 
it exists as a 'primordial', 'pre-industrial', or 'industrial' phenomenon. In the 
next instance, argument surrounding the concept centres upon the true 
dimensions of nationalism, which has resulted in difficulty for those who 
would like to locate it under a single plausible definition: 
Nationalism is too diverse to allow a single theory to 
explain it all.  Much of the content and specific orientation 
of various nationalisms is determined by historically 
distinct cultural traditions, the creative actions of leaders, 
and contingent situations within the international order.  
What can be addressed in more general, theoretical terms 
are the factors that lead to continual production and 
reproduction of nationalism as a central discursive 
formation in the modern world.  These do not explain all 
the implications or characteristics of nationalist discourse, 
but they offer a first step in the attempt to understand why 
it exists and retains its importance (Calhoun, 1997:123). 
 
                                            
94 American survivalists are very strongly opposed to state machinations, policies and 
intervention, as are the devotees of Posse Comitatus, a small offshoot of the white pride 
movement that argues for a return to non-centralised, local governance. 
95 Colin Kidd (1999) presents a strong and succinct summary of the key lines of thought 
pertaining to nationalism prior to the twentieth century.  Kidd takes a particular interest in 
the dissent that exists between primordialists and modernists, and is especially eager to 
confront the role of ethnicity in shaping and informing broader nationalist discourses. 
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The end result of this inability to condense nationalism into a single unified 
meaning sees the concept expressed today under a variety of qualifiers, 
including 'secular', 'religious', 'neo', 'individualistic' and 'collectivist' 
nationalism.  In line with this, it is necessary for researchers of nationalism 
to lucidly articulate the typology(s) inherent in their particular approach to 
the concept, so as to avoid the pitfalls that can accompany attempts to 
apply a blanket nationalist model to a specialised nationalist scenario.  
Finally, the imbroglio over nationalism is realised in academic and political 
attempts to predict and direct its future progress and uses, in both 
theoretical and practical terms. 
 Sociological thought altered markedly during the closing decades of 
the twentieth century.  Grand theories such as functionalism and conflict 
theory gradually faded from prominence, while smaller theoretical 
perspectives like symbolic interactionism and sociobiology underwent 
noticeable revivals (Smith, 1995:32).  Sociobiology, as the name suggests, 
is expressly concerned with genetic influences and stands in direct 
ideological opposition to structuration theory, given its lack of interest in 
"the additional properties of social behavior that are created in human 
interaction and as the result of social structure" (Abercrombie et al. 
1994:396). Whereas structuration theory draws heavy criticism for its 
inability to substantiate its claims with empirical evidence (Abercrombie et 
al. 1994:416), sociobiology gains disapproval for (among other reasons) 
the way in which its practitioners choose to shape their perceptions of 
empirical evidence. 
 For the sociobiologists, nationalism is seen as a 'natural' construct in 
that it provides scope for the extension "of kin groups that are selected by 
genetic evolution for their inclusive [italics added] fitness" (Smith, 1995: 
32).  The Darwinian overtones are clearly evident here, but of greater 
interest is the usage of the term 'inclusive'.  In Chapter Four of this thesis, 
much was made of the dualist nature of attitudes toward the community 
concept wherein communities are commonly spoken of as inclusive 
entities, regardless of the exclusive restrictions that are almost invariably 
afforded to community memberships.  Nationalism mirrors community in 
this respect, as the usage of the term 'inclusive' in this context could (and 
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probably should) be substituted with the oppositional term 'exclusive'.  To 
suggest that kin groups expand their thinking and activities to better 
facilitate the life opportunities of their members and that the formation of 
large-scale social, political and economic blocs (nations) occur as a result 
of this process (Smith, 1995:32), can not feasibly be seen as anything 
other than open recognition, and sanctioning, of systematic social 
exclusion. Nationalism as an agent of exclusion is not restricted to 
sociobiological interpretations of the concept, however, and it will be 
revisited in relation to other perspectives at a later stage of this chapter. 
 The primordial approach to nationalism is not exclusive to 
sociobiological readings of the concept either.  Smith, in expanding on the 
primordial theme also reveals its popularity among "early nineteenth-
century German Romantics [and] the followers of Rousseau in France" 
(1995:31-32).  Romantic perceptions of nationalism saw its successful 
creation and development as being an inevitable result of divine planning, 
as Greenfeld illustrates in writing that: 
 
By placing a society in a specific environment, God 
provided a particular principle around which the society 
was organized.  The material conditions were not chosen; 
they were given, and the moral perfection of a society, like 
that of an individual, consisted in abandoning itself to its 
nature determined by these given circumstances (1993: 
345). 
 
In this instance primordial is not a pre-programmed genetic influence (as 
the Sociobiologists may wish to contend), but rather it is a societal 
outcome bestowed discriminately upon some (invariably Western) cultures 
by God as a seal of approval for living and interacting in a suitably moral 
and civilised manner.  The exclusive nature of both community and 
nationalism again comes to the fore here, with the economic and 
ecological fortunes of a social bloc being seen as indication of God's 
favour and approval, rather than examples of what can be achieved as a 
result of fortuitous conditions, particularised ambitions, and no small 
amount of exceedingly good luck. 
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 Calhoun also writes on the subject, touching upon the relationship 
between the concepts of nationalism and ethnicity, implicating 
anthropologists (in certain quarters) as proponents of the primordial 
approach (1997:30-32).96
 
  The very nature of anthropology and its prior 
preoccupation (consciously or otherwise) with legitimising and defending 
the authenticity of tribal actions, interactions and oral histories ensures 
that it is an obvious target for such criticisms.  In spite of this, such 
criticism is unfair in that while anthropology has chosen to concern itself 
with the investigation and explication of ethnic cultures, it has mainly done 
so from a social construction framework, as opposed to the biological 
imperative option: 
We [anthropologists] study peoples rather than people.  
Our primary units of reference are 'societies', that is, 
distinct and relatively autonomous communities whose 
members' mutual social relations are embedded in, and 
expressed through, the medium of common culture.  
Culture is a key term here.  Not only does the possession 
of culture conventionally mark the great divide separating 
humans from other animals, but different human societies 
tend to possess distinctive cultures [italics added] (Lewis, 
1976:16). 
 
This reasoning aside, it need also be appreciated that the concepts of 
nationalism and ethnicity are very much separate ones, despite their 
instances of mutual inclusion (Kellas, 1998).  In line with this, any attempts 
to apportion blame to anthropology for misguided primordial accounts of 
nationalism (a notion which anthropologists are seldom captivated by) are 
generally based on out-of-context interpretations of ethnicity, rendering 
such claims largely erroneous and ill conceived. 
 Late twentieth century developments, most notably in African 
regions, have helped to bring ethnicity to the forefront of the nationalism 
debate.  This has also assisted in reigniting the primordial approach to 
nationalism, with newly developing nations organising themselves in 
response to contested internal ethnicities. At the same time many 
                                            
96 It is likely that Calhoun's comments were primarily geared toward the earlier social-
evolutionist anthropologists like Tyler, Morgan and Spencer, as distinct from more recent 
scholars of the discipline. 
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established nations have had to confront the task of addressing ethnic-
based minority groups that have threatened the legitimacy and stability of 
the preferred form of nationalism in place. 
 Primordial approaches to nationalism, while never far removed from 
the overall debate, are nevertheless viewed with considerable caution by 
most commentators on the concept.  In spite of this, residue from the 
primordial approach remains useful when considering nationalist 
sentiment in relation to ethnicity.  Calhoun best exemplifies this in asking, 
"how can nations that are in fact historical creations come to seem 
'primordial'?" (1997:33).  The answer to this question is anything but clear, 
although it is possible that the picture may become clearer when the 
accompanying variables of ‘imagined community’ and ‘calendrical’97
 I will momentarily deviate from this discussion in order to draw 
attention to the need for nationalism scholars to remain familiar with 
primordial approaches to the concept, regardless of their academic 
repudiation.  White nationalists (regardless of typology) see white peoples 
as entailing the ultimate form of race.  This viewpoint gains considerable 
currency in the broader white nationalist scheme of things thanks largely 
to the internal presence of the Christian Identity Movement (CIM), whose 
central ideology is described here by Bushart et al. 
 
nation-building are brought into play.   
 
For the Identity Christian, history itself is another element 
in the ongoing struggle between good and evil begun in 
the Garden.  It is important to note that Identity Christians, 
and some other fundamentalist faiths, view prophetic 
history as the only history which really matters.  All that 
has ever happened, or is ever going to happen, has 
already been addressed scripturally.  This does not mean 
that historical interpretations are not given some 
credence, or that Identity Christians are not interested in 
history.  Indeed they are.  And certainly, they see 
                                            
97 "The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty 
time is a precise analogue of the idea of nation, which also is conceived as a solid 
community moving steadily down (or up) history" (Anderson, 1983:26).  Calendrical 
notions of nationalism are thus linked to imagined notions of community whereby an 
individual's imagined sense of nationhood is nourished by their comprehension of the 
nation's past and ongoing linear development.  From this, an individual feels secure in the 
knowledge that other individuals within the nation who have been privy to the same 
interpretations of history commonly share their understanding of the nation. 
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conspiracy in current interpretations (1998:122; italics my 
emphasis). 
 
In so far as the CIM is concerned, the destiny of white peoples was 
primordially instituted with the creation of Adam and the fact that history 
has not borne out this destiny is less an example of flaws in their logic, as 
it is of the strength and tenacity of evil forces to temporarily derail the 
realisation of this destiny.   
 As Abercrombie et al. (1994:150) so succinctly put it "The ambiguity 
of the definition of 'ethnic group' thus reflects the political struggles in 
society around exclusive and inclusive group membership."  The day to 
day machinations of white nationalism, as with almost all nationalisms, are 
forged upon perceptions and instances of such struggle.  The main 
difficulty apparent in writing of white nationalists as encompassing an 
oppressed ethnic group is that insufficient evidence exists to support their 
argument of long-term anti-white prejudice.  On top of this, it need also be 
said that ethnicity is rarely spoken of in relation to white races and barely 
paid lip service to in Western countries per se. 
 Thus it is exceedingly difficult for white nationalists to achieve any 
worthwhile form of legitimacy for their views, when such views run contrary 
to historically and politically orthodox worldviews.  Hence the crucial role 
that white revisionists have to play within the white-pride organisation.  
White revisionists perform the task of offering "both a new interpretation of 
the Bible and a new account of historical events connected with migration 
patterns that populated Europe and the British Isles" (Barkun, 1997:245).98
                                            
 
  
Ostensibly then, for white nationalists, ethnicity is a concept that 
influences nationalist objectives, as much through collective mindsets as 
through collective actions.  White revisionists are therefore key figures in 
98 Barkun (1997) was referring mainly to early British-Israelism revisionists here, although 
contemporary white revisionists also undertake the same tasks.  Contemporary white 
revisionists also occupy themselves with modifying and discrediting commonly accepted 
versions of historical figures and events (Nazi Germany and the Holocaust are prime 
targets).  As well, revisionists have recently turned their attention toward questioning 
statistical data relating to things like socio-economic levels, crime figures and job 
opportunities as they correspond to racial groupings.  In short, white revisionists are 
trying to justify white pride in biblical terms, rewrite history in literary terms and 
reconstitute ethnic disadvantage in socio-political terms. 
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the movement as they offer forth alternative histories, ideologies and facts 
to the status quo.  This affords the organisation some hope, at least, of 
permeating these mindsets and increasing their share of the overall 
political market. 
 
Revisiting the classics 
 We can see from the aforementioned example that primordial 
approaches to nationalism remain persistent despite being consistently out 
of favour.  For many scholars of nationalism, however, the primordial 
approach is good for little more than novelty value, with most attention 
being afforded to the pre-industrial and industrial strands of the debate.  
This leads us back to the classics, where nationalism played a part in the 
early development of the sociology discipline, but did so in a manner that 
was seldom made obvious by the discipline's primary practitioners.  To 
use the words of McCrone, this was due "in part because the discipline 
grew up with another agenda, namely to explain the Great Transformation 
from pre-industrial, pre-modern to industrial, modern society, and to 
develop a more general theory of 'society'" (1998:17). 
 On the surface, the 'founders' of sociology appeared to largely ignore 
the concept of nationalism in their ideologies (Smith, 1983:19).  This is 
very misleading, however, given that Karl Marx saw nationalism as an 
obstacle to his greatly desired vision of a "worldwide community of 
workers", ensuring that the concept was never far from the centre of his 
thoughts (McCrone, 1998:17).  In actual fact, Marx (along with Engels) 
was one of the first commentators to write of nationalism as constituting an 
exclusive rather than inclusive phenomenon, as his famous "(t)he working 
men have no country" claim all too clearly emphasised (Marx & Engels, 
1967:102).   
 There is little doubt that Marx was opposed to nationalism on account 
of its capacity for privileging the claims and aims of the bourgeoisie over 
the proletariat.  It is ironic therefore, that Marx's ideologies should have 
found support from twentieth century nationalist movements that were 
intent on pursuing objectives that would have been anathema to him: 
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The combination of Marxism and underdevelopment has 
created political problems, and particularly a tendency to 
authoritarian government, that bear little relation to Marx's 
own conceptions.  For Marx, communism would be the 
inheritor of all the positive tendencies inherent in Western 
capitalism, particularly its political liberties (albeit very 
partial) and its economic wealth.  It is difficult, therefore, to 
see much connection between Third World socialism or 
Chinese communism and the ideas of Marx.  In many 
developing countries a version of Marxism combined with 
nationalism serves as little more than an ideology to 
encourage mass participation in the modernization 
process (McLellan, 1983:10-11). 
 
Essentially then, Marx's long ago dread of nationalism coming to serve the 
express needs of the capitalist elite via its overseeing role in broad market 
expansion has been unmistakably realised (Marx & Engels, 1967:37).  If 
anything, Marx's worst fears to this end have only been exceeded, with 
late twentieth century global initiatives restricting the available 
opportunities for many Western workers, whilst simultaneously crushing 
their counterparts in underdeveloped countries under the weight of 
oppressive conditions and pitiful wages.  He may have taken some 
consolation, however, from the manner in which some contemporary 
workers (and work bodies) are employing cyberspatial media to combat 
capitalism and preserve their ever-diminishing wages and conditions.99
 The second of sociology's canonised figures, Emile Durkheim, also 
dealt with the concept via his concern for the capacity of nationalism to 
replace religion as the key arbiter of power and cohesion within the 
broader political community (McCrone, 1998:18).  Durkheim was earlier 
than most to gauge the impending decline of religious control over the 
state, not that this prospect troubled him as he: 
   
 
maintained that it was of no consequence whether what 
was celebrated was the life of Christ or the life of the 
nation.  The best example that he provided of a society 
setting itself up as a god or creating new god(s) was his 
own country in the three years immediately after 1789.  
                                            
 
99 'Workers World' [http://www.workers.org] is arguably the most prominent left-wing web 
site on the Internet, regularly appearing among the top 1% of the most accessed sites on 
the WWW.  A considerable number of alternative sites and forums also exist on the 
WWW around the topic of "Workers Unite". 
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What occurred at the time was the sacralization of the 
secular (and particularly of the idea of the nation) 
(Llobera, 1994:137). 
 
Society thus worked to assure cohesion among the social blocs that 
constituted it by assuming the role of 'God', wherein the state laid down 
laws for the people to adhere to as a means of maintaining control, order, 
and morality.  For Durkheim this was the positive aspect of the state given 
that individuals paradoxically needed firmly articulated social restrictions 
and controls (over the entire population) in order to be able to achieve a 
degree of freedom over their own activities (Durkheim, 1986:50).100
 In essence, this is practical nationalism in its domestic guise, 
whereby citizens form their understandings of collective self via state 
apparatus and policy and are, for the most part, content to devote 
themselves to this strand of ideology in order to maintain ontological 
awareness and social harmony.  Durkheim was, however, fearful that the 
internal sanctity of nationalism was in danger of being overshadowed by 
the external crises of war, and the "morbid patriotism" that such crises 
engendered in modern states.  The nationalism prevalent in displays of 
morbid patriotism was "only exhibited in forms of collective action directed 
to the world without [meaning that citizens] could only show loyalty to 
[their] own patriotic or national group at times when it is at strife with some 
other group" (1986:204).  This view carried considerable prescience in that 
Western citizens throughout much of the twentieth century were, by and 
large, too preoccupied with individualistic pursuits to be concerned by 
nationalist sentiment outside of their nation's participation in sporting 
contests and war engagements.  
   
                                            
100 Giddens notion of the duality of structure can be seen to borrow from Durkheim’s 
perception of the individual and state, even if the link here may seem decidedly oblique.  
This point is supported by Jones who writes that “(T)he significance of Durkheim’s 
rejection of the state as a ‘transcendent being’, superior to individuals, is evident in his 
treatment of the issue of rights.  He rejects the moral consequences of this type of social 
and political realism, and repudiates the idea of a ‘reason of state’ and the ‘false 
antagonism’ between the individual and the state; indeed, the moral role of the state and 
the constitution of individuality imply each other.  He argues that when the role of the 
state as fostering individualities is recognized, then the state can grow without 
diminishing the individual (2001:175).  In this statement we can see the seed of Giddens 
later standpoint that decried the notion of the state (and the structures that constituted it) 
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 Durkheim's disdain for external nationalism was clear enough, but his 
writings only hint at the probability that he adopted an industrial stand on 
the concept.  Marx' pre-industrial stance on the subject was decidedly 
more lucid, although Durkheim's take on internal nationalism has proven 
equally apposite to contemporary developments.  This is highlighted by 
the 'back to the future' approach of some fundamentalist Christian 
movements during the twentieth century, where religious nationalism 
arose in opposition to the modernist nationalisms and their inherent 
predilection for: secular law, intellectual scepticism and individual moral 
choice (Juergensmeyer, 1997:1).  For these movements, state control has 
deviated too sharply from the firm moral framework that was bequeathed it 
by prior religious autocracy, meaning that theocratic rule is once again 
required to deliver contemporary citizens from the vice, greed and 
corruption inherent in highly individualistic liberal states. 
  To some extent, this desire for a return to religious ideological power 
is reminiscent of similar longings [as expressed in Chapter Four] for a 
return to highly romanticised pre-industrial forms of community. 
Essentially, group identity, in its pre-industrial guise, rarely operated 
outside of set religious conventions, which was comforting for individuals 
within these groups in so much as it provided them with a precise sense of 
who they were, why they were, and what they could and could not do.   
 This 'precise' sense of self was not realised in the philosophical 
sense that is of particular concern to individuals in the present day, but 
rather in the practical sense.  There was no overwhelming need for 
individuals to know their place in the broader celestial scheme of things, 
so long as they were comfortable with their position in the everyday world.  
Religious rule was more than adequately tailored to meet this need.  When 
religion and the state were effectively indistinguishable from one another 
in political terms, individuals were confidently aware of their place in the 
overall chain of command.  One was ultimately answerable and 
subordinate to God, who in turn delegated his supreme power through the 
auspices of his chosen representatives on Earth.  These representatives 
                                                                                                                       
as an all-powerful entity that was superior to the sum of its parts and, thus, unable to be 
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existed largely on a clearly articulated sliding scale that began with the 
monarch, and moved down through the clergy, nobility, vassals, and so 
forth (Marx & Engels, 1967:80; Anderson, 1991:Chapter 1).  
  With the eventual switch (in many regions) from religious-based 
political power to secular alternatives, such comfort was inevitably eroded 
with the gradual bureaucratisation and specialisation of group dynamics, 
along with political chains of command. This served to reify the links 
between individual identity—or at least, perceptions of it—and nationalism 
by presenting the latter concept as a broad extension of practical human 
thinking as it necessarily develops from the micro-level.  The problem was 
that although the needs and obligations of individuals were now to varying 
degrees fashioning the structure and operations of state institutions, the 
processes by which such fashioning was taking place had become 
decidedly opaque.  In simple terms, the chain of command had grown 
unwieldy through the presence of too many links, causing considerable 
uncertainty and angst to citizens who were now no longer certain as to 
their own place in the chain and whom they were answerable to at any 
given time. At such time some individuals became uncertain as to the 
ontological security of their particular sense of self; calling into question 
contemporary attempts to privilege instances of identity disjuncture as 
phenomena that is unique to the online realm. 
 The significance of nationalism was by no means lost on Max Weber 
either.  Weber perceived of "the state [as] essentially a political instrument, 
but one which both requires a distinctive ideology, and is required in turn 
to make its protection its main aim" (McCrone, 1998:21).  The place of the 
individual in the context of this perspective is not openly apparent, 
although the emphasis that is placed upon the "distinctive ideology" 
component of nation building indirectly pays homage to micro-level 
concerns.  It is difficult to imagine any nation finding success in 
constructing a superable version of national identity were it not to reflect, 
even at an abstract level, the projected hopes and needs of a significant 
majority of its people.   
                                                                                                                       
shaped (beyond its initial construction) by individual action and interaction. 
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 The use of the term 'majority' here returns the discussion to notions 
of inclusivity and exclusivity, as Weber himself indicates in writing: 
 
If the concept of "nation" can in any way be defined 
unambiguously, it certainly cannot be stated in terms of 
empirical qualities common to those who count as 
members of the nation.  In the sense of those using the 
term at a given time, the concept undoubtedly means, 
above all, that it is proper to expect from certain groups a 
specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups 
(1978:922; italics in original). 
 
As was the case with both Marx and Durkheim, Weber also speaks of the 
impact that nationalism can have on its adherents.  As he saw it, a central 
tenet of nationalist ideology related to the careful control of violence 
wherein it was strongly discouraged at the domestic level, yet openly 
legitimated (when convenient) for deployment against other nations.  The 
thinking behind this was that individuals were naturally prone to acts of 
violence, thus if the state could control how and against whom this 
violence was perpetrated, then it could satisfy this basic human need and 
its own territorial ambitions at the same time (Weber, 1978:904-905).101
 For Weber, the successful realisation of nationalist objectives were 
implicitly dependent on their acceptance at the micro-level, given that a 
"nation [only] exists where people believe themselves to be one" 
(Beetham, 1985:122).  This presupposed that individuals were significantly 
comfortable with their place in the overall scheme of things to feel affinity 
to the state and to accept its governance uncomplainingly.  Such 
  In 
simple terms, the individual had to hope that their preferences were 
popular enough to be adopted by the nation-builders and that, following on 
from this, the nation-builders would not subtly reconstitute the features of 
such preferences in a manner that may ultimately work against them. 
                                            
 
101 It is here that Weber also speaks of primordial human characteristics, while at the 
same time being careful to remove resultant political processes and initiatives from strict 
primordial explanations for their being.  For example, on page 904 of Economy and 
society he writes - "Violent social action is obviously something absolutely primordial.  
Every group, from the household to the political party, has always resorted to physical 
violence when it had to protect the interests of its members and was capable of doing so.  
However, the monopolization of legitimate violence by the political-territorial association 
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acceptance, according to Weber, was impeded by the state inception of 
bureaucratic administration, which subordinated individuals to specialised 
divisions of labour and rationalised spheres of social existence.  
Bureaucracy, as he saw it, created a "new iron cage of serfdom" that 
served to dehumanise life for many individuals (Swingewood, 1991:186).  
With this in mind, it is probable that he would have approved of online 
patriotism as an effective means for current day citizens to bypass 
bureaucratic impediments in order to actively shape and influence, albeit  
often minutely, the more intricate affairs of state.   
 
'Pre-industrial' versus 'industrial' 
 The preceding discussion on sociology's canons is important 
insomuch as it casts fresh light on the role that nationalism played in 
shaping and influencing their seminal views on broader sociological 
issues.  These perspectives on nationalism were decidedly oblique in 
scope, however, meaning that the founders' views on the concept have all 
too often been overlooked by social researchers.  Such oversights have 
inadvertently supported assertions that nationalism is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, even though most industrial views on the concept work from 
a point of origin that clearly precede the writings of Marx and his 
contemporaries.  The industrial argument most commonly contends "that 
nationalism as a political doctrine did not exist before the eighteenth 
century and that the rise of nationalist movements coincides with the 
development of nation-states in Europe after the Napoleonic period" 
(Abercrombie et al. 1994: 276). 
 Sociology, whether by accident or design, has approached the 
historical development of societies in a fashion that keenly privileges key 
events as basic stimuli for a range of wider social concepts, ideologies and 
institutions.  In keeping with this approach, nationalism is commonly 
perceived of as a prerequisite for, or result of, industrialisation and 
capitalism (as derived from the onset of the Industrial Revolution), despite 
it having come before the inception of both of these movements 
                                                                                                                       
and its rational consociation into an institutional order is nothing primordial, but a product 
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(Greenfeld, 1996).  Similarly, some also suggest that modern nationalism 
had its genesis in the French Revolution, which resulted in other countries 
being greatly influenced by the French success in creating "an organic 
relationship between the language, the culture, and the state" (Crick, 
1993:78). 
 Crick's comments are in keeping with the definition of nationalism 
that was put forward by Smith, who explains the term as being descriptive 
of "a named human population which shares myths and memories, a mass 
public culture, a designated homeland, economic unity and equal rights 
and duties for all members" (1995:56-57).  The probability of each of these 
elements being adequately engendered in a nation has, to a large extent, 
depended upon the nation's members sharing a common understanding of 
language.  This last sentence has been very carefully worded so as not to 
give the mistaken impression that shared language, in and of itself, is an 
essential requirement of modern nationalism.   
 Nor can language be put forward as the primary distinguishing 
feature of nationalism, as Hobsbawm explains in writing that: 
 
No doubt Mandarin tied together a vast Chinese empire 
many of whose peoples could not understand each 
other's language, but it did not do so directly through 
language, but through the administration of a centralized 
empire which happened to operate through a common set 
of ideographs and a means of elite communication 
(1990:62). 
 
Hobsbawm is effectively articulating his opinion that even in instances 
where widespread language comprehension is lacking, a viable nation can 
still be realised provided that strongly articulated centralisation structures 
are in place.  There is certainly merit in this view, given that innumerable 
examples exist of citizens residing within an established nationalist 
structure despite having a superficial (at best) grasp of the preferred form 
of dialect.  Of course, communication competency skills should not be 
undervalued on account of their capacity for enabling individuals greater 
and deeper participation in broader nationalist initiatives. 
                                                                                                                       
of evolution." 
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 Structuration theory is again useful at this point, as it provides 
support for the above-mentioned contention on three differing platforms.  
In the first instance, this support stems from the notion of 'mutual 
knowledge', which Cohen defines as "knowledge that is shared by all who 
are competent to engage in or recognise the appropriate performance of a 
social practice or range of practices" (1989:27).  The echoes of Goffman's 
notions of role-playing are unmistakable here, although Giddens clearly 
looks upon this knowledge process as an open, rather than hidden one. 
 In the second instance, we can see that language, as it pertains to 
notions of 'ontological security', can markedly impact upon the level of 
feeling and confidence that an individual invests in nationalist sentiment 
(Kaspersen, 2000:136).  Ontological security derives explicitly from 'mutual 
knowledge', and is realised when the latter element is sufficiently 
internalised by the individual to allow for the sustenance "of a cognitively 
ordered world of self and other, and the maintenance of an 'effective' order 
of want management" (Giddens, 1976:118).  An inability, on the part of an 
individual, to attain ontological security usually results in exclusion from 
mainstream society and severe disjuncture of identity.  In some cases it 
can also lead to occurrences of anomie, as Cohen explains: 
 
But where agents experience instabilities in their 
routinised activities and social relations, the 'givenness' of 
social life is necessarily disrupted.  These disruptions are 
experienced as insecurities or anxieties, and these 
psychic tensions can lead agents to develop an interest in 
participation in conflict, or to be 'mobilised' for 
participation in organised movements which engage in 
conflict (1989:270; italics have been added). 
 
The rise of religious-based and neo-nationalisms is often instigated by 
inadequacy over matters of ontological security at the meso-level.  
Language is only one of several cultural elements that can inspire 
ontological insecurity in societies, but it is certainly one of the most telling 
qualifiers of inclusion and exclusion insofar as notions of nationalism are 
concerned. 
 In the third instance, comprehension of language proves integral to 
an individual's (and group's) prospects of gaining knowledge of, and 
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access to, 'authoritative resources', which are described by Cohen 
(1989:28) as "capabilities that generate command over persons" (life-
chances, spatio-temporal positioning, organisation and relations between 
human beings).  In essence, this point builds from the oft-spoken maxim 
that 'knowledge is power', and that such power is expressed and 
reinforced in the day-to-day grind of everyday society, rather than imposed 
upon citizens from higher powers at prescribed moments.  It is both a 
power that subjugates individuals and simultaneously draws from this 
subjugation: 
 
All social systems of any duration involve an 'institutional 
mediation of power'.   That is to say, domination is 
expressed in and through the institutions that represent 
the most deeply embedded continuities of social life.  But 
in the context of any collectivity, association, or 
organization, domination is expressed as modes of 
control, whereby some agents seek to achieve and 
maintain the compliance of others (Giddens, 1985:9; 
italics in original). 
 
Giddens' thoughts bring added meaning to the nationalism debate in that 
they serve to portray the concept as encompassing a form of ideology that 
is as much concerned with expressions of internal (domestic) power as it 
is with external ones (Giddens, 1985:119-121; Calhoun, 1997:19-20; 
McCrone, 1998:98).  As such, any suggestion that nationalism is 
crumbling under global forces, may tend to underestimate the resilience of 
national power hierarchies as they strive to reinforce control over their 
domestic territories. 
 The right of control over authoritative resources at the domestic level 
does not, in and of itself, result in favourable financial advantages for 
those in control.  What it does tend to lead to, however, is subsequent 
sovereignty over 'allocative resources', which are the material resources 
involved in the generation of power, including the natural environment and 
physical artifacts (Kaspersen, 2000:68-71).  As Giddens himself states - 
"(O)nly with such an extension of authoritative resources does it become 
possible to concentrate the allocative resources upon which a flourishing 
modern economy depends" (1985:256). Localised control is thus 
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inextricably linked to notions of economic advantage, which makes 
exclusive forms of nationalist sentiment well worth perpetuating for those 
in power. 
 Language is indeed a significant element in so far as discussions on 
nationalism are concerned, mainly due to the power structures that it helps 
to initiate and articulate.  Such power structures are not only applicable to 
the individual and domestic groups, however, as economic stresses force 
smaller nations into conforming to the needs and standards of larger ones.  
During the twentieth century, many smaller European countries found 
themselves pressured into adopting the English language and American 
work practices in order to survive and partake in the booming US-driven 
global economy.  This led to the subsequent decline or extinction of some 
ethnic languages and cultural practices (Eriksen, 1993:140).  There is 
evidence to suggest that similar practices are at work (albeit on an 
individual scale) in the current day, whereby netizens are being compelled 
to adopt the English language in order to participate broadly on the US-
driven WWW.102
 The elements of language and power are commonly associated with 
industrial approaches to nationalism.  Liah Greenfeld opposes these 
approaches, expressing dissatisfaction with established dichotomous 
explanations of society and rejecting the notion that industrialisation lies at 
the core of modern society, suggesting instead that nationalism is more 
befitting of this honour: 
   
 
nationalism, while it did not determine the nature of the 
modern economic system, has undoubtedly contributed to 
the development of its chief component: 
industrialization…  In England, the birthplace of 
industrialization as well as nationalism, nationalism 
changed the criteria of human dignity and thus combined 
with Protestantism in making economic activity 
respectable…  Economic exploits were also interpreted as 
a service to the nation.  The growth of the English 
                                            
 
102 This is indicative of the present state of the WWW, but it does not necessarily mean 
that the situation is beyond the boundaries of change in future.  Spanish-speaking 
Americans have long been the staunchest opponents of the United States' insistence on 
English language use (in real-life), so they may continue this defiance as their 
participation on online fora increases (Eriksen, 1993:142). 
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economy in the century and a half preceding the onset of 
the industrial revolution would be impossible without the 
respect enjoyed by the merchant classes, which, with a 
few exceptions such as Holland, was unknown at the time 
to merchants anywhere else.  In England, as elsewhere, 
nationalism redefined social stratification and justified 
occupational mobility, which was another indispensable 
condition for rapid economic growth.  Through its 
encouragement of science it was also partly responsible 
for adding to the process an essential technological 
dimension (1996:12). 
 
For Greenfeld, the origins of nationalism can be traced back to sixteenth 
century England, when the first noticeable signs of individual 
empowerment, in the political sense, became apparent (1993:6).  Until this 
point in history, the concept of nation was seen as solely the preserve of 
the elite, meaning that the 'common' folk were seen as being separate 
from the concept, in physical, ideological, and economic terms.  In the 
sixteenth century this meaning was changed so as to refer to the more 
general notion of 'people', simultaneously divesting the word nation of its 
elite status, reasserting the word 'people' as a positive entity, and 
encouraging a level of political solidarity that was essentially country-wide 
(Greenfeld, 1993: 6-7).  In this way nationalism essentially evolved as a 
vehicle for upward mobility, although it necessarily depended on the elite 
coming to recognise that their privileged positions in society would be 
under threat if they refused to find some common ideological ground to 
share with the 'common' people.  
 Eriksen believes that this occurrence set in stone a basic pro forma 
for subsequent nationalisms that invariably begin as "urban elite" 
phenomena before gradually permeating the broader society as a whole 
(1993:105).  Nationalism is not a static ideology, however, and it 
constantly requires new initiatives, processes, and strands of thinking in 
order to stay fresh and meaningful.  Perhaps the recent rise of online 
activism can be seen as an attempt to shake-up established nationalist 
thought, as concerned netizens attempt to change societal thinking (by 
degrees) from the lower levels up. 
 As a final point, some industrial interpretations of nationalism rely 
overwhelmingly on 'invented traditions' in their construction.  Alluding so 
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fervently to the past in attempts to explain the present is misguided, 
however, given that greater than half of all existing 'official' states (circa 
1990) were less than forty years old (Hobsbawm, 1990:171).  The vernal 
nature of these nations can nevertheless be misleading, given the rich 
traditions and histories that compel the inhabitants of such states to fight 
for an equitable place in the burgeoning new world order.  This point is 
colourfully emphasised by Gellner who uses 'navels' as a metaphor for 
'traditional' forms of nationalism.  As he sees it, the navel is the most 
telling birthmark that an entity can be endowed with; providing its owner 
with both the comfort of being part of a lineage, as well as the confidence 
that comes from being somehow 'unique'.  The inference here is that to not 
have a navel is to be either a clone or an inferior copy, hence the need for 
certain nationalist movements to stress the length and durability of their 
origins.  To have an ancient or long acknowledged past affords a nation 
considerable respect and privilege, whereas fresh nations formed from the 
collapse and/or restructuring of other states need to work harder in order 
to earn such respect (1997:101). 
 The notion of traditionally informed nationalism, regardless of its 
merit to the wider nationalism debate, is of significant import to this study 
on account of its regular employment by white nationalists.  The white 
power movement, despite priding itself on incorporating a progressive 
approach to political reform, tends to devote considerable energy to the 
task of seeking inspiration from the past.  Revisionists within the 
movement are constantly putting forward information that glorifies bygone 
ancient, medieval and colonial white nations while, at the same time, 
rewriting history so as to absolve these nations of wrongdoings against 
non-white peoples (Thompson, 2001:33).  In this way, the white pride 
movement is able to use tradition as a source of comfort and inspiration 
that compensates for the lack of direction, support and political legitimacy 
that characterises the organisation in the present.  This firm adherence to 
tradition also manifests itself in the movement through the adoption and 
usage of symbols and tribal practices as a means of providing white 
nationalists with a singular form of common identity.  This point was dealt 
with in greater depth in the previous chapter. 
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Imagined communities 
 Benedict Anderson is one of the most prominent proponents of the 
nationalism concept in its contemporary form.  His celebrated notion of 
"imagined communities" was referred to in Chapters Four and Five 
concerning community, although it is more commonly applicable to 
discussions on nationalist sentiment.  Anderson's ideas are pivotal to the 
theme of this thesis in that they depict bodies of nationalism as 
encompassing extensions of the community concept, whilst also stressing 
that nationalist thought is most tellingly formulated and constituted at the 
micro-level. 
 Anderson, unlike Greenfeld, thinks that nationalism arose in the 
eighteenth century, at the same time that "fundamental cultural 
conceptions" began to recede from societal dominance: 
 
The first of these was the idea that a particular script-
language offered privileged access to ontological truth, 
precisely because it was an inseparable part of that 
truth…  Second was the belief that society was naturally 
organized around and under high centres — monarchs 
who were persons apart from other human beings and 
who ruled by some form of cosmological (divine) 
dispensation…  Third was a conception of temporality in 
which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the 
origins of the world and of men essentially identical 
(1991:36). 
 
It is interesting that Anderson should echo the ideas of modernist thinkers 
such as Durkheim and adopt a similar functionalist stance by contending 
that nationalism grew directly out of the vacuum that arose with the decline 
of religious autocracy. Of even greater interest still, however, is the 
manner in which Anderson subtly connects modern nationalist sentiment 
to seemingly disparate aspects of individual thought by outlining the need 
(among citizens) for new ways of situating themselves within society 
following the loss of long ingrained, religiously mediated forms of social 
identification. 
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 As alluded to earlier, nationalism is a significant means by which 
countries can—ideologically, at least—override prescribed class 
boundaries (Eriksen, 1993:102).  In this way, the viability of a nation rests 
unerringly on its ability to create "a socially integrated body" united around 
commonly held perceptions of "a singular identity" (Calhoun, 1997:77).  
For this "singular identity" to be viably achieved, it becomes necessary for 
states to furnish initiatives that assist citizens in believing that their nation 
demonstrates "the possession of a unique, authentic and adequate 
cultural heritage and ethnic past, one which will bear comparison with 
those of other nations" (Smith, 1995:67).  As well as this, the state must 
also be able to present its peculiar strand of nation in a manner that 
ensures that most, if not all, citizens feel as if they are contributing to its 
development and perpetuation in some quantifiable way.   
 The need for states to present themselves internally and externally 
as unique entities is not new as in past times "all great classical 
communities perceived of themselves as being cosmically central" 
(Anderson, 1991:13). In such times, external projections of civilisational 
identity were exponentially more crucial for states than internal ones, given 
the carefully pre-ordained nature of individual identity and the knowledge 
that citizens had of the place of themselves and others in the social 
hierarchy.  As societies have grown more dispersed and specialised in 
recent times, however, it has become necessary for the connections that 
bind society together to be imagined by citizens: 
 
imagined because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion (Anderson, 1991:6, italics 
in original). 
 
The need for citizens to cerebrally embrace these images of communion 
and for states to successfully facilitate them is evidenced by McCrone's 
assertion that "The state constitutes society as well as being constituted 
by it" (1998:92).  This statement not only serves to summarise the desired 
outcome of Anderson's process of imagining, but it also pithily reiterates 
structuration theory's central tenet of human agency and social structure 
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co-existing together in a relationship of mutual dependency (Giddens, 
1984:25).  Put simply, the state is made up of human actors. 
 The process of imagining community also expands out to indirectly 
account for the preoccupation with symbolism that is prevalent in many 
expressions of nationalist sentiment.  Anthony Cohen expounds on this 
idea further in writing of how: 
 
Community exists in the minds of its members, and 
should not be confused with geographic or sociographic 
assertions of 'fact'.  By extension, the distinctiveness of 
communities and, thus, the reality of their boundaries, 
similarly lies in the mind, in the meanings which people 
attach to them, not in their structural forms.  As we have 
seen, this reality of community is expressed and 
embellished symbolically (1985:98). 
 
These symbols are of paramount significance to nations as they shape 
and define boundaries and provide recognisable pathways for shared 
senses of purpose and direction.  They are also conveniently flexible, 
ensuring that they can thus be easily adapted to fit specific purposes as 
they unexpectedly arise (Smith, 1995:31).   
 Such symbolism is expressed in a variety of ways, although in 
contemporary times the most common mode employed is through the 
media.  The sharing of lives via the broadcasting and transmission of 
domestically orientated media vehicles aids the ground-up creation and 
sustenance of nations through cultivating a climate of shared anonymity 
(Anderson, 1991:36). As Anderson sees it, citizens gain an enormous 
sense of quiet confidence through knowing that fellow citizens are 
absorbing and accessing the same material as they are in newspapers, 
radio programs, television shows, and so on.  Similar instances of shared 
symbolism within nations can be found in devotion to flag, national anthem 
and geographical silhouette (McCrone, 1998:41).  
 This last aspect has become so routinely internalised within countries 
that it is rarely considered in a concrete sense.  Maps are by no means a 
new innovation, but their employment by states in the pursuit of national 
solidarity is a decidedly recent occurrence.  The presence of maps and 
globes in educational settings has been a very deliberate modern initiative, 
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the result being that practically all intellectually capable, adequately 
educated citizens can recognise the geographical silhouette of their 
particular nation on a map, atlas or globe.  This, of course, has 
considerable repercussions for people such as the Kurds who do not 
inhabit a set geographical location that is (politically) considered to be their 
own.103
  Most expressions of national symbolism are neither truly original 
nor unambiguously unique to the nation incorporating them, although there 
can be benefits for nations who are first to inaugurate them.  England was 
the first country to invent postage stamps and, in line with this, was also 
the first country to use them as a nationalist marker.  With regard to its 
fellow British countries, England was able to produce commemorative 
stamps that did not openly include written reference to England at all 
(McCrone, 1998:48).  This capability is mirrored by contemporary USA, 
with its people, institutions, and corporations being able to colonise the 
WWW free of national domain referents, simply because their scientists 
were responsible for initially creating the environment.   
  It also raises interesting questions in relation to white nationalists 
and their pursuit of states that are not clearly delineated in the 
cartographic sense.   
 Following on from this, we have seen symbolic nationalism 
commonly expressed throughout history in metaphoric kinship terms, as 
exemplified during the great wars of the twentieth century104
                                            
103 Kurdistan is recognised by some nation-states, but NOT by the USA or the UN.  
 when 
opposing nations would identify their allegiances to either the 'mother 
country' of England or the 'fatherland' of Germany (Eriksen, 1993:108).   
These terms have clearly been decreasing in popularity in recent decades 
and are unlikely to undergo a renaissance in the virtual realm, given that 
the United States offers the only articulation of both entities in this context.  
Nationalism, as an imagined community, also shares ideological ground 
with virtual communities in that they both evoke distinct metaphorical 
qualities.  Each entity has had the propensity to challenge traditional 
representations of religious ideology: nationalism by symbolising the 
concept of nation "as a sacred community"; and online communities by 
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allowing netizens to operate in defiance of temporal and physical 
restrictions, effectively placing them outside of God's will (Eriksen, 1993: 
107). 
  
Globalism vs localism 
 In contemporary times, the lion's share of discussion over the 
concept of nationalism has centred upon questions of its viability and 
whether or not it has been superseded by 'globalisation'. In sociological 
terms, globalisation refers to economic, cultural and political processes 
that operate and impact at a global level in defiance of set national borders 
and qualifiers (Abercrombie et al. 1994:184).  Globalisation, as a term, is a 
relatively fresh one, although some would readily argue the true age of the 
concept itself: 
 
Marx and Engels were not the only 19th century social 
observers to perceive and anticipate the importance of 
global themes…  Marx's immediate 19th-century 
forebears, Saint-Simon and Comte, had both advanced 
views of social science as an element in the unification of 
humanity.  For Saint-Simon, science and industrialization 
reflected the same logic of advancing internationalism and 
interconnection between nations (Holton, 1998:22). 
 
As with Nationalism, the act of definitively assigning a birthdate to the 
concept of globalisation is only likely to be met with a range of possible 
alternatives.105
                                                                                                                       
104 I am referring here to World War One and World War Two. 
  This study has no interest in assigning an age to 
globalisation at any rate, preferring instead to build upon the contention 
that globalisation is not leading to the death of nationalism, but rather it is 
leading to "the creation or strengthening of local identities, as well as to 
the emergence of strong counter-ethnicities" (McCrone, 1998:35). 
 
105 Pieterse (1995) offers up five different perspectives on this issue from five different 
theorists.  Karl Marx saw globalisation arising during the 1500s in line with the onset of 
modern capitalism.  Immanuelle Wallerstein also used 1500 as a starting date in keeping 
with his writings on the modern world-system.  Roland Robertson, conversely, looked 
upon globalisation as a multidimensional entity that encompassed two distinct phases; 
the first beginning in 1500 and the second occurring between 1870 and 1920.  Giddens, 
by way of contrast, presupposes that globalisation is a modern entity, arising during the 
1800s; whereas Tomlinson prefers to run with the 1960s on account of his predilection for 
the theory of cultural planetization. 
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 In recent decades, the ideology of nationalism, as practiced in 
Western nations, has been largely tied to economic developments and 
pursuits as individual countries have endeavoured to best position 
themselves in a global network driven by ever expanding market forces.   
The potency apparent in these burgeoning market forces has led some 
social commentators to presuppose the demise of nationalism as an entity 
of any firm substance (Hockenberry, 1998; Marx, 1997; Wallerstein, 1976).  
For Hockenberry, this process has been hastened by the seemingly 
irresistible processes of technological innovation that have characterised 
Western political and economic development since the 1950s.  As he sees 
it, these processes have resulted in the creation of information and 
communications technologies that exceed the capacity of independent 
nations to properly administer and police their use and potential 
(1998:264).  Marx, although adopting a less technologically-determinist 
stance on the issue, also predicts a bleak future for traditional nation-
states as contemporary responses to information and communication 
media threaten established political, temporal, geographical and personal 
borders (1997:485-491).  These writers continue a line of thought originally 
articulated by Marshall McLuhan (1994) and Immanuel Wallerstein (1976) 
during the 1960s and 1970s; when the first clear indications arose of a 
world interconnected in space and time by highly developed media 
innovations. 
 The fresh links forged by these ever expanding fiscal and media 
interests have clearly helped to alter political climates across the globe.  
This has resulted in fears that Western culture is being homogenised 
(predominantly along American lines), but this view would appear to 
underestimate the resilience of localised responses to globalised 
initiatives.  Some writers (Barwell & Bowles, 2000; Castells, 1997; 
Everard, 2000; Hakken, 1999; Miller & Slater, 2000; Mitra, 1997) have—in 
varying ways—been diligent in recognising the significance of these 
reactions to global machinations; broaching ideas that have helped to 
ensure the viability of nationalism as a study sphere within the broader 
cyberspatial research agenda. 
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 While McLuhan’s (1994) long ago vision of a media-inspired “global 
village” has been realised, to some extent, through the rise of large media 
conglomerates and their relentless push for extensive pay and cable TV 
audiences.  Anandra Mitra tells of how some countries have become 
adept at using television for nationalist purposes: 
 
Given the fact that such mass media are produced by 
groups with specific interests, there is some ideological 
work to be done and the hegemonic tendency is to 
produce one particular closure over others...  [For 
example] the Indian state-owned television system had a 
particular Hindu image that it was trying to portray through 
an array of texts.  In a similar fashion it is possible to 
identify a specific colonial/oriental/neo-colonial image that 
has been produced in literary texts and movies [from 
other regions] (1997:74). 
 
The state control of principal media outlets in a host of present day nations 
(mainly in Asian regions) ensures that the interests of these nations 
remain paramount in defiance of cultural-colonialist overtures from the 
West.  Nationalism is thus intricately associated with notions of power as 
Western countries seek to improve their economic strength through 
expansion into foreign markets.  Similarly, Eastern countries, although not 
entirely removed from market maneuverings, try to consolidate political 
control over their dominions by setting unambiguous (albeit subtle) 
constraints on the domestic social agenda.  Human actors are ostensibly 
vulnerable to the vagaries inherent in the culture to which they choose to 
identify and it is for this reason that the proponents of both nationalism and 
capitalism invest substantial energy and resources in attempting to 
permeate these cultures. 
 Globalisation, in the economic sense, is enabling corporations to 
extend their market reach, but technological advances are, at the same 
time, permitting political bodies and movements (non-governmental) to 
monitor their progress and, to varying degrees, keep them in check 
(Giddens, 1998:49-50).  For the most part, this is a largely positive 
development, but it does open the door to covert occurrences of global 
crime: 
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The technological and organizational opportunity to set up 
global networks has transformed, and empowered, 
organized crime.  For a long time, its fundamental 
strategy was to penetrate national and local state 
institutions in its home country, in order to protect its 
activities…  However, in recent times, globalization has 
added a decisive twist to the institutional strategy of 
organized crime… the high mobility and extreme flexibility 
of the networks makes it possible to evade national 
regulations and the rigid procedures of international police 
cooperation (Castells, 1998:202). 
 
The WWW has been a major boon for such criminal activity, forcing 
individual nations into assessing their levels of security in response to 
'cybercrime'.  Even when crime is not a factor, it is nevertheless apparent 
that countries approach global economics from a localised perspective.  
This involves the construction of local industries and markets that are 
distinct in that they permit the country concerned to participate globally in 
a way that simultaneously strengthens its position (others want what they 
are producing) and tempers it (others have what they want).  In this way 
the global economy does not so much diminish national economies as it 
does interlink them, ensuring that recessions in some economies may 
result in similar downturns elsewhere (Jones, 1995:36). 
 With this in mind it is often in the best interests of a country to align 
itself with other countries of like interests or minds.  Economic concerns 
often drive attempts to forge regional-continental associations, as was 
best exemplified by the creation of the European Union.  At one level, 
such associations weaken the primacy of individual nationalisms by 
forcing the countries concerned to moderate their political and economic 
activities so as to conform to the needs of their partners.  On the other 
hand, however, these associations inadvertently solidify nationalist 
sentiment at the micro-level by blatantly favouring political and economic 
concerns over cultural ones (Smith, 1995:127).  At the end of the day it is 
difficult for British citizens (by way of example) to see what they are 
gaining from arcane financial imperatives with Germany, but it is 
nonetheless perfectly clear to them that they do not speak the German 
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language.106
 The relationship between individuals and the particular national 
cultures to which they have become accustomed, ensure that localised 
responses to globalisation are prolific enough to keep nationalist sentiment 
vibrant and profound.  The perceived cultural domination of the United 
States over the rest of the world (Americanisation) was once looked upon 
as the means by which the entire globe would eventually be homogenised: 
  
 
The assumption that all particularities, local cultures, 
would eventually give way under the relentless 
modernizing force of American cultural imperialism 
implied that all particularities were linked together in a 
symbolic hierarchy.  Modernization theory set the model 
into motion, with the assumption that as each non-
Western nation eventually became modernized it would 
move up the hierarchy and duplicate or absorb American 
culture, to the extent that ultimately every locality would 
display the cultural ideals, images and material artefacts 
of the American way of life (Featherstone, 1995:87). 
 
That aspects of American culture saturate the globe cannot be disputed, 
but proponents of modernization theory clearly failed to appreciate the 
capacity of ethnic groups to rally against Americanisation with exported 
tokens of their own particular cultures.  In the words of Featherstone and 
Lash — "today we can not only speak about Europeanization and 
Americanization, but also of Japanization and even Brazilianization…  The 
range of and pluralization of responses to modernity means that it may 
well be preferable to refer to global modernities" (1995:3). 
 As Calhoun and Weber inform us, the concept of nationalism is 
necessarily contested, as any attempt to espouse a singular definition of 
the term would clearly favour some societal groups at the expense of 
others (Calhoun, 1997:98; Weber, 1948:21-22).  Insofar as contemporary 
situations are concerned, technological advancements are complicating 
the ever-tenuous filiation that binds state and individual together.  For 
nation-states, territory is no longer a crucially significant notion, given that 
the ‘information age’ has switched politico-economic emphasis towards 
                                            
106 The European Union (EU) is not overtly popular with European citizens who believe 
that it lacks democracy and relevance to the individual.  Giddens thinks it is important, 
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"knowledge and competitive capability" (Giddens, 1998:140).  In line with 
this, nation-states are revisiting the notion of characterising their 
dominions as 'frontiers' rather than 'borders' due to the overlapping ties 
they create with "other regions and transnational groupings of all kinds" 
(Giddens, 1998:130).  Such actions, whether by accident or design, almost 
invariably prejudice against communities of citizens, particularly when they 
are located in 'frontiers' that are ostensibly out of sight and out of mind to 
the state responsible for their administration. 
 Giddens' reference to the 'transnational' is of particular interest in that 
it gives voice to an aspect of globalisation that is so feared by today's 
cultural pessimists (Waters, 1995:75).   Transnational companies are 
looked upon with distrust and revulsion on account of their capacity for 
achieving financial positions that exceed the gross national products of 
many smaller nation-states.  Some commentators are less impressed by 
notions of transnationalism, however, as Castells illustrates in writing that: 
 
as the process of globalization progresses, organizational 
forms evolve from multi-national enterprises to 
international networks, actually bypassing the so-called 
"transnationals" that belong more to the world of mythical 
representation (or self-serving image-making by 
management consultants) than to the institutionally 
bounded realities of the world economy (1996:192; italics 
in original). 
 
Hirst and Thompson (1996:2), who contend that empirical evidence of the 
existence of transnational corporations is minimal at best, air similar 
doubts about the legitimacy of the 'transnational' concept.  As they see it, 
the vast majority of large contemporary corporations continue to favour the 
incorporation of a headquarters located within a particular nation, meaning 
that only the trading is transnational, not the company itself.  The views of 
both Castells (1996) and Hirst and Thompson (1996) offer considerable 
support to a pro nation-state argument that has suffered considerably in 
recent times on account of 'economic globalisation' incursions into the 
broader nationalism debate. 
                                                                                                                       
however, in that it is pioneering the cause of cosmopolitan nationalism (1998:142). 
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 Economic perspectives have their place within this debate, but they 
nevertheless lack the potential to gauge the depth of feeling and impact 
that cultural influences, ethnicity in particular, have on volatile nationalist 
agendas: 
 
Nations are not monolithic entities, but are split into 
factions, ranging from extremists and terrorists to state-
allied 'unionists'.  Only rarely does a nationalist movement 
achieve majority support in its own nation for a particular 
course of action, and the state is thus able to manipulate 
the factions of the ethnic nation to its ends (Kellas, 
1998:75). 
 
The ability of the state to construct a single acceptable form of nationalism 
under which to govern is rendered a practical impossibility by the presence 
of competing ethnicities within its jurisdiction.  This is especially true of 
states whose historical development has resulted in the creation of a 
society characterised by 'internal colonisation', wherein one ethnic group 
has become the officially sanctioned nationality type at the expense of 
smaller subordinated ones (Kellas, 1998:71).  It is also only slightly less 
problematic for states such as the USA that have no officially sanctioned 
ethnic characteristics (Greenfeld, 1993:13; Hobsbawm, 1990:63) as all of 
the ethnic groups residing there are keen to ensure that their counterparts 
do not capture the socio-political high ground at their expense.  Ethnicity is 
perhaps the most exclusive of all nationalist qualifiers as it serves to deny 
membership to those who lack a common line of descent from that which 
is considered the norm (Kellas, 1998:65; Hobsbawm, 1990:63).  To be 
denied access to this line of descent by accidents of birth can have grave 
ramifications for individuals who are effectively relegated to the hidden 
fringes of the state.  This is also true for those whose descent lines are 
favourable, but whose political leanings deviate markedly from those that 
the state in question deems acceptable. 
  Cyberspatial media vehicles allow aggrieved individuals to access 
and lobby state apparatuses even when they are consigned by fate to the 
territorial fringes of the nation.  As some citizens choose to tell it, however, 
one does not necessarily have to reside on the territorial fringes of a state 
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to be adversely treated by its government.  Giddens illustrates this point 
perfectly in alluding to a 1994 American study which showed that a mere 
25% of respondents trusted the United States government to do the right 
thing by its constituents (1998:51).107
 CMC not only provides white nationalists with an environment in 
which they can coordinate activities aimed at eroding state control over 
patriot interests, but it also allows them to filter their ideologies into the 
cyberspatial mainstream.  It is in this setting that nationalism becomes less 
preoccupied with elements of politics, culture and economy, and more 
concerned with prevailing over the opposition in a war over perceptions of 
historical truth: 
  This figure is very much in keeping 
with white nationalist interpretations of government policy and the feeling, 
among white priders, that the White House is placing external interests 
before those of the American people.  In real terms, far-right movements 
(white nationalists included) have precious little presence and influence 
over political power, but they remain viable for their ability to thrust issues 
onto conventional political agendas (Giddens, 1998:52).   
 
According to Identity Christians, the truth is getting out 
because of the ingenuity of God's people.  Circumventing 
the monopoly of the Jewish-controlled media, ZOG 
[Zionist Occupationist Government] censors and FCC 
[Federal Communications Commission] restrictions, the 
message of white Israel is being disseminated via Internet 
and e-mail [and assorted] alternate routes that the media 
censors cannot control (Bushart et al. 1998:227). 
 
And yet this freedom from censor control grows ever more fragile, as world 
governments begin to reassess the sanctity that cyberspace has long held 
as the ultimate vessel of 'free speech'.  It will be absorbing to watch the 
ways in which such groups respond to governmental attempts to close 
them out of the rapidly surging online loop.  It will be equally engrossing to 
gauge the likely repercussions for other political lobby groups if the 
capacity for them to lobby state bodies is duly compromised by the same 
                                            
107 Equally as fascinating are the results of a poll held at a similar time in which 90% of 
American respondents approved of "democratically organised government" as 
implemented by the United States government (Giddens, 1998:72). 
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initiatives aimed at silencing the virtual voices of far-right activists.  
Cyberspace may not prove to be the last bastion of modern nationalist 
imperatives, but it certainly promises to be a fertile platform for the 
contestation of global versus local concerns in the short to medium-term 
future. 
 
In closing 
 The underlying raison d'être for this chapter was to lay the 
foundations for a broad explication of the sociological concept of 
nationalism as it has developed historically.  The direction of this 
explication has been necessarily abbreviated, owing to the overwhelmingly 
vast ideological terrain that the concept covers.  In keeping with the format 
of previous chapters (2 and 4), the strands of thought highlighted in this 
explication have been chosen for their capacity to inform and shape 
discussion in the ensuing chapter. 
 The definition of nationalism that is employed here will endeavour to 
highlight the centrality of the individual to the concept, which differs 
markedly from conventional definitions that position micro-level aspects in 
clear subservience to macro-level objectives.  This approach to definition 
will also be congruous to the individual-orientated theme of the thesis, 
along with the implicit human agency tone set out in Giddens' theory of 
structuration.  It also relates neatly to the consistent efforts of this chapter 
to maintain focus on the ways in which nationalist sentiment depends on, 
and is reinforced by, its success in drawing empathy from the everyday 
citizens within states.  With this in mind, the operating definition of 
nationalism made use of in Chapter Seven will be — The underlying 
assumptions and influences that motivate and give meaning to an 
individual's perceptions of his/her place in the broader political, ideological, 
cultural and economic machinations of imagined communities of state.  
The individual may not be so prominent in investigations of nationalism, as 
compared with self-identity and community, but the willingness of persons 
to openly oppose state implemented policy and infrastructure is indicative 
of the hidden impact that nationalist machinations can have at the micro-
level of society. 
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 As was the case with the definition of community formulated in 
Chapter Four, this explanation of nationalism recognises the role of 
geography in the concept's formation, but also reasserts an individual's 
right to indulge in nationalist sentiment that is independent of geographic 
restraints.  In the same way that contemporary citizens can feel part of a 
community despite being physically distanced from it, so too can 
individuals espouse support for a form of nationalism regardless of 
whether they are internally or externally based in relation to the country for 
which this nationalism is endowed.   
 Unlike Chapters Three and Five, the following chapter does not 
devote explicit page space to predefined variables, although it operates 
similarly in the sense that it explores specific themes that best position 
contemporary nationalist initiatives within the broader sphere of 
cyberspace.   The first of these themes centres upon the degree of 
commitment that netizens display toward the physical nation in which they 
reside.  In the course of our everyday lives it has become almost 
commonplace for each of us to categorise ourselves in accordance with 
the country that we live in.  For the most part, this process is enacted out 
of learned habit and, as such, scarcely registers as an action of import in 
the mind of the individual concerned.  The action itself is also often 
unconsciously removed from deep individual consideration in that it is 
commonly requested on bureaucratic paperwork administered by 
governmental agencies.108
 The somewhat blasé approach to nationalism by many Westerners 
(Calhoun, 1997:1) is further reified in real-life scenarios by the realisation 
that one is almost constantly in the presence of like others.  This is to say 
that in the general course of the everyday, an American citizen (in the 
United States) will negotiate their activities secure in the knowledge that 
they are surrounded by fellow citizens, 99% of whom are also American.  
This is indicative of 'imagined community' most simply expressed, wherein 
the individual proceeds with unstated confidence that their general 
  
                                            
108 It is exceedingly rare for governmental forms not to include a category that asks the 
individual concerned for their nationality.  The answer to this question is all too rarely 
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worldview is shared by those in their immediate surrounds.  For netizens, 
however, it is often impossible to be certain as to the nationality of the 
person with whom you are interacting, and the particular (culturally 
generated) worldviews that they may uphold.  The netizen is unsure of 
who they may find themselves interacting with online; apprehensive about 
who else may be silently watching these interactions unannounced; and 
nervous as to where the information that they are espousing may be 
finishing up in the seemingly limitless arcane world of wires.  Because of 
this, some netizens seek to withhold or distort their nationalities as a 
means of protecting their identities and activities online.  This is 
particularly true of many white nationalist Internet users, and the analysis 
of this theme attempts to reach an understanding of how netizens choose 
to portray (or withhold) their national identities from the rest of the online 
world.   
 This theme also touches upon aspects of globalisation and deals with 
the future significance that netizens are likely to attribute to their national 
identities.  As explained above, the tendency for citizens to endow 
themselves with real-life nationalist qualifiers in a seemingly blasé fashion 
stems directly from the way that cultural institutions have routinised the 
use and acceptance of such qualifiers.  It is possible then, that being 
exposed to an environment in which such routine acceptance of qualifiers 
is significantly downgraded, may lead to netizens becoming equally 
indifferent about not identifying themselves with particular nationalities.  
Conversely, it may be that online fora become central vehicles for the 
combating of global forces, leading instead to individuals identifying even 
more acutely with elements of nation.   
 The second theme of interest here, is one that expounds upon the 
notions of inclusivity and exclusivity as they apply to nationalist 
memberships.  The writings on community provided a firm sense of the 
ways in which meso-level groups are made open to some whilst, at the 
same time, closed to others.  This is no different at the macro-level and it 
is worthwhile attempting to glean a sense of the ways in which doors are 
                                                                                                                       
pertinent to the integral reason why the form is being completed in the first place, hence 
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opened and closed to netizens as they endeavour to build a viable forms 
of national identity for themselves online.  What are the qualities and 
characteristics by which people will be assessed here, and who will be 
charged with the responsibility of deciding who is in and who is out?  This 
theme is especially intriguing when addressed in relation to the white 
nationalist focus group around which the empirical aspects of this study 
have been based. 
 Religion and ethnicity are two other key thematic areas that are 
seldom too far removed from broader discussions on the concept of 
nationalism.  The steady erosion of religious practices in Western societies 
during the twentieth century, accompanied by an increased distancing of 
state policy from theocratic doctrine has also played a part in the rise of 
stateless nationalism, along with revitalised expressions of ethnic 
nationalism.  Religion is both a driving force and dividing agent for the 
white pride movement as it works toward the unlikely realisation of a 
'White Israel' utopia.  Its capacity for enabling and constraining individual 
thought and group action are touched upon here, along with the 
movement's ongoing problems with ethnic matters. 
 One of the biggest hurdles that white nationalism faces in its search 
for internal cohesion and political legitimacy, is the ultra divisive issue of 
ethnicity.  This is an inevitable consequence of the movement having set 
its 'membership' guidelines too broadly, whilst simultaneously constructing 
a policy platform that is almost untenably restrictive in its dimensions.  The 
overriding aim of the movement (in general) appears geared toward 
uniting the white masses against the unspeakable others that, deliberately 
or otherwise, have sought to diminish the standing and living 
circumstances of white persons on a global scale.  There are many flaws 
apparent in this standpoint, not the least of which is that white persons are 
not, and never have been, a united global grouping.  In essence, white 
pride idealism blindly overlooks the harsh reality that Caucasians are as 
deeply divided by uncommon experiences of history, culture, religion and 
political process as any other classification of human.  This truism was 
                                                                                                                       
nationality is thus reduced to a state of innocuousness in the mind of the individual. 
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made lucid during my empirical observation of the Stormfront.org 
participants and is elaborated upon further in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER 
7 
Net Nationalism: CMC and the 
pursuit of nationalist agendas 
online 
 
 
Nationalism in the information age 
 
If there could be such a fantastic display of publicity about 
1992 as being five hundred years after the conquest of 
(aboriginal) America by Europeans, it is probably because 
1993 was Year One of the reconquest of the world by 
virtual capitalism (Kroker, 1996:178). 
 
 In the introduction chapter of this thesis, primary emphasis was 
afforded to the contemporary political contestation of cyberspace and the 
differing levels of success that various global states have had in 
attempting to colonise the virtual realm.  For most countries, the need to 
expand domestic economic opportunities, along with their overall global 
political presence “is the superordinate aim and justificatory condition for 
the state policy-making apparatus” (Kroker, 1996:173, italics in original).  
The wide scope and reach of CMC media has made cyberspace the 
political vehicle of choice for achieving this objective, resulting in marked 
changes to the political and economic hierarchies of many contemporary 
states (Brown, 1997:13).  For these nations there is much to be gained 
and much to be lost from their cyberspatial endeavours, a stressful task 
that is made all the more burdensome by the catch-22 situation that they 
find themselves placed in.   Technology and affluence have, it would 
seem, become mutually correlative factors.  This means that while it is 
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necessary for modern countries to have technological prowess and access 
in order to prosper, they must first have the economic means to construct 
a viable technological platform from which to build upon (Mariou et al. 
2001).  With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that so many countries 
should find themselves struggling below the technological development 
line.109
 While the main thrust of the introductory chapter was to provide the 
reader with a preliminary snapshot of the current cyberspace terrain, it 
was nevertheless also helpful in evidencing the (predominantly) economic 
imperatives that preoccupy nation-states at the beginning of the twenty-
first century.  The seemingly privileged place of economic factors in the 
broader machinations of state is not a new phenomenon, hence the 
decision to detail the developing forms of nationalist ideology in the 
previous chapter.  There were two points to arise from Chapter Six that I 
would particularly like to reiterate and reinforce at this time.  Firstly, the 
virtual realm is an especially intriguing sphere for fresh investigations of 
the nationalism concept.  On the one hand, cyberspace is the newest 
arena in which nation-states have staked their respective claims for power 
and respect in the contemporary world.  It is at once a battleground site for 
constantly evolving global disputes, and a site that is coveted in and of 
itself for the potential prestige and rewards that come with being at the 
forefront of cyberspatial development.  On the other hand, cyberspace is 
also a threat to conventional economy-driven modes of nationalism in that 
it diminishes the capacity of states to confidently maintain centralised 
modes of governance (Jordan, 1999:162).   
 
 Kroker illustrated this point well in writing that “the state that cannot 
plan in the interests of its own social economy, and that cannot act on 
behalf of its own political economy, is also the disappearing state” 
                                            
109 The ‘development line’ sets expected levels for viable economic, social and political 
growth by nations in relation to the cyberspatial sphere.  Countries that are operating on 
figures that fall above this line are seen as technologically developing nations, those 
operating at subpar levels are, by way of contrast, seen to be in regression.  Not 
unexpectedly, Scandinavian, North American and Western European countries are 
mostly performing well here, with Middle Eastern, Central European, Eastern European, 
South American, Asian, and African countries almost invariably dwelling in regression  
(Norris, 2001:chapter 3). 
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(1996:173).  There is much merit in this statement although, were it to be 
applied uncritically to the world of today, it could be argued that most 
contemporary nation-states are of the ‘disappearing’ variety.  There is little 
doubt that all of the nations residing on the wrong side of the technological 
development line are struggling to maintain the viability of their political 
economies, but even those countries performing well in this regard face 
problems.  This is because it is practically impossible to make rapid and 
pronounced advancements with one’s political economy without causing 
damage and disruption to the social economy in the process.  It is here 
that the modern state faces its humanistic crisis, with the nationalist ideal 
of 'rule for all' failing to reconcile with the harsh reality that many citizens 
cannot participate in, or benefit from, state economic initiatives at the 
highest level. 
 This is not to suggest that human actors themselves are simply 
disinterested 'consumers' of nationalist ideology, however, with the 
residents of certain countries proving quite adept at propagating nationalist 
sentiment.  The Trinidadians studied by Miller and Slater in their 
ethnographic research into the Internet clearly exemplify this point: 
 
At the same time, then, that the Internet opens the gates 
to a potential cosmopolitanism it also exposes a global 
parochialism that makes them feel insecure as to whether 
their own nationality constitutes a recognized place in the 
world at large...  The highlighting of nationalism in their 
representation of themselves to others went with a 
tendency to engage with others as members of national 
cultures and to engage with them through popular 
[specifically North American] cultures...  Trinidadians 
would often aggressively assert their knowledge of this 
common popular culture to their correspondent in order to 
combat any suggestion that they are an unsophisticated 
‘third world’ country (2000:99-100). 
 
Perhaps these Trinidadians can be seen as the prototypical purveyors of 
nationalism for the information age, wherein knowledge is seen as an all 
important commodity and the Internet looms as the choice vehicle for 
obtaining and expressing this knowledge.  On another level, the actions of 
the Trinidadians show us that nationalism should never be carelessly 
limited to discussions of state politics and contested markets. For, at the 
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elementary level, it also finds favour with everyday citizens who need to 
feel (at the very least) equal to the unknown others that they see on their 
television screens and encounter on their computer monitors. 
 In spite of this, most commentators still prefer to address nationalism 
from the state angle.  Postmodern rhetoric would have us believe that the 
nation-state is a fading relic and it is possible that the preference for 
exploring nationalism in state terms is a reaction against this view by 
scholars of modernity.  This is to be expected, although it is likely that the 
pressing reason behind contemporary state attempts to revert to traditional 
forms of nationalist ideology lies in the rise of competing strands of neo-
nationalism.  A sturdy, all-encompassing information and communication 
infrastructure is essential for any contemporary nation desiring 
administrative control over its population (Robins & Webster, 1999:134).  
Cyberspace certainly provides the platform for this potentiality, but it also 
complicates matters by allowing the opponents of conventional nationalist 
formats significant scope to oppose the status quo.  The proliferation of 
global media has thus put extra pressure on nation-states by 
simultaneously illuminating their functions and processes, whilst also 
limiting their capacity to stifle (forcefully or otherwise) dissent from sectors 
of the domestic population.  
 This leads us neatly to the thoughts of Hakken (1999) who has spent 
more than twenty years investigating the social aspects inherent in 
computing and the Internet, with much of this research centering on the 
twin spheres of work and industry.  Foremost among Hakken’s findings is 
the assertion that national and cultural differences are integral to the 
continuing construction of cyberspace.   History suggests that affairs of the 
state are never far removed from matters of technological innovation, as 
evidenced by the state-driven development of computerised technology in 
the Nordic region. Heavy state overtures have also been apparent in 
largely unsuccessful North American attempts to streamline computerised 
technology development in a manner that would best complement its 
nationalist agenda (Hakken, 1999:133-149).  Whilst these nationalist 
endeavours may have failed the Americans on a domestic level, it could 
be argued that the country is more than making-up for this on a global 
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scale wherein initiatives such as the ‘Global Information Infrastructure act’ 
(GII) cloak American cultural and economic pursuits beneath a slender 
guise of well-meaning philanthropy (Loader, 1997:6, O’Connor, 1996:271). 
 Other writers, such as Barwell & Bowles  (2000) willingly concede 
that the structural origins of the Internet ensured that the medium was 
always at risk of becoming a powerful tool in the continuing American fight 
for economic and cultural expansionism.  In spite of this, they are loath to 
write-off cyberspace as a realm that is helping to diminish nationalist 
developments in favour of monolithic expressions of Americanisation.  
Instead, they hasten to recognise “the potential of the Internet for violating 
the priorities and privileges of non-US national authorities in the control of 
sensitive information, without necessarily acting in the interests of the US 
Government”.  Accordingly, Barwell & Bowles contend that colonisation 
and governance of cyberspace remains contested and unclarified, with 
sufficient scope existing for non-American countries to create a virtual 
space for their own cultural objectives and transmissions (2000:703-705).  
 The American creation and dominance of the Internet, and the 
responses of other nations to this dominance, is a significant aspect of the 
nationalism debate as it relates to cyberspace.  It should not, however, be 
seen as the be all and end all of the debate.  It is for this reason that I 
have decided to break this discussion up into three parts so as to most 
effectively and thoroughly present the nationalism concept in its online 
guise.  In the first instance, I focused on the political/economic elements of 
Internet nationalism, which will take into account the efforts undertaken by 
contemporary states and regions to establish a prominent place for 
themselves in the broader cyberspatial infrastructure [refer Introduction].  
In the second instance, I will shift discussion to a brief exploration of 
ethnicity online, and the manner in which assorted diaspora are utilising 
cyberspace as an open gateway to otherwise closed avenues to “home” 
and family.  Finally, I will close with an investigation into ‘online patriotism’ 
and the opportunities that cyberspace presents to individuals and 
organisations whose political ideologies and objectives run counter to 
those espoused by mainstream political parties and state institutions. 
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Ethnicity and race online 
 In Chapter Three of this thesis, considerable time was devoted to the 
exploration of a variety of aspects that are considered problematic to the 
developmental processes of individual identities.  Foremost among these 
were the concepts of gender and ethnicity, although it should be noted that 
only gender appeared in significant detail during that chapter.  The 
decision to hold discussion of ethnicity and race over to this chapter was a 
carefully considered one, given that there can be little doubt that an 
individual’s ethnicity contributes substantially to the way in which they 
locate themselves within their particular social world.  The same is equally 
true of gender, but whereas a person’s gender only impacts upon their 
impressions of nationhood in a relatively minor sense, a person’s race is 
necessarily at the forefront of such considerations.  
 In turning to the virtual realm, indications are that female netizens are 
constructing a solid presence for themselves online, regardless of the 
levels of male-opposition that may or may not be in place.  The place of 
race in cyberspace is not quite as well established, however, with most 
online spaces existing devoid of racial determinants (Kolko, 2000:214).  
Just as the universal language of the Internet is seen to be English, so too 
is the default race of cyberspace perceived to be white, in line with 
Western hegemony over the CMC sphere (Kolko, 2000:216).  This 
contributes to the perpetuation of an ‘us versus them’ mentality between 
Western and non-Western Internet users, with Caucasians (in general) 
seeing Asians (and other coloured peoples) as the ‘other’ and Asians, in 
return, seeing “the white race as just monolithic” (Tsang, 1994:434). With 
most users being Caucasian to begin with [refer Table 9] and some non-
Caucasian users being unprepared to divulge their ethnicity online, it is all 
too easy for racial factors to be conveniently elided in virtual environments. 
 As is the case with gender, however, debate exists as to the 
existence of an ‘ethnic divide’ in cyberspace.  The findings published from 
a recent Stanford study into Internet usage contend that “the most  
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Table 9. Top 15 countries for Internet usage as at December 2002110
              [SOURCE: eTForecasts] 
 
 
Nation Number of Users (#K) Share % 
1.      USA 160, 700 24.13 
2.      Japan 64,800 9.73 
3.      China 54,500 8.18 
4.      Germany 30,350 4.56 
5.      United Kingdom 27,150 4.08 
6.      South Korea 26,900 4.04 
7.      Italy 20,850 3.13 
8.      Canada 17,830 2.68 
9.      France 16,650 2.50 
10.    India  16,580 2.49 
11.    Brazil 15,840 2.38 
12.    Russia 13,500 2.03 
13.    Australia 10,450 1.57 
14.    Spain 10,390 1.56 
15.    Taiwan 9,510 1.43 
TOP 15 TOTAL 496,000 74.48 
GLOBAL TOTAL 665,910 100.00 
 
important factors facilitating or inhibiting Internet access are education and 
age”, not income or race/ethnicity which account for minimal changes in 
overall rates of Internet participation (Nie & Erbring, 2000).  Technological 
initiatives are also helping to break down the long-term Western 
dominance of cyberspatial media: 
 
the Net is now growing fastest in developing countries 
(and) Web browsers are being adapted for an increasing 
number of languages and character sets.  Thus, while 
Internet users around the world still must use English for 
                                            
110 Almost a quarter of all Internet users are residents of the United States of America and 
over half of all global users represented in the top 15 hale from countries that have a 
higher concentration of Caucasians among their populations than other races.  It should 
be acknowledged, however, that the USA is in decline in terms of per capita Internet 
usage and it is also envisaged that the number of Chinese users will overtake the 
Japanese figure by the year 2005.   
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global communication, today they are increasingly turning 
to their own language to reach websites or join 
discussions in their own country or region (Warschauer, 
2000: 157). 
 
 Ethnicity carries considerable import to the concept of self-identity on 
account of the manner in which it helps to build an individual’s sense of 
self around cultural conventions, as expressed through community ties 
and strongly held nationalist leanings.  With specific regard to cyberspace, 
we can see the prominence of the ethnicity/self relationship in the plentiful 
instances of ethnic diasporic groups employing CMC vehicles as a means 
of maintaining intellectual and psychological links to their culture of origin.   
 Prominent among such groups are the Jews, widely considered to be 
among the most nomadic of all diaspora, and arguably the most well 
organised ethnic group to inhabit the virtual terrain.  This long history of 
population dispersal has helped condition Jewish people to the 
widespread usage of varied and ever changing communication vehicles, 
as Goldlust explains in writing that: 
 
Another significant characteristic of the Jewish diasporic 
experience has been the importance placed on 
continuous communication between these geographically 
dispersed ‘communities’.  Such links were maintained 
through a constant stream of Jewish travellers including, 
among others, traders, rabbis, religious teachers, 
students, musicians and entertainers who passed from 
one community to another, bringing news, gossip, and 
occasional correspondence (2001:15). 
 
In recent times, Jewish groups—perhaps as a consequence of their high 
access rates to education, finance and technology—have rapidly forged a 
strong presence (10,000+ sites) in cyberspace (Goldlust, 2001:18-19).  
Historically speaking, the Jewish utilisation of evolving communication 
media has been primarily concerned with the preservation of culture, 
although another key stimulus has also come into play over the past fifty 
years.  The official recognition of the State of Israel in 1948 provided 
Jewish people with a physical and spiritual homeland around which they 
could actively promote and nurture a defining sense of nationhood 
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(Goldlust, 2001:17; Poster, 1998:205).  The momentousness of this 
decision to create a nation for a population so long deprived of one has, 
not surprisingly, reshaped the nature of Jewish Diaspora.  For the most 
part, the extensive employment of assorted communication media by Jews 
has been necessarily aimed at the integration of Jewish people (Poster, 
1998:206).  It is noteworthy that such a process has long been more 
readily pursued by ethnic groups with a shared sense of nationhood 
behind them, and the ever-present possibility of a return to this nation 
ahead of them.  Prior to 1948, the Jewish people could only hope to 
perpetuate isolated forms of Jewish community, whereas now the 
Diaspora incorporate the added function of contributing to, and monitoring 
the development of, the Jewish state. 
 While the Jewish experience of modern nationhood may not be a 
particularly lengthy one, they have clearly been the pacesetters in other 
areas of ethnic settlement.  This is reflected in the contemporary 
circumstances of many diasporic communities, wherein immigrants now 
commonly settle into generalised society settings rather than moving to 
small enclaves composed predominantly of fellow migrants from the 
mother country (Mitra, 1997:57).  This mirrors previous movements of 
Jewish migrants, particularly in the United States, who have preferred to 
intersperse themselves throughout the wider society, rather than set 
themselves physically and symbolically apart from it.  Cyberspace affords 
extra fascination to current explorations of ethnicity on account of the way 
it serves to reverse this newly favoured emigration trend.  For all the 
computopian talk of a world united through cyberspace, it is all too clearly 
apparent that much of the WWW is organised into exclusive cyber realms 
that are primarily culturally dependent and mediated (Mitra, 1997:62). 
 A striking feature of the colonisation of cyberspace by non-Western 
ethnic groups is the tendency for such colonisation to be formulated on 
pre-existing foundations of ethnic association found in fleshspace settings 
(Goldlust, 2001:21; Gomes, 2001:59).  It is common for ethnic groups to 
take an insular approach to matters of association, as much for reasons of 
necessity as desire, wherein ethnic peoples find comfort and confidence in 
the creation of social and political networks with like-minded others who 
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share a common ancestry and racial background.  Contemporary 
innovations like the Internet afford fresh impetus and direction to this 
associative process, but do not serve to fundamentally alter the organic 
nature of the process itself. 
 Cyberspace then is a fertile environment for maintaining and 
reshaping agencies of association for ethnic groups, even if it rarely (if 
ever) serves to build such agencies from the ground up.  The role of 
cyberspace in supporting and shaping the political ambitions and motives 
of such groups is, however, not nearly as straightforwardly defined.  For 
instance, indigenous American Cherokee see the Internet as being an 
excellent medium through which to teach and disseminate social and 
historical aspects of their culture, due to the visual pictographic style of 
their language and the capacity of the Internet to accommodate this 
linguistic style (Arnold & Plymire, 2000:187).  Other indigenous American 
groups oppose the employment of cyberspatial vehicles for such 
purposes, however, contending that the Internet is not a great space for 
the reinvigoration of indigenous American histories and practices on 
account of basic native spirituality being so closely tied to physical land 
structures, from which CMC technologies are so obviously removed 
(Arnold & Plymire, 2000:189).  Indigenous American apprehension toward 
the Internet is also furnished by the manner in which online material 
relating to Indigenous Americans is packaged and presented.  Much of 
this material ghettoises native culture and inadvertently propagates 
‘Vanishing Indian Syndrome’, wherein indigenous culture is seen to be so 
derelict as to be insignificant in comparison to representations of 
mainstream North American culture (Arnold & Plymire, 2000:189). 
 For some non-Western nations and peoples then, online political 
stances are more closely approximated to global public relations exercises 
than they are to explicit attempts at national advancement.  Earlier in this 
chapter mention was made of online Trinidadians and their pressing 
concerns with showing the outside world that they are not culturally 
deprived and ignorant people (Miller & Slater, 2000:99-100).  This need 
finds a mirror in the behaviour of Tongan participants on the Kava Bowl 
online discussion forum, wherein netizens took a very dim view of other 
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users presenting bad language and expressions of violence on the site, 
embarrassed by the image of Tonga that this would portray to the rest of 
the world (Morton, 1999:245).  
 The similarities between Tongan and Trinidadian uses of the CMC 
technology do not end there, however, with Morton providing a succinct 
explanation of typical Tongan online interactions in writing that: 
 
participants are using the [Kava Bowl] forum to carefully 
reassess ‘Tongan culture’.  This includes critiques of 
practices such as giving away money beyond a family’s 
means to fulfil family and church obligations, and the 
demands placed on individuals and families by those 
considered superior to them in the hierarchy of kinship 
and rank (1999:248). 
 
In Western societies, ethnicity is commonly employed as a classificatory 
tool through which one’s status in the broader society is clarified and 
ranked.  In this way the place of ethnicity in Western societies is 
commonly conflated with notions of class, given that Western societies 
view class largely along economic determinist lines and it is ethnic groups 
that commonly occupy the lower socio-economic strata of capitalist 
nations (Eriksen, 1993:6-7).  This view serves to obscure the hierarchical 
structures that almost invariably exist within individual 'ethnic' groups 
themselves; and online groups such as the Kava Bowl are instructive for 
the way in which they lay such otherwise concealed aspects of non-
Western behaviour bare for all to see.   
 Family, as Morton has already outlined above, is often a central 
component in hierarchy construction and maintenance processes for many 
non-Western cultures.  Such processes are generally reinforced by 
steadfast adherence to endogamous kinship structures, wherein 
marriages between like others are seen as the best strategy for preserving 
cultural behaviours that are considered integral to the particular cultural 
group in question (Eriksen, 1993:32).  This goes some way toward 
explaining the considerable number of web-based initiatives that are 
devoted to the fostering of relationships between men and women of 
specific ethnic extractions.  This is not to say that WWW vehicles with a 
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bent toward dating are always required to meet these ends, of course,  
given that the endogamic nature of many ethnic-based online groups 
readily encourages the formation of such relationships anyway.  These 
contentions need to be qualified, however, by the understanding that the 
majority of relationships formed by Western couples are also endogamic, 
in spite of freely espoused cultural values that decry notions of difference. 
This last point is underscored by the realisation that global forces have, to 
some extent, weakened the capacity for non-Western cultural groups to 
control the instances of exogamy within their communities.   
 Indeed the reverse is true for many non-Western countries, with 
family ties and roles being seen as cardinal elements of Trinidadian 
culture.  Trinidad has long been characterised by high instances of 
emigration, with many Trini choosing to leave the home country for 
education purposes and a good portion of these expatriates remaining in 
the new host country upon graduation because of higher job and salary 
opportunities (Miller & Slater, 2000:36).  In past times, this has resulted in 
considerable anxiety for Trini people who have found themselves 
physically isolated from their kin and the everyday familial interactions 
around which their lives have previously revolved.  The invention of e-mail 
has thus proven a godsend for diasporic Trini who can now maintain 
familial contact and obligations on an intimate and inexpensive daily basis 
(Miller & Slater, 2000:56).  Kinship matters, albeit of a less pressing 
nature, are also seen to drive the online participation of some non-Tongan 
mothers of Tongan children who see the Kava Bowl as an avenue through 
which they can develop and foster the cultural heritage of their 
geographically displaced child (Morton, 1999:244-245). 
 While familial concerns may be foremost in the minds of many non-
Western online participants; it would be naïve to downplay the political 
presence that cyberspace affords to countless others.  Jewish groups, by 
way of example, show a strong tendency toward monitoring political 
activities and developments via CMC.  This reinforces suggestions that the 
Internet is a prime space for nation building, even though much of the 
building takes place outside of the geographical confines of the nation in 
question (Goldlust, 2001:26).  On top of this, it also serves to highlight the 
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fragility apparent in computopian assurances that the Internet is the 
‘melting pot’ in which cultural differences will be inevitably blended away.  
The desire to perpetuate and preserve local culture via global media is all 
too evident in the prominent depiction of a symbolic kumete (kava bowl) 
image on the Kava Bowl online discussion forum (Morton, 1999:239).  
Tonga’s sea-faring past has been remodelled to fit with its space-faring 
future, as the nation refuses to mimic the technological apprehension of 
other small and underprivileged countries by utilising cyberspace as a 
means of achieving desired levels of economic prosperity and security 
(Morton, 1999:235). 
 The aims of the Tongans appear suitably unifying, but this is not the 
case for all ethnic groups online.  Nationalism has proven decidedly 
problematic for some Indian-orientated online groups111, with general 
Indian Diaspora seeing themselves as ‘non-resident Indians’ and 
Trinidadians calling themselves ‘people of Indian origins’ (Miller & Slater, 
2000:176).  This appears harmless enough to uninitiated Westerners, but 
the subtle semantic difference in these terms obfuscates marked 
ideological disparities, with the latter portraying itself as a politically viable 
lobby group and mocking the former on account of its perceived dearth of 
political power and influence.  Divisions of a similar nature are also driving 
a wedge between Goan netizens, with African Goans online asserting their 
alleged superiority over their Indian and Pakistani counterparts who they 
see as being culturally and spiritually ‘beneath’ them (Gomes, 2001:58).  
Indian expatriates, in particular, find themselves fighting a war of online 
identification on multiple fronts.  Subsequently, Indian diaspora need to be 
able to assess themselves against fellow Indian peoples, rival immigrant 
cultures and perceptions of them that are held by the dominant ethnie of 
the host country.  Discussion pertaining explicitly to India and Indian-ness 
invariably divide these diasporic communities, whilst discussions relating 
to non-Indian others help to unite them (Mitra, 1997:62).  This is the crucial 
distinguishing factor that separates ethnic culture as espoused by some 
diaspora, from the national identities commonly negotiated by their 
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erstwhile compatriots back in the ‘home’ country (Mallapragada, 
2000:182).  
 Two of the three major strands of online nationalism have now been 
elaborated upon in this chapter.  The first strand focused implicitly on the 
across the board push by numerous nation-states for a greater political 
and economic presence in cyberspace and access to the subsequent 
increase in power and prosperity that success in the virtual realm is 
predicted to bring.  This form of nationalism is unashamedly driven by 
fiscal motivations and is essentially indistinguishable from the broader free 
market objectives that have underscored Western tenets of nationalism for 
the better part of two centuries, most specifically since the end of World 
War Two.  Ostensibly, cyberspace is an extension of the vast media 
terrain that has preoccupied governments and corporations for decades, 
with one telling difference.  In the past it has often been enough for 
governments to control these various media forms at the domestic level, 
but with cyberspace, as several Asian states have discovered, overt 
control at the domestic level often results in untenable restrictions at the 
global level.  This is the challenge of online nationalism for contemporary 
nation-states as they struggle to reconcile domestic needs for market 
expansion, whilst simultaneously protecting the national security and 
political status quo from the unprecedented threat of free and openly 
critical information flow.   
 This is nationalism at the most profoundly macro-level, where input 
from human actors at the widespread micro-level is neither implicitly 
desired nor expressly required.  By way of contrast, the second form of 
online nationalism presented here was instructive of the place of 
nationalism at the meso-level, wherein groups of individuals (communities) 
cling to tenets of national culture and tradition as a means of informing and 
supporting the everyday machinations and future directions of the group.  
The final form of online nationalism to be written of here is stateless 
nationalism, which changes the conceptual focus again by privileging 
nationalism as a micro-level initiative in which human actors can, and will, 
                                                                                                                       
111 In this instance, I am referring to expatriats of India itself and NOT natives of North 
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have some influence on the broader national agenda developing around 
them.   
 
Stateless nationalism 
 This discussion on stateless nationalism will be heavily influenced by 
the views of first-hand Internet patriots themselves, with much of the 
material for this section being drawn from the lurking and interviewing 
phases of the thesis methodology. If it is true that cyberspace and 
assorted global media are serving to diminish the import and sovereignty 
of nation-states, then it should stand to reason that netizens, in general, 
are exemplifying this erosion of nationhood through declining support for 
the concept.  Theoretically, at least, this scenario should only be further 
heightened for white nationalists online, given that a unifying tenet in the 
broad sweep of competing ideology that swamps the movement is the 
idea of privileging the white race before and above all else, nation 
included.  If the comments made by white pride devotees themselves are 
anything to go by, however, it would appear that there is still plenty of life 
left in the nation-state yet. 
 
 Will your current nationality retain any future significance for you if 
the promise of a white utopia is realised? 
 
Yes: 11  No: 9  Unsure: 1 
 
Nordic Fury: It will only be significant in the sense of 
being true about my past.  Race extends beyond 
culture and nation.  The new definition of nation 
should be a more concrete one, as it has been 
traditionally, that of race. 
Madame Blavatsky: My current nationality?  I will 
always adhere to the Constitution of the United 
States of America.  If others choose to nullify it, and I 
have to oppose them, then so be it.  It’s still my 
Constitution. 
Redshift: Yes.  Nationality is the cornerstone of 
identity.  Since my nation [Germany] has evolved 
                                                                                                                       
America and Canada. 
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over 40,000 years it is unique from other nations and 
should therefore be preserved and cherished, as 
should other nations.  The white race is not just one 
homogenous mass, but consists of distinct ethnic 
subgroupings which should be preserved in their 
racial purity. 
Njord: I don’t believe in white utopia... or in a multi-
ethnical white state.  A Germanic Union with freedom 
of movement, free trade, a common currency and a 
common military — including all Germanic states & 
Finland & Estland & Letvia & Lithuania (maybe) — 
would be the most desirable political solution. 
Alex: Yes I think that Russian people will be in a 
head of [the] new world. 
Mad as Hell Cow: Nationality... as much as it hurts 
to say... no, only the race is important now. 
Abel: First and foremost I’m an Irishman and a 
Socialist and in a ‘Socialist’ utopia my nationhood 
would still be an issue, though not a great one; so I 
could still see nationality being important for White 
Nationalists.  And remember the ethos of many of 
these groups is nationalist to the point of hating 
others.  German nationalists hate British nationalists 
and vice-versa. 
Emperor CS: There will never be a utopia and my 
nationality already means nothing to me...  if you 
studied my interests on the ICQ interest page you 
could possibly see that...  I am a business 
administration student, we deal internationally now. 
  
 There are several key points of interest to arise out of the above 
quotations.  Firstly, it is clear that for many white nationalists, white skin 
colour alone will not be a sufficient criterion for the creation of a bold, new 
future society.  This is hardly surprising, given that the notion of a white 
utopia stems largely from the fundamental Christian sectors of the white 
nationalist movement.  For Seedline Christian Identity Movement (CIM) 
white nationalists, non-white persons are not merely lesser quality human 
beings (as they are for mainstream white priders), but rather they are 
innately evil beings spurned by God:  
 
It is the intention of this evil Prince of the World [Satan] to 
destroy the white race — the Adamites who are 
descended from the first white man — to make wars upon 
 276 
 
them and to wipe them from the face of the earth...  
Seedline Identity holds that just as there is a people of 
God, there is also a direct lineage of Satan, and these two 
lineages are set against each other now and forever.  For 
Seedline Identity Christians, Jews are the children of 
Satan (Bushart et al. 1998: 45).112 
 
This view aids in the prefacing of white nationalism as a form of divine 
quest for the construction and development of a white utopia, which will 
unite the true (white) Israelites in a prophesised ‘Kingdom of Israel’ — 
commonly thought to exist in Northern America (Barkun, 1997:7).  
Seedline Identity is not the dominant player in white nationalist circles, but 
it is the simplest to comprehend in terms of what does and does not 
constitute "membership" of the movement.  Essentially, if you look white 
you are white, and you will be granted acceptance on that basis, provided 
you also share a belief in the central tenets of Identity ideology. 
 It is the issue of “membership” that most tellingly divides the overall 
white nationalist movement today, and Internet patriots are not proving 
any more adept at negotiating this hurdle than their offline counterparts 
have been in the past.  The difficulties apparent in finding common ground 
with fellow white nationalist devotees online are elucidated in the following 
responses to the question — do you have a problem with the differing 
viewpoints (among white nationalists) on the Stormfront.org website? 
 
 
Viking: Yeah, sometimes.  There are a lot of 
Christians.  I’m a heathen nationalist. 
British Dave: Sometimes I have a problem with 
certain American views on the scummy IRA!!! 
Alex: I said [to Western white priders] “You must 
know your place fulish bastards!”  Because all 
troubles with Western nationalists is [that they think] 
“All Russians are communists” and “Hitler fight with 
Russians, [therefore] they are not Aryan”. 
Emperor CS: Yes, most of the members were 
uneducated and confused.  They could not define 
                                            
112 It should be stressed here that Bushart et al. are describing Seedline Identity thought 
as gleaned from their research, not openly promoting it. 
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what was white and what was not.  Therefore 
because of the sheer void of educational value, I left. 
Vamp88: Sometimes.  To put it out there, I do not 
think that religion belongs in the same realm as 
politics, they are separate viewpoints, but so many 
organisations fight mostly over the religious issue 
when they should be FOCUSING on racial and 
political issues. 
Lycia: I do have a major problem with infighting and 
provocateurs.  The worst are the flame wars over 
religion and “Who Is Really White” threads.  We need 
to remain united if we are to be successful in 
reclaiming our ancestral lands. 
 
For the Internet patriots on Stormfront.org, the points of difference are 
many and varied, but most commonly they relate back to one of four main 
bones of contention — indicators of whiteness, the role of religion, the 
legitimacy of online activists, and the clarification of controversial political 
issues.   
 In the dominant Western countries (the USA in particular) it is 
common for Caucasian citizens to adopt a decidedly unproblematic 
perspective on their “whiteness”.  These citizens are so prominent in 
number, and so conspicuous in positions of cultural influence and power 
that it is difficult for many of them to consciously perceive of themselves as 
representing a particular cultural ethnie.  In America, as is also the case 
for Britain and Australia, whiteness of skin, in conjunction with maleness 
and heterosexuality, has come to unambiguously represent “cultural 
authority” (Sudan, 2000:70).  Such cultural authority is also invariably 
linked to side elements, such as a predisposition toward capitalism; 
English language; and membership of a Christian religious denomination 
(in one of its various guises).  Most white persons would adhere to at least 
two of these three elements, ensuring that it is difficult for Caucasians, in a 
general sense, to look upon other Caucasians as being representative of 
others from whom they are significantly different. 
 The situation does become somewhat clouded, however, when 
political and religious ideology is heavily emphasised in regular 
interactions occurring between whites.  At such a time, it is made all too 
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clear that a single white race only exists in an idealised and imagined 
sense and that the white race is no less affected by ethnic divisions (on a 
global level) as are other races.  The term 'white race', it should be noted, 
is presented here in the manner in which it is commonly articulated in 
white nationalist discourse and should not be taken as a sign that I accept 
such a categorisation as fact.   As a direct consequence of this misguided 
interpretation of race, any firmly held white pride ambitions relating to the 
potential creation of a white utopia (White Israel) are necessarily 
diminished by ongoing disputes over the clarity and quality of a person’s 
whiteness: 
 
Anonymous: As a proud white aryan 
Hispanic/Latino, I just want to let everyone know that 
we do exist and that we wish to take part in your 
movement.  Spain, Portugal, France and Italy are 
just as white as any other European country. 
LMcLoughlin: Portugese are not white.  Don’t try to 
change the definition of the word. Portugese are part 
black.  Yes, I am “intolerant”, but why should I be 
offended, I have already been called this.  As I said 
many times here; white is white and you are not. 
t_hay: I take it that you have never been to 
Argentina have you?  Before you start deciding who 
is white and who is not, take your little Irish ass on a 
field trip why don’t you.The portugese are indeed 
white and who the hell are you to say that they are 
not.  Are you a Jew?  Argentina is a whiter country 
than the US will ever be. 
Wlliam Forrest: Please teach us more.  And please 
spread the word about Stormfront to your Aryan 
relatives.  Even Hitler made [an] alliance with the 
Japanese, so how can we not look with kindness 
upon our White Brothers and Sisters from the 
Spanish and Portugese speaking parts of the Aryan 
World? 
WP: sure lets open the doors to everyone... maybe 
we can [get] some affirmative action going in here 
too... yea!  sounds like a good idea dont it, call all 
your spic reletives and tell them stormfront wants to 
diversify...LOL 
Don Black: (t)he “Nordic supremacist” theory is held 
by many sincere White Nationalists, even though 
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Nordic types are, from my observation, the least 
likely to be racially conscious and have any sense of 
self-preservation.  Though there are obvious 
differences between White subraces, these fade to 
insignificance when compared to our differences with 
other races.  We must overcome these short-sighted 
views if we are to become more than [just] an 
ineffectual cult. 
Anonymous: Don’t let anyone tell you that you have 
to have blue eyes and blond hair to be white.  That is 
laughable.  I have known bi-racial people 
(black/white) who have had blue eyes and blond hair.  
That is just a crock.  If you are of 100% European 
descent, you are white period.  White Europeans 
should unite if our movement is ever going to 
succeed.  By bickering with ourselves over trivial 
matters such as this we will gain nothing. 
Bryn: Anonymous is right, the word “Hispanic” does 
not necessarily indicate someone of non-white 
lineage.  The term, I suppose, has come to represent 
someone of wholly Indian, non-white blood.  This is 
not an accurate assumption as it is not faithful to the 
literal meaning of “Hispanic”.   
LMcLoughlin: Hello Johann...  If you identify with 
the Japanese, form a Japanese enclave...  In the old 
days when tribes began mixing, those mixed-race 
folks broke off into their own tribes, or the culture and 
race fell into oblivion.  We are trying to prevent that 
and hold the line.  We may have few pure Celts, etc.. 
but what is wrong with trying to preserve the 
Northern European tribe?  Maybe you could form a 
new tribe?  The new Ainu’s?  An assimilated white 
minority enclave of like-minded folk? We will be sure 
to form diplomatic and military alliances with your 
people. 
pure_race: I’ll make it blatantly simple for everyone, 
and stick with the 15/16 [Caucasian blood] criteria for 
the moment, as that’s what I’ve been doing for the 
last several months.  Anyone would be hard-pressed 
to find someone that was 15/16 and had really dark 
skin, or non-white features.  I’m sure David Lane 
took that into account when he stated it...  15/16 
white is the cut-off, period. 
 
The colour issue clearly shows that white nationalism cannot feasibly be 
removed from traditional nationalist frameworks.  The above quotations 
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highlighted the way in which support for white nationalism is predicated 
upon understandings (and misunderstandings) of ethnic lineages and 
nation-state histories.  It is not unusual for ethnic groups to construct their 
particular belief systems around common ancestry (Eriksen, 1993:35), 
although it is atypical for an ethnie to be characterised by such a wide 
range of competing histories and cultural identifiers.  
 The online white pride cause can also be seen to suffer from the 
overt number of American-based devotees within the movement.  
Stormfront.org is a prime example of this [refer Table 10] with upwards of 
half of the entire forum’s participants hailing from the United States of 
America.113
 Essentially, white nationalism is an ideology that desperately requires 
increased levels of support and broad intra-organisational unity in the face 
of substantial worldwide opposition.  It is a predominantly Western 
movement that struggles to adequately combat the residue of countless 
centuries of hostility and competition between fellow Western nation-
states.  The angst over notions of colour within the movement is further 
intensified by uncertainty (among members) as to how the military and 
technological developments of previous “white” states can be reconciled 
with contemporary white pride calls for racial unification.  Alex’s comments 
concerning his frustration over American assertions that Russians are anti- 
Aryan (for having fought the Nazis in World War Two); and t_hay’s  
  In accordance with this, it is exceedingly rare for main board 
message postings to the site not to be concerned with North American 
issues and developments in some shape or form.  As a consequence of 
this, the broader white nationalist ideal of a unified global white nation is all 
too easily compromised by the regular and blatant privileging of American 
views and demands.  This largely unconscious championing of American 
hegemony within the movement only leads to further tension when 
American–based white power adherents unwittingly patronise and/or 
trivialise political developments in Europe. 
                                            
113 The exact figure cannot be arrived at here, given the exorbitant number of participants 
(over half) that did not nominate a country when submitting their details to the site.  This 
table does, however, provide an unmistakable sense of the American dominance of the 
site, and it is highly likely that a solid number of those failing to nominate a nationality 
(9981 in all) would have been North American. 
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Table 10. Stormfront.org membership growth by nationality 2000. 
         [SOURCE: data manually mined by author from  
              Stormfront.org throughout 2000] 
 
COUNTRY JANUARY NOVEMBER INCREASE (%) 
ARGENTINA 6 21 15 (250) 
AUSTRALIA 98 234 136 (138.8) 
BRAZIL 8 23 15 (187.5) 
CANADA 228 508 280 (122.8) 
CHINA 0 1 1 (-) 
DENMARK 26 64 38 (146.1) 
ENGLAND  71 189 118 (166.2) 
FRANCE 16 61 46 (281.3) 
GERMANY 144 496 352 (244.5) 
INDIA 1 11 10 (1000) 
INDONESIA 2 3 1 (50) 
IRELAND 16 48 32 (200) 
ITALY 11 33 22 (200) 
JAPAN 3 3 0 (0) 
MEXICO 8 13 5 (62.5) 
NETHERLANDS 81 216  53 (189.3) 
NEW ZEALAND 7 45 38 (542.9) 
PORTUGAL 3 15 12 (400) 
RUSSIA 41 97 56 (136.6) 
SCOTLAND 9 25 16 (177.8) 
SOUTH AFRICA 27 65 38 (140.7) 
SPAIN 21 56 35 (166.7) 
SWEDEN 105 216 111 (105.7) 
SWITZERLAND 2 9 7 (350) 
TURKEY 2 11 9 (450) 
USA 2285 5621 3336 (146) 
VIETNAM 1 1 0 (0) 
WALES 0 1 1 (-) 
YUGOSLAVIA 3 7 4 (133.3) 
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ZIMBABWE 3 5 2 (66.7) 
OTHERS 3947 9981 6034 (152.9) 
TOTAL 7122 18,079 10957 (153.9) 
 
aggressive contention that Argentinian and Portuguese persons are white 
peoples are very instructive of this intra-movement division. 
 Unsettled by the allegedly precarious state of the white race in the 
present day, white nationalists invariably retreat into history to take solace 
in the glorious achievements of “unsoiled” white nations such as Britain, 
Spain, France and Germany (Kemp, 1999).  As white nationalists see it, 
great nations such as these have only experienced social decay and 
military weakening through having been internally destabilised by the 
steady increase of "mongrel races” emigrating to their shores (Ferber, 
1997).  The downside to this argument is all too easily identified, however, 
with white revisionists failing to adequately explain the regular instances of 
aggression and hostility that occurred between these 'white' nations prior 
to their infiltration by the so-called ‘mongrel hordes’.   
 The revisionist arm of the white pride movement has also had little 
success in its attempts to restore credibility to the organisation via 
extensive rationalisation of Adolf Hitler’s true place in history.  
Considerable time and effort has gone into justifying and downplaying the 
Nazi leader’s much publicised war atrocities, yet the movement remains 
torn between fervent support for his ideological stance and unyielding 
revulsion for his part in killing countless numbers of white Caucasians. 
Adolf Hitler encompasses one of four regular and prominent points of 
discussion (the others being — who is white and who is not, the superior 
intellects of whites as “proven” by IQ tests, and the disproportionate 
instances of crimes committed by non-whites in comparison to whites) on 
the Stormfront.org discussion fora. 
 The white-pride movement also endures considerable internal 
disjuncture on account of its privileging of technological innovation and 
symbolism from past white nations.  It is standard practice for members of 
Stormfront.org to espouse the superiority of white civilizations over others 
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on account of their greater proficiency at introducing and developing new 
forms of technology: 
 
GMAN: History shows us that negroes are incapable 
of sustaining any decent civilization and if they were 
we would be buying cars, computers, electronics of 
all kinds from them, but that has not happened at any 
time in history.   
Armin7: Why is Africa currently in the Stone Age 
while the Western European and North American 
countries are the most advanced civilizations 
ever????? [and] Why is it that modern day 
Caucasians fly to outer space and navigate the seas 
while you Africans have yet to develop any form of 
transportation besides your feet??? 
RacSknHd: We are the Race, of Beethoven, 
Wagner, Robert E. Lee, and George Washington.  
Our people have created Automobiles, Airplanes, not 
to mention other small things such as Space Travel 
and the light bulb, and yes, even the car stereos you 
listen to your nigger music on.  Not to mention 
modern freedom, and civilization. 
 
Online white nationalists are acutely aware of the import attributed to 
computerised technology on a global scale and, as such, are happy to 
emphasise their competence with cyberspatial navigation and the 
(sometimes) extensive amounts of time that they spend online.  This is 
indicative of the often under-appreciated relationship that exists between 
the self and the machine, as Broughton explains thus: 
 
Since technology is already a crystallization of selfhood—
of the constitutive, transcendental framework of 
subjectivity itself—identification with it is not just a 
discovery, but a rediscovery (1996:148). 
 
It is probable then, that white-priders are reshaping their perceptions of 
self in accordance with their growing use of, and competence with, CMC 
media vehicles.  This, in turn, reinforces the link between the individual 
and the nation-state, wherein the former needs to champion and protect 
the latter as it defines, supports, and legitimates his/her particular mode of 
being.   
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 The 'masters of technology' argument also links neatly to broader 
Western approaches to nationalism that promote high technology as the 
driving force behind desired improvements to national economies, living 
standards, knowledge bases, and security vehicles for those countries 
fortunate enough to be at the forefront of technological development.  It is 
also one of the rare arguments to find favour across the widely disparate 
ideological terrain that is white nationalism; with technological prowess 
and progress forming central planks in the doctrinal platforms of both the 
CIM and the prominent skinhead “faith” known as ‘Creativity’114
 This pandering to technology is hardly surprising given that most 
major technological innovation has occurred in Western countries and the 
vast majority of white nationalists also hail from these regions.  It also 
enables the movement to put forward technology as a prize for non-white 
persons in Third World countries to covet, and for white persons in First 
World countries to necessarily protect.  It is an argument that also runs 
lean, however, when talk inevitably turns to revered past white nations 
such as ancient Ireland and Scotland, neither of which were noted for 
being technologically prolific.  It could also be said that the technology 
card runs the risk of alienating white nationalists from outside the 
computer affluent North American and Western European regions.  This is 
especially true of those residing in Britain, where the impetus for 
technological growth appears to be aimed at positioning England within 
(what some British subjects see as being) the restrictive boundaries of the 
burgeoning European Union.  The angst is no less noticeable among 
some German white nationalists who, despite their pride of place within 
the movement, are threatened by American endeavours to seize the moral 
and symbolic high ground.  For the Germans, American pride in 
 (Bushart et 
al., 1998:56; Legions, n.d.).   
                                            
 
114 ‘Creativity’ is an unusual faith that exists almost as a secular form of religion.  
Creativity devotees despise conventional Christianity because of its preference for 
exhorting people to “love their enemies”.  Followers of Creativity put enormous faith in 
science and the cause of technological innovation, which they see as being crucial to 
future human progress and well-being.  Unlike conventional Christians, they preach a 
mantra of hating and destroying their enemies and those who would stand between them 
and their goal of an all-white, technologically advanced world. 
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technological innovation is always expressed as entailing a natural 
extension of the nation’s pioneering origins; with the patriot heroes of this 
pioneering era (Washington, Jackson and the like) coming to replace Adolf 
Hitler as the symbolic figureheads for the broader white pride 
movement.115
 It is clear that the Internet has much to offer the white pride 
movement, permitting its members extensive fora for interaction and event 
planning that they could scarcely have even dreamed of in the pre-
cyberspace era.  The WWW affords white nationalists access to a 
relatively cheap and readily available technology that is not only efficient 
and easy to use but, as an added bonus, also carries the considerable 
weight of being a flagship for their ideological dogma pertaining to the 
white race’s alleged mastery of technological means.  At the top end of the 
movement the message is made patently clear for all, as shown by the 
following statement from prominent political activist, David Duke: 
 
 
If you are not on the Internet, get on board.  If you are 
somewhat unfamiliar with computers, most computer 
shops will set up your new computer and Internet 
connection at your home or office for a nominal fee.  
Using your eyes, your brain, and your fingers — you can 
participate in the Internet revolution that will awaken our 
people and pave the way for the survival of our heritage 
and way of life (1998:4). 
 
And yet, for all this bravado and confidence, the white-pride movement is 
still struggling to maintain organisational unity and depth of presence in 
the virtual realm.  In the first instance, the countless years of physical 
isolation from one another have led to deep ideological divides among the 
movement’s many political splinter groups, with online interaction serving 
to highlight these disparities rather than diminish them.  In the second 
instance, the ability to organise online in greater numbers also has a 
downside for the movement in that it also leaves it open to unprecedented 
exposure, scrutiny and abuse (Chaudhry, 2000:1).  Following on from this, 
                                            
115 The North American people have long lionised the ‘masters of technology’ standpoint, 
believing firmly that to master technology (on such a grand scale) is to master the world 
— Broughton (1996:149). 
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many devout white-priders would prefer to recruit and interact in person, 
as they feel that the anonymity of the Internet attracts 'armchair' activists 
and reduces the prospect of real action taking place (Whine, 1999:10).  
This view found a mirror among many of the respondents to my online 
interviews and questionnaires, with most believing that a mere 5% of 
Stormfront.org participants could be classified as genuine white pride 
activists. 
 There is considerable irony in the inability of the white nationalist 
movement to maximise the potential available to them online, when the  
Zapatistas of Mexico have gathered extensive Internet support for their 
operations largely by accident. The Zapatistas are spoken of as the 
world’s first informational guerilla movement on account of their 
astonishing success at internationalising a local struggle, whilst at the 
same time utilising information communications media to focus global 
attention on the misdemeanors of their enemies in the Mexican 
government (Castells, 1997:72-83).   What makes this scenario all the 
more remarkable is that the Central American region in which the 
Zapatistas choose to hide is essentially devoid of telephone and Internet 
connections, meaning that few (if any) Zapatista guerillas themselves 
would be aware of the Internet’s existence, much less have surfed its 
boundless spaces (Burbach, 2001:141; Castells, 1997:80; Elison, 2000:2-
3; Froehling, 1997:8; Walch, 1999:136-138).   
 The Zapatistas use of the Internet differs markedly from that of white 
nationalists in very discernible ways.  The white-pride movement, whether 
it be in its online or fleshspace guise, adheres unswervingly to the notion 
of ‘leaderless resistance’ wherein no set chain of command exists, nobody 
openly fills the role of organisational figurehead and, in instances when 
movement members are accused or convicted of a hate crime, it becomes 
a practical impossibility to trace back to those responsible for organising 
and ordering the crime (Bushart et al. 1998:243-257).  By way of contrast, 
the Zapatistas have employed the Internet as a form of political theatre 
with their charismatic leader, Subcomandante Marcos, playing out the 
starring title role (Rich & De Los Reyes, 1997; Ross, 2000:18). 
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 The Zapatista approach is more in keeping with conventional forms 
of leadership, although it is easier for them to correspond to this model. 
This is due to the simplified, grassroots nature of their ideological struggle, 
which is built around practical concerns, such as “housing, land, health 
care, work, bread, education, information, culture, independence, 
democracy, justice, liberty and peace” (Burbach, 2001:124-125; Froehling, 
1997:4; Ross, 2000:38).  These were social areas around which other 
groups, governments, and organisations were fundamentally prone to 
support, prompting a large groundswell of foreign assistance for the 
Zapatistas’ plight, and the placement of significant pressure on the 
Mexican government to take a softer line on the rebels and their demands 
(Esteva, 1999).  Conversely, the white nationalist movement has been 
less lucid in outlining the central planks in its overall ideological platform 
and finds most of its attempts to broach political initiatives in mainstream 
society disregarded primarily as a response to the organisation’s violent 
history.  This is why the Zapatistas proved successful in mobilising 
widespread unaffiliated online support for their cause whilst white 
nationalists have only been able to muster considerable online opposition 
against their cause.  
 As such, we can see from this example that a political movement’s 
potential success online can not be guaranteed by its privileged access to 
communications media, nor by its capacity to flood the global media with 
dogma and propaganda explicit to its particular form of ideology.  
Moreover, the startling cyberspace prominence achieved by the Mexican 
Zapatistas is enough to suggest that online patriots will thrive or perish in 
accordance with their ability to strike a chord with unaffiliated, yet 
decidedly sympathetic, political groups in the seemingly limitless 
cyberspatial arena.  As is the case with all political initiatives, the ability to 
spread the message is only half of the battle, whereas winning the war lies 
implicitly in the message finding broad acceptance on the multiple 
battlefronts on which it is received. 
  
Closing thoughts 
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  This chapter addressed a number of key points that can be 
summarised here as follows.  Firstly, the concept of nationalism cannot be 
seen to be either extinct, nor in dramatic decline, for so long as the 
economic implications of cyberspace propel nations to outbid one another 
for the bulk of its market rewards.  In real terms, the virtual world exists as 
the latest in a long line of economic challenges for peripheral nations to 
contemplate and first world powers to conquer.  The heavy current (and 
future) emphasis on information and communication technology 
development in Western countries reinforces nationalist sentiment by 
holding up successful IT corporations and innovations as loci for immense 
public pride in national achievement.  For as long as capitalism remains 
the driving global focus it is practically impossible for nationalism to fade 
into premature extinction.  There will always be countries who have ample 
access to finances and technology and countries that do not; with the 
former constantly striving to increase their surplus, while the latter strive 
relentlessly to bridge the disparate divide.   
 Secondly, it is important that future researchers do not fall into the 
trap of conflating nationalism with capitalism, given that national sentiment 
operates on several different levels, not all of which relate back to fiscal 
concerns.  This point was perfectly exemplified by the various online 
diaspora discussed in the middle-section of this chapter.  The idea of 
declining nationalism is one that is easily refuted by ongoing historical 
developments, which these multifarious diasporic communities have long 
played a key role in.  Australian history alone is enough to illustrate the 
unyielding potency of nationalist sentiment, with many decades of ‘white 
Australia’ and ‘assimilation’ policies clearly failing to deter immigrant ethnic 
groups from preserving and celebrating central aspects of their “home” 
cultures.  The Internet has thus become a boon for nationalist pursuits that 
run along these distinct meso-level lines.  Assimilation tendencies would 
still appear to be surreptitiously driving the political machinations of many 
ethnically diverse nations and popular public sentiment will always 
privilege the cultural preferences of the host country above all else.  In 
spite of this, it is nonetheless difficult to suppress elements of ethnic 
culture when you can not see them transpiring before your very eyes.   
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 Finally, the notions of inclusivity and exclusivity that have long 
characterised nationalist thought and practice in Western states are no 
less pronounced in displays of stateless nationalism online.  This 
contention would be strongly debated by computopians such as Barlow, 
given his almost evangelical assertion that: 
 
We [netizens] are creating a world that all may enter 
without privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic 
power, military force, or station of birth.  We are creating a 
world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her 
beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being 
coerced into silence or conformity (1996). 
 
Barlow's declaration preaches inclusiveness but, as was the case with the 
'American Declaration of Independence', on which this later document was 
unmistakably based, elides the reality that many citizens will be excluded 
purely by virtue of not having the necessary equipment to enter the virtual 
realm (Lockard, 2000:181).  Nationalism must therefore necessarily be 
exclusive in tone, as the driving purpose behind its very existence is to 
protect the viewpoints and interests of specific groups of people from the 
potentially disruptive and destructive agendas of others.  Cyberspace, far 
from reducing the cause of nationalism, effectively increases the 
crucialness of the nation-state as more and more individuals find 
themselves happening across more and more unlike others whilst online. 
 Cyberspace is not play space, it is real world space.  The inordinate 
number of politically orientated chat and discussion sites on the WWW are 
testimony to the seriousness with which many netizens choose to conduct 
their interactions online.  There may be a freshness to this activism in 
terms of the relative freedom with which ideas are being forwarded and 
exchanged, but the content of these interactions itself is not essentially 
new and original.  Hill and Hughes (1998:179) brought this point to the fore 
in arguing that "political groups are not suddenly transformed in their 
thinking and practices" when they gather online.  Indeed, their findings 
from broad spectrum investigations into citizen activism on the Internet 
revealed that much political activity online mirrored the conservative 
approach to political issues that was prominent in bricks and mortar 
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environs.  The concept of stateless nationalism also reflects the tendency 
of CMC vehicles to recreate fleshspace initiatives and debates, rather than 
invent original ones.  On the surface, the efforts of netizens to propagate 
forms of ideology that run contrary to established state standpoints gives 
the impression of a fresh development.  In reality, however, the only thing 
new here is that individuals finally have the chance to broadly express and 
exchange nationalist views with others, having been denied open 
participation in state-development by state governing bodies for centuries.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
Recapping the line of argumentation 
  For some years now it has been common for cyberspace scholars to 
write of the realm in a manner that, deliberately or otherwise, isolates it 
from the everyday spaces that social actors generally interpret as being 
representative of real world place.  This approach has also been readily 
disseminated outside of academia, with governments and large 
corporations trumpeting CMC technology as both a panacea for current 
global woes and the primary vehicle for intensive future social and 
economic development.  As a consequence, cyberspace exists in the 
minds of many as a bold new frontier of humanity; a mythical, arcane 
place that is viewed with equal parts fervor and disdain depending on the 
level of technological knowledge endowed in the viewer.  This thesis 
argues heavily against the notion of cyberspace as ‘unreal’ space, calling 
upon the social concepts of self-identity, community, and nationalism in 
order to highlight the ways in which virtual space has assumed a 
legitimate place within everyday Western society. 
 In argumentation terms, this central theme of the thesis is supported 
throughout the body of work by three secondary contentions that link 
explicitly to the key concept spheres outlined above.  The first such 
contention disputes the alleged prominence of multiple identity expression 
in virtual environments, claiming instead that netizens are more openly 
predisposed toward adopting singular expressions of identity whilst 
interacting online. In Chapter Two I provided an outline for self-identity 
construction that neatly fused the key strands of thought from three 
theorists — Erik Erikson, Erving Goffman and Anthony Giddens.  Erikson 
saw identity formation as a process that began in childhood, with early 
socialisation and bonding experiences (with parents and close 
acquaintances) aiding the individual in obtaining ego synthesis and a 
comforting sense of inner solidarity.  Goffman, continuing along these 
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lines, also thought that it was important for an individual to have inner 
solidarity, as having a firm understanding of one's self and the 
expectations that others placed on you was crucial to the successful 
realisation of ontological awareness.  Ontological awareness, the 
individual's inherent comprehension of the world they inhabit and their 
unique place in it, is also a key plank in the overall platform of Giddens' 
structuration theory.  Giddens builds upon the human agency ideas of 
Goffman, emphasising the symbiotic relationships that tie human actors to 
institutional structures, with the latter serving to both simultaneously 
constrain human actor egos (for the good of society) and enable individual 
opportunity and growth. 
 These three theorists can be read together and the sum of their key 
ideas provide a sound working model for explorations into self-identity 
development in both fleshspace and online terms.  The common 
denominator that runs through each theorist's writings is the notion that 
strong expressions of the self are implicitly reliant on elements of 
sameness and continuity that underscore an individual's stable 
comprehension of their particular life circumstances.  In order to 
confidently transact with those around them, it is essential for an individual 
to draw on their ontological awareness to ensure that their actions attune 
to the expectations of them that are held by others, and vice-versa.  To act 
outside of set interaction conventions would be to run the risk of censure, 
rejection and/or alienation from acquaintances and could, in extreme 
cases, result in the individual concerned falling foul of the constraining 
measures that moderate individual participation in the greater society. 
 The conventional nature of the theoretical discussion presented in 
this thesis may have been somewhat disappointing to some, but it was 
nevertheless in keeping with the central hypothesis that I chose to pursue 
throughout the study.  I have made much of the fact that cyberspace is not 
sufficiently removed from the everyday machinations of contemporary 
Western culture to be seen as encompassing a distinct world unto itself.  
With this in mind, it should be unsurprising that cyberspace similarly lacks 
the structural distinctiveness required to provide the necessary material for 
the developing of social theories that go beyond the familiar scope of 
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contemporary (and, in some cases, classical) social commentary.  It is 
possible that fresh theories will evolve with time, but this will be largely 
dependent on the diligence of social science researchers in mining the 
cyber terrain to the point where sufficient ethnographic studies exist to 
make deeper theoretical incursions viable.     
 Contrary to popular perception, cyberspace is in most instances not a 
lawless, anarchic environment, with webmasters and netizens alike 
placing significant stock in steady and conformist modes of behaviour.  
Consistency is thus a prized quality for participants to have on sites such 
as Stormfront.org, with displays of respect, warmth and support most 
commonly reserved for the familiar and long serving members of the group 
dynamic.  This reality is further evidenced by the nickname typologies 
[refer Table 7] apparent on the Stormfront.org site, with 70% of all handles 
on the fora relating implicitly to ‘real life’ names.  Extending out from this, 
research subjects from the questionnaire/interview stage of the 
methodology overwhelmingly stated their tendency for reserving a 
particular nickname for regular use on the Stormfront.org site.   
 It is true that these same subjects also indicated that they used more 
than one nickname for their overall participation in the virtual realm.  In 
most cases, however, this is less a sign of identity multiplicity and play as 
it is a reflection of the restrictive elements at work in moderated and 
regulated web environments.  In conventional ‘real life’ settings it is 
perfectly possible for several ‘Kevins’ to interact within the same social 
space at the same time, but in carefully regulated web environments it is 
often only possible for one participant to interact under the handle ‘Kevin’.  
Consequently, any newcomers to these sites wanting to use the handle 
‘Kevin’ would have to modify the name or find a new one in order to 
participate on them. 
 This is not to suggest that nicknames are entirely representative of 
an online user’s self-identity, but they are nevertheless a good pointer as 
to an individual’s self-image and defining characteristics.  To this end they 
are not to be surrendered or altered readily and, as evidenced by the 
research subjects of this thesis, are customarily infused with considerable 
emotional and personal meaning and attachment on the part of the user.  
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It need also be said that MUVES are only representative of a small section 
of the contemporary cyberspatial landscape, and yet much of the impetus 
for the ‘multiple identity’ approach to online interactions has stemmed 
directly from early research into these phenomena.  MUVES are markedly 
different CMC vehicles to newsgroups and discussion boards, and 
subsequently engender different behavioural needs and objectives in 
participants.  Rampant identity play is clearly a counter productive pursuit 
in these latter environments and more research into identity development 
in newsgroups and discussion boards is needed in order to restore 
balance and credibility to the broader online identity debate. 
 In Chapter Five I devoted significant energy to contesting the 
computropian assertion that virtual communities are essentially inferior to 
bricks and mortar communities.  Cyberspace is all too readily dismissed by 
some social commentators purely on account of their perception of the 
realm as being unsubstantial ‘non-space’.  This ideological standpoint is 
seldom more acutely intimated as it is when discussion turns to the notion 
of virtual community.  The long engrained links that bind perceptions of 
community to physically-bound and reified geographical locations are not 
helpful here, nor are the misguided assumptions that carelessly disregard 
the WWW as a sphere in which the individual is allowed complete 
autonomy over matters of personal behaviour and expression. 
 Established norms for conduct and behaviour are essential for the 
efficient and effective running of any given community.  In line with this, 
the existence of such guidelines in most online chatrooms and discussion 
fora offer firm support to the much debated contention that virtual 
communities are real communities.  This line of thought presents as the 
second subsidiary theme of the thesis and helps to counter the view that 
cyberspace lacks the legitimacy and viability that is automatically accorded 
to 'real world' spaces.  
  In past times, notions of community were almost obligatorily 
expressed in terms of the geographical place inhabited by the community 
members.  The reasoning behind this was sound enough, community 
(prior to sophisticated developments in travel and communications) was 
almost necessarily dependent on the bonds formed and experiences 
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shared between group members physically proximate to one another on a 
regular basis.  In spite of this, it was these shared bonds and experiences 
and not the physical boundedness that principally defined the community 
in question; yet perspectives on the concept have continued to privilege 
geographical notions of community.  There are obvious political reasons 
for this, as outlined in Chapters Four and Five, but it is encouraging to see 
that association models of community are becoming increasingly 
prominent in contemporary social science studies. 
 The association model of community, as outlined in this study, is not 
only more in keeping with discussions pertaining to cyberspace, but also it 
stands as a strand of the community concept that has been revitalised by 
cyberspatial exploration.  To a large degree, the concept of community 
had been academically dormant for the best part of two decades until 
burgeoning interest in virtual groupings led to a recent upsurge in scholarly 
interest relating to community studies.116
 This thesis has argued the case for virtual communities being 
accepted as real communities.  There are several elements at play in 
online interaction that support this contention and they can be summarised 
here as follows.  Firstly, cyberspace can transcend the long restrictive 
tyrannies of time and space even at a time when established spatial and 
physical borders are breaking down.  This is significant to the formation of 
community ties in that individuals are able to maintain relationships and 
interactions with others from (practically) anywhere and at anytime.  In 
previous times, community ties would invariably have been strained by the 
act of moving away from the physical site at which other group members 
resided.  Nowadays people can freely move from place to place without 
losing access to the regular and affordable contact on which community 
ties are implicitly dependent. 
  In essence, the Internet 
encapsulated a back to the future emphasis on community, returning the 
concept to its bygone communication origins and away from the locale-
centred aspects of the term that are largely redundant in the present day.   
                                            
116 Obviously other social and political aspects (notably the onset of communitarian ideas 
and new right policies) also played a part in the 'renaissance' of community, but there is 
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 Secondly, not everybody can be a part of an Internet community, just 
as not everyone can be part of certain real life communities.   There is a 
feeling among some social commentators that virtual communities are 
impoverished forms of community primarily because they are too easy to 
join and too easy to discard.  It is true that most online groups will allow 
entry to practically anyone, but gaining entry to a virtual domain and 
finding acceptance within it are two very different things.  The latter 
eventuality is generally premised on the new participant conforming to the 
norms and netiquette set down by the rest of the group members. It is 
understood that it is commonly left to webmasters and/or moderators to 
oversee these rules and regulations, but they will only remain in place if 
the vast majority of group participants agree to abide by them.  
Accordingly, the fate of the community in question rides on its set 
guidelines reflecting the common values incorporated by the overall group 
dynamic.  It is also common for group newcomers to be judged over an 
unspecified time period as to the depth and sincerity of their participation 
in the group.  Acceptance is thus a two-way process here, as netizens 
keen to be part of the broader group dynamic will show particular devotion 
to the group, and the group—in turn—will want the newcomer to remain 
involved.  This is not greatly removed from fleshspace occurrences where 
an individual’s standing within the community is directly proportionate to 
their investment and participation in it.   
 To this end, communities become important to individuals because 
they fill an express need that supports and/or enriches their everyday 
lives. If, for whatever reason that need diminishes, the individual 
concerned will more than likely move on to form new community ties in an 
alternative group dynamic that better suit their circumstances.  This is not 
always a conscious process, for it is common for people to gradually drift 
apart.  As such, it is quite normal for human actors to participate in an 
inordinate number of communities throughout the course of their life cycle.  
This suggests that the tendency for netizens to move from virtual 
community to virtual community is not so much an indicator of group 
                                                                                                                       
little doubt that the colour and intrigue inherent in 'virtual communities' was also of 
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impoverishment, but rather it is evidence of cyberspace offering up a 
greater number of alternatives and the individuals concerned having 
greater control over their choice of community participation. 
 One of the most resounding aspects of my empirical research into 
the Stormfront.org site pertained to the research subjects’ perception of 
their own place in the virtual community.  Many of those interviewed 
openly railed against the suggestion that they were “members” of the 
Stormfront.org site, which initially appeared to cast doubt over the validity 
of Stormfront.org’s claim to community status.  On reflection, however, the 
heavy and lengthy Stormfront.org participation rates attributable to these 
netizens are clearly indicative of community-type spirit.  It is also worth 
noting here that participation in fleshspace communities has never really 
been predicated on formally outlined terms and offers of membership.  In 
fact, it is quite possible that some social commentators have trouble 
accepting the legitimacy of the community concept (in general) on account 
of the limited instances in which individuals seem willing to openly 
articulate their ‘membership’ of a particular community(s).  This hesitancy 
to commit to group membership is less damning than it appears on the 
surface though, given that association models of community are, by their 
very nature, loosely defined and highly personal in scope.  To express this 
another way, individuals will generally participate in the community 
environment because they find comfort, appreciation and acceptance in it, 
and not due to having their presence in the community openly requested.  
The idea of ‘membership’ is thus anathema to association models of 
community, wherein the largely subconscious act of belonging is an 
unspoken, inalienable and unproblematic issue for the individual 
concerned.
 Cyberspace is also very much in keeping with Benedict Anderson's 
seminal idea of imagined community.  The lack of face-to-face contact 
inherent in online interaction ensures that virtual communities are 
necessarily imagined in that netizens can mostly only imagine the faceless 
others with whom they are interacting.  In another way, however, 
                                                                                                                       
importance in this regard. 
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cyberspace also serves to decrease the imagined nature of community in 
that it confirms (for uncertain individuals) the existence of other persons 
who share their particular values and/or worldview.  Prior to the Internet, 
these uncertain individuals could only presume that other individuals 
existed in this fashion, hence Anderson's employment of the term 
'imagined' community. 
 The imagined community thesis has resonance in debates relating to 
nationalism and national identity.  Micro-level perceptions on what it has 
meant to be American, Australian, British and so on have by necessity 
been formulated upon idealised notions of nationhood.  Ostensibly, this 
entailed common experiences of images of what other Americans, 
Australians and Britons were like, accompanied by shared impressions of 
foreigners.  The growing proliferation of information and communication 
media has helped to remove some of the uncertainty and misconception 
from this imagining process. 
 This is not to suggest that conventional modes of nationalism are 
disappearing, as contemporary nations still strive to maintain levels of 
power and prosperity that are expressly derived from outperforming rival 
nations in the global marketplace.  The big difference is that such nations 
are finding it ever more difficult to keep their operations secret from their 
citizenry, as cyberspatial technologies continue to bring transparency to 
government actions via ever increasing information and communication 
exchanges.  It is now an onerous task for some governmental bodies to 
quietly extinguish domestic political movements that run contrary to the 
status quo.  Consequently, government agencies that once watched over 
human actors in a 'big brother' fashion now find themselves open to 
considered scrutiny from wide sections of the general public. 
 Such scrutiny has simultaneously been influenced by and resulted in 
the rise of new expressions of 'stateless' nationalism.  Stateless 
nationalism is the last of the major subsidiary themes to be addressed in 
this body of work.  In basic terms, stateless nationalism is a form of 
patriotism that enables individuals to contribute to nationalist debates and 
developments, despite being ignored by conventional economy-centred 
state nationalist typologies.  Matters of economy aside, stateless forms of 
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nationalism also facilitate new perceptions of, approaches to, and 
reactions against, multicultural policies and expressions of race and 
ethnicity more generally.   
 Stateless nationalism is thus a prominent ideological leaning among 
white pride devotees, as exemplified by the Stormfront.org adherents 
focused upon in this thesis.  The Stormfront.org users are predisposed 
toward stateless nationalism for the following three reasons.  Firstly, the 
predilection for multicultural policy that is common to contemporary 
Western societies and the state-driven initiatives that facilitate multicultural 
practice run directly contrary to the unashamedly WASP-orientated tenets 
of traditional white nationalist dogma.  Nationalism, by its very nature, 
relies on the existence of external others against whom a nation can 
construct and regularly reassess its own privileged form of cultural 
uniqueness and difference.  As a consequence, state nationalism 
becomes untenable for white pride devotees on account of its inclusive 
approach to cultural groupings that the white pride movement has dimly 
viewed as hostile others.  Ethnic perceptions of otherness no longer have 
a sanctioned place within macro-level expressions of Western state 
nationalism, making it necessary for disillusioned individuals to reinstitute 
race-based strands of otherness via alternative means. 
 Secondly, the white pride movement imbues a deep across-the-
board mistrust of economically driven state initiatives, desiring instead to 
return to localised and theocratic expressions of government.  This is a 
scenario that can only be realised through the erosion of centralised 
government; a protracted exercise that necessarily requires the 
implementation of decentralised systems of political opposition.  It is highly 
probable that this line of thinking was foremost in the minds of Internet 
patriots like Don Black when they sought to move the white pride 
movement into the virtual realm the best part of a decade ago.  The 
movement has built a solid online presence for itself since then, although 
the intensity with which Western governments (the United States, in 
particular) have sought to diminish this presence in recent years has come 
as a surprise to some.  White pride organisations may appear mere 
minnows when assessed against opponents such as the United States 
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government, but it is nevertheless clear that Western state bodies concur 
with the McLuhanesque notion of the media as internal enemy number 
one.117
 Finally, consistent findings across the contemporary terrain of 
globalisation research maintain that expressions of nationality are 
retaining their significance in the face of allegedly eroding state borders.  
This view is reinforced by the comments of white priders themselves, with 
most respondents to my questionnaires and interviews strongly asserting 
their love of country, in spite of their contrary loathing for what (they 
believe) their country has become.  For netizens such as these, love of 
nation is very much a romanticised and idealised notion, and it is usually 
expressed by invoking the words and ideas of long dead national patriots.  
In this way, the pursuit of ‘White Israel’ becomes the ultimate expression of 
imagined community and the Internet the most obvious (temporary) site for 
an imagined state.  Future cyberspatial researchers would be well advised 
to take note of this point; for what stateless nationalism (in its Internet 
guise) lacks in official political sanction, it more than compensates for in 
depth, diversity and discussion.  
 
 It would be remiss of me to close out discussion on the key lines of 
inquiry and major findings to stem from this study without mentioning the 
main limitations apparent in the empirical research framework.  The 
implicit qualitative nature of the study has proven successful insomuch as 
it has generated data that is conducive to the pursuit of broader 
discussions pertaining to cyberspatial interactions (in general) and the 
white pride movement (in particular).  In spite of this, the minimal number 
of research subjects involved has made it impossible to express many of 
the study’s findings in concrete terms.  This being said, it need be noted 
by the reader that the aim of this thesis was always more intimately 
predisposed toward the exploration and explication of obfuscated themes, 
given that concrete assertions—assuming that they are at all achievable in 
the field of social sciences— cannot be made on the strength of a single 
                                            
117 Marshal McLuhan once wrote that media forms were inherently more dangerous than 
tyrants of the ilk of Stalin and Hitler, principally because they were capable of damaging 
and diminishing societies gradually, silently and without express warning (1994:26). 
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study such as this.  This is another reason why social scientists need to 
journey into cyberspace in greater numbers, as sound quantitative 
assessments of the realm will only become plausible when a suitably 
broad foundation of qualitative ethnographies of the realm are in place to 
guide them. 
 I have already made mention of the difficulties associated with 
obtaining access to white pride devotees for questionnaire/interview 
purposes and this is by no means a problem that is applicable only to the 
online realm.  Ezekiel (1995) was the first academic to make serious 
inroads into the white pride movement when he bravely attended white 
pride rallies and sought out members of the organisation for face-to-face 
interviews and informal question and answer sessions.  Ezekiel’s work is 
commendable for the depth in which he probed key figures for information, 
but it is true that much of the study revolves heavily around the thoughts 
and actions of the same dozen or so activists.  The same can be said of 
Bushart et al. (1998) who conducted a similar study and even Blee’s 
(2002) seminal investigation of women within the hate movement was 
‘limited’ to the views of thirty-four respondents.118
 At the time of writing, the most large scale fleshspace investigation of 
the white pride movement was conducted by Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 
(2000).  This award winning study
  This stanza is not 
intended to disparage any of these studies in anyway, but rather it is 
included here as a means of highlighting the reserved nature of white 
pride followers and their unwavering disdain for participating in research 
projects. 
119
                                            
 
 incorporated 125+ interviews with 
white separatists—a number well above that associated with most 
qualitative projects— and while this is indeed impressive in scale, it still 
118 I do not use the term ‘seminal’ loosely here, as negotiating access to female members 
of the white pride movement is especially problematic for two reasons.  Firstly, men within 
the movement are commonly seen as the strong action figures and are generally deemed 
the appropriate gender to act in a ‘spokesperson’ capacity for the organisation.  
Secondly, women within the movement almost invariably perceive of themselves as 
subservient to the males and would be loathe to comment on matters when their sense of 
protocol would suggest that such comment should be preserved for the men. 
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begs the question of how many research subjects are needed before the 
study is seen as a credible one?  This is not a question that I am 
interested in ruminating upon, as it is essentially surplus to the point that I 
am trying to convey here.  This point being that white nationalism in 
cyberspace is a study field that is as equally bereft of broad spectrum 
information as its fleshspace counterpart.   
 Matters of numbers aside, any debates over qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies need also take into account the nature of the 
issue(s) that are being placed under examination.  Topic areas like 
community and nationalism are not easy to assess in pure quantitative 
terms, due to the difficulty that researchers have in getting research 
subjects to comprehend the terms in similar ways.  The different meanings 
with which individuals choose to associate with the concepts of community 
and nationalism are all too clearly exemplified in this thesis.  With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is possible that I failed to frame interview questions 
relating to these concepts in a manner that best supported my research 
subjects in reaching decisions about them.  Future researchers of the 
online white pride movement, of which there will hopefully be many, may 
be advised to pay greater care to the framing of their inquiries in light of 
this.  
     
Recommendations for future research 
 In Chapter One of this thesis I briefly touched upon the theme of 
future directions for cyberspatial research and speculated on the 
possibility of a new academic discipline arising to cater for it.  Cyberology 
may or may not eventually become a reality (there are some people who 
already refer to themselves as cyberologists), but such a creation could 
prove to be a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, the locating of 
broad spectrum cyberspace research under a single disciplinary umbrella 
would most likely lead to a rise in the number of investigators exploring the 
field, along with an increase in group projects that exploit the specialised 
                                                                                                                       
119 Winner of the Scholarly Achievement Award of the North Central Sociological 
Association and selected by Choice Magazine as an Outstanding Academic Book of the 
Year. 
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skills of scholars schooled in diversified subject spheres. On the other 
hand, any moves to position cyberspatial research under its own banner 
would only further the unwanted impression that cyberspace is at best 
removed from real world space and, at worst, somehow inferior to it. 
 With this in mind, it may be better for CMC research to continue on 
as a sub-discipline of the established academic disciplines.  In this 
capacity it still has much to offer for new researchers and established ones 
seeking a fresh angle on worn ideas.  This is especially true for scholars in 
the social sciences who, as was outlined in Chapter One, have been 
worryingly reticent to delve into explorations of a sphere to which they 
have so much to contribute.  Of the cyberspatial treatises that I have 
perused so far, the most captivating and exciting have almost invariably 
adopted anthropological stances toward the topic.   
 In past times, non-Western cultures held a seemingly other worldly 
place in the wider Western imagination even though they were as much a 
part of the real world as the Westernised cultures with which Westerners 
were deeply familiar. It was the task of the anthropologist to explain and 
demystify these cultures, and anthropologists now have a similar 
opportunity to clarify human understandings of online life.  The 
ethnographic tradition, so long ensconced in the fabric of anthropological 
study is the perfect vehicle for the in-depth analyses of online behaviours 
and interactions.  With the pressures on academic researchers 
mounting120
 There will also be many openings for sociologists looking to 
elaborate on fresh developments arising out of the online realm.  With 
, cyberspace affords considerable scope to investigators who 
would otherwise find difficulty in restricting the demands inherent in the 
fieldwork to the time frame permitted by the study.  CMC will not be 
sufficient for all modes of anthropological inquiry, but a flexible student 
stance on subject group and methodological dimension will be rewarded 
with rich, efficiently compiled data that is simple to store and convenient to 
analyse. 
                                            
120 In Australia, the time allowed for students to complete doctorates without incurring 
financially-based penalties has shrunk from 7 years during the late seventies and early 
eighties, to 4 years at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
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regard to notions of the self, a good place to start may be with Nie & 
Erbring's (2000) assertion that education and age, not race/ethnicity or 
gender, are the most significant aspects enabling or hindering online 
participation.  Education is an intriguing variable in so far as cyberspace is 
concerned.  This is primarily because it is difficult to accurately gauge 
whether people with higher education levels are more openly predisposed 
toward Internet usage, or merely register higher instances of online 
participation due to their inhabitation of technology dense workspaces.  
 Education is not, by any means, an under-researched topical area in 
the overall field of CMC inquiry.  A surfeit of studies pertaining to online 
teaching and learning have been released in recent years, almost all of 
which have arisen out of the education discipline.  This is fine, but 
limitations can be seen here, mainly because the focus for such studies 
has been centered on the costs, structures and pedagogical shortcomings 
apparent in e-learning; with minimal attention devoted to the non-curricular 
facets that underscore and accompany its implementation.  It has yet to be 
clarified if humankind is truly entering into a new knowledge age. At any 
rate, the common Western presumption (influenced in no small part by the 
exhortations of corporations such as Microsoft) that humankind is indeed 
doing so has helped ensure a renewed upsurge in demand for tertiary 
education places as the new century begins to unfold.  Perhaps then, we 
are at the point where we need to go beyond the almost routinely stated 
premise that face-to-face learning is preferable to online learning.  Rural 
living, inflexible work commitments and insufficient on-campus university 
places highlight the overwhelming social need for CMC-based tuition, and 
sociologists should embrace the chance to elucidate the qualitative human 
experiences that flow from it.  
 The age factor is also worthy of further explication, both in terms of 
its affect on identity assuredness and its impact on future instances of 
community development.  Age is a sensitive issue for Western societies to 
address, with age-based employment redundancies likely to increase, 
fueled further by the pervading perception that to be over the age of fifty is 
to be an incurable technological illiterate.  Community bodies appear to 
have identified this as a growing social dilemma, with recent telecentre 
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initiatives (in Australia, at least) targeting older persons as sought after 
participants in subsidised, beginner-level Internet and computer 
awareness courses.  At the other end of the spectrum, similarly organised 
‘Bean Bag Internet centres’ have been catering for underprivileged 
teenagers in a bid to (however small) lessen the ever widening 
cyberspace divide.  These endeavours are well meaning and full of 
promise, but providing the basis for cyberspatial learning and exploration 
does not ensure that such endeavours will be effectively implemented, 
confidently negotiated, or lead to skills and competencies that are put to 
broader use at a later stage.   
 This brings us back to matters of gender, and while it is almost 
certainly true that the online ‘gender divide’ has been all but bridged, there 
are other facets to the concept that require sociological attention.  It has 
now been eight long years since Dale Spender (1994) produced the first 
in-depth investigation into the idiosyncratic nature of male and female 
interactions and communications online.  To this point, gender remains a 
neglected and largely inconclusive research sphere in online terms, 
although Lori Kendall’s (2002) treatise on representations of masculinity 
online may bring much needed insight into what is a markedly under 
researched phenomena.  On a less general note, the paradoxical nature of 
female white pride participation online would warrant extra research in and 
of itself. 
 Gender issues, with particular regard to how they arise in online 
environments, are seldom too far removed from communication identifiers.  
In Chapter One I made mention of the heavy input that scholars from the 
communication studies discipline have had into the burgeoning field of 
cyberspace research.  With this in mind, it is perplexing that gender 
matters online have not been afforded greater prominence by these 
researchers than has been the case to date.  Social scientists would 
indeed make much of this astonishingly unturned study terrain and could 
do worse than to utilise the still extant ideas of Erving Goffman as a 
backing framework for such explorations.  Charles Lemert (1997:xv) has 
written that “one of the most remarkable events in the history of social and 
humanistic study in the last generation is its famous linguistic turn.”  
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Goffman was arguably the most seminal of all writers on the subject of the 
linguistic turn and would surely have viewed the Internet as an ideal 
sphere for the furthering of his groundbreaking treatises on the subject. 
 Conversely, further research projects could break new ground for 
discourses on nationalism by expanding out from my initial foray into the 
theme of online patriotism.  The discussion presented here was restricted 
(empirically, at least) to the white pride movement in general, and the 
Stormfront.org online discussion fora more specifically.  This was fine in so 
much as it illuminated one particular body of online patriotism, but the 
needs and objectives of white nationalists online differ from those pursued 
by the Zapatistas, who themselves differ markedly in tone and tenor to 
alternative activists like those involved with the ongoing opposition to state 
rule in China.  Accordingly, a rounded understanding of online patriotism 
will only be realised (assuming that it can be realised) by way of 
comparative studies that seek to address the issue holistically and with a 
more prominent quantitative framework from which to work from. 
 Studies of this type, as is the case with most cyberspace research, 
should require profound researcher sensitivity to ethical concerns.  Up 
until now, it has been considered acceptable for cyber researchers (myself 
included) to proceed with lurking and message post gathering methods 
purely on the basis that online communications are public domain 
property. This is indeed convenient insomuch as it absolves the 
researcher from consultation with the individual(s) responsible for creating 
the data, prior to employing it in the study.  If cyberspace is to be fully 
accepted as real world space, however, then research practices such as 
this need to be carefully reconsidered.  As a general rule, social science 
research projects employed in fleshspace settings almost invariably 
require the researcher(s) involved to make the subject(s) of their study 
aware that they are part of a study project.  At the very least, it is decorum 
to inform subjects that writings or comments attributable to them are likely 
to appear in the finished piece of work.   
 Barbara Sharf (1999:252-255) has constructed a five-step process 
aimed at bringing cyber researchers into synch with real world ethical 
practices.  Sharf’s steps are a promising starting point for concerned 
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scholars wanting to heighten the professional image of cyberspace 
investigators.  In keeping with this objective, such scholars would be well 
advised to ignore Sharf’s afterthought suggestion, which infers that some 
online subject groups (child pornographers and racists, by way of 
example) should be automatically exempted from ethical conventions.  I 
can understand the sentiment behind this view, but without wishing to 
defend either of the aforementioned groups, I would nonetheless express 
concern at any ad hoc approaches to deciding who is worthy of ethical 
consideration and who is not.  
  It is expected that, wherever possible, a conscientious researcher 
will adopt a pragmatic and objective approach to his/her study.  Such an 
approach should also carry over to the research subjects focused upon for 
the study.  If you are willing to ask an individual to take part in your study 
then that person must be accorded the same respect and rights that other 
participants receive.  Research subjects can be difficult to recruit at the 
best of times and good researchers, aside from constructing quality 
research projects, are duty bound to ensure that the available subject pool 
is not further depleted by inconsistent and overtly subjective research 
practices. 
 As a final point, it would be refreshing to see a gradual uplift in the 
number of cyberspace related texts that deal with singular research 
projects and interest topics.  An inordinate number of cyberspatial texts 
are edited works containing dispersed chapters written by multiple 
authors.  This assertion is not intended to disparage these works, nor to 
suggest that such works should not be attempted in future.  It is probable, 
however, that a closer ratio between single author books and works that 
exist in compendium essay form would be of considerable benefit to cyber 
research, enabling an amplification of large, comparative and/or 
comprehensive research projects within the sphere.  It would be all the 
better still were a considerable portion of these extensive studies to be 
written from scholars in the social sciences, but time alone will be the 
judge of sociology’s capacity to meet this worthwhile challenge. 
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Closing thoughts 
 The tendency for social commentators to refer to cyberspace as a 
metaphorical 'frontier' may have been perfectly appropriate in the 1990s, 
but such an allusion is no longer applicable.  With each passing year the 
number of Westerners utilising cyberspatial technology dramatically 
increases and the instances of non-Western nations embracing CMC 
vehicles rises accordingly.  The computropians would contend that the 
global proliferation of cyberspace is merely an obvious by-product of 
intensified efforts (on the part of states and corporations) to privilege 
information and communication technology development throughout 
Westernised nations.  There is some truth in this, but technological and 
economic determinist accounts of CMC growth show a notable disregard 
for the capacity of human actors to adapt new technologies so as to meet 
the specified demands and requirements of their everyday life.   
 Cyberspace is therefore not an entity that should be condescendingly 
dismissed as unreal or 'play' space.  Online participation is clearly altering 
the scope available for micro-level human actors to broaden and modify 
the control they have over the direction of their everyday lives.  Netizens 
are no less likely to convey stable expressions of self (rather than multiple 
identity signifiers) while online because they desire understanding and 
acceptance from others, just as they do in fleshspace.  Nor are netizens 
likely to find greater value in bricks and mortar communities as distinct 
from virtual alternatives (or vice-versa), as community at the micro-level is 
prefaced only on the level of commitment and depth of feeling that an 
individual sees fit to attribute to it.  With regard to nationalism, it is possible 
to envisage future scholars looking back to the early years of the Internet 
and lionising it for breaking down the hierarchical barriers that had for so 
long denied micro-level individuals a fair say in the way that their state(s) 
was governed.  It is still too early to talk of nation-states as being 
egalitarian entities, but—at the very least—it would seem that the 
processes are in place for an unprecedented upsurge in people power 
from the lower levels of society upwards.   
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Ethics clearance  
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Appendix B: 
Interview/questionnaire running list 
 
 
• IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT 
STORMFRONT.ORG IS FACILITATING AND ENCOURAGING 
COMMUNITY TIES VIA THE VIRTUAL REALM?    
 
1. How much time do you spend online each week? 
 
2. Do you maintain online interests that are removed from white 
nationalism? 
 
3. How long have you been a member of Stormfront.org? 
 
4. How often do you access the Stormfront.org site? 
 
5. Are you a regular poster on the site? 
 
6. Do you keep in contact with other Stormfront.org members on a regular 
basis? 
 
7. Have you mixed socially with other Stormfront.org members in a RL 
setting? 
 
8. Do you regularly access alternative White Pride sites to 
Stormfront.org? 
 
9. How did you come to be a member of Stormfront.org? 
 
10.  Is it too easy for people to participate on the Stormfront.org site? 
 
11.  If you were in charge of the Stormfront.org site, would you change  
       anything about it? 
 
12.  Do you have a problem with differing viewpoints (among white  
      nationalists) on the site? 
 
13.  When you're participating on Stormfront.org do you feel as if you are    
       part of a community? 
 
14.  Give the Internet a rating on how well it meets your needs as a citizen. 
 
Very Poor      Poor       Okay       Good      Very Good 
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• ARE ONLINE IDENTITIES CRUCIALLY SIGNIFICANT TO AN 
INDIVIDUAL'S INHERENT SENSE OF SELF, OR ARE THEY JUST A 
COLOURFUL AND ELABORATE MEANS OF PROTECTING 
PRIVACY? 
 
15.  How many different nicknames (handles) do you use online? 
 
16.  What is the reasoning behind your choice of nickname(s)? 
 
17.  How comfortable would you be with having to change your handle in  
       order to continue participation on the Stormfront.org site? 
 
18.  Do you use your Stormfront.org nickname outside of the site itself?  If  
       yes, in what context? 
 
19.  If you had to use your real name to participate on the Stormfront.org 
       forum, would you be willing to do so?  Why or why not? 
 
20.  When speaking with others online, do you generally refer to them by 
       their real names or by their nicknames? 
 
21.  Give a rating as to how important your nickname is in relation to your  
       everyday use of the Internet. 
 
    Very Unimportant      Unimportant       Indifferent     Important     
Very Important 
 
• HOW DEEP DO SITES LIKE STORMFRONT.ORG GO IN 
NURTURING AND MAINTAINING ELEMENTS OF NATIONALIST 
SENTIMENT?  ARE THEY AIDING OR IMPEDING THE WHITE 
NATIONALIST CAUSE? 
 
22.  Which came first for you, the white nationalist cause or the  
       Stormfront.org site? 
 
23.  As a white nationalist, how effective do you think Stormfront.org has  
       been in advancing the white pride cause? 
 
24.  As a white nationalist, what aspects of Stormfront.org impress you  
       most? 
 
25.  Do you think that —by and large— Stormfront.org participants are  
       serious about pushing white nationalism in RL settings? 
 
26.  The Internet -- rightly or wrongly -- is perceived as being the great new  
       frontier in social, political and economic terms.  With this in mind, how  
       well positioned is the white nationalist movement to take advantage of  
       this; in terms of political organisation, economic advantage & social  
       interaction? 
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27.  How well organised is your opposition (Hatewatch etc) in online  
       terms? 
 
28.  Give a rating on how well Stormfront.org is meeting your needs as a  
       nationalist? 
 
Very Poor      Poor       Okay       Good      Very Good 
 
 
• DOES THE STATE OF ONE'S NATION REMAIN PROMINENT IN AN 
INDIVIDUAL'S THOUGHTS AMID THE CONTESTED MILIEU OF 
THE NOUVEAU VIRTUAL WORLD AND THE IDEALISED UTOPIA 
OF 'WHITE ISRAEL'? 
 
29.  When you joined Stormfront.org, did you give details of the nation in 
       which you are living? 
 
30.  Will your current nationality retain any future significance for you if the 
       promise of a white utopia is realised? 
 
31.  How do you feel your country of residence is performing on the world 
       stage? 
 
32.  Are the forces of globalisation likely to erode established national  
       borders? 
 
33.  Are the costs associated with online participation restricting or  
       impeding your white pride pursuits online? 
 
34.  Give your country of residence a rating on how well it satisfies your  
       needs as a citizen. 
 
Very Poor      Poor      Okay      Good      Very Good 
 
• IS ONLINE INTERVIEWING VIA ICQ A VIABLE PROCESS IN 
TERMS OF HOW IT IS RECEIVED AND UTILISED BY THE 
INTERVIEWEES THEMSELVES? 
 
35.  Have you had any experience in the past of completing interviews or  
      questionnaires? 
 
36.  What were you most concerned about prior to undertaking the 
       interview? 
 
37.  Did the interview allow you to adequately get your points across? 
 
38.  Would you be willing to undergo an online interview again in the  
       future? 
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39.  Which research method would you prefer to endure: an online  
       interview, a face to face interview, or an e-mail questionnaire? 
 
40.  Give a rating as to how well you think the online interview process  
       works as a research method 
 
Very Poor      Poor      Okay      Good      Very Good 
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 Glossary 
 
 
Abbreviations: 
Also referred to by some writers as 'acronyms'.  
Abbreviated terms and/or clever 'play on words' that 
are used by some netizens as a means of hastening 
the writing of, and adding humour to, their online 
letters, discussions and postings.  For example, LOL 
equates to 'lots of laughs' or ‘laugh out loud’. 
 
AIT: 
Advanced Information Technology. 
 
ARPAnet: 
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network. 
 
Avatar: 
A symbol or icon that is used by a netizen in 
conjunction with their nickname so as to provide a 
visual sense of how the netizen sees themselves, or 
how they would like others to perceive of them. 
 
BBS: 
Bulletin Board Systems.  Operate similarly to 
newsgroups, but are generally found attached to 
websites and are accessible via the WWW. 
 
Chatservers: 
(Also known as chatrooms)  Synchronous CMC 
vehicles that allow netizens to interact with fellow 
Internet users in realtime regardless of where they 
are positioned globally. 
 
CMC: 
Computer-mediated communication. 
 
 315 
 
Community: 
The regular interacting of like-minded individuals for 
the express purpose of sharing similar interests 
and/or pursuing common objectives; and the 
structures and processes through which this 
interaction is formalised and mediated. 
 
Computopians: 
Writers, theorists and social commentators who 
adopt an ultra-positive attitude toward computer 
technology, largely on account of its perceived 
capacity for improving the quality of human life. 
 
Computropians: 
Writers, theorists and social commentators who 
adopt an overtly negative stance toward computer 
technology, primarily due to its perceived role in 
widening the societal gap that exists between the 
'haves' and the 'have nots'. 
 
CPU: 
Central processing unit. 
 
Cyberspace: 
The sphere of information and communication 
exchange that does not involve face-to-face 
interaction.  Is commonly thought of in terms of the 
Internet and WWW, but also entails telephones, fax 
machines, various radio formats, and virtual reality 
equipment. 
 
Cyberspace Divide: 
The social chasm dividing those with access to 
cyberspatial media (and possessing the necessary 
skills to use them gainfully) from those who are 
deprived of online skills and participation.  Can also 
be expressed in terms of those nations that are 
technology rich and those that are technology poor. 
 
Emoticons: 
Small signifiers that are constructed by joining 
together keyboard letters and symbols (for example, 
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:, -, ) when put together produce , which means the 
person posting or writing the material is happy).  
These signifiers are used to compensate for the lack 
of available visual cues in online interactions. 
 
Fleshspace: 
The sphere of information and communication 
exchange that does involve face-to-face modes of 
interaction.  Fleshspace is also seen as the physical 
representation of ‘real world’ space, which specifically 
includes the physical structures, institutions and 
machinations that are seen to encompass 
conventional elements of everyday life. 
 
GII: 
The 'Global Information Infrastructure'.  An American 
initiative aimed at ensuring that all global nations 
have a viable presence in cyberspace. 
 
Hacktivism: 
The term 'Hacktivism' refers to the politically 
motivated hacking and cracking of websites. It 
should not be confused with the act of 'Hacking' per 
se, as this is usually performed by individuals solely 
for their own benefit (just for the thrill of breaking into 
someone else's computer account and causing ad 
hoc mischief). Hacktivism, by way of contrast, has a 
background goal of hurting, embarrassing and/or 
inconveniencing an organisation against which the 
hacker holds some sort of enmity or disapproval.  
 
High Style: 
A writing style employed by some netizens, which 
privileges the use of good grammar, perfect 
punctuation, and solid syntax.  Users of high style 
will commonly berate other netizens for employing a 
lax approach to grammar and writing conventions.  
Conversely, users of high style can find themselves 
being criticised for adopting a supercillious and elitist 
manner in what is, for many people, an informal 
environment. 
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ICQ: 
An online chatserver used by millions of netizens 
worldwide.  Takes its name from a play on words — 
'I Seek You' for a chat. 
 
IRC: 
Internet Relay Chat. 
 
IT: 
Information Technology 
 
Kava Bowl: 
A Tonga-orientated Internet discussion forum. 
 
Listservers: 
Similar to newsgroups except that listservers bring 
the messages to the netizen, as opposed to the 
netizen going to a particular site on which all the 
messages are presented.  With listservers, a person 
will email a message to a subscribed list of users and 
these users can reply to messages that capture their 
interest. 
 
Lurking: 
Observing an online domain without expressly 
contributing to the domain, or notifying other 
participants of your presence. 
 
MOOs: 
Multi-object orientated MUDs.  Similar to MUDs [see 
below], but these environments usually contain a 
range of prescribed objects around which netizens 
negotiate their participation on the site (for example, 
the virtual pool tables and beanbags of a MOO bar).  
It is also common for netizens to adopt iconic avatars 
when participating on MOOs. 
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MUDs: 
Multi-user dimensions, domains, or dungeons.  
Operate in a similar fashion to chatservers, but 
usually incorporate architectural, structural, and/or 
fantasial elements into the interactive environment. 
 
MUVES: 
Multi-user virtual environments.  A collective term for 
MUDs and MOOs. 
 
Nationalism (conventional): 
The policy of asserting the interests of a nation, 
viewed as separate from the interests of other 
nationsor the common interests all nations. 
 
Nationalism (stateless): 
The underlying assumptions and influences that 
motivate and give meaning to an individual's 
perceptions of their place in the broader political, 
ideological, cultural and economic machinations of 
imagined communities of state. 
 
Netiquette: 
The norms, rules and operating guidelines that 
netizens are expected to adhere to when 
participating in a virtual group or community. 
 
Netizen: 
An online user, particularly one who participates in 
assorted discussion fora and/or chatrooms. 
 
Net Savvy: 
The term applied to a netizen who is experienced in 
online matters and competent at using and 
recognising forms of emoticon, abbreviation and 
netiquette when online. 
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Newbie(s): 
Participant(s) in an online environment who are new 
to the virtual realm and are unfamiliar with other 
participants and the established behavioural 
conventions that the group in question adheres to. 
 
Newsgroups: 
Asynchronous online discussion fora that are 
organised around specific topic and interest areas.  
Newsgroups are commonly linked to email servers 
and are mainly accessible via telnet and ftp moreso 
than the WWW. 
 
Real world space: 
Space(s) in which the machinations and interactions 
common to everyday human life take place.  Real 
world space is comprised of elements of fleshspace 
and aspects of cyberspace. 
Register: 
The different types of language that are used for the 
purpose of writing and speaking. 
 
Self-identity: 
The continual process of internally comprehending 
and externally expressing culturally mediated forms 
of belief, emotion, desire and knowledge that are 
ontologically fundamental to an individual's everyday 
state of being. 
 
Spamming: 
The posting of email messages to an online 
newsgroup or discussion forum that are irrelevant to 
the interest areas being pursued by the group or 
forum. 
 
Topophilia: 
Love of, or a fond attachment to, a particular region 
or place. 
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Topophobia: 
Loathing of, or a particular disdain toward, a 
particular region or place. 
 
Trolling: 
The posting of sarcastic and/or provocative 
messages to newsgroups, chatrooms or online 
discussion fora. This can be done in order to agitate 
or besmirch the reputation of an online user(s), but is 
commonly performed purely as a means of bringing 
humour to an online environment.   
 
Virtual Cities: 
Online sites that represent and/or are influenced by 
bricks and mortar cities.  
 
WWW: 
World Wide Web. 
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